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**WORLD POPULATION YEAR**

**COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF NATIONAL RESEARCH IN DEMOGRAPHY**

# **INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION**

**PROCEEDINGS OF A SEMINAR ON**

**DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH IN RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION**

**HELD IN BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA (5 - 11 MARCH 1974)**

**CICRED 1974**

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**Edited by Georges TAPINOS**

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- \* Original text in French, Cicred translation.
- \*\* Original text in French, OECD translation.
- \*\*\* Original text in Spanish, Cicred translation.

## FOREWORD

Jean BOURGEOIS-PICHAT,  
Chairman of Cicred

1. *The Second Seminar of Cicred took place in Buenos Aires (Argentina) from March 5th to 11th, 1974. The theme to be discussed was "Demographic Research in relation to International Migration". This choice was made to comply with a wish of the Population Commission of ECOSOC. The Commission had many times in the past expressed its concern about how the study of international migration was rather neglected. When it was decided to hold a Third World Population Conference, the Commission, acting as preparatory committee for that Conference, made it clear that the problems raised by international migration had to be discussed at the Conference. Consequently, the United Nations Population Division prepared an important study on the subject as a background document for the Conference. But it was difficult for the Division to go beyond that without risking jeopardising a work program already heavily loaded. Hence the idea of asking Cicred to organize a Seminar on the matter and to submit to the participants in the Third World Population Conference the report which would be adopted by this Seminar. This report has therefore been issued as a document of the Conference.*

*But it also seemed worthwhile to publish the complete proceedings of the Seminar, if possible before the Conference, and that is the aim of this book. The reader will find in it the program of the Seminar, the background documents prepared for the discussion of the various items of the program and the final report already submitted as a separate document to the governments.*

2. *The Argentinian Government, which has always taken an interest in International Migrations, offered to host the Seminar. It has to be thanked for such a decision and these thanks go more precisely to Mr. L.A. Marmora, Director of Migrations at the Ministry of the Interior.*

*The City of Buenos Aires put at the disposal of the Seminar, free of charge, a meeting room and several offices in the building of the "Centro Cultural General San Martin". Thanks to this generous offer, the Seminar was able to work in excellent conditions. Mr. Alfredo A. Barcalde, Director General of this Center, has to be congratulated for the physical facilities he provided for the Seminar.*

3. *Mrs. Zulma Recchini de Lattes from the Demographic Research Center at the "Centro de Investigaciones Sociales del Instituto Torcuato di Tella" (\*) had accepted the task, quite difficult indeed, of acting as Director of the Seminar. She was helped in this task by Mrs. Edith Alejandra Pantelides. Cicred and all participants in the Seminar have to express to both of them their gratitude for the way in which they succeeded in organizing the holding of the Seminar.*

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\* Since then, "Instituto Torcuato di Tella" has given up demographic research. The team of demographers who were working in this Institute is presently attached to the Bariloche Foundation.

4. Mr. Georges P. Tapinos, from the *Fondation nationale des sciences politiques* (France) accepted to be Co-Director of the Seminar. In this capacity, he had, in particular, the task of drawing up a program, choosing the subjects of the background papers and their authors. He was helped by a group of four advisers: Mr. R. Appleyard (Australia), Mr. A. Lattes (Argentina), Mr. M. Livi Bacci (Italy) and Miss H. Wander (Federal Republic of Germany). During the Seminar, Mr. Tapinos introduced the matter to be discussed, monitored the discussion and tried, during the last meeting, to draw the conclusion of the debates.

5. Most of the expenses were borne by the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA). It seems worthwhile to repeat here that the founding of such a Seminar does not enter, strictly speaking, into the mandate of the Fund as defined by the donor countries. We must therefore give particular thanks to the donors for having accepted to interpret broadly the rules of funding. The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migrations (ICEM) also made a financial contribution, and its local team in Buenos Aires was particularly helpful in providing very efficient secretarial help. The other local expenses were met by Argentinian authorities.

6. Participation in the Seminar was as follows:

Continents, Regions, Countries	Demographic Research Centers or other Organisms represented	Number of Participants
AFRICA	5	5
LATIN AMERICA (except Argentina)	7	8
ARGENTINA	14	32
CARIBBEAN	1	1
CANADA	3	3
U.S.A.	4	4
ASIA	10	10
AUSTRALIA	1	1
EUROPE	12	13
Partial Total	57	77
International Organizations	10	11
Grand Total	67	88

The Staff of Cicred has to be added: Director and Co-director of the Seminar, Chairman of Cicred, Assistant to the Chairman, Treasurer, Secretaries, i.e., 9 persons.

7. The program of the Seminar is given in Annex (I) of this book with the names of the chairmen, discussion leaders and rapporteur of each sitting. One finds also the titles and the names of the authors of the background papers. These background papers are reproduced hereafter. The paper written by Miss H. Wander deserves a special comment. As a preliminary to the discussion of the various themes, a sitting was used to draw a world-wide view of international migrations. Several international organizations (United Nations and its regional economic commissions, OECD, ICEM) and numerous demographic research centers, had accepted to prepare background documents for this sitting. Miss H. Wander was in charge of presenting a synthetic summary of these documents. Only this summary is published here. It is contemplated to publish separately the documents on which Miss Wander's summary is based. Such a publication raises, however, a financial problem which has not yet been solved.

As a foreword to the various background papers, one finds a report prepared by Mr. Georges P. Tapinos, Co-director of the Seminar, in which he gave the principles he followed in the preparation of the program and the organization of the discussion, and some final comments on trends in on-going research.

To conclude the series of background papers, one finds the final report adopted during the last sitting. As said above, this final report has already been submitted to the participants in the Third World Population Conference. Mr. M. Livi Bacci accepted to be general rapporteur of the Seminar and he is the author of the final report.

8. The Seminar was opened by Dr. Julio H.G. Olivera "Secretario de Estados de Ciencia y Tecnologia" of the Argentinian Government. He said he was particularly happy with the choice of Buenos Aires to discuss

*a matter which has always been an important component of his country's policy. In his view, not only the location but also the date was well chosen. He was particularly keen to open the Seminar precisely when the Argentinian Government was launching an audacious population policy in which international migration had an important role to play.*

**9.** *Then, Mr. Maselli, Deputy Secretary General of ICEM, took the floor. He reminded the participants of the help brought about to the international migrants by his organization during the last two decades—ICEM created indeed the concept of assisted migrations and, by implementing it, permitted millions of workers to be employed outside their country under conditions which enabled them to be rapidly assimilated into their new country. In spite of these positive results, he said, many things remained to be done and this explains why ICEM was eager to participate in the funding of the Seminar.*

**10.** *Mr. O. Cabello, Director at the United Nations Population Division, who was representing Mr. Léon Tabah, Director of this Division, informed the Seminar of the various actions taken by the United Nations on the occasion of the World Population Year, 1974. He gave more precisely some information on the Third World Population Conference to be held in Bucharest (Romania) from 19th to 30th August, 1974. This Conference is due to discuss and adopt a "World Plan of Action on Population" and Mr. O. Cabello expressed the wish to see the debate of the Seminar clarify the aspects of the World Plan of Action dealing with International Migrations.*

**11.** *To conclude, I would like to thank warmly all those who participated in the debates: in one week's discussion, they have been able to draw up a list of new research to be undertaken in order to fill in the gaps in our knowledge of demographic aspects of International Migrations. These research projects are found throughout the final reports, but it appeared useful to gather them in a list appended to the Report. It is hoped now that the demographic research Centers will accept to include some of these projects in their work program. May I remind you that this is the ultimate goal of every Cicred Seminar.*

*Buenos Aires  
Argentina  
March 1974*



# I

## INTRODUCTION

# INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION PROBLEMS AND TRENDS IN RESEARCH

## Introductory report to the Seminar and guide lines for future research

Georges Tapinos

Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques

Paris (France)

### I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

1. In choosing, among the priority subjects for study, "Demographic research in connection with international migration" and in deciding to devote its second research seminar to this subject, the Committee for International Coordination of National Research in Demography was responding to an urgent need for restatement in a field in which research endeavour has not in the past been in keeping with the size of the phenomenon and the profound changes it has undergone. This review at international level links up, moreover, with the renewed interest in the phenomenon shown by the United Nations through its Population Division, as demonstrated by the preparation for the third World Population Conference in Bucharest of a vast comprehensive report on migratory currents throughout the world.

2. If, indeed, we ask ourselves what changes have occurred in this field during the last ten years or so, the outstanding fact is undoubtedly *the grasp of the phenomenon at the level of inter-regional labour markets*. This is true, first of all, for the combined area formed by Western Europe and the Mediterranean countries. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Council of Europe, the Ford Foundation, the International Labour Organisation, to mention only the principal international bodies, have one after the other concentrated their attention on international migration. It is true also for Latin America, where the replacement of the earlier inter-continental migration by the new intra-continental migration has given rise to the project for coordinating censuses planned by the Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE). And it is true, finally, for Africa where there has been a reversal of migratory currents similar to that in Latin America and where intra-continental migration, long overlooked, is now included in the research programmes of such university institutes as the Institut Africain de Développement économique et de Planification (Dakar) or the University of Liverpool, or of international bodies such as the World Bank.

3. It is not part of our intention to give an introduction to the various papers that follow, but rather to suggest the general spirit of the Seminar and the reasoning behind the programme; both are governed by the particular nature of the migratory phenomenon.

### II. THE NATURE OF THE MIGRATORY PHENOMENON

4. International migration presents four specific fundamental features.

(a) International migration is a *complex social fact* which brings into play demographic, economic, sociological, historical and other factors. Here, more than in other fields, a multi-discipline approach is not a fashion but is essential to research. This is brought out by A.H. Richmond (28) who seeks to approach the problem through systems' analysis.

5. (b) International migration is a “numerous” phenomenon. Of course, compared with other demographic phenomena—fertility, mortality—it is not an inevitable event in the life cycle; and compared with other economic categories—production, consumption—it does not play a fundamental part, and this explains the omission of international migration in traditional demographic and economic analyses; however, by its frequency and its repercussions, it does constitute an explanatory and determining factor in demographic and economic structures and growth.

6. All economic growth, indeed, involves some form of mobility—internal or international. In this connection, analysis of the processes of economic development can be regarded as the focal point for consideration of international migration, the central concept around which the various aspects of the phenomenon revolve. This is why the programme of the seminar gives precedence to the relation between international migration and economic development, thus notably excluding from the field of study migrations which are *primarily* political in character and which are mentioned in passing in the various regional reports without being made the subject of specific presentation.

7. (c) International migration covers a wide variety of processes. The problem arises, indeed, in most regions of the world, where the same types of migration are in fact often found to recur. Thus, for example, temporary migration—temporary at least in intention at the time of departure—of relatively unskilled workers, which is often taken as the prototype of the new migration in Western Europe, is not in reality a phenomenon confined to Europe. The regional reports on Latin America (22) (24) and Africa (15) (33) show, on the contrary, that this type of migration has grown considerably in these continents and represents, at the present time, the main factor in the migratory currents.

8. (d) International migration is a *poorly-observed phenomenon*. If migratory movements—internal or external—are generally less well known statistically than other demographic facts, and more particularly international migration, due to the very fact that it involves two different countries, that is to say two different systems of recording. In addition, the quantity and quality of the available data depend in part on how useful they are to the governments concerned. This is very clear, for example, in the Federal Republic of Germany where the federal nature of the State requires, for the purposes of allocating the resources and expenditure of the various *Länder*, precise knowledge of population figures for each state, at frequent intervals (7).

9. Without claiming to be exhaustive, it appeared interesting to compare the various methods of approach currently in use: permanent registration (7), censuses and inter-census comparison (13), surveys, and particular multi-round surveys (25) (27). All this information is collected and collated in the general report by D. Courgeau on the methodological problems involved in measuring migration (9), which after critical examination of the various methods, suggests which procedures are most efficient and emphasizes the necessity for international cooperation in this field.

### III. THE SPIRIT AND REASONING BEHIND THE PROGRAMME

10. The peculiar nature of the migratory phenomenon, the specific aim of the CICRED seminars and the present state of research in this field have determined the general lines of the work programme and the choice of subjects and of participants. The approach adopted has deliberately set out to be “controversial, comprehensive, problematic and research oriented”.

#### 11. *A controversial approach*

In view of the restriction on the number of papers planned and the variety of the subjects raised, one method of approach would have been to divide the material into its main components and plan *one* comprehensive report on each aspect of the problem. A different procedure has been chosen. It appeared preferable to establish a real *debate* on the “principal issues” rather than to review the *whole body* of problems raised. With this in view, we sought—in dealing with a given question—to gather together a number of papers approaching the problem from different angles and through different disciplines. This is outstandingly so in the case of the relation between international migration and economic development, the five papers devoted to this subject (6) (12) (23) (30) (32) providing a very broad sample of the various approaches to the phenomenon.

## 12. *A comprehensive approach*

The second concern was to consider the migratory phenomenon in all its possible aspects in order to grasp the essence of the phenomenon. This has two implications. Firstly, we did not wish to give precedence to theory over fact, the positive over the normative, or analysis over policy. Of course, since the seminar is required to produce a research programme, it would have been wrong to place the accent entirely on a description of the phenomenon; at the same time, the variety of empirical situations and the social character of the problem prevented us from confining ourselves to the analytical level alone.

13. Secondly, here more than elsewhere, it appeared necessary to extend participation to fields generally neglected by demography. A reading of the various papers underlines the interdependence of the different approaches. Examples are many. The system of recording is not unrelated to the nature of the migration. If it is a question of permanent migration, comparison of censuses appears to be the most efficient procedure for describing the structures and trends in development; if it is a question of temporary migration, subject to the hazards of the economic situation, census statistics are no longer of much help, and improvement in the counting of entries and exits becomes an essential priority. Similarly, the economist needs to know the net annual flows; the sociologist, the length of stay, etc.

## 14. *A problematic approach*

In a subject in which the body of theoretical knowledge is slender, it appeared preferable to explore the twilight areas rather than to restate certainties. With this in view, the authors of background papers were not restricted to a general "first part" but were able to express "points of view", designed to lead to genuine discussion and to point the way for future research.

## 15. *Research oriented*

This prime aim of the CICRED seminars is implicit in the various features emphasized above. The seminar sets out to provide a landmark in the progress of research on international migration. The final report of the seminar (21) does not claim to be the last word on migration, but seeks to establish research priorities and consequently to suggest the changes necessary to meet these priorities.

## 16. *The reasoning behind the programme of the seminar*

Before entering on a discussion of the various subjects selected, we sought in the opening session to give a general view of migration throughout the world. A large number of international organisations (U.N.O. and its various regional commissions, O.E.C.D., I.C.E.M., etc.) and research institutions agreed to contribute. The authors of the various regional reports were asked to recall the historical trends of migration, its structural features and the policies followed by the various States and to extrapolate, if possible, the prospects for the future. Only the general report, drawn up by Mrs H. Wander, is presented here (36).

The second session is devoted to the measurement of international migration and to the theoretical and practical problems it raises. For this purpose, the paper on the methodological aspects of the measurement of international migration is supplemented by accounts of three typical examples of systems for observing international migration: see above § 9.

The analysis of the factors determining migration (Session III) cannot claim to be exhaustive; rather than seeking to identify all the explanatory variables, it has appeared preferable to place the accent on three specific problems: the relevance of patterns of internal migration in explaining international migration (31), the respective weight attributed to economic and non-economic factors in the dynamics of migration (1) and the factors determining the brain-drain (35).

Sessions IV, V and VI are concerned with the economic, demographic (14) (29) and sociological (5) (8) (28) implications of migration. They aim to analyse the relation between international migration and economic development, to measure the effect of migration on the demographic structures and to estimate what migration means for society as a whole.

Migration policies are tackled in the VIIth session. It is not a question of drawing up an inventory of ends and means in this field, but of considering three fundamental questions: the right to migrate (10), the comparative advantages of voluntary and assisted migration (17), and the types of social action in favour of migrant workers (19).

The last two sessions aimed to evaluate the contribution made by the seminar, with respect to the state of work and present knowledge in this field, to identify subjects for research and to define priorities. In addition, to illustrate the necessity of a multi-discipline approach to the process of migration, two case-studies are presented (a country of departure: Yugoslavia (2) and a country of arrival: Argentina (20).

#### IV. TRENDS IN CURRENT RESEARCH

**17.** Without claiming to be exhaustive, on the basis of various notes prepared for the seminar and of the information gathered during its course, we may outline a typology of the state of current research\*. We propose to distinguish four types of situation.

*The first situation* concerns countries for which immigration is a long-established tradition. This is the case with the United States, Canada, Australia and Israel. In these countries, the recording of flows and numbers is in general very satisfactory, the factors determining migration are well known, and the analysis of its economic implications is very advanced. Present research relates essentially to problems of *adaptation and education*, the role of the *second generation*, etc. The quality of observation and the long-established nature of the phenomenon often permit longitudinal studies to be made.

Research, in this first situation, may be on two levels: either work on the integration of migrants (Canada, Israel) or—the more advanced stage—a real study programme, comprehensive and coordinated, which seeks to take stock of the phenomenon in its many aspects. This is the case, for example, with the Australian project sponsored by the Academy of Social Sciences under the direction of Dr. Ch. Price and Professor R.T. Appleyard, which aims at a systematic analysis of immigration into Australia since the war.

**18.** *The second situation* is that of countries for which migration is a relatively recent phenomenon—more or less—and where attention is focused more on the *determining factors and mechanism—generally economic—* and not as yet, or to a lesser degree, on the sociological and cultural implications of migration. On the economic plane, two directions for research are explored: the long-term effects of immigration (emigration) on economic growth, and the short-term implications of immigration (emigration) for the balance of employment and the economic cycle. It must be noted that research is generally carried out in the host countries or from the point of view of those countries and that the economic implications of emigration for the development of the countries of origin remain relatively unknown and uncertain, even though most of these countries (Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy among others) seek to encourage research. Sociological studies are not, however, neglected, particularly in the countries where immigration (emigration) is longest established (Italy or France, for example) or in those where, for particular reasons, a massive influx of immigrants racially and culturally remote from the host society has been recorded (Great Britain). We may mention by way of example the work carried out by the Centro Studi Emigrazione and the C.S.E.R. on migration and social change, surveys on Italian immigrants in Germany and Switzerland, the I.N.E.D. surveys of case-studies on the adaptation of immigrants from the Maghreb countries in France, or the projects of the Social Science Research Council on race relations in Great Britain.

**19.** *The third situation* is that of the apprehension of the size of the phenomenon. This relates essentially to Latin America and to a lesser degree to Africa, that is to say to areas which have recently experienced a redirection of migratory currents. The new intra-continental migration was long overlooked. Little is known about it statistically and the analysis of its determining factors is yet to be carried out. The work required is still at the level of *descripton*. It is a question, first, of measuring this immigration, of taking stock of the national legislation in the various countries, of gauging the immediate reactions of public opinion and, finally, of proposing possible explanatory hypotheses.

In Latin America, great hopes are placed in the 1970 censuses and the Celade projects on the harmonisation of statistics. At a deeper level of analysis, the work group on migration of the CLACSO Commission on Population and Development is planning a comparative study in Paraguay, Chile, Peru, Colombia and Argentina. This latter country, the main centre of attraction for migrants in this part of the world, appears to be the most advanced in research in this field. In particular, a current study undertaken by the National Department for Human Resources aims to evaluate, on the basis of surveys of case-studies, the economic and social input of immigrants from adjoining countries.

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\* My acknowledgements are due to the following: E. Adams, R.T. Appleyard, M. Bieber (3) R. Böhning (4), F. Bourguignon, B.T. Halajczuk, A. Lattes, R. Marcenaro Boutell, L. Marmora, A.H. Richmond, G. Rosoli, and M. Slemenson.

In Africa, we observe the tendency in recent years to set up barriers to free circulation and the considerable growth in the number of refugees. Here the attitude of the State and public opinion to the problem of migration expresses mistrust towards a phenomenon which is seen as an attack on national sovereignty.

20. (d) *The fourth situation* is that of the regions where, though the phenomenon exists, it is completely overlooked and unrecorded. This is the case in Asia and in the countries of Eastern Europe.

As regards Asia, in spite of the size of the flows, the ECAFE report prepared for the Seminar notes that "very little hard evidence, systematic documentation and even less scientific analysis exist—perhaps far less than any other region of the world" (11).

Little is known about migration between Eastern countries. The numbers involved are probably very small. However, current research undertaken by the Economic Commission for Europe suggests that "forecasts of future imbalances in the employment market in Eastern Europe allow us to suppose that pressures likely to cause migration already exist" (I.L.O. January 1974).

21. Special mention must be made of the brain-drain. The acuteness of the problem has in recent years prompted research specifically designed to cover the whole spectrum of earlier situations. An attempt has been made to take the full measure of the phenomenon and at the same time to analyse its implications and propose corrective policies. Few of the countries concerned have not undertaken some research. The international bodies, in particular UNITAR and the United Nations Office for Science and Technique, have played an important part in the research drive.

## V. THE PRINCIPLES OF RESEARCH AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

22. In order to enable research projects to be classified and a procedure to be established for determining priorities, we propose to define a few general principles for research on migration and to underline their implications.

(a) *Identify the various types of migration*, with a view to establishing a general typology of the phenomenon, so as to enable the lessons of the past to be used in the study of present migration of the same sort, and at the same time avoid transferring results established for certain types of migration to new migrations. Thus, the analysis of the determining factors and economic mechanisms of labour migrations in Europe is not without interest for the intra-continental migrations occurring in Latin America or Africa (particularly from the point of view of economic integration), and similarly the body of sociological knowledge of migrations to Australia or the United States may be of great use in studying the future of migrations to Europe, once the migrant appears to be permanently settled. Conversely, a typology of this kind should avoid certain errors which consist in analysing the causes, mechanisms and consequences of present European migration in terms of the pattern of the transoceanic migrations of the past.

In this connection, three criteria seem to us to be decisive: *expectations concerning the length of stay* (as opposed to the actual length of stay), with a distinction for example between *ex ante* temporary migrations and *ex ante* permanent migrations; the *degree of skill*, bearing in mind the continuum of possibilities (as opposed to the dichotomy between migration of workers and the brain-drain, whereas there is a growing migration of technicians, who cannot be assimilated to either category); the *ruling motive*, economico-political (as opposed, here again, to a dichotomy which separates two fields which are in fact intimately linked).

22. (b) *Study the processes and mechanisms rather than seeking to draw up a balance-sheet of costs and benefits*. Even before the appearance of the cost-benefit analysis efforts have long been made to analyse migration along similar lines. This procedure seems to us to be fundamentally unsuited to the analysis of migration, not only because migration affects all the variables of the social system, but also because we are really concerned with a process which has its own dynamic and which alters with the passage of time. It must also be noted that the main conclusion drawn by the only scientific approach along these lines was to warn against the method. (O.E.C.D. Development Centre). Thus, the particular features observable in two different countries *at a given moment* do not necessarily express different structural conditions or policies, but different phases in the development of each of the countries concerned. It was usual, for example, some ten years ago to contrast French immigration policy with German policy, the former based on both economic and demographic considerations, the latter confined to the labour requirements of the economy. There were certainly, at first, differences in intention between the two policies. However, subsequent deve-

lopment has shown that labour immigration in the strict sense of the word was not borne out by experience and that any policy relating to labour inevitably involved family immigration, with the result that the migratory structures of France and Germany drew closer together. In other words, features which were supposed to be peculiar to a given moment of time, in fact only expressed different phases in the development of the phenomenon and not fundamental differences.

**23.** (c) *Affirm the permanent and continuous character of research.* It is advisable to discard the simplistic and scientific view, according to which there is a definitive body of theoretical knowledge. The effect of this view is to postpone decisions, pending the final results of current research.

**24.** (d) *Bear in mind the inter-disciplinary nature of the phenomenon.* Here we come up against a difficulty which, while not peculiar to migration, is particularly pronounced in this field. In fact, from the moment the problem is tackled by a variety of disciplines, there is a danger that work appearing in specialist publications will fail to come to the notice of those who are endeavouring to pursue the problem from a different point of view. Moreover, the newness of the problem explains the large amount of unpublished material, university work, or work done under research contracts for public bodies.

It would be advisable to set up and regularise a procedure for circulating information. The Research Committee of the International Sociological Association on migration, formed in 1972, points the way with the establishment of its Bulletin designed to facilitate the circulation of information. An initiative of this kind should be extended to cover all the disciplines concerned.

**25.** (e) *Set up international projects.* These alone are capable of grasping the logic of the phenomena. It may be a question of coordinating national research, or, even more, of a number of interested countries drawing up joint projects.

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# TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

## (Summary statement)

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**1.** International migration as a factor influencing the regional distribution of population, skills, knowledge and welfare has long since attracted the interest of demographers, economists and other social scientists. Its immense contribution to the evolution of our contemporary world is well documented in literature and also deeply impressed in current thinking on what role international migration should play in mitigating existing discrepancies in social and economic conditions between countries and regions. A large stock of knowledge concerning the nature, mechanism and consequences of migratory flows has been built up and is available for further research.

**2.** Based on the experience of overseas migration from Europe before World War I and on related economic models simulating an unrestricted flow of production factors, there was widespread belief until quite recently that free migration would always be beneficial to all parties involved. In fact, history provides us with many examples where freedom of movement associated with social and economic prosperity and where barriers to migration went along with economic and political distress. However, there is also ample and well-founded evidence of unfavourable consequences of unrestricted movements manifest in poverty, social segregation or the return of many unsuccessful migrants as well as in economic stagnation in many sending areas. Moreover, while it is true that the free flow of people from Europe to overseas countries has largely contributed to relieve population pressure in Western Europe, to generate economic growth in the New World, to spread knowledge, to promote technical progress and to favour economic cooperation among an increasing number of nations, it is also indisputable that large parts of the world have not benefited from this development.

**3.** Clearly, migration from Europe to overseas countries was only one factor that influenced the contemporary international scene. It has long been recognised that there are always many types of migratory movements which are in cause and effect related not only to each other but also to the prevailing social, economic, demographic and political conditions and norms. It is logical that within such an ever-changing complex of variables the impact of migration is not fixed, once and for all but, in any particular instance, dependent upon the interplay of all relevant factors. Moreover, with increasing social, economic and political diversification in the world, migration's role has become diverse in functional, regional and historical respects. There is consequently an urgent and constant demand for more intensive empirical and theoretical research in this field. It is essential that more attention be given to an interdisciplinary approach in order to finally arrive at suitable theoretical concepts to identify and explain typical incentives, pattern and consequences of international migration in the various economic, social and political settings.

**4.** While this is a long-term objective for coordinated research with demography serving as a "bridge" between the other competent disciplines, in this summary statement we can only refer to the need for more refined theoretical tools. But it is indispensable to always keep in mind the diverse and undetermined nature of international migration, if we want to understand the specific and the common elements in the various contemporary flows as described in the regional background papers prepared for this session\*.

**5.** Although special papers on the Middle East, North America and Oceania are missing, those available give nevertheless a sufficient idea of the main types and pattern of current migration within and between major regions and continents. They also exemplify the historical and other circumstances that mark the position of the different flows in the superior process of social, economic and demographic change.

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\* For a list the regional background papers, see Annexe 2.

6. Since in the following discussion we shall deal mainly with the general pattern of the various flows, it is sufficient to define "international migration" as any movement across national boundaries except tourism and ordinary travelling for private or business purpose. Such broad treatment is justified by the fact that all movements are interrelated. Although there is also strong interdependence with all kinds of internal migration these movements will be disregarded, but we must mention that some arbitrariness in our definition is caused by the different size of the political units between which international migrants move. With the recent emergence of numerous independent states many movements which in the larger colonial combines were "internal" have now become "external". At the same time, fragmentation of political power has made possible more stringent control over international migration. These tendencies must be taken into account when migration trends in Africa or in the Caribbean are compared with those in Latin America or Asia.

7. After these general considerations we shall now try to characterize current migration trends in more detail. In order to understand the very heterogeneous scene, a look into the past may be instructive. In fact, migration has always been a basic manifestation of man's activity. Although we shall disregard the earlier periods, it may be useful to remember that many of the original causes of migration—such as the search for better and more secure living conditions as well as expulsions and flights—have remained forceful until today. More important, certain of the earlier types of movements still form part of our contemporary migration spectrum. *Gould* refers to tribal migrations in Africa which have proceeded without much change since ancient times following routes which were established long before the present state boundaries were set up. Traditional movements in search of land and grazing area or for petty trading and similar purposes may seem of little relevance under global aspects, but they still serve important local needs. Moreover, after becoming "international" some of them have repeatedly led to border conflicts and resultant flights or other hardships. The movements of Somali herds to Ethiopia and Kenya are typical examples. Likewise, many ethnical problems of today find their root in migration which dates back centuries. The pre-colonial movements of Chinese, Indians, and Japanese in East and Southern Asia are cases in point.

8. While these and similar migrations put their marks on specific geographical areas, the discovery of the New World and the expansion of colonial power were to change the whole globe. *Harewood* in his paper on the Caribbean gives us an instructive description of the world-wide forced and voluntary population transfers during the colonial period and of their present-day repercussions. The colonial economies served mainly to provide the metropolitan countries with raw materials and tropical crops produced on large estates or in mines. As in Asia and in tropical Africa, and in the Caribbeans, too, there was little scope for Europeans to settle as farmers. Most came as traders, administrators, soldiers, priests, or as planters, managers and supervisors of estates. Ordinary workers for farms and mines were seldom found among voluntary migrants from Europe. Where local labour was short or unavailable as in most parts of the New World, whose indigenous population was largely exterminated by the invaders, slaves or indentured labourers were brought in from other continents to satisfy the ever-increasing demand for unskilled workers. *Gould* estimates that from the 16th to the middle of the 19th century 15 to 30 million Africans were shipped as slaves to the American continent. Although mortality among slaves was very high and fertility low—in most of the Caribbean colonies for example—Africans soon dominated in numbers over other population groups. *Harewood* gives some information on the British possessions which indicate that around 1840, slaves comprised 70 to 75 per cent of the total population, on average. In spite of the massive transfer of slaves from Africa there was very little return movement after slavery was abolished. All kinship ties and all cultural bonds with the old homelands had been cut off, to the effect that incentives to migrate back were largely lacking. A major exception was the movement of freed slaves from the United States to found the state of Liberia in West Africa in 1847.

9. Import of indentured labour was another type of mass movement under the colonial system, almost as fatal as the slave trade. It served to supply the estates with cheap workers after the termination of slavery, but it was not restricted to the American continent. Many of the Asian and African colonies, too, recruited labour through this or similar schemes. Indians and Chinese made up by far the biggest supplies, but Pakistanis, Malays and Portuguese from the overcrowded Atlantic islands were also sent overseas in great quantities.

10. Many racial and political conflicts of today and concomitant dislocations within and across national boundaries find their origin in these vast colonial population transfers. *Gould* refers to some legal difficulties in respect of citizenship and nationality which the independent states in Africa inherited from the multi-racial colonial societies. Due to the fact that the new laws established *jus sanguinis* rather than *jus soli* as the basis for nationality, many descendants of former immigrants were excluded from citizenship of their country of birth. As foreigners they often suffered from economic and other restrictions and in

many instances they became scapegoats for internal discontentment. The recent expulsion of Indians from Uganda is one such tragic example. In the Caribbean, too, a multi-racial society of varied composition has been built up from the different streams of forced and free migrants. While in the originally British, Dutch and French colonies, the majority of the population is of African and Asian stock, in the formerly Spanish territories, especially in Cuba, the main segments are white, due to the influx of many free migrants from Spain. *Harewood* points out some important economic and cultural differences which still separate the races in the Caribbean and which explain many of the latent tensions. The special family union arrangements, the large proportion of female household heads and certain family attitudes also find their origin in the region's fatal migration history. Moreover, the colonial economic system, especially the sugar-cane cultivation, has greatly influenced today's fragile employment situation and the resultant emigration pressure.

**11.** Multitudinous types of free migrations accompanied and succeeded the colonial labour transfers. Various forms of assisted and unassisted migration for work on estates or in mines have replaced the previous systems of organized recruitment and persist along with more modern types of labour migration which turn more and more towards the most industrialized centers. But, although every former colony had its specific migration history, there are certain features which were typical of all. All were caught in some way or another in the wake of the massive movements from Europe to North America and all have retained close ties with their colonial mother country. Both facts are manifest in the pattern and direction of contemporary migration between the developed and the less developed world.

**12.** The great migration from Europe to overseas during the 19th and early 20th centuries left by far the most powerful marks on present-day mobility pattern. The tremendous exodus which involved some 50 million people was the result of a unique combination of circumstances which set free labour in the Old World and attracted it to the New World. Population increase of unprecedented magnitude and duration and concomitant economic pressure in Western Europe coinciding with more ready access to the rich supplies of land and natural resources overseas provided strong incentives for many economically displaced peasants, farm workers, craftsmen and traders to escape proletarianization by making use of the better opportunities abroad. Yet, the massive trek could not have been set in motion without the fundamental changes which took place simultaneously in all spheres of life, mentally as well as physically. The dominating principle of economic laissez-faire and the desire for personal independence and equality of chances contributed towards speeding up migration as much as did the progress in transport and communication technologies. Migration of labour and skills from Western Europe was accompanied by a constant flow of private capital and by the shipment of manufacturing goods to the new settlements in exchange for foodstuffs and raw materials. A cumulative process of increasing productivity, industrial diversification and expanding employment evolve from this intimate interaction between the immediate sending and receiving areas.

**13.** However, the distributive effects in terms of population and welfare appear less favourable under global aspects. Western Europe and the United States as the forerunners in modern economic development had an advantage over the countries that were drawn later into this process. It was not only the strong attraction of the United States or European labour and capital which placed the late-comers at a comparative disadvantage. The tremendous change in the structure of labour and capital needed to promote development provided additional problems. New technological and social standards had been set and the conditions of economic growth had become much more complex than they once used to be in the United States.

**14.** True, in Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and South America, development started also in agriculture and many European settlers were attracted to the rich land resources. But for various reasons these movements gained momentum mainly after fertile land had become sparse in the United States and they were comparably limited in terms of area and production lines. The rising capital and skill requirements of modern farming and of agricultural infrastructure formed a striking contrast to the respective supplies ready to move into these pursuits. Labour went increasingly into the industrial centers which offered more diverse and less risky employment outlets, while capital found more profitable investment chances in manufacturing, foreign trade and above all in mineral oil.

**15.** Nevertheless, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa were able to undergo rapid development. They profited from the close relationship with Great Britain which supplied them with capital and labour. In this sense they enjoyed advantages similar to those of the United States. South America, on the other hand, was less privileged. The Mediterranean countries, from where most immigrants came, were no exporters of capital. Although conditions varied from country to country and over time, Latin

America experienced the full impact of structural change in foreign capital flows, the more so as it was placed in strong competition with the more advanced immigration countries of the British Empire. Economic development proceeded mainly in and around a few urban centers thus favouring disparity in income, in social opportunities and in population distribution. In spite of large undeveloped resources, population growth soon tended to out-pace the capacity to enlarge the economic base. Migration was affected accordingly. Most migrants were attracted into the big cities and contributed to quicken the process of economic centralization. Nor did the sending countries profit much from emigration. Without intensive economic connections with the receiving areas, the loss of people could not bring about the needed relief from population pressure.

**16.** Still slower was the movement of capital and skills to the colonies in Central Africa and Southern Asia where plantation agriculture and mining were almost the only stimuli. Even the influx of European settlers into North and East Africa did not contribute much to diversify the economic base. Thus, the division of the world into developed and less developed segments and the distinction between labour shortage and labour surplus areas became more accentuated in spite of the large-scale transfer of capital and human resources.

**17.** In this short summary we cannot go into greater detail as far as historical trends are concerned. But we have to keep in mind two countervailing consequences as a legacy of the past: the increased pressure for international migration which is implied in the wider disparity of population growth and income opportunities *and* the restricted role of international migration in promoting greater equality in the regional distribution of people and welfare. This restricted role does not imply that international migration has lost importance as a driving force of development; rather, it relates to the more complex set of conditions within modern migration operates. The close relation with the industrial labour markets tends to draw the flow which into areas which are already crowded and where the economic situation is highly responsive to factors that promote further rapid growth. Such development is not likely to lead towards more equality in regional population density and income opportunity. More important, the heterogenous and highly flexible labour demand works in favour of selective migration, which in turn implies a reduction in the number of migrants. Labour demand is subject to structural change and to business cycle fluctuations and both trends are in many ways affected by direct or indirect state intervention. Governments of modern welfare states are committed to promote and secure a high level of employment and to improve the social and economic situation of the nationals. In order to accomplish such goals they have the power to influence the pattern of investments as well as of labour demand and supply. Moreover, governments carry also social responsibility for non-nationals, at least in the sense that hardships below a certain level are not tolerated and therefore provoke intervention. It is logical that migration cannot remain unrestricted if the social and economic framework of which it is part is largely conditioned by intentional policy action. But it is obvious that it is very difficult to devise a migration policy which is not only in line with the social and economic objectives of the receiving countries but which serves also to reduce population pressure in the sending areas.

**18.** Within these general constraints, national policies or attitudes towards international migration differ very much. According to the papers by *Gould* and by the *ECA*, visa regulations and work permits have been introduced in most African countries to control both emigration and immigration, and this has resulted in a remarkable decline in intracontinental mobility. Although some immediate profits may have accrued in certain instances, the long-term effects will possibly be detrimental to economic development, inasmuch as migration policy served to discriminate against foreigners and often involved a waste of needed skills. The Caribbean countries have a somewhat ambivalent attitude towards migration. Most encourage or assist emigration of special classes of workers for whom there is a shortage of employment outlets, but they would like to draw back qualified nationals residing abroad and are also anxious to attract foreign professional workers as long as these do not compete with local labour. Great Britain, which had been very liberal in the admission of immigrants from the Commonwealth, imposed severe restrictions on various groups by the UK Immigration Act of 1962, while other West European countries promoted freer mobility. Migration is fully liberalized within the boundaries of the Scandinavian labour market and of the European Community. Furthermore, immigrants coming from outside these areas are granted various privileges codified in agreements between the receiving and sending countries. But even so, as explained by *Pilliard* in his paper, such measures were not sufficient to make migration advantageous to all parties involved. They were mainly designed to serve the immediate needs of the receiving labour markets rather than to promote development within a larger region. The predominance of short-term considerations in migration policy is especially indicated in the more recent restrictions that some countries, e.g. the Federal Republic of Germany, imposed in response to the oil crisis.

**19.** It is in the context of contrasting policies that we have to appraise the various types of contemporary intra- and intercontinental migration. We may disregard the traditional forms of tribal and colonial movements which we mentioned before but must make some remarks on forced migration which is still part of the current migration spectrum. Forced migrations are never isolated events; they have in many respects influenced our present-day scene. The heavy influx of refugees and displaced persons from Eastern to Western Europe after World War II conditioned numerous voluntary movements within Europe and to overseas countries. It led to the introduction of several schemes of assistance by international and national agencies, some of which are still in use. Moreover, the influx of refugees affected in various ways post-war reconstruction in Western Europe, it influenced the regional and industrial structure of the labour markets and in turn the demand for spontaneous immigrants. Similarly, as mentioned by *Gould*, refugees in Africa have in many situations promoted rural development and contributed to reduce population pressure.

**20.** In contrast to previous periods, present-day international migration is more transient, dispersed and skill-oriented. Instead of a few centres of attraction there are now many more. Industrial regions, not only in Western Europe but also in other continents, have become the destination for migrants from various directions. Intra-continental migration gains much importance over inter-continental migration, at least in terms of volume. However, more significant than such general changes in intensity and direction are the changes in occupational structure, duration, causation and other specific characteristics. There is need for more detailed statistical information in order to reveal the different composition of the flows that are lumped together in the conventional aggregates. The different types of flow serve different functions. This fact must be remembered if overall trends are compared.

**21.** The paper presented by *ICEM* for this Session on immigration into the traditional receiving countries in America and Oceania during the period 1961 to 1970 is very suggestive in this respect. It shows that it would be misleading to draw from the aggregate trend any conclusion on the real pattern of change in inter-continental migration. The steep rise in the number of overseas migrants from 1962 to 1967 and the then following decline which characterizes the overall course are not typical for all receiving countries, nor is the apparent strong relationship between immigration and emigration from Europe a common factor. On the contrary, only the immigration curve of Canada and to a lesser degree of New Zealand and of the United States correspond with the overall pattern, while in Australia the trend rose consistently upwards with some minor swings around. In Argentina, on the other hand, total immigration fluctuated rapidly without a clear up- or downtrend, and in Brazil, finally, there was a sharp decline during most of the period. Migrants from Europe determined the total trend only in Canada, Australia and Brazil, but in Argentina, New Zealand and the United States migrants from closerby areas marked the general course. Moreover, increasing numbers of North Americans went to Australia and New Zealand, and there was a tremendous rise in the Asian contingents admitted in to Australia and the United States.

**22.** The *ICEM* paper deals with permanent as opposed to temporary migrants. However, the fact that in several instances the number of migrants from contiguous areas (e.g. Canadians, Central Americans and Caribbeans to the United States, Polynesians to New Zealand, or neighbouring South Americans to Argentina) is now much larger than the number of migrants from Europe, suggests that transient movements with comparatively small demographic balance are quickly gaining importance over the conventional types of more permanent settlement. Moreover, migrants from Europe as well as from Asia and Africa to North America and Oceania tend to include higher proportions of professionals, skilled workers, students and trainees than do migrants from some of the closerby areas. It must be expected that, associated with such criteria as skill level, migration distance and country of origin, are typical differences in demographic structure, economic activity and average length of stay, as well as in resultant impacts on the home and host economies.

**23.** The flows of highly qualified migrants run mainly between industrialized countries (e.g. between Canada and the United States) and from the less developed to the developed countries (e.g. from India to Great Britain or to the United States). Although there are reverse flows consisting of return migrants and of technical experts moving under special contracts, many developing countries have lost rather than gained skilled personnel through international migration. While this problem is not yet serious in Africa with the major exception of Egypt, in most Asian and Caribbean countries it gives rise to growing concern. Even the Latin American countries which encourage migration from overseas, and in this respect are supported by *ICEM*, were unable to attract sufficient skills from abroad in order to balance the outflow of qualified nationals to the United States. Migrants from neighbouring countries who arrived in large quantities did not contribute much to meet the demand for skilled personnel.

24. *Vergara* in his paper on Latin America deals with intra-continental movements in great detail. We learn that these movements have gained importance only over the last 20 years. Argentina became the destination of many migrants from Paraguay, Chile and Bolivia, while Venezuela attracted many Columbians. In addition there was some remarkable movement from El Salvador to Honduras. 60 to 80 per cent of the immigrants to Argentina and Venezuela stayed in administrative districts along the border and only 10 to 30 per cent proceeded to the capital or areas close to it. This very surprising pattern would need more information to be fully explained, but it seems to suggest that the influx from neighbouring countries served largely to replace internal migrants who moved to the big cities in search of better living and working conditions.

25. Recent prosperity in Western Europe has very much contributed to check and redress the transatlantic flows. Many citizens of the industrialized countries who might have been ready to leave the continent under more stringent economic conditions have decided to stay, and many South Europeans now prefer to move and work temporarily in the nearby industrial centers. But even so, an upsurge of migration to overseas comparable in scale and structure to current intra-European migration would have been unlikely under any conditions. The receiving countries in Western Europe and overseas continents compete mainly for skills rather than for ordinary workers which make up the bulk of intra-European migrants. Some of the traditional immigration countries in America and Oceania have an oversupply of unskilled workers, others can meet their demand from the large resources of nearby developing countries.

26. The national workforce of most West European receiving countries is very inflexible in volume and composition. Improvements in education and training allowed many indigenous workers to take up more qualified and better paid positions to the effect that more and more unskilled jobs were deprived of national applicants and had to be filled by foreign workers. Shortage of ordinary labour which was first felt in agriculture, mining, and construction has by now become chronic and common to almost all industries. Many economic and social factors have combined to generate a persistent flow of migrants into the industrial centers which to some extent develops from its own dynamics and which tends to draw into its wake migrants from ever-increasing distances.

27. According to *Pilliard's* paper, there were approximately 11.5 million foreigners living in OECD countries in 1972, among them 7.7 million workers. Most of them were employed in the Federal Republic of Germany (2.3 million), in France (1.65 million), and in Great Britain (1.55 million), but percentage-wise Luxembourg (32%) and Switzerland (21%) ranked before all other countries. The distribution of migrants by nationality reflects both longstanding affiliations between specific sending and receiving countries and newly-established relationships. Thus, most immigrants to Sweden come from Finland. In Switzerland, Italians dominate over other nationalities. France is the preferred destination of migrants from North Africa and Portugal, and Great Britain continues to employ large contingents of Irish workers. Finally, in West Germany, which started to attract foreign migrants much later than the other countries, Yugoslavs and Turks outnumber Italians who formerly were the largest group.

28. However, the network of flows within Western Europe is much tighter. There are large movements from Greece to Germany and Sweden and from Spain to Germany, France and Switzerland, as well as intensive return migrations from all parts of Western Europe to all parts of Southern Europe. Moreover, migration between the industrialized countries has gained importance, although less than may be expected in consequence of the fact that citizens of member countries of the European Community and of the Scandinavian labour market can move freely within these areas. Finally, there are many connections with other continents and even with Eastern Europe. Ordinary workers have not only been attracted from North Africa but also from the Middle East and the Caribbean. Apart from France, Holland and Great Britain which are or were until recently the main destinations for migrants from their former colonies, West Germany has also admitted growing numbers of non-Europeans under various assistance and recruitment schemes. Suggestive of the rapidly growing labour surplus in the least developed sending areas such as Turkey, Tunisia or Morocco, is the incidence of clandestine migration not only into the industrial centers but also into Southern Italy and parts of Greece and Spain which have become short of certain types of low-paid agricultural workers in consequence of excessive out-migration.

29. As is true for transatlantic migration, the flows between Western Europe and the less developed world contain high proportions of professionals and technical experts as well as of students and trainees. These movements would merit much more attention than they actually receive, in view of the necessity to improve knowledge and skills in the developing countries. However, we lack the statistical data which would allow us to disentangle the various flows according to their specific importance for the development of skills. From information available for a limited number of West European countries, we know that the respective move-

ments of Europeans and of non-Europeans serve quite different functions and that the inflows and outflows are differently structured. European settlers and administrators leaving the former colonies in Africa or Asia for example do not comply with the counterstream of European experts, neither in volume nor in demographic and occupational composition. Furthermore, there seems to be a strong inclination for natives of developing countries to stay in Western Europe over extended periods, rather than to return after completion of training or termination of work contracts and to utilize their skills for the benefit of their home countries.

**30.** A similar tendency to stay much longer than initially planned or even to settle for good in the receiving countries can be observed among the ordinary migrant workers in Western Europe as well as in other immigration centers. *Pilliard* refers to a system of permanent observation of migration currently tried out by OECD which indicates that the flows into and out of the West European receiving countries tend to become smaller while the stock of foreign workers has remained high. This fact is probably due to policy measures rather than to changing business cycles. Similarly, as noted in the *ECA* paper, many migrants from Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho to the Republic of South Africa attempt to avoid immigration control and to escape the risk of being sent home after termination of their work contract. But, whatever the specific legal requirements may be under which the migrants are allowed to enter and to work, the desire to remain points to some deeper problems associated with migration between poor and rich countries. The duration of stay is primarily conditioned by the individual aspirations of the migrants in terms of durable goods, savings or other benefits, by the factors which influence these aspirations and by the time period within which they can be realized. Consequently, dissatisfaction with prevailing earning and living conditions may often be a stronger incentive to postpone the return, than preference for the host society over the home country. Administrative control is therefore neither adequate to check the duration of stay, nor is it suitable to avoid or alleviate the task of more effective social and economic integration placed on the host society as a consequence of prolonged stay.

**31.** It is impossible to evaluate the consequences of the various migration streams in definite terms, inasmuch as any conclusion on what are favourable or unfavourable effects is subject to many qualifications in social, economic and political respects. The criteria for such judgement depend very much on the specific goals which the individual countries pursue in their migration policy. What may be considered advantageous from one point of view may appear less advantageous from another. Moreover, the interests of the various groups involved—private employers, individual migrants and governments of the sending and receiving countries—are very much apart and difficult to harmonize in view of the unequal bargaining position which is much in favour of private industry in the receiving countries. The sending countries are especially interested in being relieved of population pressure and surplus labour, and they want the migrants to return with skills and savings suitable to speed up economic development. Such objectives are of a long-term nature, and they necessarily conflict with the aims of the receiving countries to adjust migration to the immediate needs of their labour markets. The *OECD* paper gives some interesting data on the employment structure of the migrants which indicate strong concentration in such activities of the metal, building and service industries which offer the migrants neither much chance to make use of their previous work experience nor to acquire skills which are most needed at home.

**32.** If the migrants are expected to return some day—and in this point the interests of the sending and of many receiving countries converge—then care must be taken to re-integrate them properly into the home economy. Whatever skills and savings they may bring back, well designed social and economic measures are required to open up for them adequate employment and investment opportunities. This would imply that both sending and receiving countries reconsider their migration policies and bring them into line with long-term social and economic policies in favour of higher equality in the regional distribution of employment and welfare. Current attempts to speed up economic progress and to create more jobs in the least developed parts of the European Community through mutual assistance among member countries point in the right direction.

**33.** Within the wide spectrum of flows which compose the contemporary scene of international migration, there is much scope for intensive demographic research. The predominance of flows intended for temporary rather than for permanent settlement makes it necessary to study in greater detail the distinctive demographic, economic and social characteristics of these flows as well as their specific determinants and consequences in the various political settings. Although temporary flows imply less redistribution of population and labour, on balance, than permanent migration, they nevertheless may have profound impact on population composition in both the sending and receiving countries. There is a need for example to analyse changes in birth trends resulting from temporary deflation or inflation of specific age groups as well as the impacts on the dependency burden. Most attention should be given to the study of demographic, social and economic

interrelationships with regard to economic development. The contribution of migration to reduce population pressure is much more indirect than direct. It is not the number of people who depart or arrive which is important, but the social and economic potential they represent and the prevailing conditions within which this potential can be utilized. From this point of view the problems of integration in the host society and of return migration require special attention.

**34.** Concerning historical comparison, there is need to identify in what specific manner present-day international flows differ from previous flows, rather than to look for common characteristics. The important changes in structure and function of international migration that have taken place over time as well as their policy implications will be brought to light only if migration trends are analysed in the broader context of social and economic development.

**35.** More intensive empirical studies in this field depend on suitable theoretical concepts and sufficient statistical data. In order to improve these basic tools it is important to examine systematically all conventional concepts, models and definitions as well as statistical categories and whether and in what respects they are still in line with present-day realities in international migration. This is a most urgent task for demographic research.

## II

# THE MEASUREMENT OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

# SYSTEMS OF REGISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS PERMANENT REGISTRATION (The case of the Federal Republic of Germany)

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## GENERAL SURVEY

### Relevant events of population history

**1.** The inflow of people who had been living in the eastern territories of the former German Reich and in German settlements abroad is both politically and in respect of population history one of the major events observed in the Federal Republic of Germany after World War II. The territory of what is now the Federal Republic absorbed some 10 million expellees and immigrants, which amounted to 20% of the population at that time. In the destroyed cities and villages they frequently had first to be provided with temporary makeshift quarters. In search of better accommodation and of work most of these refugees have later frequently changed their residence. There was also a very high mobility of the native population streaming back from the areas to which they had been evacuated to their old communities of residence and also fluctuations related to the reconstruction of the cities and economic enterprises as well as the proceeding industrialization. The Federal Republic thus received after 1950, in addition to the 10 million people who had arrived immediately after the war, another 4.5 million persons from former settlement areas and from the German Democratic Republic. Because of this high proportion of mostly destitute people it was necessary to take large-scale economic and social measures. In the field of population statistics this involved a stock-taking of the number and structure of the population, which was the objective of the 1950 Population Census. Further population censuses were taken in 1961 and 1970.

### The necessity of migration statistics

**2.** In order to determine the quotas for the refugees to be distributed to the individual Laender (federal states), cities and Landkreise (rural districts) as well as for measures in view of the provision of dwellings and jobs, the administration required however also current figures on the arrivals across the borders of the Federal Republic and on the fluctuations inside the country. For this reason migration statistics were introduced on 1 January 1950. The basis for determining the changes of residence or of the dwelling is provided by the registrations and deregistrations each person has to effect at the registration office when moving into another dwelling. Thus migration statistics are secondary statistics based on an administrative act. If only for its volume, it is one of the most expensive among the current population statistics in the Federal Republic. Migration statistics are conducted on a total basis; all registrations and deregistrations are determined and evaluated statistically. According to the Registration Law (infra § 11-14) the foreigners living in the Federal Republic are also obliged to register. Foreign tourists who are staying only temporarily in the Federal Republic are however exempted from registration.

**3.** The high degree of mobility of the population in the Federal Republic of Germany may be seen from the volume of migrations. In the year 1972 for instance the total volume of migrations across the borders of

the Federal Republic was 1,475,000 cases of migration (903,000 arrivals and 572,000 departures), while there were about 3.7 million cases of migration inside the Federal Republic. If one does not consider the fact that moves inside of communities (local moves) are not contained in the survey programmes of the Federation and the Laender and that persons may change residence several times a year, the calculated figure was one case of migration for every 11th person in the Federal Republic; in 1960 it was every 14th person with a total volume of 4.1 million cases of migration.

4. There are manifold methodological and organizational interrelationships between migration statistics and other statistics which provide information on the geographical and structural changes of the population, namely population censuses, population sample surveys and the current estimation of the population. They will briefly be discussed below.

#### Population censuses and current estimation of the population

5. The population censuses provide the basis for determining the total population of Laender, Kreise, communities and parts of communities. On this basis it has been possible since the introduction of migration statistics to perform the current estimation of the population for these territorial units. The arrivals and births have been added, while the departures and deaths were subtracted. The results of this current estimation serve as key figures for demographic computations, e.g. birth and death rates. But they are also of greatest importance for administrative purposes since there are in the Federal Republic about 100 laws and ordinances in which it is laid down that the latest currently estimated official population figure provides the basis for administrative decisions, such as the assessment of street and school costs, the financial adjustment between the financially weak and the richer communities, the delimitation of election districts, the staffing of the municipal administrations, etc.

#### Sample surveys

6. In addition to the results of the population censuses and the current estimation of the population, there have been since 1957 also results from a current sample survey on population and economic activity, referred to as the microcensus. The purpose of this sample survey is to furnish between the population censuses and the housing censuses at short notice structural population data. The microcensus is performed once every year with a sampling fraction of 1%. It involves about 220,000 households with some 660,000 persons. In the three other quarters the sample survey is taken with a sampling fraction of 0.1%, i.e. 22,000 households and 66,000 persons. Plans are to effect as from 1975 only two surveys per year, one of which in April of every year with a sampling fraction of 1% and a second in October of every year with a sampling fraction of 0.5%.

7. The microcensus is conducted with a basic programme which remains virtually unchanged from one survey to the other. It comprises mainly the population census characteristics. Since 1962 a supplementary programme has in addition to the basic programme been connected with every survey. This supplementary programme is to cover changing characteristics of particular topicality.

8. The microcensus as a sample survey using trained interviewers is particularly well suited for recording complicated topics. Like the population censuses, the microcensus has so far not included any data relating to migration statistics. Due to the size of the sample, structural data cannot be recorded in a very detailed analysis. The limit is both for the administrative and the non-administrative territorial units (e.g. regions of the federal town and country planning programme and planning regions) a minimum population of 1 million persons.

## LEGAL FOUNDATIONS

#### General remarks

9. In the field of population statistics, the competent statistical offices and the departments of specific authorities have in the Federal Republic de facto a monopoly for the performance of current and comprehensive surveys. The monopoly of these "official statistics" is safeguarded by a privilege: as a rule the persons and institutions involved as respondents may, if this is necessary, be obliged to provide information. It is above all this privilege which distinguishes official statistics from all other institutions dealing with statistics and which—from the point of view of constitutional law—can be granted only to such government organizations.

**10.** The principle of the commitment of the executive to the law, which applies also to the statistical administration, is laid down in the Constitution of the Federal Republic, as is the conveyance of the legislative power for federal statistics to the Federation.

#### Legal foundations for the current registration of migrations

**11.** The determination of changes of residence is primarily serving administrative purposes. For this reason the geographical units which by definition change in the course of migration are administrative geographical units. This means that in practice the most important procedure used for delimitating migrations consists in distinguishing whether the migrants cross specific administrative borders, e.g. the borders of parts of cities, of communities, Landkreise, Laender and states.

**12.** The current registration of migrations—that is the statistical recording of internal and external migration at the time of the move—is in the Federal Republic based on uniform legal regulations of the federal Laender on registration. The Laender laws, which in their implementing provisions and administrative regulations largely coincide as to their major directions, provide, among others, that persons who move into a dwelling have, within a period of as a rule 14 days, to register with the registration office of the relevant community. Upon registration, the certificate of deregistration issued by the authorities at the place of origin has to be produced. A person moving out of a dwelling has also to deregister at the registration office within a fixed period stating the new dwelling. There is no obligation to deregister in the case of a move inside the same community.

**13.** At the present time a federal registration law is being prepared which is to provide a uniform frame for the Laender regulations. It will presumably pass the Bundestag by mid-1974. The federal Laender will follow suit by passing Land registration laws and the relevant executive regulations. This federal registration law has to be considered in connection with the introduction of the personal identification number referred to under § 44 et seq. and with the automation of the registers of inhabitants. This automation will obviate deregistration also in the case of a change of *residence*.

**14.** Besides the registration offices, all urban and rural Kreise have specific aliens departments. Following the promulgation, on 7 July 1967, of the “General administrative regulations concerning the implementation of the Law on foreigners”, the registration offices are to keep the aliens departments informed about the registration or deregistration as well as about every change of dwelling of a foreigner inside a community, about changes in his personal situation (such as marriage, change of name or nationality, births of children) and about the death of a foreigner. The aliens departments in turn currently inform the Federal Administrative Office, which is keeping a central register of foreigners, inter alia, about registrations and deregistrations, about changes in the personal situation and about the death of foreigners.

#### Legal foundations for the statistical evaluation of registered migrations

**15.** The use of the registration sheets, which are completed for registrations and deregistrations, for the purposes of migration statistics is not laid down in the registration laws of the Laender, but in the federal law of 1957 on statistics on the movement of the population and the current adjustment of the demographic situation, as amended in 1971. On the basis of this law, the arrivals and departures (changes of dwelling) are currently recorded upon registration and deregistration with the following characteristics:

- Date of move into the new/out of the old dwelling, old/new community of residence,
- main or secondary domicile,
- sex,
- age,
- marital status,
- economic activity or non-activity,
- legal membership in a Church, religious or political-philosophical association
- and nationality.

### METHODS OF COVERING FOREIGNERS AND EXTERNAL MIGRATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC

**16.** There are several statistical possibilities of recording foreigners and migrations across the borders of the Federal Republic:

## Population census and housing census

**17.** Tables on foreigners according to nationalities are available from the 1950 and 1961 population censuses. For the 1970 population census the nationality of non-German persons was recorded only in the 10 %-sample survey performed at the same time. The total number has been broken down in tabular form according to the characteristics, age, sex, economic activity and economic group in which this activity is performed, by marital status, employment status (official, salaried employee, wage earner, etc.), religious denomination, level of school education completed as well as combining these characteristics. Where a foreigner is living in a household together with family members or other foreigners not belonging to the family, the number of household and family members as well as the household and family structure (nuclear family consisting of married couple and children, father and children, mother and children, etc.) can be determined.

**18.** The housing census is not conducted together with the population census, but 5 years after the population census. As the survey questionnaire of the housing census comprises an additional part relating to population statistics, the span of 10 years between two population censuses can be bridged. The topics to be covered by the next housing census scheduled to be taken in 1975 are as follows:

Age,  
sex,  
marital status,  
economic activity

and some additional criteria which are to yield information on vocational and social relationships, such as  
distance to the place of work,  
hours worked per week,  
level of income (this question is to be answered by indicating specific income groups, e.g. under 800 DM, 800-1000 DM, etc.).

## Microcensus

**19.** For the 1 %-sample survey conducted every year, the exact nationality had, prior to 1972, been recorded only for persons originating from countries of the European Community; the other persons were combined in groups of countries. As from 1972, the nationality has been recorded and presented in the results for every person, provided that the extended figures for the members of a foreign country who live in the Federal Republic exceeds 10,000 persons. For the foreigners recorded by the microcensus, counts can be made as in the population census according to characteristics of the person, the economic activity, the sources of livelihood, the household and family structure. Far-reaching classifications or combinations can however be made only for larger groups of foreigners and even in this case only for the Federal Republic as a whole, at the best for the major federal Laender.

## Current estimation of the foreigners covered by the population census

**20.** One of the most important sources of information concerning the number of foreigners living in the Laender of the Federal Republic is the current estimation on the basis of the 1970 Population Census. This current estimation is effected every year for the 31st of December separately for the two sexes, for individual age and birth years combined with the marital status.

## Investigations made by the aliens departments

**21.** Pursuant to the general administrative regulation concerning the implementation of the 1967 Law on Foreigners, the relevant authorities had for the years 1967 to 1971 on a key date annually determined by nationality, sex and residence status the foreigners who had their ordinary residence within their jurisdiction. The results of this survey had to be reported through the supreme Land authorities to the Federal Minister of the Interior and were later compiled to federal results by the Federal Statistical Office. Apart from the well-known imprecision of card-files, the major deficiency of these statistical schedules was their insufficient differentiation of the personal data. The aliens departments determined the foreigners as a whole according to their nationality, of which men and women over 16 years of age and children under 16 as well as the residence status. An advantage of these investigations was their highly detailed regional breakdown as well as the relatively early availability of the data. These results of the aliens departments have no longer been used since 1971 because the deviations as compared with the results of the central register of foreigners were too great.

### Investigations based on the central register of foreigners

**22.** The central register of foreigners kept at the Federal Administrative Office which receives the reports of the aliens departments concerning the arrivals and departures of foreigners, deaths and changes of the personal data, records on an EDP installation in addition to a personal identification number also nationality, date of birth, sex, marital status and kind of economic activity, residence status, date of arrival and departure and possibly the date of re-entry. From the technical point of view, the central register of foreigners is in a position to supply quickly topical results in the analysis by nationality and the other criteria. Statistics on the migration movements of foreigners have however not been provided for by the evaluation programmes.

### Investigations of the Federal Institution of Labour

**23.** In 1973 the Federal Institution of Labour produced its latest statistics on the employment of foreign labour as well as on their recruitment and placement. It thus supplied information on arrivals and departures, on the regional distribution and the distribution over the various branches of economy, on the total number of sick persons and further data compiled in the course of administrative activities. Most of these records were arranged according to nationality. The evaluation of these statistics provided a comprehensive and differentiated idea inter alia of the length of stay, the former jobs, the fluctuation, the activity performed and the occupational qualification. The advantage of the investigations made by the Federal Institution of Labour was that they were linked with administrative measures and thus gained in reliability. A disadvantage was that surveys of this kind related only to employed persons and not to the total number of foreigners.

**24.** The Federal Institution of Labour conducts at several years' intervals sample inquiries of foreign labour with a sampling fraction of 0.5 %. These inquiries yield information on length of stay, accommodation, level of wages, training and further education, family situation, school attendance of the children, knowledge of languages etc.

### Organizational and methodological operation of migration statistics

**25.** The population censuses and the microcensuses do not record migration processes because, as has been explained, in the Federal Republic of Germany the current migration statistics have since 1950 been able to resort to the legal regulations of the federal Laender concerning the registration system. The special statistics on immigration and emigration which had been conducted since 1953 were discontinued in 1960. Instead, the recording of migrations across the international borders of the Federal Republic in migration statistics was extended beginning with the reference year 1962.

**26.** As migration statistics in the Federal Republic are secondary statistics, no special statistical enumeration cards are processed, but rather the registration sheets which exist anyhow. Arrivals at and departures from a community are reported by submitting to the local registration office a registration sheet completed by the migrant. The members of a family are listed on a joint registration sheet which is signed by the head of the household.

**27.** These registration regulations are not in the first place to serve statistical, but general administrative purposes. The registration offices inform various authorities about the arrivals and departures either by passing on a copy of the registration certificate or by a special note. The original of the registration sheet is used by the registration office for its own evaluations and for informing those communal agencies for which it is important to know about the changes of residence, e.g. police, registrar's office, electoral office, tax office, statistical office. The registration system thus is an absolute precondition of the keeping of local card-indexes of inhabitants which in turn provide the basis for information to be given to authorities and private persons concerning the persons living in a community, for keeping the electoral lists, for issuing wage-tax cards, for military recruiting, etc.

**28.** Pursuant to the federal law on statistics on the movement of the population and the current adjustment of the demographic situation (1957), one copy of each registration sheet is on a monthly basis passed on for evaluation to the Land statistical office to which the individual community belongs.

**29.** This involves mutual information concerning migrations to another federal Land; the Land of origin receives from the Land of destination a duplicate of the processing material in the form of punch cards. As in this way the Land of origin and the Land of destination have the same processing material, the figures on the arrivals from Land B recorded in Land A automatically conform to the figures recorded in this federal Land concerning the departures to A. The Laender results are combined at the Federal Statistical Office.

**30.** The data on arrivals and departures across the borders of the Federal Republic are collected from the registration and deregistration sheets. For the migrations inside the Federal Republic every arrival at one community corresponds to a departure from another community. To cover these migrations it is sufficient to handle only *one* registration sheet. Since 1953 the registration sheets have in general been drawn upon. They indicate the conclusion of the migration event and therefore contain more reliable information than the deregistration sheets on the community of origin and of destination of the migrants. Registrations are also more complete; they are not as often omitted as deregistrations.

**31.** Deregistrations which had been omitted are reconstituted by the registration office of the community of destination which informs the community of origin about the move using the indication on the registration sheet concerning the last residence. In this way it is possible to correct the register of inhabitants at the community of origin. For statistical processing the notification of the communal registries among each other is however of no importance since for internal migration statistics only the registration sheets are drawn upon anyhow and because for calculating the departures the indications are used which they contain on the former place of residence.

**32.** For the migrations across the borders of the Federal Republic (external migration) the following topics are recorded and published:

On a quarterly and an annual basis for the entire Federal Republic and for the individual federal Laender:

Areas of origin and of destination,  
sex,  
economically active persons,  
persons, total

in addition annually:

Age groups,  
marital status,  
economically active persons by age years and years of birth,  
community size classes (combined with location in urban regions),  
for the Federal Republic: birth years  
for the Landkreise: persons, total.

Because of the specific situation due to the partition of Germany after World War II, the number of external migrations is broken down into migration

1. across the international borders of the Federal Republic,
2. between the Federal Republic and the GDR as well as Berlin (East) and
3. between the Federal Republic and the eastern territories of the former German Reich (position 31 December 1937).

## CONFORMITY OF THE DATA FROM DIFFERENT SOURCES

**33.** The data derived from different sources often vary considerably—though less so as to their structure than in absolute size—in particular as regards their regional analysis. The reasons are above all connected with the differing organization and methodology of data acquisition at the various administrative agencies dealing with statistics on foreigners.

**34.** Apart from the imprecisions necessarily connected with card-index coverage, the lack of uniformity in the material analysis according to personal criteria as well as differing definitions and classifications contribute to differences in the figures. Another reason is the delay in the exchange of information between the individual authorities. A further frequent source of errors especially in statistics derived from the material of the central register of foreigners are omitted reports and double counts.

**35.** The differing objectives pursued by the administrative agencies mentioned entail necessarily the supply of specific statistical information on the foreigners living in the Federal Republic. This fact involves however the advantage that, on the one hand, these statistics provide at different times information on foreigners and, on the other hand, the differing types of information are supplementing each other and thus permit a more comprehensive insight into the problems related to foreigners.

## ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF PRESENT MIGRATION STATISTICS

### The advantages

**36.** The main advantage of the migration statistics conducted in the Federal Republic is that as secondary statistics they can draw upon the currently available registration sheets of the communal registration offices. For this reason surveys for primary statistics on migration, as they are performed in other countries where comparable registration laws do not exist, are not necessary in the Federal Republic. This means that the subsequent recording of migration events (residual method) which does provide material on the effects of migration on the structure of the population, but is suitable only for criteria such as sex and year of birth which remain unchanged over time, can in principle be dispensed with. The difference method is however used also if there exist current migration statistics in order to determine the migration balances (net migration) for regional units such as communities, Kreise or Laender between two population censuses. Net migration provides however only a very limited insight into the migration process. It is neither possible to find out how many persons arrived, nor how many left, since only the calculated result from these two values is available.

### The disadvantages

**37.** The disadvantage of the migration statistics conducted in the Federal Republic of Germany resides—as has already been explained—in the fact that they are not based on persons but on cases. Results of case statistics do not provide any information on the frequency of migration for individual persons or for groups of persons in a given period. Migration statistics which are based on the current recording of arrivals and departures would be more productive if the documents concerning the moves effected in the course of time by one individual person could be brought together in a central population register. Such a source of information would enable investigations to be made in connection with flow statistics permitting both statements concerning the migration behaviour in the family cycle and also in respect of the geographical stages of migration.

**38.** In particular the cases still included in migration statistics where persons for instance for taxation reasons report a second or a secondary domicile, though this does not involve a change of the place of residence, lead in the statistics to an overestimation of the figures for migration cases. According to the new federal registration law, therefore, only changes of the main domicile will be considered. Above all for the migrations across the international borders of the Federal Republic which comprise mainly foreign labour and the members of their families, the case statistics also present too great a volume of migration since foreigners who for their Christmas vacation of mostly several weeks return to their home countries deregister at the registration office only in order to be entitled to apply for the reimbursement of their contributions to the legal old-age insurance fund.

**39.** Other shortcomings follow from the fact that the registration sheets providing the basis of the survey supply only the data needed for the various administrative purposes, not however information permitting to conclude on the reasons of migration, let alone their motives. It is in particular impossible to make any statements in respect of social mobility in the form of changes of occupations or jobs which is frequently linked with migration events.

## POSSIBILITIES OF IMPROVEMENT

### Specification of the data contained in the registration sheets

**40.** It would be possible to improve migration statistics if, on the one hand, the data already collected could be specified on the registration sheet and if, on the other hand, additional information could be included. These additional data would however primarily be of no relevance to administrative work and would necessarily constitute an additional burden for the execution of administrative duties. For legal reasons, too, it would hardly be feasible to include additional data in the registration sheets.

**41.** An indication already figuring on the registration sheets which would have to be further specified is the occupation. The occupational titles stated by the persons registering are however so inaccurate that they can be used neither by the administration nor by statistics. Often the registering persons state the occupation

learned or a former occupation which is no longer practised. Migration often involves a change of occupation. At the time of registration the relevant person has however not yet found a new job and therefore states the former occupation, etc. In the set of data to be included in the future automated registers of inhabitants, the occupation will have a 3-digit code. Even then it will however not be guaranteed that this indication will also be sufficient for statistical purposes. The question is whether the indication of an occupational title should not be dispensed with altogether, stating instead only roughly classified spheres of occupation, work characteristics and branches of economic activity. These criteria would at least offer some general indication concerning the economic and social circumstances of the migrants.

**42.** As above all the sheets for registration are drawn upon for statistical evaluation, the indication of the length of stay at least in the preceding dwelling and community of residence would be of great use. The indication of reasons for the change of residence which is of great value for migration statistics and migration research, possibly in the form of pre-determined categories of replies such as

- family reasons (e.g. marriage or divorce, birth of children)
- occupational reasons (e.g. change of job)
- economic reasons (e.g. reduction of the distance between dwelling and place of work)
- school reasons (e.g. improvement of school facilities for the children)
- reasons of housing accommodation (e.g. greater and/or better equipped dwelling)
- legal reasons of housing accommodation (e.g. construction of a building or acquisition of an owner-occupied dwelling)

can at the present time not yet be achieved in view of the fact that the statistics in the first place are still serving administrative purposes.

### Supplementary inquiry in the microcensus

**43.** If not in the current migration statistics, criteria permitting conclusions to be made on the motives of the migrations could yet be recorded by means of sample surveys. It would be possible to compensate the disadvantage of a sample survey by securing through trained interviewers more reliable and more precise indications than could have been obtained by the evaluation of the registration sheets. In particular it would be possible to obtain information on the migration behaviour in the family cycle (e.g. when juveniles leave the family group, in the case of marriages and divorces, when children are born, in the case of retirement because of the age limit, if one of the spouses dies, etc.). Such a sample survey has so far not yet been conducted in the Federal Republic.

### Introduction of the personal identification number

**44.** The emphasis will shift from census data to data derived from existing statistical material when, according to plans, individual data of the various administrative agencies have been transferred to data recording media. Individual or original data will then be stored for the specific administrative purposes and at the same time will be available to the statistical offices in view of the transformation for statistical evaluations. The machine processing of data thus will involve a rationalization effect. At the same time the collection of statistical material would thus to a greater extent become part of general administration if it is possible by legal measures to integrate the concerns of official statistics firmly into the administrative process. This would however presuppose that the very strict regulations of data protection are duly considered.

**45.** In several cities of the Federal Republic the registers of inhabitants have been stored on data recording media, so that now it is already possible for these communities to retrieve at any time both information for administrative purposes and on demographic facts such as number of inhabitants, age and employment structure of the relevant population as well as natural and geographical movements of the population.

**46.** Registers of persons and family registers of the administrative agencies comprise for every unit registered in addition to the characteristics needed also the name. Only in this way is it possible to perform correctly the administrative operations relating to the individual person. An identification based on the statement of the name is not necessary for the statistical use of the individual data, provided that the individual cases can be distinguished by other unmistakable attributes. The Federal Republic is therefore preparing the introduction of a personal identification number. This personal identification number has a numerical structure and can therefore directly be used in the data processing system. As an unchangeable identification mark of a person it contains the date of birth, the sex and, as an additional means of distinguishing persons of the same sex who have the same date of birth, a 4-digit serial number.

**47.** For purely administrative purposes such a personal identification number permits the unmistakable combination of personal data derived from different branches of administration. Changes of residence for instance which are reported to the registration office thus can be corrected by machine in all connected registers of the other administrative agencies without any manual operations.

**48.** On the other hand it will then be possible to obtain for migration statistics information not only on individual cases of migration, but also on migrating persons and families, and further on the mobility process at a specific period or over time.

**49.** The possibility of combining the personal identification number, on the one hand, and individual data derived from registers—but also from censuses—on the other hand, would considerably further the development of flow statistics. In the form of longitudinal-section analyses one would obtain information both on migration by stages and on the geographical mobility in the family cycle. Moreover, the data of the register kept by the registration offices would, in combination with those of the tax offices, provide information concerning possible material consequences of the migrations; in combination with those of the registrars' offices, they would possibly permit to conclude on migrations due to marriages, the birth of children or divorces. Data relating to the length of stay of foreigners in the Federal Republic, to residence status, employment, economic circumstances, occupational promotion, old age and health insurance, residence of the family members of foreign labour, economic activity of husband/wife and school attendance of the children, though certainly still contained in a decentralized form in the registers of the various administrative agencies, could be linked with each other by means of the personal identification number, which so far had either been possible only with great difficulties or not at all.

**50.** Migration statistics would gain by the introduction of the personal identification number in so far as on the one hand it would be possible to perform real longitudinal-section analyses, while on the other hand the combination of data supplied by the various authorities would permit to determine the migration behaviour of demographic groups and social classes. Moreover, the register of inhabitants, which permits the evaluation by machine, would supply information on the consequences of migrations; it would, for instance, provide by means of the already introduced community codes, an insight into redistributions of the population between areas lagging behind in their development and growing economic and demographic agglomerations.

**51.** The significance of migration statistics will be restricted from the regional point of view by the regional reform now under way in the Federal Republic, the purpose of which is to reduce the number of independent communities to about 35% of the original number in 1968. The question is now being discussed in how far it will be possible to obviate the reduced detail of the information provided by regional statistics by regionally differentiating migration data down to parts of communities or even blocks of houses.

We are not going to deal here with the problem of solving the technical and organizational difficulties which will arise in the cooperation between official population statistics and the registers of administration. It does however seem to be agreed that problems of this kind cannot be solved by creating a single central register storing all individual data of administration and official statistics. A materially and regionally decentralized system of registers will have to be given preference, if only because it will not be possible to keep a central register comprising a vast amount of data per individual at a desired level of currentness.


## SOME MAJOR RESULTS OF STATISTICS ON EXTERNAL MIGRATION SINCE 1950

**52.** The extent of the population growth in the Federal Republic of Germany has in the long-term trend from 1950 to 1972 about equally been influenced by the excess of births over deaths and net immigration (see Graph 1). While the curve for net immigration is however subject to strong fluctuations, the curve for the excess of births shows—at least up to 1964—a straight upward trend. The retrograde course of the excess of births over deaths, observed since 1964, for the first time resulted in 1972 in a negative balance of the two components of the natural movement of the population which determine the population growth, namely figures of births and deaths. The negative excess of births is however overcompensated by net immigration, so that there is for 1972 still a population growth of about 300,000 persons.

**53.** The extent of the migration across the borders of the Federal Republic is essentially influenced by the economic development. The years of the economic recession, 1951/52 and 1966/67, can clearly be seen by the two lows of the curve for net immigration. The structure of external migration has however clearly


Graph 1

# POPULATION GROWTH 1950 - 1972 BY BIRTH SURPLUS AND MIGRATION SURPLUS



Graph 2

MIGRATION SURPLUS IN THE FRG<sup>1)</sup>




1) Beginning 1965, federative territory incl. Berlin (West). Excluding unclarified cases and those without statement.

2) Up to 1963, excluding unspecified countries abroad; beginning 1964, including unspecified countries abroad.

Source : Statistisches Bundesamt, Bevölkerung und Kultur, Reihe 3, Wanderungen.

Graph 3

### AGE STRUCTURE OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION IN APRIL 1971



shifted since the early 1960s from net immigration from the GDR, Berlin (East) and the eastern territories of the former German Reich to a positive balance from the migration across the international borders (see Graph 2). While up to 1959 the balance from the arrivals and departures across the international borders still was well below the migration surplus with the GDR or the eastern territories, the inflow from abroad became dominant since 1960, all the more because the arrivals from the GDR receded since 1962 to a largely constant value.

**54.** The migration across the international borders essentially consisted of arrivals and departures of foreign labour. In 1972 for instance the net immigration from the external migrations of 331,000 persons was mainly due to the exchange of population with the other European countries resulting in a balance of 252,000 persons with 755,000 arrivals and 503,000 departures. As much as 76.9% of this balance was due alone to the migrations between the Federal Republic of Germany and those countries which contribute the major part of foreign labour in the Federal Republic, viz. Turkey, Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Due to the favourable economic situation and the continuing demand for labour, the number of foreigners in the Federal Republic of Germany increased between 1961 and 1972 from some 686,000 to about 3,439,000. Graph 2 also shows the great extent to which external migration in the Federal Republic is influenced by the economic trend: After the recession years 1966/67 with, for the first time, a negative migration balance, net immigration reached an absolute maximum because of the following economic upswing and the manpower requirements beginning in 1968; since 1970, the measures taken by the Federal Government and the Federal Bank in view of checking the excessive economic activity again caused a decline of the positive migration balance.

**55.** The analysis of the age years in Graph 3 shows that due to the arrivals of expellees and refugees in and after World War II the birth years both of the male and the female population grew relatively steadily in each age year by about 60,000 to 100,000 persons. The arriving foreign labour and their family members influenced the strength of the age years of the men to a much greater extent than those of the women. Moreover, the specific age structure of the arriving foreigners entailed a massive increase of the ages between 20 and 45 years, above all of those in which the efficiency of the labour force and their capability of sustaining continuous efforts is greatest. For the men aged 24 to 34 years, for instance, the proportion of foreigners in every age year is already considerably above 10%, while it declines sharply for the older men.

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# INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION STATISTICS FROM CENSUSES (The case of Canada)

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. In Canada, international migration data are needed for many purposes since immigration and emigration exercise significant influences on population changes as shown by Table I. The foremost demand arises regarding the amount of immigration and emigration that has taken place during a year and the characteristics of them in order to assess the impact on the demographic situation and labour market. Migration (1) statistics are specially needed for preparing population estimates and projections (2) and thus, as in Table I, they form an integral part of the system of demographic accounts. Besides, migration is directly associated with economic trends in the country and consequently, migration statistics bear close links with statistics of labour, income and wage and thereof, with the system of economic statistics as well.

2. Other needs for statistics on international migration arise for carrying out various studies on the many complex problems associated with international migration. The nature of these studies which may be broadly divided here into the two groups of a) general studies and b) policy studies, determine in essence the types of information required on immigration and emigration. The general studies covering demographic, social, economic and other aspects of migrants need basically information on age, sex, marital status, family size, employment, industry and occupation status, income and education level with a view to studying the growth pattern and differentials between the native-born and foreign-born population and their implications for the Canadian society. Data are also needed in these studies for the scientific analysis of the nature and causes

TABLE I — COMPONENTS OF POPULATION GROWTH IN CANADA, 1851-1971

Intercensal period	Total population increase (00)	Births (000)	Deaths (000)	Natural increase (000)	Ratio of natural increase to total growth	Immigration (000)	Emigration (000)	Net migration (000)	Ratio of net migration to total growth	Population at the end of the census period (000)
1851-1861	793	1,281	670	611	77.0	352	170	182	23.0	3,229
1861-1871	460	1,370	760	610	132.6	260	410	-150	-32.6	3,689
1871-1881	636	1,480	790	690	108.5	350	404	-54	-8.5	4,325
1881-1891	508	1,524	870	654	128.7	680	826	-146	-28.7	4,833
1891-1901	538	1,548	880	668	124.2	250	380	-130	-24.2	5,371
1901-1911	1,835	1,925	900	1,025	55.9	1,550	740	810	44.1	7,207
1911-1921	1,581	2,340	1,070	1,270	80.3	1,400	1,089	311	19.7	8,788
1921-1931	1,589	2,420	1,060	1,360	85.5	1,200	970	230	14.5	10,377
1931-1941	1,130	2,294	1,072	1,222	108.1	149	241	-92	-8.1	11,507
1941-1951	2,141	3,186	1,214	1,972	92.1	548	379	169	7.9	13,641
1951-1961	4,228	4,468	1,320	3,148	74.5	1,543	463	1,080	25.5	18,238
1961-1971	3,330	4,105	1,497	2,608	78.3	1,415	693	722	21.7	21,568

Note: Figures for 1941-1951 exclude Newfoundland.

Source: Population data are from 1931 Census of Canada, Vol. 1, Table 2a; 1966 Census of Canada, Vol. 1, Table 1; and 1971 Census of Canada, Advance Bulletin (AP-2) Catalogue No. 92-753. Other figures are from Pierre Camu, E.P. Weeks and A.W. Sametz in *Canadian Society Sociological Perfection* (3rd edition) edited by P.E. Jones, K.D. Naegele and John Porter, Toronto, 1969, Table 1, and from M.E. Fleming, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census Division, *Technical Memorandum* (General Series) November 14, 1967.

(\*) The author is thankful to Miss J. Perreault and Mr. N.E. Collishaw for their assistance in preparing this paper. The views expressed in the document are, however, those of the author and not of the Census Field, Statistics Canada.

of international migration. Migration can also cause some social problems as some groups can assimilate well into the new society, but others not. Investigation of these problems call for additional information on ethnic or racial origin, language, religion, etc.

3. Canada's immigration policy had undergone many changes over the years. In the early decades of this century, the immigrants were selected on the basis of nationality or country of origin. This policy was altered in 1962 and 1967 when the new regulations placed greater emphasis on education, training or other specific qualifications to suit the manpower needs of the economy. Another important element is the humanitarian aspect of Canada's immigration policy which has been clearly reflected in her response to the immediate post-war refugee problems, to the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian refugees and most recently, to the Asians expelled from Uganda.

4. Implementation of the new policy and regulations require a variety of statistics on international migration and studies designed specifically to know whether the recent immigration trends are in accord with the policy as compared to the arrivals in the years before the policy was introduced. Do immigrants join the occupations declared on arrival? Are the immigrants settling down in regions where their skills are in short supply? What are the effects of immigration on the demand for schooling, for various kinds of housing and for social security? These are a few examples of many questions (or studies) (3) requiring data for scientific investigations.

## II. PRESENT SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION STATISTICS FOR CANADA

5. Two important and regular sources of migration statistics are available for Canada. These are: a) frontier statistics collected on a continuous basis by the Department of Manpower and Immigration, and b) census statistics collected every ten years by Statistics Canada. The first source is of the nature of flow statistics recorded at the time of arrival for all individuals who possess landed immigrant visas. A well balanced system of information to meet adequately the various needs described in the preceding paragraphs, will require inclusion of many questions on socio-economic characteristics in addition to items utmost required for administration purposes. This imposes severe limitations on the scope of frontier statistics; nevertheless, the immigration statistics thus collected annually are fairly detailed and provide information on age, sex, marital status, country of former residence, destination in Canada, mode of arrival, intended occupation and country of citizenship. Besides, it may be noted that a Longitudinal Survey (4) is being carried out from 1969 by this Department to study the economic and social adaptation of immigrants.

6. No information is however collected by this or other Departments on emigrants from Canada. However, an extensive use is being made of immigration statistics collected administratively in the U.S.A. and U.K. to compile emigration statistics for Canada subject to the limitations of definitions used by these countries.

7. The second source, i.e., the Canadian censuses contain a rich and more comprehensive data on international migration. However, as well-known, the migration data that could be obtained from a Census are subject to certain limitations. First and foremost, the census statistics are stock data, and do not measure the continuous inflow as the system of frontier or border collection does. Census data reflect the net results of population movements, and do not cover the return migration. In addition, they provide only a partial coverage of those who survive to the census date. But, the great advantage is the variety of data that may be extracted from census most economically and for smaller geographical areas. Further, under the first system, information is registered using the individual as the unit whereas migration studies seldom point to the need for using the family as a unit of registration. Also, several studies, and in particular the policy studies, require data on migrants after they had fairly settled in the country that could be obtained only by a separate inquiry or through census.

8. In the context, the purpose of this paper is to present in detail the types of information available from the 1971 Census of Canada. As we know well, the data are far more valuable if collected in the same manner in two censuses and therefore, the paper will cover the 1961 Census as well. Moreover, since 1971 census migration data are not yet published, the illustrative examples of available data will be taken from the 1961 Census results. It is to be emphasized, however, that similar data, unless otherwise indicated, could also be derived from the 1971 Census.

### III. INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION QUESTIONS IN THE CANADIAN CENSUSES

9. The Census of Canada has a long tradition of asking one or more questions on international migration reflecting the data needs of the time and the advances in concepts and measurement of migration. These questions may be divided into two categories: a) international migration questions proper, and b) international migration related questions. The latter group includes, for example, the questions on i) ethnic or cultural group; ii) racial origin; iii) mother tongue; and iv) religion. The first category denotes the following: i) country of birth; ii) period of immigration; iii) nationality or country of citizenship. In the 1961 Census, for the first time, and later in the 1971 Census, another question of place of residence five years ago was introduced which, from the point of migration studies, may be considered very valuable. Table II presents in detail information about the 1971 Census content, i.e., the questions asked and what responses were recorded on the master file. The table also indicates whether these questions were included in the 1961 Census

TABLE II — LIST OF MIGRATION AND RELATED QUESTIONS CONTAINED IN 1961 AND 1971 CENSUSES OF CANADA

Census Questions	1971 Census (a)	1961 Census
<b>A. Migration Questions</b>		
1. Birthplace	×	×
2. Birthplace of parents	×	Not asked
3. Country of citizenship	×	×
4. Period of immigration	×	×
5. Place of residence 5 years ago	×	× (b)
<b>B. Migration Related Questions</b>		
1. Ethnic group	×	×
2. Language most often spoken at home	×	Not asked
3. Mother tongue	×	×
Note: a. Coverage limited to one-third sample except for the question of mother-tongue. b. Coverage limited to one-fifth sample.		
Source: Statistics Canada, <i>Dictionary of the 1971 Census Terms</i> , Census Division, Statistics Canada, Ottawa, December 1972.		

10. Among these migration questions, the most common and continuously asked in many Canadian Censuses has been the question on country of birth. On the basis of this query, the foreign-born population was calculated at the time of census. The foreign-born population may further be classified according to the country of birth and place of enumeration giving thereof a more detailed picture of distribution of immigrants across the country. An illustrative compilation of the birth-place data from the 1971 Census is shown in Table III.

11. The question is very simple and easily understood. For this reason, misstatement of place of birth might be far less in the census; nevertheless, there might still be errors owing to deliberate misreporting of the country of birth for political or other reasons. Another difficulty in the Canadian situation arises from the boundary-changes of the nations especially after the World War II. But, the most serious problem is that the time of immigration would not be known from this question. To overcome this problem, the Canadian Censuses of 1971, 1961 and even earlier years included the question on period of immigration. Cross-classification of statistics on country of birth with period of immigration provide very useful information for explaining the demographic trends in terms of the components at different intervals of time.

12. Further, the birth-place question assumes a single movement directly from the country of birth to the receiving country. Immigration in modern times is characterised by what is known as the circular or progressive migration, i.e., movement in stages from one country to another (e.g. U.K. to U.S.A. and then to Canada). Also, in the case of Canada until recently when the immigration from Canada to U.S.A. had been limited, there was a large and free movement of population across the borders of Canada and U.S.A. These aspects of international migration to and from Canada are not well captured by the place of birth question.

TABLE III — POPULATION BORN OUTSIDE CANADA BY PERIOD OF IMMIGRATION, CANADA AND PROVINCES, 1971 CENSUS

	Total	Immi- grated prior to 1946	Immigrated during 1946-1971					
			1946- 1971	1946- 1955	1956- 1960	1961- 1965	1966- 1968	1969- 1971 (1)
Number								
Canada	3,295,530	953,585	2,341,945	789,035	495,320	346,980	416,420	292,195
Newfoundland	8,940	1,410	7,530	2,010	1,100	1,330	1,560	1,530
Prince Edward Island	3,705	1,335	2,370	850	395	370	415	340
Nova Scotia	37,190	12,785	24,405	7,930	4,030	3,770	4,320	4,350
New Brunswick	23,730	9,590	14,145	4,515	2,415	2,415	2,375	2,420
Quebec	468,925	97,375	371,550	101,935	82,720	70,215	70,645	46,030
Ontario	1,707,395	381,155	1,326,235	457,895	280,410	194,140	233,835	159,955
Manitoba	151,250	69,415	81,835	30,260	16,015	9,270	14,980	11,305
Saskatchewan	110,690	77,950	32,740	13,430	6,015	4,085	5,560	3,650
Alberta	282,260	117,430	164,830	64,060	34,025	19,200	27,215	20,325
British Columbia	496,660	184,250	312,415	105,040	69,355	41,630	54,640	41,745
Yukon	2,545	535	2,005	575	455	275	410	300
Northwest Territories	2,245	355	1,890	535	375	280	460	240
Percentage								
Canada	100.0	28.9	71.1	23.9	15.0	10.5	12.6	8.86
Newfoundland	100.0	15.7	84.2	22.4	12.3	14.8	17.4	17.1
Prince Edward Island	100.0	36.0	64.0	22.9	10.6	9.9	11.2	9.2
Nova Scotia	100.0	34.4	65.6	21.3	10.8	10.2	11.6	11.7
New Brunswick	100.0	40.4	59.6	19.0	10.2	10.2	10.0	10.1
Quebec	100.0	20.7	79.3	21.7	17.6	14.9	15.1	9.8
Ontario	100.0	22.3	77.7	26.8	16.4	11.4	13.69	9.4
Manitoba	100.0	45.9	54.1	20.0	10.6	6.2	9.9	7.5
Saskatchewan	100.0	70.4	29.5	12.2	5.4	3.7	5.1	3.3
Alberta	100.0	41.6	58.4	22.7	12.0	6.8	9.6	7.2
British Columbia	100.0	37.1	62.9	21.2	13.9	8.4	11.0	8.4
Yukon	100.0	21.0	78.8	22.6	17.8	10.8	16.1	11.8
Northwest Territories	100.0	15.8	84.2	23.8	16.7	12.5	20.5	10.7

(1) Includes the first five months only of 1971.

Source: Statistics Canada, 1971 *Census of Canada*, Advance Bulletin, Catalogue 92-761 (AP-10) Ottawa: Information Canada, September 1973, pp. 2-7.

13. The foregoing limitation of the birth-place statistics has been considerably reduced in the 1971 and 1961 Censuses which contained, as pointed out earlier, a question on place of residence five years ago. As a result, the migration statistics from these two censuses are time specific in the sense that immigration is, according to this question, determined by a comparison of residence at two definite points of time. Cross-classification of responses to this question with place of birth yields the valuable information on the return of migration of the Canadian-born.

14. A new question introduced for the first time in the 1971 Census enquires about the birth-place of parents. In consequence, valuable information will be available from the 1971 Census on the socio-economic characteristics of the second generation of immigrants and their place in the Canadian society.

#### IV. CROSS-CLASSIFICATIONS OF MIGRATION STATISTICS WITH OTHER SOCIO-ECONOMIC DATA FROM CENSUS

15. As already indicated, the census is perhaps the most economical source for obtaining a variety of cross-classifications of migration statistics with demographic, economic and social characteristics that are indispensable for in-depth analyses and studies on immigration or emigration using the foreign censuses. To indicate the types of demographic and non-demographic information with which migration data may be cross-classified, the 1971 Census Questionnaire is shown in Annex I.

16. In addition, some of the cross-classifications that have produced useful information are in the following pages highlighted from the 1961 census results (5). It may also be pointed out here that the 1961 census

migration data were more fully utilized in the Census monograph by Warren E. Kalbach, *The Impact of Immigration on Canada's Population* (6). The migration tabulations prepared for this monograph were very exhaustive reflecting the maximum information so far extracted from a Canadian census. Therefore, a list of the 1961 Census monograph tabulations (published or unpublished) is reproduced in Annex II with a view to indicate the variety of cross-classifications of migration statistics with other variables of the census data system.

## A. Cross-classifications with Economic Data

17. From the point of policy studies, the cross-classifications of immigration data with economic characteristics, i.e. employment status, occupation, educational level, industry and income are most valuable. By its very nature, the system of frontier statistics cannot provide these types of information for it is necessary that a few years has elapsed since the time of arrival to carry out these studies. Except conducting an *ad hoc* migration survey, the census proves to be the only data source for these various studies.

18. In general, immigration brings relatively more economically active adults and in recent decades, highly qualified people or what is described as the 'braindrain' from other countries. Based on 1961 census data, Chart 1 illustrates the activity patterns of immigrants to Canada and of native-born people. It is noticed that the post-war immigrants had higher rates of participation in the labour force than the native-born at all age groups. The economic activity pattern of the pre-war immigrants showed higher rates than that of the native-born at ages 25 to 64 only. These differentials were even more striking among females as evident from Chart 1. It is interesting to observe that at the middle ages, the female participation rates among post-war immigrants were quite high compared to the native-born.




Chart 1. — Percentage of the native-born, pre-war and post-war immigrant population in the current experienced labor force, by age and sex, Canada, 1961.

19. Besides the quantitative impact on the labour force, the educational level of immigrants could be obtained from the 1961 Census and Table IV illustrates a detailed cross-classification of immigrants by place of birth and period of immigration. Thus, the post-war immigrants had relatively more educational attainment than the pre-war group. The proportion of post-war immigrants who had 1 to 4 years of University education was 4.2 percent as compared to just 2.8 percent of the pre-war group. Comparisons by country of origin revealed certain striking features. First, the proportion of post-war immigrants with a university

degree was remarkably greater, about 11.8 percent from U.S.A. (3.9 percent in the pre-war period), 9.3 percent from the Commonwealth (9.1 percent) and 6.3 percent from the Asiatic and other countries (3.8 percent). This proportion was only 3.6 percent among the post-war immigrants from all countries. Highly educated immigrants from the U.K. although increased in this period, it was not so sharp as the immigration from the U.S.A.

TABLE IV — PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PRE-WAR AND POST-WAR IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS, BY YEARS OF SCHOOLING AND PLACE OF BIRTH, CANADA, 1961

Years of schooling	Total immigrants	United Kingdom	Other Commonwealth	United States	Northern and western European	Other European	Asiatic and other
Pre-war immigrants							
	p.c.	p.c.	p.c.	p.c.	p.c.	p.c.	p.c.
No schooling	3.8	0.3	2.8	0.8	1.9	11.5	15.4
Elementary school	55.2	49.9	28.9	47.9	60.8	67.5	55.2
1-5 + yrs. secondary school	36.0	45.0	50.0	42.9	32.4	18.3	22.4
1-4 + yrs. university	2.8	3.0	9.2	4.5	2.8	1.3	3.2
University degree	2.1	1.8	9.1	3.9	2.1	1.4	3.8
Totals, per cent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Totals, Number	1,337,146	605,283	11,274	213,881	126,997	353,737	25,974
Post-war immigrants							
	p.c.	p.c.	p.c.	p.c.	p.c.	p.c.	p.c.
No schooling	4.6	2.9	5.3	14.0	4.5	4.0	10.5
Elementary school	47.7	28.8	31.0	30.8	45.3	64.1	48.4
1-5 + yrs. secondary school	39.9	59.9	45.9	33.2	44.6	25.7	29.4
1-4 + yrs. university	4.2	4.8	8.5	10.2	3.4	3.3	5.4
University degree	3.6	3.6	9.3	11.8	2.2	2.9	6.3
Totals, per cent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Totals, Number	1,507,116	364,432	36,613	70,027	396,496	590,827	48,721

Source: P.W.I. tabulations, Table A16. W. Kalbach, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

20. This trend was also reflected in Chart 2 which compares the 1961 census data on the occupational structure of immigrants by period of immigration with the native-born labour force. The proportion of post-war immigrants reporting professional and technical occupations was larger than that of native-born and the pre-war immigrants. About two-fifths of the post-war immigrants belonged to the craftsmen category. The proportion of farmers was less than two percent in sharp contrast to the trend in the pre-war period. Most of the female immigrants represented the service and recreation, clerical and craftsmen and professional groups.

21. Further break-down of census data in Table V shows the relative concentration of post-war immigrants in the professional and technical occupations. It also compares the educational level of immigrants with the native-born in this category for both males and females. Post-war immigrants, especially in physical sciences, teaching and certain other occupations had higher proportions with a university degree. Female post-war immigrants showed better than males and had markedly higher proportions with a university degree in several categories of occupations than the native-born women.

22. From the point of immigration policy, it is of importance to compare the intended occupations of immigrants at the time of arrival with the information available from the census (7).

#### B. Cross-classifications with Fertility Data

23. The 1971 and 1961 Censuses contain a question on the number of children born alive to ever married women 15 years and over. Cross-classifications of this information with census migration question provide




Chart 2. — Percentage distribution of the current experienced labour force by major occupation and sex, for native born, pre-war immigrants, Canada, 1961.

TABLE V — CURRENT EXPERIENCED LABOUR FORCE 15 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER IN PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL OCCUPATIONS AND PERCENTAGE WITH UNIVERSITY DEGREES, FOR NATIVE BORN AND POST-WAR IMMIGRANTS BY SEX, CANADA, 1961

Sex and professional and technical occupations	Male				Female			
	Native born	Post-war immigrants						
	No.	No.	p. c.	p. c.	No.	No.	p. c.	p. c.
Professional engineers	28,776	10,829	75.0	68.2	74	38	74.3	89.5
Civil	8,162	3,009	82.8	77.9	19	9	78.9	77.8
Mechanical	4,729	2,664	70.1	62.1	2	11	100.0	100.0
Industrial	2,647	888	46.1	46.4				
Electrical	5,880	2,192	76.9	67.4	33	6	75.8	100.0
Mining	1,755	399	80.4	84.2				
Chemical	2,175	609	88.2	83.6	5	9	80.0	88.9
Not elsewhere stated	3,428	1,068	71.0	61.0	15	3	45.4	66.7
Physical scientists	7,084	2,683	71.7	78.0	390	175	64.6	78.8
Chemists	3,787	1,520	63.8	71.6	276	145	67.8	77.9
Geologists	1,852	698	84.8	88.8	40	13	67.5	84.6
Physicists	441	173	89.6	94.2	16	9	81.2	100.0
n.e.s.	1,004	292	69.7	75.3	58	8	43.1	62.5
Biologists and agricultural professionals	4,496	744	71.5	75.5	258	89	69.4	77.5
Biological scientists	1,017	269	82.0	81.4	191	68	75.9	79.4
Veterinarians	1,179	237	84.9	88.2	17	9	76.5	100.0
Agricultural professionals, n.e.s.	2,300	238	60.0	56.3	50	12	42.0	50.0
Teachers	53,822	5,539	48.5	58.1	115,540	4,948	13.6	27.8
Professors and college principals	6,541	1,556	89.1	92.9	1,978	225	60.3	82.2
School teachers	43,087	3,396	45.3	49.1	109,296	4,463	13.0	26.1
Teachers and instructors, n.e.s.	4,194	587	17.7	18.2	4,266	260	5.6	10.0
Health professionals	33,117	6,055	77.2	67.1	81,312	11,384	9.1	13.0
Physicians and surgeons	15,097	3,540	96.3	96.2	810	542	78.4	93.7
Dentists	4,714	191	95.5	89.5	145	75	24.1	74.7
Nurses, graduate	1,616	527	6.7	5.7	49,167	7,488	10.6	6.0
Nurses-in-training	271	46	6.3	4.3	21,714	837	0.3	0.8
Law professionals	11,283	372	92.5	89.0	283	19	82.7	68.4
Religion professionals	18,511	2,908	55.2	55.6	8,607	548	6.8	13.1
Artists, writers and musicians	14,545	3,306	15.8	18.6	9,595	1,094	14.4	21.9
Other professionals	100,742	25,109	17.0	19.1	20,866	4,224	25.1	23.6

Source : W. Kalbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 229, 230, 231.

TABLE VI — NUMBER OF LIVE-BORN CHILDREN PER 1,000 WOMEN EVER MARRIED, BY AGE AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH OF WOMAN, CANADA, URBAN, 1961

Country of birth	Age of woman (in years)										
	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65+
Canada	706	1,260	2,102	2,664	2,944	2,971	2,801	2,882	3,238	3,536	3,970
Germany	580	902	1,375	1,688	1,742	1,930	2,021	2,211	2,279	2,518	3,363
U.S.A.	641	1,092	2,091	2,565	2,938	2,718	2,660	2,726	2,889	3,324	3,661
Italy	636	907	1,410	2,052	2,493	2,416	2,129	2,129	2,210	2,492	2,850
Northern Ireland	429	990	1,607	1,930	2,475	2,375	2,250	2,279	2,362	2,536	3,106
Netherlands	402	970	1,570	2,013	2,484	2,876	3,182	3,827	3,906	4,076	4,832
Poland	457	1,136	1,930	2,519	2,788	3,264	3,777	4,240	4,186	3,979	4,276
Great Britain	368	980	1,756	2,148	2,193	2,019	2,001	2,343	2,596	3,052	4,400
Scandinavia	455	1,043	1,623	2,011	2,356	2,369	2,269	2,355	2,615	2,606	3,814
U.S.S.R.	273	945	1,626	2,023	2,079	1,949	1,974	2,193	2,593	3,470	4,496

Source: DBS, *Census of Canada, 1961*, Bulletin 4. 1-8, Table H6.

most valuable and seldom available data to investigate the level, pattern and differential by country of birth, (or ethnic groups) and period of immigration. Types of cross-classifications available as well as an extensive analysis would be found in the 1961 Census Monograph by Jacques Henripin, *Trends and Factors of Fertility in Canada* (8). An illustrative tabulation of fertility data by country of birth and age of women is given in Table VI.

24. Before the age 40, it is observed that the Canadian-born women had the largest fertility followed by the American women. Women born in other countries reported a lower fertility but there were no indications of substantial differences, except for the German women who showed markedly lower fertility. Among the older women, the highest fertility was observed for women born in the Netherlands and in Italy. The fertility of immigrant women may likely be more influenced by the number of years they were settled in Canada, i.e., by period of immigration. The 1961 Census of Canada furnishes data of this type for detailed investigation.

### C. Cross-classifications with Other Census Data

25. More cross-classifications of migration data with citizenship, language, family characteristics and income could be obtained from the Canadian censuses (see Annex II). Trends in citizenship status by period of immigration provide valuable information for policy studies besides reflecting the assimilation process. In this respect, the immigrant family as a unit plays a significant role in the social adjustment and eventual settlement in the country, and as indicated in Section II, the census is the main source of information on the immigrant families. Data on ethnic inter-marriage, trends in class of worker, and income which are available in 1961 and 1971 Censuses provide additional information on the assimilative processes—economic as well as social—and the evolution of the Canadian society.

## V. CONCLUSION

26. Overlooking the international migration statistics from the census of Canada, it may be underlined that a variety of migration data, on the basis of the individual as well as the immigrant family as the statistical unit, is available in the census. Further, many tabulations showing multiple cross-classifications with socio-economic characteristics of immigrants are prepared as part of the regular publication programme in each census. In the 1971 Census, in addition to the regular tabulations, census tapes would be available for further computer analysis by users in more detail by geographical areas or by characteristics at a small cost.

27. However, it may be pointed out that a serious gap exists in our system of international migration statistics regarding emigration. As indicated in the beginning, emigration is an important factor in the Canadian situation especially the exchange of population between Canada and the U.S.A. More surprisingly, no information was so far collected at the frontiers nor attempts made to collect emigration statistics in the census. A valuable source of information on the Canadian emigration has been and will continue to be the censuses of other countries, in particular the Census of the United States. Besides the fact that the U.S. and other censuses are held at different years, another and more serious problem is faced by lack of international comparability of immigration statistics collected in the censuses of different countries. At present, there is no uniformity in the definitions of immigrants or emigrants.

28. In the above context, it will be most valuable to develop and adopt an international standard regarding the definition, collection and tabulation of migration statistics from the census. This effort will further enhance the usefulness of migration statistics collected in the censuses to both the receiving and the sending countries.

## REFERENCES

- (1) The term 'migration', unless specifically stated, refers in this paper to immigration and/or emigration.
- (2) For an example of the use of migration statistics in population projections see K.S. Gnanasekaran, *Migration Projections for Canada, 1969-1984*, Analytical and Technical Memorandum No. 5, Census Division, Statistics Canada, Ottawa, 1970. Also, J. Perreault and K.S. Gnanasekaran, *International*

*and Interprovincial Migration Projections: Canada and Provinces, 1951-1986*, Background Paper prepared for the 1971 Statistics Canada Population Projections, Census Field, Statistics Canada, Ottawa, October 1973.

- (3) See M.V. George and L.W. St. John-Jones, *Proposals for Migration Research Using 1971 Census Data*, Working Paper (Demographic and Socio-Economic Series) No. 17E, Census Field, Statistics Canada, Ottawa, July 1973.
- (4) For more details see E. Ziegler, "The Longitudinal Study of the Economic and Social Adaptation of Immigrants", *Paper presented at the Conference on Policy and Research on Migration*, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, October 17-20, 1973.
- (5) For more detail see Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *1961 Census of Canada, Vols. I to IV*, Queen's Printer, Ottawa and Statistics Canada (formerly Dominion Bureau of Statistics), *1971 Census of Canada*, Volume Series as released, Information Canada, Ottawa.
- (6) Warren E. Kalbach, *The Impact of Immigration on Canada's Population*, The Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1970. Also see W. Burton Hurd, *Origin, Birthplace, Nationality and Language of the Canadian People*, 1921 Census Monograph; W. Burton Hurd, *Racial Origins and Nativity of the Canadian People*, 1931 Census Monograph; and *Ethnic Origin and Nativity of the Canadian People*, 1941 Census Monograph, Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1965.
- (7) *Ibid.*, pp. 260-262; also Anthony H. Richmond, *Post-War Immigrants in Canada*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1967; and Canada, Department of Manpower and Immigration, *Immigration Statistics*, Annual Reports, 1950 to 1971, Information Canada, Ottawa.
- (8) Jacques Henripin, *Trends and Factors of Fertility in Canada*, Information Canada, Ottawa, 1972, pp. 149-220.

Annex I - Questionnaire of 1971 Census of Canada

Page 21 Please start with Question 1 by listing names.

1. Print the NAME of usual residents of this dwelling on June 1, 1971:  
 (a) present in this dwelling.  
 (b) temporarily away.  
 Include persons with no other home. For details and order of listing, see Reference Booklet.

2. RELATIONSHIP TO HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD  
 The HEAD of household is the husband unless the wife is the parent where there is one parent only, with unmarried children; or any member of a group sharing a dwelling equally.

3. MOTHER TONGUE  
 Languages FIRST spoken and STILL UNDERSTOOD  
 FILL ONE CIRCLE ONLY

4. MARITAL STATUS  
 FILL ONE CIRCLE ONLY

5. DATE OF BIRTH  
 MONTH OF BIRTH FILL ONE CIRCLE ONLY  
 YEAR OF BIRTH FILL ONE CIRCLE ONLY  
 ACTUAL YEAR FILL ONE CIRCLE ONLY

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Person 1  
 First name Last name Initial  
 Relationship to head of household: Head of household, Son or daughter of head, etc.  
 Mother tongue: English, French, Italian, etc.  
 Marital status: Single, Married, etc.  
 Date of birth: Month, Year, Actual year.

Person 2  
 First name Last name Initial  
 Relationship to head of household: Wife of head, Son or daughter of head, etc.  
 Mother tongue: English, French, Italian, etc.  
 Marital status: Single, Married, etc.  
 Date of birth: Month, Year, Actual year.

Person 3  
 First name Last name Initial  
 Relationship to head of household: Wife of head, Son or daughter of head, etc.  
 Mother tongue: English, French, Italian, etc.  
 Marital status: Single, Married, etc.  
 Date of birth: Month, Year, Actual year.

Person 4  
 First name Last name Initial  
 Relationship to head of household: Wife of head, Son or daughter of head, etc.  
 Mother tongue: English, French, Italian, etc.  
 Marital status: Single, Married, etc.  
 Date of birth: Month, Year, Actual year.

Person 5  
 First name Last name Initial  
 Relationship to head of household: Wife of head, Son or daughter of head, etc.  
 Mother tongue: English, French, Italian, etc.  
 Marital status: Single, Married, etc.  
 Date of birth: Month, Year, Actual year.

Person 6  
 First name Last name Initial  
 Relationship to head of household: Wife of head, Son or daughter of head, etc.  
 Mother tongue: English, French, Italian, etc.  
 Marital status: Single, Married, etc.  
 Date of birth: Month, Year, Actual year.

Person 7  
 First name Last name Initial  
 Relationship to head of household: Wife of head, Son or daughter of head, etc.  
 Mother tongue: English, French, Italian, etc.  
 Marital status: Single, Married, etc.  
 Date of birth: Month, Year, Actual year.

**NAME OF PERSON 1** \_\_\_\_\_  
 Complete pages 6 and 7 for Person 1

**11. Where were you born?**  
 If born IN Canada, mark the province then SKIP TO QUESTION 13.  
 Nfld.  N.S.  Que.  Man.  Alta.  Yukon  
 P.E.I.  N.B.  Ont.  Sask.  B.C.  N.W.T.  
 Otherwise, mark country according to present boundaries.  
 U.K.  Poland  
 Germany  Rep. of Ireland  
 Italy  U.S.A.  
 Other, write here \_\_\_\_\_

**12. If born OUTSIDE Canada, in what period did you first immigrate to Canada?**  
 Before 1931  1931-1945  1946-1950  1951-1955  
 1956-1960  1961-1964  1965  1966  
 1967-1968  1969  1970  1971

**13. Were your PARENTS born in Canada?**  
 Both  Mother only  Father only  
 Neither

**14. Of what country are you a CITIZEN?**  
 Canada  U.S.A.  
 U.K.  
 Other, write here \_\_\_\_\_

**15. To what ethnic or cultural group did you or your ancestor (on the male side) belong on coming to this continent?**  
 English  Native Indian  Polish  
 French  — Band  Scottish  
 German  Native Indian  Irish  Ukrainian  
 Irish  — Non-band  
 Italian  Netherlands  
 Jewish  Norwegian  
 Other, write here \_\_\_\_\_

**16. What is your religion?**  
 Anglican  Pentecostal  No religion  
 Baptist  Presbyterian  
 Greek Orthodox  Roman Catholic  
 Jewish  Salvation Army  
 Lutheran  Ukrainian Catholic  
 Mennonite  United Church  
 Other, write here \_\_\_\_\_

**17. What language do you MOST OFTEN speak at home now?**  
 English  Magyar  
 French  Netherlands  
 German  Polish  
 Indian  Ukrainian  
 Italian  Yiddish  
 Other, write here \_\_\_\_\_

**18. Can you speak English or French well enough to conduct a conversation? (See Instruction Booklet.)**  
 English only  Both English and French  
 French only  Neither English nor French

**19. Have you attended school or university since last September?**  
 Yes, full-time  Yes, part-time, day or evening  No

**20. What is the HIGHEST grade or year of elementary or secondary school you ever attended? (See Instruction Booklet.)**  
 No schooling  Kindergarten  
 Elementary or secondary (grade or year)  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

**21. Are you 15 years of age or older (i.e., born before June 1, 1956)?**  
 No — End here for this person  
 Yes — Continue below

**22. Where did you attend your HIGHEST grade of elementary or secondary school?**  
 This province  Other province (specify) \_\_\_\_\_  
 Outside Canada  
 No schooling

**23. How many years of schooling have you had since secondary school?**  
 University \_\_\_\_\_ None 1 2 3 4 5 6+  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Other (See Instruction Booklet.) \_\_\_\_\_ None 1 2 3+  
 \_\_\_\_\_

**24. Do you have a university degree, certificate or diploma?**  
 Mark highest academic qualification.  
 No university degree, certificate or diploma  
 Yes, a university certificate or diploma (below Bachelor level)  
 Yes, Bachelor degree  
 Yes, First Professional degree  
 Yes, a Master's or equivalent, or earned Doctorate (e.g., Ph.D., Ed.D.)

**25. Have you EVER COMPLETED a full-time vocational course of three months or longer?**  
 Do not include university or high school courses.  
 Yes, apprenticeship course  No — GO TO QUESTION 26  
 Yes, other full-time vocational  
 (a) Describe course or apprenticeship of longest duration \_\_\_\_\_  
 (e.g., auto mechanic, chemical technology, drafting, commercial art, X-ray technician, accounting, barbering . . .)  
 (b) How long was this course or apprenticeship?  
 3-5 months  6-12 months  1-2 years  2-3 years  More than 3 years  
 (c) When did you complete this course or apprenticeship?  
 Before 1946  1946-1955  1956-1960  1961-1965  1966-1968  1969-1971

**26. Where did you live 5 years ago, on June 1, 1966?**  
 Same dwelling — SKIP TO QUESTION 28  
 Same city, town, village or municipality (not same dwelling)  
 Outside of Canada  
 Different city, town, village or municipality in Canada, give its name \_\_\_\_\_  
 City, town, village, municipality, etc. \_\_\_\_\_  
 County \_\_\_\_\_ Province \_\_\_\_\_  
**IMPORTANT: If outside city or town limit, specify name of suburban municipality and not of city or town.**

**27. How many times have you MOVED from one Canadian city, town, village or municipality to another since June 1, 1966? Count moving away and returning to the same place as 2 moves.**  
 None  1  2  3  4  5 or more

**28. For PERSONS ever married:**  
 What was the date of your first marriage?  
 Mark circles for month, decade and year.

Month	Decade	Year
<input type="radio"/> Jan.	<input type="radio"/> July	<input type="radio"/> 188- <input type="radio"/> 0
<input type="radio"/> Feb.	<input type="radio"/> Aug.	<input type="radio"/> 189- <input type="radio"/> 1
<input type="radio"/> Mar.	<input type="radio"/> Sept.	<input type="radio"/> 190- <input type="radio"/> 2
<input type="radio"/> Apr.	<input type="radio"/> Oct.	<input type="radio"/> 191- <input type="radio"/> 3
<input type="radio"/> May	<input type="radio"/> Nov.	<input type="radio"/> 192- <input type="radio"/> 4
<input type="radio"/> June	<input type="radio"/> Dec.	<input type="radio"/> 193- <input type="radio"/> 5
		<input type="radio"/> 194- <input type="radio"/> 6
		<input type="radio"/> 195- <input type="radio"/> 7
		<input type="radio"/> 196- <input type="radio"/> 8
		<input type="radio"/> 197- <input type="radio"/> 9

**29. For WOMEN ever married:**  
 How many babies have you had, not counting stillbirths?  
 None  1  2  3  4  
 5  6  7  8  9  
 10  11  12  13  14+

**30. For MEN 35 years of age or over:**  
 Did you have any wartime service in the active military forces of Canada or allied countries?  
 Yes, in World War I or earlier wars  
 Yes, in World War II or in Korea  
 No wartime service

**OFFICE USE ONLY**

11. \_\_\_\_\_  
 14. \_\_\_\_\_  
 15. \_\_\_\_\_  
 16. \_\_\_\_\_  
 17. \_\_\_\_\_  
 22. \_\_\_\_\_  
 25. \_\_\_\_\_  
 26. \_\_\_\_\_

PN  C

QUESTIONS 31 TO 40 ARE TO BE ANSWERED IF YOU ARE 15 OR OVER (BORN BEFORE JUNE 1, 1956)

**31. (a)** How many hours did you work for pay or profit last week?  
*Include all jobs and overtime.*  
 None  20 or more  
 1-19

**(b)** Last week, how many hours did you help without pay in the operation of a family business or farm?  
*Do not include housework in own home.*  
 None  20 or more  
 1-19

**(c)** Did you look for work last week?  
*For example, contact a Canada Manpower Centre, check with employers, place or answer newspaper ads, etc.*  
 Yes  No

**(d)** Last week did you have a job from which you were on temporary lay-off?  
 Yes  No

**(e)** Last week did you have a job or business from which you were absent because of illness, vacation, strike, training courses, etc.?  
 Yes  No

**32.** When did you last work at all, even for a few days?  
 In 1971   
 In 1970  
 Before 1970 **SKIP TO QUESTION 40**  
 Never worked

Questions 33-38 refer to your job or business last week. If none, answer for your job of longest duration since January 1, 1970.

**33.** How many hours do you usually work each week?  
 1-19  35-39  50 or more  
 20-29  40-44  
 30-34  45-49

**34.** For whom did you work? **PLEASE PRINT:**  
 Name of firm, government agency, etc.  
 Department, branch, division, or section

**35.** Industry  
 What kind of business, industry or service was this?  
*Give a full description, e.g., paper-box mfg., road construction, retail shoe store.*

**36.** Occupation  
**(a)** What kind of work were you doing?  
*E.g., selling shoes, civil engineering, motor vehicle repairing, metal machining, clerical work.*

**(b)** What were your most important activities or duties?  
*E.g., fitting shoes, designing bridges, auto body work, operating lathe, posting invoices.*

**(c)** What was your job title?  
*E.g., manager of shoe department, civil engineer, auto body repairman, lathe operator, invoice clerk.*

**37.** In this occupation were you mainly:  
 working for wages, salary, tips or commission?  
 working without pay in a family business or farm?  
 self-employed without paid help? **Was this farm or business incorporated?**  Yes  No  
 self-employed with paid help?

**38.** Where do you usually work?  
*Give this information for job described above. If no usual place of work, see Instruction Booklet.*

Number Street  
 City, town, village or municipality County Province  
 At home   Outside Canada

**39. (a)** In how many weeks did you work during 1970?  
*Include weeks worked part-time, leave with pay and weeks of self-employment.*  
 Did not work during 1970  14-26  40-48  
 1-13  27-39  49-52

**(b)** Was this work mainly full-time or part-time?  
 Full-time   Part-time

**40. INCOME FOR 1970** (State in dollars only)

**(a)** During 1970 what were your total wages and salaries, commissions, bonuses, tips, etc.? (*before any deductions*)  
 Amount \$ \_\_\_\_\_ /00  None

**(b)** During 1970 what was your net income from self-employment or operating your own non-farm business or professional practice?  
*State total business income less expenses of operation. If lost money, give amount and write "Loss".*  
 Amount \$ \_\_\_\_\_ /00  None

**(c)** During 1970 what was your net income from operating a farm on your own account or in partnership?  
*State total farm income less expenses of operation. If lost money, give amount and write "Loss".*  
 Amount \$ \_\_\_\_\_ /00  None

**(d)** During 1970 how much income did you receive from:  
 1. Family and youth allowances?  
 Amount \$ \_\_\_\_\_ /00  None

2. Government old age pensions, Canada pensions, and Quebec pensions?  
 Amount \$ \_\_\_\_\_ /00  None

3. Other government income? (*e.g., unemployment insurance, veterans' pensions and allowances, welfare*)  
 Amount \$ \_\_\_\_\_ /00  None

4. Retirement pensions from previous employment?  
 Amount \$ \_\_\_\_\_ /00  None

5. Bond and deposit interest and dividends?  
 Amount \$ \_\_\_\_\_ /00  None

6. Other investment income? (*e.g., net rents*)  
 Amount \$ \_\_\_\_\_ /00  None

7. Other income? (*e.g., alimony*)  
 Amount \$ \_\_\_\_\_ /00  None

**(e)** During 1970 what was your total income? (*a+b+c+d*)  
 Amount \$ \_\_\_\_\_ /00   None

35	36 S	38	40a) E C	b) E L	c) E L	d) 1	OFFICE USE ONLY							d) 2	d) 3	d) 4	d) 5 E	d) 6 E L	d) 7	e) E L	
0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	OFFICE USE ONLY							0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000
0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000								d) 2	d) 3	d) 4	d) 5 E	d) 6 E L	d) 7	e) E L	
0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	3							0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000
0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000								d) 2	d) 3	d) 4	d) 5 E	d) 6 E L	d) 7	e) E L	

Please turn to the next page and answer questions for person 2 listed on page 2.

Questions 1 to 26 of the Population Questionnaire (Form 2A)

1961  
Census of  
Canada  
Form  
**2A**  
POPULATION

**1. Same or different household?**  
 Start of a new household → **A. Household No. (from Visitation Record)**  
 Continuation of same household → **B. Exact location of this dwelling?**  
 (Street and no., or lot and concession, etc.) (City, town, village, parish, municipality)

**C. Is this dwelling on a farm or small agricultural holding?**  
 (One acre and 1/20 sales)  
 Yes  No

**2. Name of person?**  
 (Surname or family name - PLEASE PRINT) (Given name and initials)

**3. Relationship to head of household?**  
 Head of household, Wife of head, Son of head, Daughter of head, etc.

**4. Male or female?**  
 Male  Female

**5. Age of last birthday? (Before June 1, 1961)**  
 Under one year, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100 years or over

**6. Single, married, widowed, or divorced?**  
 Single (Never married), Married (Include separated), Widowed, Divorced

**7. In what province (or country) were you born?**  
 (If outside Canada, give country according to present boundaries)

**8. In what year did you immigrate to Canada?**  
 Born in Canada or Before 1921, 1921-1930, 1931-1940, 1941-1945, 1946-1950, 1951-1955, 1956-1957, 1958-1959, 1960, 1961

**9. Country of citizenship (Are you a Canadian? (If not, of what country are you a national or a citizen?))**  
 Canada, United Kingdom, U.S.A., Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, U.S.S.R., etc.

**10. To what ethnic or cultural group did you or your ancestor (on the male side) belong on coming to this continent?**  
 Austrian, Belgian, Czech, Danish, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Icelandic, Irish, Italian, Jewish, Lithuanian, Negro, Netherlands, Norwegian, Polish, Rumanian, Russian, Scottish, Slovak, Swedish, Ukrainian, Welsh, Yugoslav, etc.

**11. What is your religion?**  
 Adventist, Anglican, Baptist, Christian Science, Greek Catholic, Jewish, Lutheran, Mennonite, Roman Catholic, etc.

**12. What language did you first learn in childhood and still understand?**  
 English, French, Danish, Finnish, German, Indian or Eskimo, Italian, Magyar, etc.

**13. Can you speak English? French?**  
 English only, French only, Both English and French, Neither English nor French

**14. What was the highest grade or year of schooling you ever attended? (Mark one space only)**  
 No schooling, Kindergarten, Elementary (Grade) 1-4, 5+, High School (Year) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, University (Year) 1-2, 3, 4+, Degree

**15. Since last September, did you attend school or university?**  
 Yes (any regular day-time attendance), No

QUESTIONS 16-25 FOR ALL PERSONS 15 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER (AS APPLICABLE)

**16. Did you have a job of any kind last week? (Even if not at work or part-time)**  
 Yes  No

**17. Did you look for work last week?**  
 Yes  No

**18. Did you have a job at any time in the past 12 months?**  
 Yes  No

**19. Number of hours usually worked each week?**  
 1-19, 20-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40, 41-44, 45-49, 50+, Never worked (Omit Questions 20-25)

**20. For whom did you work last week, (or when you last worked)?**  
 Name of firm, government agency, or other employer.

**21. What kind of business or industry was this?**  
 As retail grocery, auto manufacturing, city busline, transportation

**22. What kind of work did you do in this industry?**  
 As sales clerk, lathe operator, purchasing agent

**23. Did you operate your own business or work for others in this occupation?**  
 WORKED FOR OTHERS: Wage or salary earner, Unpaid family worker; OPERATED OWN BUSINESS: With paid help, Without paid help

**24. In how many weeks did you work for wages or salary in the past 12 months? (Include weeks worked part-time and leave with pay)**  
 1-4, 5-13, 14-26, 27-39, 40-48, 49-52, None (Omit Question 25)

**25. What was your gross wage and salary income (before deductions) in this period?**  
 0, 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, 5000, 6000, 7000, 8000, 9000, 10,000, 11,000, etc.

QUESTION 26 FOR ALL MALES 25 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER

**26. Did you ever have any wartime service in the active military forces of Canada or allied countries?**  
 In what war? Wars prior to 1914, World War I (1914-18), World War II (1939-45), In Korea (1950-53), None

**or what forces?**  
 Canadian, Allied, Both

## ANNEX II

## 1961 CENSUS

## POST-WAR IMMIGRATION MONOGRAPH TABULATIONS

The basic design of the analysis of post-war immigration which served as the analytical framework for this monograph required the preparation of a considerable number of tabulations beyond those planned by the Census Division of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics for their normal programme of census publications. Tables and charts utilizing these special data include references to the specific tabulations from which they were obtained, e.g., P.W.I. tabulations, Tables A2 and B4. Since the actual tables and charts often utilize the original data in a more compact form, or only partially utilize the original table, a listing of the special tabulations is provided below, followed by a legend of variables showing the extent of detail provided for the variables in a specific tabulation. For example, the list indicates that Table A11 provides data for mother tongue (18) by age (12). The numbers in parentheses following each variable indicate the degree of detail provided for each variable and, from the legend of variables, the reader may determine the specific nature of the categories for which data are available (not shown here).

Tabulations for the A series of tables are provided for the following populations: Total Canada, Native born, Pre-war immigrants, and Post-war immigrants. Tabulations for the B series of tables are provided for the same populations as for the A series except that post-war immigrants are further subdivided by year of immigration (6). Series C tables, a special series on citizenship status from Census, are provided only for the foreign-born population by period of immigration (3). Unless otherwise indicated (by an asterisk), all tabulations were provided for Canada, provinces, and territories by metropolitan area type (5) and size (3) for metropolitan areas.

## Series A tables, P.W.I. Tabulations

## Ethnic origins and Birthplace

- A 1. Ethnic origin (44).
- A 2. Birthplace (36) of foreign born.
- A 3. Ethnic origin (20) by birthplace (6) of foreign born.

## Age and Sex

- A 4. Age (21) by sex.
- A 5. Age (21) by sex by ethnic origin (20).
- A 6. Age (12A) by sex by birthplace (6) of foreign born.
- A 7. Age (12A) by sex by marital status (4).

## Marital Status

- A 8. } Marital status (4) by sex by ethnic origin (20) for population 15 years and over.
- A 10. }

## Language

- A 11. Mother tongue (18) by age (12A).
- A 12. Mother tongue (18) by sex by official language (4).

## Religion

- A 13. Religion (12) by ethnic origin (20).
- A 14. Religion (12) by birthplace (6) of foreign born.

## Schooling

- A 15. Schooling (5) by age (12) by sex.
- A 16. Schooling (5) by birthplace (6) of foreign born.
- A 17.\* Schooling (5) by ethnic origin (20) by age (7A) by sex.

## Labour Force (population 15 years and over)

- A 18.\* Current labour force status (3) by age (12).
- A 19. Current labour force status (3) by age (7A) by sex.
- A 20.\* Current experienced labour force by sex industry (17).
- A 21.\* Current experienced labour force by sex by occupation (14).
- A 22.\* Current experienced labour force by sex by industry (17) by class of worker (4).
- A 23.\* Current experienced labour force by industry (17) by birthplace (14) of foreign born.
- A 24.\* Current experienced labour force by industry (17) by ethnic origin (20).
- A 25.\* Current experienced labour force by occupation (14) by birthplace (14) of foreign born.
- A 26.\* Current experienced labour force by occupation (14) by ethnic origin (20).
- A 27. Employment status (5) by age (7A) by sex.
- A 28. Employment status (5) by sex by ethnic origin (20).

**Income**

- A 29. Total earnings (9) by age (7A) by sex for current experienced labour force.
- A 30. Total earnings (9) by ethnic origin (24) for current experienced labour force.

**Family Characteristics**

- A 31. Family head in labour force by age of head (7) by average earnings of family head for wage and salary earning families.
- A 32. Family head in labour force by age of head (7) by average family earnings.
- A 33. Age of family head (7) by family size (average).
- A 34. Age of family head (7) by family type (5).
- A 35. Age of family head (7) by average number of children (0-24 yrs.).
- A 36. Age of family head (7) by husband-wife families.
- A 37. Age of family head (7) by current labour force status of wife (3) for husband-wife families.
- A 38. Ethnic origin of family head (20) by family size (average).
- A 39. Ethnic origin of family head (20) by family type (5).
- A 40. Ethnic origin of family head (20) by average number of children (0-24 yrs.).
- A 41. Ethnic origin of family head (20) by current labour force status of wife (3) for husband-wife families.
- A 42. Ethnic origin of family head (20) in current experienced labour force by average total earnings of family head.
- A 43. Ethnic origin of family head (20) in current experienced labour force by average family earnings
- A 44. Age of family head (7) by schooling (5).
- A 45. Age of family head (7) by current labour force status (3) of head.
- A 46. Ethnic origin of family head (20) by origin of wife (20) for husband-wife families.

**Residential Mobility**

- A 47. Type of movement (12).
- A 48. Type of movement (12) by age (12A) by sex.
- A 49. Type of movement (12) by marital status (4) by sex.
- A 50.\* Type of movement (12) by ethnic origin (20).

**Series B Tables, P.W.I. Tabulations****Ethnic origins and birthplace**

- B 3. Ethnic origin (44).
- B 4. Birthplace (36) of foreign born.

**Age and Sex**

- B 5. Age (21) by sex by ethnic origin (20).

**Marital Status**

- B 7. Marital status (4) by sex for population 15 years and over.
- B 8. Marital status (4) by ethnic origin (20) for population 15 years and over.

**Language**

- B 1. Official language (4) by sex.
- B 2. Official language (4) by ethnic origin (20).

**Religion**

- B 6. Religion (12) by sex.

**Labour Force (population 15 years and over)**

- B 9. Current labour force status (3) by age (7A) by sex.
- B 10.\* Current labour force status (3) by ethnic origin (44).
- B 11. Current labour force status (3) by ethnic origin (20).
- B 12. Class of worker (4) by age (7A) by sex for current experienced labour force.
- B 13. Class of worker (4) by ethnic origin (20).
- B 14. } Total earnings (9) by age (7A) by sex for current experienced labour force.
- B 15. }
- B 16. Total earnings (9) by ethnic origin (20) for current experienced labour force
- B 17. Occupation (14) by sex.
- B 18.\* Occupation (14) by ethnic origin (20).
- B 19.\* Occupation (14) by total earnings (9).
- B 20.\* Occupation (14) by total earnings (9) by ethnic origin (20).
- B 21.\* Occupation (14) by birthplace (14) of foreign born.
- B 22.\* Industry (17) by sex.
- B 23.\* Industry (17) by ethnic origin (20).

**Family Characteristics**

- B 24. Ethnic origin of family head (20) by wife's origin (20).
- B 25. Ethnic origin of family head (20) by family type (5).

**Series C Tables, P.W.I. Tabulations**

Canadian citizenship status (2) of foreign born by period of immigration (3), is given for the following

- C1B. Ethnic origin (24) by sex.
- C1C. Birthplace (14) by sex.
- C1D. Occupation (14) by sex.

- C1E. Marital status (4) by sex.
- C1F. Schooling (5).
- C1G. Official language (4) by sex.
- C1H. Current labour force status (3) by sex for population 15 years and over.
- C1I. Age (7A) by sex by birthplace (6.)
- C1J. Ethnic origin (24) by schooling (5).
- C1K. Birthplace (6) by schooling (5).

Source : W. Kalbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 456-459.

# THE USE AND POSSIBILITIES OF SAMPLE SURVEYS FOR THE MEASUREMENT OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN AFRICA

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## GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Sample surveys have proved the ideal instrument for gathering statistical information in many fields, an instrument which is constantly being improved by the very great sophistication of the electronic equipment on which it is processed and by the ever-more complex subjects to which it is being applied.

2. Early studies in demography were concerned with the phenomena which directly affected the natural movement of populations: birth rates, mortality, fertility, etc., and with a description of its structure. The development of these surveys took place in those areas where there were gaps in the information available—most commonly in censuses and civil registrations. The sample surveys initiated by INSEE\* as long ago as 1952 in most of the French-speaking countries of Africa must be seen in this context. Later and more detailed surveys on mortality and fertility lead to the development of methods which combine both retrospective and longitudinal observation.

3. The data on natural growth and structure, of course, also produced information on physical mobility as an “unforeseen” or “unexpected” by-product. The important point is that this was material which could complement or effectively replace the entry and exit controls in international migration which operate in practically all the countries.

4. In fact, the increasing importance of international migration in the economy of African countries (exchanges between neighbouring countries, high labour demands in Europe) is such that the information available from police records is wholly inadequate not merely to check the movement but also to understand and analyse it and appreciate the repercussions on the economy and structures of the country. No development plan mean anything unless it includes forecasts of international migration. Is an employment policy conceivable without such knowledge when we depend on international emigration to absorb more than one-third of the jobs to be created? (1)

5. Some (still only a very few) surveys are therefore focusing on emigration. Since this is a complex phenomenon (the event studied—the departure of one individual—often leaves little trace among the original population; the infrequency of the event in relation to the whole population...) many methodological problems remain, and this probably prevents the rapid extension of this type of survey. Nevertheless, the increased efficiency of multiround surveys\*\* gives hope for rapid progress in this field.

A few examples of sample surveys carried out in Africa providing data on international migration are given below. This is not an inventory, but outlines the potentialities of some surveys in analysing this phenomenon. The special problems of nomadic populations who move over several countries and the surveys carried out in Europe on African emigrants have been disregarded for this purpose.

6. As a matter of convenience, a distinction has been drawn between *North Africa*, where international emigration is almost exclusively directed to Europe (with the exception of Tunisian emigration to Libya) (2),

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\* Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques.  
\*\* Enquêtes à passages répétés.

and *Africa, south of the Sahara*, where international emigration to Europe is still low (though increasing rapidly in some countries), but where migration between neighbouring states can be very considerable and involves some little-known features—migration to a fully-developed economic centre, traditional migration within an ethnic region covering a number of states...

## TYPES OF SURVEYS

7. Several kinds of surveys have been carried out in Africa, depending on the aims, the means available and the populations studied. We may distinguish three main types, depending on the method of observation used: retrospective, multi-phase and continuous.

*The retrospective survey* has only limited possibilities when the survey is held in the place of departure. It is therefore frequently associated with other methods (continuous, renewed\* etc.).

Of course, *multi-round surveys* yield the most interesting data since all changes occurring between two rounds can be noted by reference to the initial state of the population.

*Continuous observation* is very onerous, as each movement must be recorded as it takes place. It can therefore only be carried out in restricted areas (trunk roads, intersections, frontier posts, groups of villages...).

Each individual survey will make use of one or other of these methods or of a combination of several, depending largely on the statistical material available and the possibilities it affords (e.g. sampling frame, precise definition of area).

8. In *North Africa* where statistical information is already collected systematically (regular censuses, reasonable completeness of civil registrations (3), few surveys use continuous observation, preference being given to large-scale national surveys of the multi-round retrospective type (Algeria and Tunisia). Information on migration is usually a by-product of these surveys.

Few surveys are undertaken specifically in respect of international migration. Nonetheless, in the three Maghreb countries, surveys on population mobility are currently in progress. (Migration and Employment Survey—Tunis 1972-1973, AARDES\*\* survey in Algeria on the drift from the land, INSEA\*\*\* survey in Morocco on migration.)

International emigration is included in these surveys inasmuch as no clear distinction is drawn between internal and international movement. Foreign countries represent one or more poles of attraction which often compete with internal ones. In view of the interdependence of the migratory flows it is not possible to isolate them nor to study them separately, at least not in the countries of departure.

In short, therefore, in North Africa:

- International migration is directed almost exclusively to Europe. Movements between the three Maghreb countries are insignificant except for Tunisian migration to Libya. There are no surveys on this subject.
- Specific surveys in the countries of departure are almost non-existent; the numerous studies on the subject all result from observations made in the host countries.
- This emigration is largely controlled by and subject to precise agreements between the countries concerned. Records are kept by the offices responsible for the organisation of such movements.
- Official entry and exit data are complemented by the results of multi-round surveys which permit a closer analysis of the structure of the populations involved.
- Surveys on migration are carried out in each of the Maghreb countries. Though their prime object is to study the drift from the land or urbanization, they also consider international migration inasmuch as it affects the direction and size of the flows either by influencing would-be migrants to prefer emigrating abroad (competing flow) or by including a number of persons who had no intention of migrating to leave their country (complementary flow)—the case of Tunisian emigration to Libya.

9. As regards *Africa, south of the Sahara*, statistical information is very largely based on surveys (censuses and vital registration are rare) such as the demographic surveys carried out between 1955 and 1964 in the 15 French-speaking countries. Furthermore, internal and external mobility are closely linked because of the fairly recent readjustments in territorial and national boundaries. The result is a comparatively larger number of surveys specifically concerned with migration—some of them carried out quite a long time ago, as, for

\* Enquêtes renouvelées

\*\* Association algérienne pour la recherche démographique, économique et sociale.

\*\*\* Institut national de statistique et d'économie appliquée.

instance, that in Ghana dated 1953-1955 (4). Whilst the majority of these surveys cover only small areas (tests of methodology, limited research objectives, lack of means, monographs, etc.), some have been on a larger scale and most are recent (survey of the Mossi migrations in Upper Volta; surveys carried out in Nigeria and Ghana).

Continuous recording is more commonly used in such cases and is applied in well-defined areas. Thus, in Cameroon, all movements on one trunk road were recorded during one year (5). (Other surveys concentrated on an intersection, a frontier-post or villages whose chiefs were asked to record all arrivals and departures over a specified period.) The main feature of these surveys, apart from the rich harvest of data, is that an overall picture of the phenomenon rarely emerges. Therefore, the authorities attempt to carry out broader surveys, and these are becoming possible with the improvement in the statistical infrastructure (a census campaign has gradually been covering the whole of Africa since 1970).

In short, in *Africa, south of the Sahara*:

- There is little international migration to Europe. It is not the specific subject of any survey.
- International migration is very considerable in certain regions, leading to a redistribution of the population since independence. Surveys have followed the measures taken to control it.
- Surveys carried out between 1952 and 1964 in the French-speaking countries provide some initial data on African mobility—overall information beginning with the place of birth.
- Large-scale surveys have again become necessary; they will be feasible after the current round of censuses has been completed.

## SAMPLE SURVEYS ON INTERNATIONAL EMIGRATION IN NORTH AFRICA

### 10. *Research by multi-round surveys (6).*

In Tunisia, in 1968-69, and Algeria in 1969-70, multi-round surveys consisting of three rounds of interviews at six-monthly intervals were taken. These two surveys have many points in common, as regards methods of observation and survey technique, but are quite different in their methods of tabulation and analysis. The surveys covered 125,000 individuals in Tunisia and 400,000 in Algeria.

The objectives were the same—an attempt to study population movements by means of a specific survey which would, on the one hand, allow an up-dating of the 1966 censuses and, on the other, measure with reasonable accuracy the main demographic rates: birthrates, death rates, fertility rates, migration rates, labour force participation rates, etc., and to study components, especially with respect to age.

Survey techniques: both retrospective and continuous recordings are used. On the occasion of the first interview, the survey is purely retrospective and the period of reference is defined in relation to an earlier date, that of the last *Id al-Saghir*, the feast marking the end of Ramadan. All the changes that have occurred in the intervening six months are noted on the occasion of the second and third interviews. Each survey shows a complete picture of all events occurring during two periods of six months, hence they provide a continuous record for one year. Recording and measuring movements: a basic principle of multi-round surveys is that they do not seek to distinguish between the different types of movement (seasonal, internal, international, etc.) *a priori*, but simply record all movements. Later, by using such data as destination, duration, reasons for the move, a distinction can be made *a posteriori* between temporary and permanent flows and, among the latter, between international and internal flows.


The Tunisian survey included no questions referring specifically to migration. In an endeavour to preserve the homogeneity of the sample (household sampling), households were followed up wherever possible—note that households which had moved abroad were in any case lost to the research. As concerns individuals, the interviewer had no difficulty in noting newcomers or leavers by reference to the list of persons present at the time of the previous interview. In respect of those absent, the interviewer was asked to enter on the appropriate line the reason for the absence, its duration and whether the person intended to return to the household or not. In all cases, even if the household could not be traced, the initial records (first interview) gave the characteristics of the migrants.

In Algeria, the sampling unit was not the household but a geographical area. To ensure its homogeneity it was not therefore necessary to keep track of households but merely to record the departures and arrivals in the sample area—whether of households or of individuals. This method is more reliable provided the delimitation of the area remains the same on each of the three interviews. In addition to the data relevant to the continuous research, there were some retrospective questions regarding the position before first interview *i.e.*:

- Place of residence on 1.4.1966 (date of previous census).
- Since what date have you lived there?
- Last place of residence.

This survey, therefore, enables both emigration and immigration to be studied, whereas the Tunisian survey shows emigration only. Further, the heads of those households whose place of residence was the same as at the 1966 census (a little over three years earlier) were asked to list the persons who were then part of the household but were no longer so at the date of the survey. The data obtained should tally with these persons' position at the time of departure.

In order to compare the recording of mobility in the two surveys consider the case of a person who left for work in Europe in 1965, returned to his native village before the first interview and went abroad again before the third one. The diagram will be as follows:



It will be seen that the Tunisian survey cannot record the first departure abroad.

In general, therefore, multi-round surveys make it possible to obtain data on international emigration even though this was not one of the objectives. This is an important point because variability in migration may make it desirable between one year and the next to carry out a study which had not been included in the original plan (note that internal mobility can also be studied.) This was the case in Tunisia where international migration, until 1968, was considered to be of secondary importance, but suddenly increased at such a rate (approximating that for Algeria by 1970) that it became necessary to study any data available to shed light on what was happening. The survey was thus able to evaluate international emigration during the period of reference, together with its extent, origins (in particular its part in the drift from the land), fluctuations and particular features. The rates of emigration for each region and environment, as shown by this survey, are as follows:

RATES OF INTERNATIONAL  
EMIGRATION BY REGION AND ENVIRONMENT  
(per 1000)

Region	Urban	Rural
Capital	7.5	1.7
Bizerta	4.7	6.1
Nabeul	2.9	0.4
North West	3.1	1.8
Centre	6.5	2.3
Sahel	5.7	6.5
South	10.6	8.2
Overall	5.6	4.3

RATES OF EMIGRATION  
BY AGE AND SEX OF EMIGRANT  
(per 1000)

Age at first interview	Males	Females
0-4	0.1	0.2
5-9	0.5	0.6
10-14	0.3	0.6
15-19	10.6	3.6
20-24	37.0	6.6
25-29	31.8	3.2
30-34	19.6	0.8
35-39	16.0	0.2
40-44	11.3	—
45-49	8.9	—
50-54	7.2	—
55-59	2.8	—
All ages	8.3	1.2

Finally, it should be pointed out that data so obtained are very comprehensive. Most of the characteristics of the emigrants can be related to their age and it is also possible to isolate the migration of households and that of individuals, voluntary migration and passive migration (wives and children)...

The value of surveys for the study of international migration is therefore undeniable. Departures are recorded in the greatest detail possible. Their main disadvantages are the expense of the field work (three visits), the scope of the survey (nationwide), the difficulties in the collation of data, etc.

**11. *The migration and employment survey—Tunis 1972-73*** was conducted on principles similar to those of the multi-round surveys. Two visits were made at yearly intervals to a sample of 10,000 persons. Sampling was by clusters and based on the May 1966 census blocks up-dated to the time of the survey.

The first interview comprised a very detailed questionnaire on the past mobility of the individuals and households studied. It was possible to trace in detail all the moves which had brought the migrants to settle in the capital. The second interview was mainly concerned with the arrivals and departures which affected the sample population, with particular stress on departures abroad, since a significant number of persons had expressed the intention of leaving at the time of the first interview. It was possible to record the development of departures abroad, to note the relatively larger proportion of non-natives of Tunis among the emigrants and thus to highlight the fact that, in this field, the capital represents only a transit stage.

The major disadvantage of this type of survey lies in the restricted nature of the sample which does not allow much scope for analysis, since problems of interpretation arise as soon as any attempt is made to introduce a number of characteristics.

**12. *All three Maghreb countries*** are at present carrying out general surveys on the drift from the land. They are either under way or in the process of preparation.

CERES\* project - Drift from the land (Tunisia), about 10,000 households - nationwide

AARDES project - Drift from the land and urbanization (Algeria), about 3,000 households - nationwide

INSEA survey - Study of the drift from the land in the host areas (Morocco) - urban centres.

Although these surveys will probably provide few data on international emigration, they are of value because they describe the mechanisms of the formation of flows, the rôle of towns in the migration process, the competition between internal and external poles of attraction and the influence of a liberal migration policy on the network of international flows or, on the other hand, of an abrupt check on external emigration which is very sensitive to economic developments in the host countries.

More data on external movements become available provided the survey takes place at the point of departure.

— *AARDES survey* Drift from the land. The phenomenon is to be examined in the host areas (towns of over 30,000 inhabitants) on a sample of about 20,000 people, priority to be given to large townships. Data on international emigration will be very limited.

— *CERES survey* To take place in 1974, the first stage will cover the points of departure. Natural sample areas will be exhaustively studied. Foreign countries will be regarded as one among several poles of attraction. Observation will be retrospective and will use the *sheikh* (local official) as an information agent on the households. The second stage will take place in the host areas—medium and large towns. It is further planned to supplement the information gathered in Tunisia by direct research among the communities of Tunisian migrants settled in Europe.

### **13. *Specific survey of international migration***

In view of the rapid growth of external migration since 1968, a project for the study of this problem was drawn up in Tunisia. Although the project was not put into effect (7), the procedure is interesting and merits description.

The principle was to check existing sources (records, annual receipts of postal orders from abroad, Department of Emigration records) against the results of a direct survey among the *sheikhs*. The approach was to be threefold:

- Exhaustive survey among the *sheikhs* and heads of wards, the *sheikhs* to establish a nominal list of persons born in the sheikhdom and now living abroad, with date of departure, destination, etc.
- Follow-up survey carried out by the statistical department among a certain number of *sheikhs* drawn by sample from the initial list. The objective was to construct, from the May 1966 census, a list of persons aged 10 to 45 then living in the sheikhdom and to discover from the *sheikhs*, or from the household if necessary, what had happened to them. These surveys should make possible an assessment of the coverage of the nationwide "*sheikh*" survey.
- The plan also included an attempt at continuous recording in the sheikhdoms already covered. Each *sheikh* would be given a book in which he would record all movements which came to his

\* Centre d'études et de recherches économiques et sociales.

knowledge during the period selected (between two Id al-Kabirs). Periodic follow-up surveys were to have tested the validity of such records. This was accepted because some *sheikhs* were keeping these records on a voluntary basis with a very acceptable rate of completeness.

## SAMPLE SURVEYS ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

**14.** *Sample surveys carried out in French-speaking countries between 1954 and 1964* (8). All these surveys included a question on the place of birth and a column, in most cases, was also provided for the length of stay in the current place of residence. The data available allow foreign residents to be classified by their country of origin. Where questions were asked in the survey on the date of arrival it was possible to calculate the net contribution made by migration over a given period (e.g. one year).

The reports of these surveys, therefore, all provide a series of results relating to persons born outside their countries of residence. These results are cross-classified with the principal characteristics of such persons. It must be pointed out that, in this case, the work is done in the host areas, that the measurement applies to the net balance of movements and can give only a vague idea of the real size of the flows (more particularly there are no data on the size of return flows, subsequently revealed by the surveys on Abidjan and Yaoundé).

**15.** *The surveys on migration in the Ivory Coast and in Ghana, 1958-60* (9).

The main objective was to measure the influx of foreigners into the two countries which attract the greatest number of seasonal labourers. The method adopted was rather original since the field of investigation in this case was not the population of a given area but the entire flow of migrants at certain selected points of observation; frontier posts, bus stations, ferries etc. Representative sampling was carried out on those crossing the control point chosen (a bus station in the Ivory Coast, a ferry in Ghana).

The questionnaire, which was the same in both surveys taken simultaneously in both countries, aimed at:

- analysing the flow of migrants in both directions (origin, destination, length of stay, purpose of stay, number of journeys, entry/exit balance);
- establishing the characteristics of these migrants (ethnic group, sex, age, occupation, marital status, education, religion...).

The records for the period of the research in the Ivory Coast showed 60,500 people going to the Basse Côte area and 53,000 returning, in Ghana 211,000 entries against 228,500 exits. The results are very rich and very detailed. Their accuracy is assured since the questionnaires went direct to the migrants. Nevertheless the method has its difficulties and limitations: an appreciable number of the observations concerned relatively short visits or business trips, night checks were either not planned or difficult to carry out, it was not possible to check all crossing points—the Ivory Coast survey, for instance, did not cover railway stations, nor were arrivals by sea recorded. An estimate of the total volume of traffic therefore seems impossible.

The benefit from these surveys lies mainly in the comparisons between categories of migrants by length of stay in particular and on the characteristic features of the phenomenon in the two countries.

**16.** Many surveys using retrospective questionnaires have been conducted in limited areas in several countries (middle valley of the River Senegal, Upper Volta, Congo, Korhogo...). They are predominantly of an experimental nature. They have made possible a refinement in the concepts and definitions of mobility, brought to light difficulties resulting from notions of absence and of length of stay as well as from the very nature of the retrospective method itself (the appeal to memory). They are of methodological interest, particularly in that they bring out the need to use multi-round surveys.

**17.** Surveys on urban mobility at Abidjan (1963-64) and Yaoundé (1964-65) (10). This was one of the first surveys on migration to use the principle of several interviews of the same sample and to demonstrate its many advantages (17), notably the possibility of quantifying the volume of departures over a given period. Two interviews took place at intervals of one year at Abidjan and of six months at Yaoundé. All movements inside or outside the survey area are recorded very accurately for the intervening periods.

The advances in methodology resulting from these surveys have been enormous. It is not an exaggeration to say that they served as a model for the surveys carried out in North Africa. The method proved especially fruitful there because in North Africa facilities required to carry out operations of this kind on a large scale existed.

18. *A new method of observation: Renewed surveys at intervals greater than one year - Survey of the Mossi migrations in Upper Volta by Vaugelade and Quesnel.*

## CONCLUSIONS

Some important points:

- There are few surveys specifically concerned with migration owing to:
  - the difficulty of observing the phenomenon, especially at points of departure (technical reasons);
  - the late awakening of interest in the study of mobility
  - the recent tendency not to isolate the separate flows any longer but to consider the interrelation of all the flows affecting a population.
- Multi-round surveys seem to offer the most interesting prospects (observation at points of departure). They open up the way for experiments in new forms of observation.
- These new methods have been developed largely in experimental surveys of limited populations in Africa south of the Sahara but they became operational in large national surveys carried out mainly in North Africa. This is where they have proved their value in the study of mobility.

## NOTES

(1) As is the case in Tunisia. Options on employment. Fourth Plan for economic and social development. 1973-75.

(2) This ran at a very high level between 1968 and 1971. The figures are now average. The movement, which was virtually unchecked during the first years, has gradually been brought under control, though not without some difficulty.

(3) Approximately 95 % for births and close to 70 % for deaths in Tunisia.

(4) "Migrations au Ghana - Enquête 1953-55" (Migrations in Ghana - Survey 1953-55), J. Rouch - Journal de la Société des Africanistes, No. 26 - Paris 1957.

(5) "Deux essais de mesure des relations ville-campagne" (Two experiments in measuring relationships between town and country) - A. Franqueville, Orstom, Yaoundé.

(6) A detailed description of these surveys will be found in "Les enquêtes démographiques à passages répétés - Méthodologie" (Follow -Up population surveys - Methodology) - INED, INSEE, ORSTOM - 1972.

(7) The data of the next Tunisian census having been put forward, the need for such a survey became less urgent.

(8) For the conclusions on mobility drawn from these surveys see "Démographie comparée (Comparative demography) - tome II, vol. 7: déplacements temporaires et migrations (migrations and temporary changes of residence)" - L. Roussel - DGRST, Paris 67.

(9) This survey followed an earlier one carried out in Ghana 1953-55. "Migrations au Ghana - Enquête 1953-55 (Migrations in Ghana - Survey 1953-55)" - J. Rouch - Journal de la Société des Africanistes - No. 26 1957.

(10) "La mobilité de la population urbaine en Afrique Noire, Deux Essais de Mesure, Abidjan et Yaoundé (The mobility of the urban population in Black Africa. Two experiments in measurement, Abidjan and Yaoundé)" L. Roussel, F. Turlot, R. Vours - Population No. 2, 1968.

(11) A demographic survey was conducted at about the same time on the principle of periodic visits in two districts of the Sine-Saloum in Senegal. The main aim was to study natural movements but much information on migration also resulted. See "Étude démographique dans la région du Siné Saloum (Demographic study in the area of the Sine Saloum)" - P. Cantrelle - Travaux et Documents de l'ORSTOM N° 1 1969.

# THE MULTI-ROUND SURVEY: A NEW TOOL FOR THE OBSERVATION AND ANALYSIS OF TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT MIGRATIONS

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## Background to the Upper Volta survey

1. One of the aims of the Upper Volta administration was to gain insight into international migratory movements, both as regards size of flow and their socio-economic implications. These movements were mainly directed to the Ivory Coast. The majority were temporary, generally lasting a few years, a smaller proportion of them were permanent or near-permanent.

2. One of the aims of the survey carried out in the area of departure was to construct a year-by-year evaluation of the departure and return flows, and in addition, to estimate the number of nationals outside the country.

3. Two approaches were available: the retrospective survey and the multi-round survey.

Retrospective surveys have many drawbacks: the period to be taken into account is ill-defined and the estimation of flows difficult; the less recent the event the greater the risk of omission, if the migrant's family still remains; if it has left, omission is certain.

In view of the urgency of the matter, and because of the time required, and the costs to be incurred, a multi-round survey was not considered.

4. The existence of a demographic survey (1) carried out twelve years earlier which could be made the basis of a renewed survey designed to study duration of migrations, provided another possibility. The idea came from a study carried out by J. Hurault in the Lamidate of Banyo (Cameroon) (2) where a survey taken in 1967-68 used data from a 1954-55 administrative census which had been planned and carried out with exceptional care.

## The renewed survey

5. The renewed survey is based on a nominal list of individuals resulting from a previous survey, of the subsequent lives of a population.

6. Investigating the same individuals a second time means using the same sample, and most of the basic concepts must remain in their original form. This implies that the reference must be to a survey made for demographic and not for administrative purposes.

7. The initial sample has been modified by arrivals (births and immigration) and departures (deaths and emigration).

Situation at initial survey	Situation at renewed survey				
	Present	Absent	Deceased	Emigrated	
Present Absent					Initial sample
Resident elsewhere (immigrant)					
Not born					
	Final sample				

The group of individuals to be studied represents an amalgamation of the two samples, i.e. individuals resident at the time of the initial survey or at the time of the renewed survey. For certain studies, one might wish to include individuals who appear in neither of the samples as defined (children born and deceased for instance, in the case of a study on fertility). Renewed surveys are not suited to this type of study.

8. The observation of events is akin to that in multi-round surveys. Events are not obtained retrospectively. The occurrence of an event is not observed by reference to the surviving population, but by reference to the population alive at the time of the initial survey.

9. Temporary migrations are observed in different ways depending on the residential status of the individual at the initial and at the renewed survey.

Migrations of persons absent at one or other of the surveys are immediately observed, whereas it will be necessary to ask those present at both surveys a retrospective question to learn of their migrations during the intervening period.

10. Lastly, it must be noted that the existence of a nominal list favours the observation of departures against that of arrivals. Thus, in respect of migrations within the survey area a greater number of emigrants than of immigrants was recorded.

### The sampling plan

The very principle of renewed surveys implies the retention of the sampling plan of the initial survey. Nevertheless, there are several possible approaches.

11. The sample may be regarded as a *sample of individuals*: a study will be made of the subsequent history of each person, and of the children born to the women appearing in the initial survey. This method, used by J. Hurault, involves following up people who may now be scattered and can be applied only to a small sample.

12. The sample may be regarded as a *sample of holdings* (family enclosures): all holdings, of which the present head appeared on the list of individuals in the initial survey will be studied. The population is that resident in the present sample of holdings. The geographical dispersion of persons chosen by this method is smaller than in the previous case, but is still incompatible with a large sample.

13. The sample may be regarded as a *sample of villages*. Up-dating the list of villages makes it possible to draw a supplementary sample for the new villages. We have not recorded any newly created villages, in our survey area, the Mossi country being an area of emigration rather than of immigration.

Within the village the two possibilities already mentioned: exist again a sample of individuals or a sample of holdings. If a complete study of a village were made, the results would be the same: the entire village is investigated, including the immigrants. Where only a proportion of holdings were studied, sampling of individuals would lead one to draw an equal proportion from a list made up of all the immigrants. Such a list, cannot however, be established in respect of those holdings which had not previously been investigated because the essential reference list was lacking. The best solution is to consider a *sample of holdings within the village*. It was adopted for this survey but it is not free of difficulties (cf. (3)).

14. To remedy these, *the sampling plans of any surveys likely to be repeated* should be modified so as to avoid as far as possible difficulties arising from villages which had not been completely investigated. One method might be to draw a sub-sample of wards from the sample villages which could then be exhaustively studied. These wards could be selected after enumeration, the probability of selection being proportional to size. This method would also be of advantage in the initial survey by ensuring a smaller dispersal of the sample and affording the opportunity of completing the list of the holdings in each ward during the survey.

### Data Collection

15. The first question raised by a survey of this kind is whether it is fanciful to consider the possibility of *tracing the histories of individuals after twelve years*. Every individual would have to be accurately identified. The classic objection—that changes of names are common in certain populations—has already been made against multi-round audit surveys. The difficulties encountered among some populations do not, however, justify rejection of the method for all populations. Every survey technique must be tested in

relation to the population surveyed. In the Mossi population a renewed survey was possible even if it was not always easy.

**16.** The sample investigated in 1960-61 was selected by a two-stage sampling plan, the primary unit being the village, the secondary unit the holding; the sampling fraction in the first stage being 1/50th, 1/25th or 1/10th according to the size of the village, and in the second stage 1/1, 1/2 or 1/5 so that the overall sampling fraction was uniform at 1/50th. The sample re-surveyed in 1972-73 was restricted to the Mossi and Bissa districts and included 101 villages, 4,760 holdings and 39,600 residents. The 1972-73 sample included approximately 44,000 persons. The form used in the 1960-61 survey was a schedule for each holding. It showed, amongst other data, the surnames, first names, sex, age, kinship, and residential status of the individuals belonging to the holding. A copy of the same collective schedule was used in the renewed survey (see specimen appended).

**17.** In practice, the renewed survey consisted of several stages: First, *the original primary unit*—the village—had to be identified. Several neighbouring villages may have the same name, so that trial and error was necessary before the village which had been investigated 12 years previously was located.

**18.** Having found the village, the *secondary unit (the holding)* had to be identified. A holding is usually identified by the surname and first names of its head. The administrative villages used in the survey may have up to 3,000 inhabitants, which means about 400 holdings. The villages include one or several patrilineal lineages so that the same surname frequently recurs. Men with the same surname may also have the same first name and reference must then be made to the other members of the holding, usually the wife or wives, in order to identify its chief with certainty.

**19.** The holding may have been divided after the head had died, all its members may have died, or some may have died and others emigrated. The village elders can normally be called together to clear up such cases without difficulty. This was done in nearly all the villages in the Mossi country with the exception of a few where meetings were arranged in each of the wards. A few holdings remained unidentified but reference to the tax rolls reduced their numbers to a maximum of two per village. (This excludes the Peul who, as nomadic graziers, were studied on their seasonal pastures and were not well known to the settled population.)

**20.** It is not always easy to *identify the individuals* within the holding. First names have sometimes been incorrectly transcribed but the family ties between wives and husbands, children and parents and others with their nearest relatives made it possible, with very rare exceptions, to identify all the individuals. Overall, only 2% could not be traced in the field (in 60% of the cases they were Peul who had changed their grazing grounds).

We excluded two urban centres where we encountered difficulties, since one of them had grown between the two surveys with the consequent dispersal of some wards. With the traditional links weakened by an urban way of life, it was impossible to follow up one tenth and one-third of the holdings, respectively.

## Analysing the results

**21.** This method of collection needs a method of analysis appropriate to the nature of the observations.

**22.** The longitudinal nature of the observations makes possible an analysis of a similar nature; cohorts are naturally made up from the individuals investigated in the initial survey. This would not be the case in an analysis based on the comparison of two surveys. The cohorts built up from individual data would not consist of the same individuals at the beginning and end of the period defined by the two surveys for, apart from sex, the other characteristics are liable to error. In particular, distortions in regard to age lead to an underestimation of some age groups and over-estimation of others. An under-estimated group may, ten years later, be included in an over-estimated group and the apparent migration balance will have no meaning.

**23.** This perspective aspect recurs in the analysis of migrations. However, the length of the period of observation (12 years) is less than the duration of life of cohorts in the Volta migrations (about 30 years) so that the observations did not extend over the whole period for which generations were at risk of migration. Nevertheless it is possible to place events approximately in the year in which they occurred, a series of period analyses may be made year by year or by groups of years throughout the interval. In this way, changes in the timing and rate of the phenomenon can be studied. A trend becomes apparent: this is the dynamic aspect of the analysis affording the possibility of more realistic projections.

**24.** An analysis of the kind usually made in fertility studies is also possible since migration histories for individuals are available. We know that the observation is not free from distortion. There is, for instance, an under-estimation of the migrations of residents who were present at the time of both surveys but had migrated in the interim. This under-estimation is noticed in the return flows (see table below resulting from a partial count).

MIGRATIONS LASTING LESS THAN 5 YEARS  
ACCORDING TO PERIOD OF RETURN  
(INTENSITY OF THE PHENOMENON: 100 = AVERAGE OF THE THREE PERIODS)

1960-1964	1965-1969	1970-1973
125	8	114

Incidentally, the under-estimation is less marked for migrants returning in more recent years. One concern of the renewed survey will be to estimate these distortions in order to correct them.

**25.** Observation of the histories of the initial population reveals movements of populations as a whole and an average trend of all these movements over a relatively long period of time may be obtained; this avoids possible hazards of observations over a single-year period.

Furthermore, as the number of years in the interval is related to the number of events observed, the increase in the number of events makes it possible to reduce the size of the sample proportionally or, for a given size of sample, to make additional analyses without increased expense. A survey restricted by lack of numbers to an overall analysis could, for instance, be extended to include studies at a lower, e.g. regional, level.

There remains, however, the problem of individuals whose history remains unknown and this increases with the length of the period of observation. In this case, two extreme possibilities must be considered: the unknown individuals have not been affected by the phenomenon studied, or they have all been so affected. It is obvious that if the proportion of persons who cannot be traced is large, the results of the analysis will be of limited value. The validity of the renewed survey depends on the proportion of individuals with unknown history being small.

**26.** One advantage of the method lies in the analysis of the other demographic variables. For instance, a *table of mortality* can be established from the probabilities of survival between the opening and closing dates of the chosen interval. This analysis presents special technical problems if the classification cannot be made by single years of age (4).

Also, a *measure of natural increase* may be deduced by comparing two estimates of the population in the same way as two censuses, the disadvantages are eliminated because the methods used were the same on both occasions, i.e. the same sample remains under observation over the same period of time.

**27.** Yet another benefit of this form of survey is a possible elimination of distortions due to *errors in the estimation of ages*. In the renewed survey, ages were recorded without reference to the initial survey. 15-year age groups only were shown to avoid confusion over identities. The count produced individual discrepancies of two years or less in 51% of the cases. This analysis should make it possible to estimate distortion for each age and to construct an adjusted age pyramid without recourse to the stable population method.

## Conclusion

**28.** This method is not without its pitfalls at collection level. It can be stated definitely that the survey has been possible. That it was *successfully carried out* in Upper Volta is due to the fact that it took place in a rural or semi-urban area with *strong social cohesion*. Experiments in an urban environment would be interesting. Success was also due to the fact that the initial survey was of good quality and the records correctly preserved. This last point may be fundamental, the preservation of the basic questionnaires being a *sine qua non*. If the option of making this type of survey is to be retained the preservation of all basic documents must be the absolute rule; it would be regrettable if this type of survey proved profitable, only to find that it could not be applied because the records had been dispersed or destroyed.

No.	Kinship	Sex	Age	MS	RS	Absent			Immigrants 1st line Emigrants 2nd line			Deaths			
						Dura- tion	Place	Reason	Years since	Place	Reason	Years since	Age	MS	Place
1	Head of family	M	53 75	M1 M1	P P										
2	Wife 1	F	59	M	P DCD							9	60	M	V
3	Son 1 × 2	M	7 19	S M1	P A		IC	Work							
4	Son 2 × 2 Daughter — × 2	M F	17 27	S M	P E				10	IC	marriage				
5	Wife 1	F	25	M	I P				8	V	marriage				
6	Son 1 × 5	M	5	S	P										
7	Omitted Son 1 × 2	M	28	S S	A P		IC	Work							
8	Wife 3	F	25	M	I A		IC	With husband	6	V	marriage				

29. Renewed surveys appear to be promising, pending a marked improvement in the registration of births and deaths. Even then, renewed surveys will remain essential for the study of migrations. Only countries which can afford the cost of multi-phase surveys will have data concerning both natural and migratory movements, and only in those cases, does a renewed survey lack interest.

#### Appendix - Specimen of collective record card

30. This specimen is an extract from an actual schedule, only such information and individuals as are necessary to give varied combinations of residential status being shown.

31. The first line is copied from the initial survey, with added data from the renewed survey relating to immigration and, for those omitted, their status observed retrospectively. The second line is completed entirely from the renewed survey, the use of different coloured inks making for easier differentiation of sources.

32. Headings and abbreviations:

- No.: Number of the individual—numbers for new arrivals follow on
- Kinship: son 1 x 2 means: father = No. 1, mother = No. 2
- Sex: M = male, F = female; a correction of sex will be noted in the case of individual No. 4
- Age: actually only given within an age group of 15 years (child, adolescent, adult, old person), the exact age, alone shown here, was entered after the renewed survey
- MS: Marital status. S = single, M = married, M1 = monogamous marriage
- RS: Residential status. P = present resident, A = absent resident, I = immigrant, E = emigrant, DCD = deceased
- Absent: duration of absence in years at time of survey; place: IC = Ivory Coast; reason
- Immigrants, Emigrants: Data on immigration are shown on the first line, those on emigration on the second line (this refers to departures and arrivals between the two surveys). Number of years from event to date of survey; place: V = village; reason
- Deaths: years since death, age at death, marital status at death, place of death

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- (4) Henry L. « Annexe à l'article de J. Hurault : Méthode utilisée pour le calcul des tables de survie » in *Population* 1969 n° 5 pp. 984-994.

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The following translations have been adopted: enquête à passages répétés, multiround-survey; enquête rétrospective, retrospective survey; enquête renouvelée, renewed survey.

# METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE MEASUREMENT OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

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## INTRODUCTION

1. Is it useful to approach once more the methodological problems of defining and measuring international migration (1)? A considerable number of articles, official documents and studies on the subject have already been prepared in the course of the last fifty years, and when one considers the failure of attempts to render these methods comparable between countries, one may well wonder whether this effort is worthwhile.
2. In the past, scarcely any interest was in fact shown in migration in the two fields in which it might play an important part: economics and demography. For the economist, migration appeared only as a result of his theories. For him it was therefore a secondary phenomenon, the measurement of which was of little interest. The demographer, on the other hand, was concerned primarily to clarify the connections between the phenomena he was studying, and neglected migration, the main causes of which were economic.
3. This attitude, which persisted for a very long time, led to the independent development of studies on particular points, based on existing statistics, and prevented any complete approach to the phenomenon.
4. This view of migration, which was plainly too cursory, has now been discredited by a certain number of researchers. Migration should, in fact, be integrated within the framework of economic theory and the demographic analysis of populations, since there are complex links connecting it with the other elements of these two sciences (2).
5. Bearing the above in mind, when one examines the existing forms of measurement, one quickly sees that they are scarcely capable of use in research. These measurements, made for administrative and political purposes, give too imperfect a picture of the phenomenon and do not allow its integration with a demographic or economic analysis.
6. We must therefore follow another course: Instead of starting from existing statistics to discover what kind of analysis they permit, it would be useful to plan the analysis first and then to decide what statistics are needed.
7. This analysis should, in the first instance be demographic in order to eliminate the internal causes which affect the phenomenon. Only when this stage has been passed, can research into the external causes be successfully undertaken.
8. This is the procedure which will be followed in this report. It will attempt to show that migration is somewhat different from other demographic phenomena and to discover a possible method for demographic, and subsequently economic and sociological analysis of it. Of course, since this report is concerned only with what is measurable, the latter analyses will be largely incomplete. It is important however to bear constantly in mind these limits to quantitative methods.

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(1) For the remainder of this report, "migration" will be understood to mean international migration. Where internal migration is referred to, this will always be explicitly stated.

(2) We are speaking here only of labour migration, which at present accounts for the greater part of migration. Movements of refugees, deportees, or population transfers, the main causes of which are political, are not considered in the report. In this connection, see [3] and [15].

## I. PREVIOUS WORK

**9.** There can be no question here of presenting all the previous work on methods of measuring migration. We will content ourselves with placing in their context the main works or articles on the subject, seeking to bring out the various approaches to the phenomenon they imply.

**10.** In fact, the methodological problem is two-fold:

- to find a definition of migration which will be acceptable to all countries, and
- to establish a measurement of migration which would allow international comparisons.

These two problems will henceforward be treated together, since it will be seen that the existing methods have influenced both the definition and the improvement of methods of measurement.

**11.** Migration statistics date mainly from the beginning of the 19th century. Imre Ferenczi [7] made a historical study and gathered all the statistics existing on the subject up to 1924. His work shows clearly the variety of definitions and measurements.

**12.** However, the first important study, devoted to the improvement of these statistics and especially to the possibility of rendering them more easy to compare, dates from 1932 [3]. It confirms the multiplicity of definitions used in the various countries and proposes a single definition of migration. A first important distinction is drawn between the term "*migration*" which denotes the act of moving and the term "*migrant*" which denotes the person performing the act. Migration is defined as passage from one country to another for a period of more than a month. The movements concerned fall into two main classes for which statistics are desirable:

- temporary and permanent migration (1), excluding tourist travel and frontier traffic;
- seasonal migration and transit (2).

**13.** The use in these studies of the sole term migration, shows clearly that only the act of moving is being considered, quite independently of the individual performing such acts. However, the individual seems to appear in the classification of temporary or permanent but it is a question of the intention of the migrant at the time of migration, which is uncertain in character and must be interpreted with great caution.

**14.** This definition of the various types of migration leads to a classification of the existing methods of measurement according to the information they provide on such migration. The three categories recommended are:

- passport statistics;
- port statistics;
- declaration of residence statistics, which may be regarded as superior to the two preceding types.

The first two categories, which are of interest in connection with inter-continental migration, lose much of their value when it comes to intra-continental migration, which is now in a majority. The last categories is comparable to the method of population registers which unfortunately applies only in very few countries (about ten).

**15.** Recommendations are made to allow comparison of the various statistics. Similarly, a list is proposed of the main items of information which are desirable to obtain from migrants.

**16.** Almost twenty years later, a United Nations report in 1949 [15] notes that "the situation regarding statistics on migration is substantially the same today as it was in 1932". This is all the more troublesome in that certain methods which formerly proved useful have become out of date owing to changes in the phenomenon, though they continue to be employed.

**17.** This report resumes and refines the previous definition of migration and especially recommends (3) new methods of measurement, i.e.,

- information collection at frontier control posts,
- information collection from population registers, which are better adapted to post-war migration.

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(1) Temporary migration is migration assumed to last between one month and a year, permanent migration is migration lasting more than a year.

(2) Entry into a third country which lies on the route from the country of emigration to the country of immigration.

(3) These recommendations are developed in a study published in 1953 [16].

18. Once more, twenty years later, A.J. Jaffe in his report to the International Population Congress in London in 1969 [12] states that definitions still remain just as diverse and methods of measurement are far from being unified. He is surprised that numerous governments, deeply concerned by the considerable flow of migration, are unaware of the numbers entering and leaving the country and the number of nationals returning, which constitute the minimum information (1) necessary to shed light on the phenomenon.

19. Inquiry into the reasons for this situation leads him to suppose that the governments of the various countries do not consider the subject sufficiently important to justify the collection and processing of data. Other reasons have been given elsewhere [4], including inability or ignorance on the part of governments regarding the importance of these recommendations, or else, the fact that they do not apply in certain special situations.

20. Faced with the persistent non-application of the system recommended by the United Nations, Jaffe proposes the use of census data, and in particular the reply to a question on the place of residence at an earlier date. It is now no longer migration that is being defined, but migrants, as will be seen later (§ 25), though without detecting all of them.

21. Apart from the usefulness of such a method of measurement in analysing migration, certain conditions are necessary for it to be valid. In particular, the censuses asking the question must take place in all countries on the same date. Only on this condition would it be possible to ascertain both the emigrants and the immigrants for each country. Without this, the measurement would lose much of its interest. Unfortunately, few countries as yet ask a question of this kind and, among those that do, the period of reference may vary considerably.

22. Other census data, on the place of birth or the last change of residence, provide similar information on migration. These data are not always known for all countries and thus lose some of their value. We will return to them later.

23. Thus, almost fifty years after the first international effort to define and measure migration in a correct and uniform manner, the results obtained are disappointing. The reasons given for this do not seem to us to be entirely satisfactory. These methods of measurement may fail to cover a considerable proportion of the phenomenon and are therefore of little use either to the demographer or the economist. We will therefore examine the definition of migration or migrants in more detail.

## II. DEFINITION

24. We noted earlier (§ 12) that, already in 1932, a distinction was drawn between migration (an event) and the migrant (an individual). The demographic analysis of internal migration has shown that these two important concepts must be accurately defined.

25. The United Nations manual [17] defines *migration* (2) as *a move from one migration-defining area to another, that was made during a given migration interval and that involved a change of residence*. A *migrant*, on the other hand, is *a person who has changed his usual place of residence from one migration-defining area to another at least once during the migration interval*. Taking the various countries as migration-defining areas, we obtain a perfect definition of migration and migrants.

26. For this definition to be consistent from one country to another, it is necessary that all countries define an individual's place of residence in the same way. The definition given by the multilingual demographic dictionary as the place where the individual habitually lives, appears to be entirely satisfactory only if all the countries are agreed on the meaning of the term "habitually" (3). This problem can only be solved by an international meeting but it does not appear to present insurmountable difficulties.

27. When it is a matter of permanent migration, that is to say migration where there is no return and no further migration to other countries, then the number of migrations observed between two countries is equal to the number of migrants. In this case, the distinction between the two concepts ceases to be meaningful.

(1) We shall see later that this flow is not sufficient to provide a clear definition of a country's migration.

(2) This manual deals only with internal migration, but the definition is perfectly valid for any type of migration.

(3) In the french section.

**28.** But, in most cases, there are multiple migrations or returns. Then the number of migrants within a given period will always be smaller than the number of migrations.

**29.** We have already seen that, if we count the numbers entering and leaving a country, without relating the two, we measure that country's migrations. But, if we include in the census a question on the place of residence at an earlier date, we measure certain migrants, though not all: an individual who has emigrated and returned, or who has died in the country of emigration during the period, will not be counted as a migrant by this question.

**30.** These two concepts do not appear sufficient to define completely the migratory phenomenon in a country. In fact, this phenomenon is not only connected with the number of migrations or the number of migrants experienced by that country. To demonstrate this, let us take a simplified example which, however, in no way detracts from the general application of the result.

**31.** Let us imagine a country which, over 1 year, records a flow of immigrants amounting to 100 (census data) and which each year also records a flow of immigration and emigration amounting to 100 (frontier records). If we first suppose that each migrant stays for 1 year, we may deduce that the migrants supply the said country with 500 years' work during a five-year period. If however we suppose that each migrant stays 20 years and that the annual flow was the same in the past, these migrants supply the said country with 10,000 years' work during the same 5-year period.

**32.** We see therefore that for a given flow of migration and migrants, a country may in fact enjoy a highly variable number of hours of foreign labour, depending on the length of stay of the foreign workers concerned.

**33.** This third concept must therefore be included in the analysis of migration. In fact, international migration has never been entirely permanent. The significance of return migration is now recognized in most countries, but it was far from negligible in the past and a question on the presumed length of stay could only provide a vague estimate.

**34.** Now, this concept was virtually omitted in the past and the information now available on the subject is still very sparse and very incomplete [4], [11], [13]. It appears however to be an indispensable addition to any analysis of migration and only the difficulty of measuring it can explain its absence from current statistics.

**35.** It is now important to see whether migration defined as length of stay of foreign migrants, or as loss of nationals for a certain length of time, allows us to obtain a better grasp of the phenomenon. For this, it is necessary to indicate the course that the demographic analysis will take, and we shall see at the same time what economic and sociological corollaries it allows.

### III. SUGGESTED ANALYSIS OF MIGRATION

**36.** No demographic phenomenon can be directly observed in the pure state. The raw data which constitute the statistics must be processed so as to isolate each phenomenon from the influence of numbers, structures and other phenomena. These other phenomena or causes fall into two classes: internal or demographic causes and external causes belonging to other fields. Now, before examining the external causes, it is advisable to make sure that internal causes play no part, or else to eliminate the part they do play. This is the proper function of demographic analysis [8].

**37.** However, for migration which does not escape this examination, it is not other demographic phenomena which will play the dominant part, but migration itself. We have seen indeed in the previous section that a migration followed by a return migration is, by that very reason, cancelled out. The resulting net migration is nil, and the number of migrants discoverable during the period in which they occur is nil. Only the length of stay of the migrant reveals this migration.

**38.** To bring the phenomenon into the open, it is therefore necessary to work on the various orders of migration, and this analysis is akin to the analysis of internal migration or, more remotely, of fertility.

**39.** This study should initially be longitudinal. We will consider the case of a generation, but it can be taken for other sub-populations.

**40.** It appears useful, in the first instance, to define the first migration, taking a given generation. Eliminating the effect of mortality, which operates as a disturbing factor, the phenomenon can be described without difficulty. It can be expressed as an intensity, a percentage of individuals belonging to the generation who have experienced the phenomenon before a given age, and by an average age at the first migration. Emigrants can be classified by country of destination. This classification allows us to analyse the effects of economic and political measures in the countries of departure and arrival on the likelihood of emigration from a country. A classification by occupation and social status would also be useful.

**41.** The study of second-order migrations is based on the country of first emigration. It can be broken down into the study of returns or of migrations to another country. The population at risk is the population which has made a first migration, and this in turn may be broken down according to country of origin or according to age at the time of the first migration. The phenomenon may still be expressed by its intensity and by the average length of the first migration.

**42.** For migrations of a higher order, a study of the same kind can be made, but the numbers considered are likely to be small. However, a distinction may be drawn between returns followed by further migration, and migrations between countries which rapidly dwindle into insignificance.

**43.** An analysis of this kind (1), if the period of observation is long enough, permits us to determine the number of permanent migrations per 1,000 initial migrations. For temporary migrations, we may calculate the total length of stay produced by the entry of 1,000 temporary migrants and even the distribution in time of the returns. Conversely, we also learn the corresponding losses of labour to the countries of emigration.

**44.** Thus, this analysis allows comparison of the results obtained for various generations or cohorts, once we have eliminated the effect of the demographic phenomena which influence migration most strongly: returns and—to a lesser degree—migrations to other countries, and mortality. On the basis of these results, we may look for the periods during which the phenomenon fluctuates and link these periods with economic and political events in the various countries. Alternatively, it is also possible to study a long-term development of the phenomenon by eliminating these periods of fluctuation.

**45.** Finally, this analysis allows us to study the part played by migration for certain population policies: thus, does the encouragement of family migration entail an increase in permanent migration? This analysis of the role policies play in the recorded length of migration appears very important, since there is at present no available method of estimating their success.

**46.** Such a longitudinal analysis, which is necessary to throw full light on the phenomenon, should be complemented by a transverse analysis. Migrations in a given year, mainly first migrations and returns, in fact depend [19] :

- on the size of the various generations in the countries of emigration in the case of first migrations, and on the size of the entry cohorts in the case of returns,
- on the particular behaviour of each generation and cohort,
- on the existence of accidents in the past (economic crises, policy changes, wars...), and
- on the reactions of the generations or of the cohorts to the economic, political and social conditions of the year.

**47.** Analysis of each of these factors would allow us to form the most realistic hypotheses concerning the development of the phenomenon in the near future.

**48.** Apart from this line of research, which we consider should come first, other subjects for quantitative study emerge. We will mention here those which seem to us to be the most important.

**49.** First, as opposed to the influence of other demographic factors on migration, the influence of migration on these other factors calls for study, in particular its effect on nuptiality and fertility.

**50.** Similarly, the combined study of migration and certain economic variables is necessary, in order to integrate migration with economic theory.

**51.** Finally, the sociological study of migration should be attempted. But this can only be undertaken on the basis of detailed surveys on the subject and can be only partly quantitative.

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(1) For more details of this analysis, applied to internal migration, see [8], [5]. For a study of returns, see [4].

**52.** Having thus laid down the main lines along which the analysis of migration should proceed, without taking into account the measurements which actually exist, let us now see whether these measurements permit of such analysis.

#### IV. INADEQUACY OF MOST PRESENT METHODS OF MEASUREMENT

**53.** We cannot in this report consider all the methods of measurement used throughout the world. We will confine ourselves in the main to two chief sources of data: frontier records and census data. We will look at them separately first before studying in more detail what may be achieved by combining them.

##### 1. Frontier records

**54.** We are taking the most favourable case, in which a definition independent of the country is applied to migration and in which the numbers are recorded without errors or omissions. We have already seen that this is not at present the case, and that, since most migration has become intra-continental, the omissions may be very considerable.

**55.** Since records of migrants entering and leaving a country are not linked, no estimate of the length of stay is possible. To have an estimate of permanent migration, it would also be necessary to record the date of birth of migrants.

##### 2. Census data

**56.** These may be of several kinds and we will consider them separately.

###### a) *Question on the place of residence at an earlier date*

**57.** Let us again take the most favourable case, in which the question is asked on the same date in all countries, with the same period of reference, which we will suppose to be 5 years.

**58.** In this case, we still do not know the date of migration, which occurs during the period. Thus, if there is a strong current of immigration just over 5 years before the census and if the migrants are still present during the census, no migrants are recorded. Conversely, if this strong flow occurs just under 5 years before the census and if the migrants are still present during the census, the movement is completely revealed, although the situation is very similar to the earlier one. Corresponding data in the countries of emigration allow returns to be estimated but they still do not give information as to their exact date nor, more particularly, do they link them with previous departures.

**59.** These figures again give no serious estimate of the length of stay, even when they are combined with data on the place of birth.

**60.** In fact, data of this kind can be more usefully employed in the study of internal migration, owing to the great stability in time of this phenomenon [5]. In studying migration, the greater irregularity of the phenomenon detracts considerably from the interest of a question of this kind.

###### b) *Question on the last change of residence*

**61.** This question seems to give the length of stay between entry into the country of migration and the census. In fact, in the form in which it is often put, if the migrants have made at least one internal migration within the country, only the last internal migration is recorded. We will consider henceforward only questions on the last migration (1).

**62.** The question does not give any information on the length of stay in the country: an individual who has entered shortly before the census may subsequently stay longer than an individual who entered the country before him, who may leave the country shortly after the census.

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(1) It should be mentioned that a question of this type was asked in a country of emigration (Yugoslavia) [1], in order to ascertain the number of people employed outside the country. The question asked the year of departure abroad and was put to members of the family who had remained in the country, or, if the whole family was abroad, to neighbours. The advantage of such a question is to provide coherent statistics for the various countries of emigration, which they could not get by reference to their records. Unfortunately it still does not always provide information on the length of stay abroad.

c) *Question on the place of birth*

63. A question of this type permits no estimate of the length of stay of migrants. It does, however, provide data on the permanent migration of generations of advanced age. But it only gives the numbers present during the censuses; the total number of first migrants to which they should be related is not known.

3. Combined use of several types of data

64. We will consider here only the frequent case in which a country has both frontier records classified by year of migration and age at migration, and also a question asked during the census, of one of the three types mentioned above (1).

These data are of course not linked.

a) *Frontier records and question on the place of residence at an earlier date*

65. Possession of these two types of data, always supposing them to be perfectly recorded, scarcely improves the information on migration.

66. For migrations recorded at the frontiers which took place 5 years before or more:

— in the country of arrival, whether the individuals remain in the country or return to their country of origin, the census does not record them,

— in the country of departure, the census still does not record them if the individuals remain in the country of immigration. But if the individuals return during the 5-year period, the returns are recorded, though it is not known to which population of migrants they refer.

67. For migrations recorded at the frontiers which took place less than 5 years before:

— in the country of arrival, the census records the migrants remaining in the country and these can be compared with the annual numbers of migrants, though only over the whole 5-year period, which gives a somewhat inaccurate estimate of the returns. In addition, multiple migrations occurring before the date of the last migration may falsify this result.

— in the country of departure, the census generally records nothing, unless there occurs within the period a return followed by a further emigration followed by another return, a very rare case indeed.

b) *Frontier records and question on the last change of residence*

68. We will take the most interesting case, in which the question relates to the last migration.

69. For the countries of arrival, we learn the entries for a given year from the records and the census gives the number of these individuals still present when it is taken.

70. We may therefore calculate the return rates for a cohort within a given period, each cohort having a different period of observation. This allows transverse study of the phenomenon and, where the behaviour of the migrants of the various cohorts is identical, we obtain a longitudinal idea of the phenomenon.

71. For the country of departure, however, it will not be possible to link the returns recorded by the census with the relevant emigrations, in order to calculate the length of stay.

c) *Frontier records and question on the place of birth*

72. Let us suppose that, for a given country, we have a frontier record of entries, together with data on the age of the migrants. We can then compare the total numbers of migrations of individuals born in a given year coming from another country, with the individuals born in that other country in the year in question and enumerated in the country of arrival. This estimate of returns will be very vague, since it does not apply to an entry cohort, but to a generation, regardless of the date of entry into the country. In addition, multiple migrations will falsify the phenomenon, for while they are counted only once in the census (migrant) they are counted in the frontier records every time the individual migrates to the country concerned.

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(1) We are not considering here the comparison of successive censuses, which only gives an estimate of net migration. In this connection, see [14].

#### 4. Conclusions

**73.** Thus, even the combined use of the various types of methods considered in this section does not give an adequate idea of length of stay. The best combination observed, frontier records and question on the last migration, does give return rates. But it should be noted here that the use of such a method requires an identical definition of migration for the administrative records at frontiers and statistical departments to carry out the censuses. This condition appears to be far from being fulfilled as yet.

**74.** In addition, this method requires 2 questions to be asked in the census :

- one on the date of the last migration, and
- the other on the previous country of residence,

whereas for the method based on the place of residence at an earlier date, there is only one. It is easy to see that by asking a greater number of questions on the successive migrations of persons completing the census, one could obtain all the information necessary for the analysis of migration. Unfortunately, questions of cost make this eventuality somewhat unlikely. We must therefore now see what possibilities remain for the correct measurement of migration.

### V. PROPOSED METHODS OF MEASUREMENT

**75.** We shall consider separately two methods, which are in fact presented in greater detail in this seminar, as types of systems for observing migration: population registers (1) and sample surveys (2).

#### 1. Population registers

**76.** Population registers, insofar as they note all migrations, both within and across frontiers, provide a valuable source for the study of the phenomenon. Unfortunately, only some ten countries use these registers.

**77.** In fact, for migration in a given country, there is only one record (either of leaving or entering) whereas for internal migration there are two. Frequently the declaration of departure from a country is not made, so that the data are incomplete.

**78.** In addition, the data taken from these registers are most often limited to the volume of entries and exits, and take no account of the links between them. It would therefore be necessary to make provision for this information to be specially processed, where possible, in order to reconstruct the individuals' migratory history.

**79.** Up to the present, it has only been possible to conduct studies confined to small populations on the basis of these registers [10]. The general processing of all the information would in fact be very costly and cannot easily be envisaged.

#### 2. Sample surveys

**80.** Faced with the difficulty of using exhaustive statistics and the cost of these operations, we are left with sample surveys.

**81.** The sample to be chosen can only be representative of the whole population of the country and not of its foreign population. This sample should indeed reveal emigrations and returns on the part of the country's nationals. In addition, the choice of such a sample permits study of both internal and foreign migration, which are no doubt closely linked. A survey of this kind would bring out the connection.

**82.** The sample should be relatively larger as foreigners and returning nationals form a smaller part of the population. Of course, for countries which have no external migration, a survey of this kind would no longer be of interest for migration but only for internal migration.

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(1) In this connection, see [2], [10], [21].

(2) In this connection, see [6], [20].

**83.** It is essential that the survey be carried out simultaneously in all countries. To show international migrations clearly, it is necessary to work on the countries of departure and arrival at the same time : by working on the country of departure, we register return migrants and by working on the countries of arrival, first migrations and certain multiple migrations.

**84.** The main questions of the survey should give, first, all the demographic characteristics of the individuals:

- date and place of birth;
- sex;
- all changes of dwelling made by the individual in the course of his life, with respective dates and locations;
- all changes affecting the individual's career in the course of his life, with dates and qualifications. It would also be interesting to have changes in economic status, and
- all family changes (marriages, births, deaths, cessation of cohabitation, children's entry on career) with the dates and locations of these events.

**85.** For each migration mentioned, additional information may be asked which would enable these to be studied more closely:

- occupational training received;
- languages spoken;
- expenditure in the country of emigration, funds sent to the country of origin;
- reason for migration, and
- reception in the country of emigration;

**86.** This list is not exhaustive; it is limited only by the risk of making the questionnaire too onerous so that replies may be refused.

**87.** Surveys of this type have already been carried out in a certain number of countries. They suggest that oversights on the part of subjects are likely to be few, since the questions are concerned with important events in the lives of the persons questioned. Moreover, comparison is possible with the various sources at present existing on the subject.

**88.** Another supposition should also be made. In fact, one is working on a population which has escaped the risk of mortality. This disturbing factor should not therefore be affected by the phenomenon under study, in this case migration [8]. Insofar as migrants have a death-rate which differs greatly from that of the initial population, there is a bias which it is difficult to assess.

**89.** Surveys of this kind are of great interest. In the first place, in the face of the complete absence of information of the type asked for here, we have no perspective from which to judge present conditions of migration. These surveys will provide information on all generations now living and will enable us to discover the long-term pattern of migration, if it exists. They therefore constitute the sole means of learning about the past, given the inadequacy or the various sources available in the different countries. In the second place, by employing a single questionnaire, at least for the main questions in all countries, we will be sure of having comparable data. We have seen that this factor of comparability, which is absolutely necessary for any study of migration, is absent from the existing statistics. Finally, these surveys allow combined study of internal and international migration. These two types of migration, between which an arbitrary distinction is drawn, are often not very different [18]. In particular, the differences between migration and the rural-urban migration are very small, and only combined study seems useful.

**90.** The main disadvantage is the size of the sample necessary to acquire adequate information. However the interest of this type of survey seems to us sufficient to outweigh this objection. They in fact permit an analysis of migration at once demographic, economic and sociological.

**91.** Before concluding this report, it seems useful to define more accurately the indices that can be constructed for the purpose of making such an analysis.

## VI. INDICES OF MIGRATION

92. We will suppose that we are working on retrospective survey data (1). We will not therefore have to take into account fluctuations due to mortality (2).

## 1. First migration quotients

93. We are working on a given cohort in the country of emigration. Let  $N_x$  be the number at the  $x$ -th birthday of the members of this cohort who have always lived in the country. Let  $E_x$  be the number of these who emigrate between the  $x$ -th and the  $(x + 1)$ -th birthday. The quotient of first emigration at age  $x$ ,  $e_x$  will read :

$$e_x = \frac{E_x}{N_x}$$

94. In the same way, first emigration quotients may be defined for every country of emigration, or calculated for part of the total population (single persons, for example) [8].

## 2. Second-order migration quotients

95. We are working now on the emigrants from country  $i$  who are present in country  $j$  and who entered  $j$  at age  $x$ . They may in the future either remain in  $j$ , or return to  $i$ , or migrate to another country  $k$ .

96. Let us suppose, at first, that there are no migrations of the last type. We may then define a return quotient  $r_y$ ,  $y$  years after the first migration:

$$r_y = \frac{R_y}{E_y}$$

where  $R_y$  is the number of returns to  $i$  recorded between the  $(x + y)$ -th and the  $(x + y + 1)$ -th birthday, among the first migrants who entered at age  $x$  and are still present in  $j$  on the  $(x + y)$ -th birthday,  $E_y$ .

If there are migrations between a number of countries, various viewpoints may be considered.

97. For country  $i$ , the various countries of emigration are of little importance, all that counts is the length of stay outside the country. It is therefore pointless to take into account all the migrations between  $j$ ,  $k$ ... All that matters is the return to country  $i$ . If,  $y$  years after the first migration at age  $x$ , the number  ${}_iR_y$  of these individuals return to the country, then the return quotient  ${}_i r_y$  reads:

$${}_i r_y = \frac{{}_i R_y}{{}_i E_y}$$

where  ${}_i E_y$  is the number of first migrants at age  $x$ , who are still abroad at age  $(x + y)$ .

98. For country  $j$ , on the other hand, it is the length of stay in the country that counts, regardless of the country ( $i$  or  $k$ ) to which the migrant goes on his second migration. We can therefore define, on the basis of exits from country  $j$ ,  ${}_j R_y$ ,  $y$  years after the first migration at age  $x$ , an exit quotient  ${}_j r_y$ :

$${}_j r_y = \frac{{}_j R_y}{{}_j E_y}$$

where  ${}_j E_y$  is the number of first migrants at age  $x$  still present in country  $j$  at age  $(x + y)$ .

99. Of course, for a more refined analysis of the phenomenon, other quotients can be defined.

100. On the basis of these quotients, we can calculate the proportion of returns by a given age. This allows us to define permanent migrants, if this age is sufficiently advanced (it will be the age after which

(1) For indices definable for other types of data, see [14].

(2) If these fluctuations are taken into account, the following formulae are easily alterable.

there are practically no returns). In this case, it is preferable to define a new return quotient,  $r'_y$ , relating, not to all the first migrants, but to those who will return in the future (1). If  $E_d$  is the number of permanent migrants, the equation reads:

$$r'_y = \frac{R_y}{E_y - E_d}$$

This allows us to define two differently-behaving sub-populations.

### 3. Higher order migration quotients

**101.** We will take the simplified case, which must however be close to reality, in which an individual makes several migrations between two countries only, and not to others (2),

**102.** To be thorough, we should draw a distinction between individuals from country  $i$  who left for  $j$  at age  $x$ , returned to  $i$  at age  $y$ , returned again to  $j$  at age  $z$ ... It is easy to see that the numbers in these groups will rapidly approach zero. It is therefore necessary to regroup these numbers (this may indeed be necessary even with second-order migration). This may be done in various ways:

— by taking only the age at which the migration of order  $(n-1)$  was made and studying the distribution in time of migrations of order  $n$  in a given generation;

— by working on all migrations of order  $(n-1)$  and, taking as starting-point the time of migration, studying the distribution of migrations of order  $n$  in relation to this starting-point, in a given generation:

— by working on all the migrations of order  $(n-1)$  which took place in a given year and studying the distribution in time of migrations of order  $n$ .

**103.** The first method is preferable to the other two, since it allows work on a given generation and age but the numbers will be small. The second method has the advantage of providing larger numbers, while still working on a single generation. But, since the individuals may have made their migration of order  $(n-1)$  at any age, they will all be observed over different periods. The last method has the same disadvantage and it no longer allows work on a given generation. On the contrary, a new cohort is defined here, that of the individuals who made their migration of order  $(n-1)$  in a given year. It appears interesting to consider this cohort insofar as migration is very sensitive to the economic conditions of the moment: in certain years, the number may be very high but it may be nil in other years.

### 4. Other indices

**104.** Of course, numerous other indices can be constructed. In the first place, we may characterise, for a given generation, the intensity of permanent migration in a country and the average length of residence for those making a return, without taking into account either the age at first emigration or the order of successive migrations.

**105.** The question of comparing the first emigrants with the population subject to the risk of migration, can also be discussed. In particular, the population of earlier emigrants present in country  $j$  can be considered as exercising an attraction on new migrants in proportion to its numbers.

## CONCLUSION

**106.** Before drawing any conclusions from this study, it is useful to summarise here the course we have followed.

**107.** The development of earlier work on migration falls into two stages. In the first, *migration* is considered almost exclusively as an event, unrelated to the other events in the life of an individual, and in particular to any other migrations he may make. *Frontier records* constitute the most frequent measurement of this. However, the failure as yet to apply international recommendations aimed at rendering the mea-

(1) For simplicity, we are taking the case in which there are no further migrations to a third country.

(2) The most general case can be treated, but it is very complex.

surements of the various countries comparable, leads to a second approach. The *migrant* is now defined as an individual who has experienced at least one migration during the period in question, but without considering the number of migrations he may have made. A question asked during census on the place of residence at an earlier date permits an approximate measurement of these.

**108.** However, when we seek to define the phenomenon accurately, we see that these two definitions are inadequate. They ignore an important aspect of migration: the *length of stay* of migrants in a country. Only this concept provides exact information on the gain or loss of labour which migration involves for a given country.

**109.** We should therefore analyse the possibilities of studying the phenomenon, without at first worrying about whether the necessary statistics exist. We must first ascertain the part played in migration by the various demographic factors: returns, multiple migrations, mortality. Only after this has been studied can the economic, political and sociological analysis of migration be developed.

**110.** When we turn to the existing statistics, mainly frontier records and census data, we see that, even if the international recommendations were applied, and if these two types of data could be used together, the information provided would not enable the analysis to be carried out.

**111.** It is necessary therefore to resort to other methods. The first that comes to mind is the use of *population registers*: the small number of countries which have such statistics and the complexity of processing them make this method impracticable. There remains therefore the use of retrospective *surveys* on migration. To give complete information on migration, these surveys should take place at the same time in the various countries.

**112.** These surveys do, however, present a certain number of disadvantages. To give valid results, they require a large sample: the cost would therefore be very high. In addition, certain oversights on the part of subjects or errors in the migration dates given are to be feared. It will be useful to refer to previous data, where possible, to ascertain the extent of these omissions.

**113.** In spite of this, the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. First of all, these surveys allow us to supply the information missing in the past. Longitudinal analysis of migration thus becomes possible. Secondly, these surveys give all the demographic, economic and sociological information for a complete analysis of the phenomenon, which the incomplete data previously available from a variety of sources did not allow. Moreover, some of these sources are of little use, since most migration is now intra-continental: this is particularly true of frontier controls.

**114.** Thus the use of surveys on migration allows a great step forward in its study, which is as yet very incomplete.

**115.** The demographic study of migration is far from lacking in interest, as was previously thought. In fact, factors such as returns or multiple migrations require analysis, which is yet to be undertaken (1). Other demographic factors also operate, among which we may mention: the birth rate of children abroad, mortality and the link between present and past migrations. This last factor may be important, since the presence in the host country of fellow-countrymen and the help they may be expected to give, also play a part in migration. Conversely, migration affects the development of other demographic factors and its effects also require evaluation.

**116.** The interest of the economic analysis made possible by these surveys is obvious. The demographic analysis already made provides indices which define migration accurately. Only when we know the period a migrant has spent in a country, can we make a serious estimate of his contribution to the economy of that country. Other data can then be adduced, in particular economic and sociological data, to produce a more thorough analysis.

**117.** These surveys are necessary both for the administration of the various countries and for the purpose of defining the right policy for a given situation.

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(1) The first results obtained [11], show that the effect of economic crises on returns is much less than might have been expected, and that the long-term development of the country's social and economic structures played a dominant part.

**118.** Many countries do have accurate statistics on births and deaths. Careful demographic analysis of these enables population forecasts to be made, without migration, which show the results that will follow from the pattern of development observed in the past. These forecasts therefore allow a policy to be defined in full knowledge of the facts.

**119.** The moment migration occurs, the situation changes. While certain countries still have migration statistics, these are in most cases incomplete, as we have seen. In addition, the absence of any demographic analysis of the phenomenon prevents any population projection being made, including migration, on the basis of the pattern of development observed in the past.

**120.** Many people think that fluctuations connected with the economic and political situation make it impossible to project the trends of migratory movements. Even if these movements have very little stability forecasts are not without value, since it is obvious that not all futures can be equally probable [9].

**121.** We would go even further, for we think that only an analysis of the phenomenon can show us whether the trends of migratory movements, outside periods of very serious economic crisis, do in fact vary only very slowly over a period of time. It seems to us that the stability of migration must be much greater than it is held to be, according to the economic point of view taken by many present governments. First attempts at analysing returns show that this certainly appears to be so [11]. We see therefore the profound interest of conducting surveys, which alone can show whether or not this supposition is well-founded. If it proves true, solidly-based projections can then be made in the various countries.

**122.** In addition, the effect of political measures taken in the past can be examined with the aid of these surveys. They will enable us to judge whether these measures modified the flow of migrants in the desired direction. It will also be possible to see what consequences they may have had in other fields.

**123.** Lastly, it will be possible to attempt a joint approach to migration by a number of disciplines. For this approach to be fruitful, the survey questionnaire must be drawn up by representatives of the various sciences concerned with migration. Only very close collaboration between both the countries and the sciences concerned will make possible these surveys, which seem to us to be of fundamental interest.

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### III

## DETERMINANTS AND MECHANISMS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

# THE RELEVANCE OF MODELS OF INTERNAL MIGRATION FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION (1)

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## INTRODUCTION

1. The literature on internal migration contains several thousand studies (2). Because internal migration takes place within national boundaries it is often possible to obtain detailed data about the size and composition of all major streams of migration within the universe of a study. As a result, many empirical regularities have been observed and several models of internal migration have been developed and tested.
2. The purpose of this paper is to explore the relevance of these models for the study of international migration. The first part of the paper will review the existing models of internal migration. The second part will discuss some of the major differences between internal migration and international migration. The last part of the paper will discuss the potential utility of different models for the study of international migration.

## REVIEW OF INTERNAL MIGRATION MODELS

3. We shall assume that a model is a symbolic and simplified representation of reality which aids in the patterning of observed behavior (3). Ideally, all observations related to a particular type of behavior should be integrated into a unified model. Unfortunately, no such comprehensive model exists in the area of migration. Instead, there are several different models which attempt to explain different aspects of migration. For purposes of discussion, we have grouped these models under four headings.

- A. Gravity Models
- B. Cost-Benefit and Optimal Location Models
- C. Transition Matrix Models
- D. Stress and Awareness Models

### A. Gravity Models

4. One of the earliest observations about migration was that it was strongly influenced by distance and size of place. In 1885, Ravenstein published a detailed study of migration in the United Kingdom which set forth a series of empirical laws. These included the following statements :

“In forming an estimate of this displacement we must take into account the number of natives of each county which furnishes the migrants, as also the population of the towns or districts which absorb them.”

“Migrants enumerated in a certain centre of absorption will consequently grow less with the distance proportionately to the native population which furnishes them” (Ravenstein, 1885: 198-199).

5. The gravity model of migration can be seen as an attempt to express Ravenstein's laws in a single simple equation:

$$M_{ij} = K \frac{P_i P_j}{D_{ij}}$$

$M_{ij}$  = No. of migrants going from place  $i$  to place  $j$   
 $K$  = Constant  
 $P_i$  = Population of place  $i$   
 $P_j$  = Population of place  $j$   
 $D_{ij}$  = Distance between them

6. This model says that migration between any two points is simply a function of the size of the two places and the distance between them. As such, the model has the status of an empirical law and provides little insight into why migration follows this pattern.

7. Zipf (1946), Carrothers (1956), Isard (1960), Olsson (1965) and others have shown that this model results from assuming that migration is similar to random interactions of people at a distance. Their arguments are most easily understood if one considers such things as the travel of persons, the shipment of goods, or long distance telephone calls between cities. Let us consider the travel of businessmen who are equally likely to do business with other businessmen throughout the country. If the cost of each trip were the same, the probability of a given businessman in city  $i$  doing business with someone in city  $j$  is simply  $P_j/P_i$  where  $P_j$  is the number of businessmen in city  $j$  and  $P_i$  is the total number in the country. Now if there are  $P_i$  businessmen in city  $i$ , the volume of travel between  $P_i$  and  $P_j$  will be  $K P_i P_j$  where the constant  $K$  includes the factor  $1/P_i$ .

8. These trips usually will vary in cost with distance so it is reasonable to include an inverse function of distance in the question. An inverse function of distance can also be obtained by assuming that one is more likely to want to do business with someone in a nearby city than one far away. If both cost and business contacts vary with distance, the interaction between the two places may fall off more rapidly with distance than  $1/D$ . For this reason the gravity model is frequently specified as  $M_{ij} = K \frac{P_i P_j}{D_{ij}^\alpha}$  where  $\alpha$  usually varies between 1 and 2.

9. The gravity model is aptly named. Like the law of gravity it describes an empirical observation involving interaction at a distance but fails to provide an understanding of why there should be such interaction. When applied to migration it says that people move as if they were drawn to other people by a force which diminishes with distance. It is useful mainly as an empirical law about the relative volume of migration streams. The model cannot be used to explain why migration rates vary with the characteristics of migrants (Morrison, 1971), with duration of residence (Morrison, 1967; Land, 1969; Speare, 1970) or from one culture to another (Long, 1970).

10. Another problem with the gravity model is that it is a symmetric model. It assumes that the volume of migration between two places is the same in both directions. The model allows for no net redistribution of population among areas. While this redistribution may be small compared to the total volume of movement, it is often the part of migration which is of greatest interest to the social scientist or planner. Another failing of the gravity models is that they assume a constant propensity to move for all segments of the population and this does not allow for changes in the volume of out-migration with population composition.

## B. Cost-Benefit and Optimum Location Models

11. The second set of models is distinguished by the assumption that migrants move to optimize their location. Optimization is usually expressed in terms of either opportunities or place utility.

### *Stouffer's Model of Intervening Opportunities*

12. One of the first such models is the intervening opportunities model developed by Stouffer (1940). Stouffer's theory is summarized by the statement that "the number of persons going a given distance is directly proportional to the number of opportunities at that distance and inversely proportional to the number of intervening opportunities" (Stouffer, 1940: 846).

13. By casting the problem in terms of opportunities he comes closer to a model which explains individual mobility behavior—people move because of opportunities. The form of the model is similar to the gravity

model with opportunities at the destination replacing population of the destination and intervening opportunities replacing distance. The use of opportunities instead of populations allows the model to predict a different volume of migrations in the stream and counterstream between two places. The use of intervening opportunities in place of distance provides an explanation for the relationship of migration to distance—the greater the distance the more intervening opportunities. If opportunities are distributed relatively homogeneously over space then the number of intervening opportunities is a simple inverse function of distance. Independent studies by Anderson (1955) and Strodtbeck (1949) have shown that using intervening opportunities instead of distance adds little to the predictability of migration. The intervening opportunities model is difficult to apply because of problems in measuring opportunities and intervening opportunities. Stouffer (1960) and Galle and Taeuber (1966) used the total number of in-migrants to represent opportunities and intervening opportunities. This leads to an exercise which is highly tautological and fails to provide any more understanding of migration patterns than that provided by the gravity model.

#### *Lowry's Model*

**14.** Lowry (1966) has developed a more sophisticated model for the volume of migration between metropolitan areas. Since most migration between metropolitan areas is related to job changes, he defines opportunities in terms of job opportunities. Since data on jobs are not generally available, he uses three variables which when taken together should indicate the relative number of opportunities in an area—the size of the labor force, the wage rate, and the unemployment rate.

$$M_{i \rightarrow j} = K \frac{U_i}{U_j} \times \frac{W_j}{W_i} \cdot \frac{L_i L_j}{D_{ij}}$$

where  $M_{i \rightarrow j}$  = Number of migrants from place  $i$  to place  $j$

$L_i$  and  $L_j$  = Number of persons in the non-agricultural labor force in  $i$  and  $j$

$U_i$  and  $U_j$  = Unemployment rates in  $i$  and  $j$

$W_i$  and  $W_j$  = Manufacturing wages in  $i$  and  $j$

$D_{ij}$  = Distance between  $i$  and  $j$

**15.** Using a sample of migration streams between SMSA's, Lowry was able to explain 56% of the variance in the volume of migration between streams for 1955-60. This was only slightly better than the 51% of variance explained by the gravity model. Lowry's results question the importance of unemployment and wages at the place of origin because neither shows a statistically significant relationship to migration. He concludes that "the evidence presented above suggests that the total volume of out-migration from a given place depends on the size and structural properties of the resident population rather than on the absolute or relative level of economic opportunities at this place" (Lowry, 1966: 30).

**16.** The basic model is probably too highly aggregated. Lowry (1966: 20) achieves better results by adding separate terms for the military and civilian labor forces. Stone (1971) has shown that migration streams vary in their occupational composition. This implies that a model specific to a particular occupation might be more successful.

#### *The Cost-Benefit Model*

**17.** Although the models of Stouffer and Lowry operate at the aggregate level, they imply that individuals move to optimize income or to secure employment. These assumptions have been built into a formal model of individual migration decision making by Larry Sjaastad (1962). Sjaastad's model is fashioned after the cost-benefit approach that has been used extensively by economists in evaluating education and manpower training programs. Sjaastad treats migration as an investment from which one expects to receive returns sufficient to offset the costs of moving.

**18.** In the simplest form of the cost-benefit model, a person is assumed to move if the present value of all future monetary benefits from moving is greater than the monetary costs of moving. It is assumed that the only benefits are the difference in income between the origin and the destination and that the only costs are those of transporting the migrant, his family if they also move, and his belongings between the two points. The model thus includes only one factor at the origin, one at the destination, and one intervening obstacle.

**19.** The cost-benefit model is best expressed by the following equation : A person will move if

$$\sum_{j=1}^N \frac{(Y_{dj} - Y_{oj})}{(1+r)^j} - T > 0$$

where  $Y_{dj}$  = Earnings in the  $j$ th year at the destination  
 $Y_{oj}$  = Earnings in the  $j$ th year at the origin  
 $T$  = Cost of moving  
 $N$  = Total number of years in which future returns are expected  
 $r$  = Rate of interest used to discount future earnings

Simplifying assumptions can be made about the rate of interest and the period over which future benefits are summed which make it possible for the model to be used in multivariate analysis of migration. Most of the tests of the model have used aggregate data and the form of the model which was used resembles Lowry's model (see Sjaastad, 1961; and Gallaway, Gilbert, and Smith, 1967).

**20.** Adaptations of the model have proved useful in understanding rural to urban migration in developing nations. Todaro (1969) has calculated the expected change in urban employment resulting from a given change in rural-urban wage differential. Speare (1971) used this model to distinguish migrants from non-migrants in the empirical analysis of rural to urban migration in Taiwan. The model is difficult to test because it is hard to identify and measure all the relevant costs and benefits, both monetary and non-monetary. These can include cost of living differences, opportunities for new experiences, benefits from social relationships and many other factors. A broader framework was developed by Lee (1966) where potential migrants were viewed as influenced by factors at the origin, factors at the destination, intervening obstacles, and personal factors.

**21.** Another problem with the model is that it assumes that everyone is continually weighing costs and benefits and thus continually in the process of deciding whether or not to move. While this assumption may hold for some professionals, it does not hold for most people. Lansing and Mueller (1967: 204-207) found that 82 percent of those who had not moved in the last five years had not given any serious consideration to moving.

**22.** A similar set of assumptions is involved in treating migration as an individual location problem similar to the problems of location of the firm. Location models have also been used to predict the location of households in urban areas under normative assumptions (Brown, *et al.*, 1970; Alonso, 1964; Walter, 1971). Termote (1972) considers the optimization of location where one has a trade-off between costs of moving and costs of commuting to work.

### C. Transition Matrix Models

**23.** A different type of model is the transition matrix model where observed mobility rates between places are expressed as entries in a transition matrix. If the rates are stable over time, the matrix can be applied to the distribution of population among places to produce the distribution at a future time. Rogers (1968) has shown how the mobility matrix can be incorporated into the matrix method of population projection so that both the size and distribution of future populations can be projected.

**24.** The method depends heavily upon the assumptions that the mobility matrix is stationary over time and that the rates apply equally to all people. The approach can be improved by using different mobility rates for different age groups. However, this is not sufficient to make the population reasonably homogeneous with respect to mobility. Goldstein (1958, 1964) observed that a great deal of mobility is due to a limited segment of the population who are repeated movers. The result of this is that areas of high in-migration tend to have higher out-migration rates than would be expected from studying their native population. To cope with a similar problem for labor mobility, Blumen, Logen and McCarthy (1965) developed a mover-stayer model. To project the number of workers in each industry under the assumption of a fixed population of workers, they merely carried forward the stayers in each industry and added these to the results of applying a Markov transition matrix to the mover population.

**25.** McGinnis (1968) extended this model to encompass a mover-stayer continuum by adding states for each duration of residence. This allows for the probability of moving to vary with duration of residence. One problem with this approach is that it greatly multiplies the number of states which a researcher must deal with. A recent version of the Cornell Model reduces this problem somewhat by specifying an upper limit on duration of residence after which time the probability of moving is constant (Henry, McGinnis, and Teytmeyer, 1971). Further work by Ginsberg (1971) has attempted to reformulate the model in terms of a semi-Markov process in which the relationship of mobility to duration of residence is specified in more precise mathematical terms.

**26.** Studies by Morrison (1967), Land (1969), and Speare (1970) have shown that while the probability of moving declines consistently with duration of residence, it also varies with age, life cycle stage and home ownership when duration of residence is held constant. If these variables are introduced into the Cornell Model by adding additional states in the same way the McGinnis (1968) added duration of residence, the number of states becomes so large that the model becomes unworkable. Stone (1973) has suggested that it should be possible to solve this problem by specifying functions for different variables. If this could be done, one would have a model which would specify the probability of moving for a particular person as a function of duration of residence and other individual and residence characteristics. Even with these changes, the mover-stayer model would remain a descriptive model and it would still fail to explain why people with certain characteristics had high mobility while others with different characteristics had low mobility.

**27.** Another problem with the Cornell models arises when they are employed to predict future mobility. In such prediction a Markov chain model is used where the states represent combinations of specific locations and duration of residence. By using a Markov chain they are assuming that the observed mobility rates will remain unchanged in the future. This assumption seems highly tenuous in a society such as the United States where there is considerable change in the relative opportunities available at a particular place over time.

#### D. Stress and Awareness Models

**28.** Another approach to a theory of who moves is to view migration as a response to stress. This approach grows out of a concept of human decision-making which is perhaps best represented in the work of Herbert Simon (1957). Simon views the individual decision-maker as limited in the capacity to formulate and solve problems and to acquire and retain information. To cope with these problems the individual constructs a simplified model of the situation and acts rationally with respect to that model. Simon suggests that in this simplified model only a subset of the alternatives are perceived and that payoffs are evaluated only as satisfactory or unsatisfactory. No action is taken if the current state is judged to be satisfactory. If it is unsatisfactory, a search is made for outcomes which are satisfactory, and the search is terminated when a satisfactory alternative is found (Simon, 1957: 198ff).

**29.** Rossi (1955) used a somewhat similar approach in his study of intra-urban mobility in Philadelphia. He divided the mobility decision-making process into three stages: the decision to leave the old home, the search for a new home, and the choice among alternatives. The first decision was seen as depending on household characteristics and housing satisfaction which he measured by means of a mobility potential index and a complaints index. The first index was made up of age, household size, and housing tenure preference. The second index was the sum of housing characteristics with which the individual expresses dissatisfaction. Leslie and Richardson (1961) showed that mobility could also result from career patterns which involved upward social mobility.

**30.** Wolpert (1965, 1966) has used these concepts to develop what has been called the "stress-threshold" model of migration. According to Wolpert, an individual will assign a "place utility" to the current place of residence which represents the social, economic, and other costs and benefits derived from that location. The individual evaluates this place utility relative to a threshold which is a "function of his experience or attainments at a particular place and the attainments of his peers" (Wolpert, 1965: 162).

**31.** Brown and Moore (1970) have attempted to make this model more explicit. They divide the mobility decision into three stages which are slightly different from Rossi's. The first stage is the decision to seek alternatives which does not necessarily commit one to moving. This is followed by the search for alternatives, and the final evaluation which may result in the decision to relocate or to abandon the search and adjust to one's current location. They describe the search pattern as highly dependent on the information possessed by the individual and that available from the local environment (4). They use the term "awareness space" to refer to those locations which the potential migrant has knowledge about through direct contact, through friends and relatives, the mass media, and contact with specialized agencies such as employment services. In most cases the awareness space includes only a small subset of the opportunities which are available.

**32.** Although these ideas have yet to be formulated into a precise mathematical model, they are worthy of consideration because of the qualifications they place on the models which assume economic rationality. In a study of residential mobility, Speare (1974) found that residential satisfaction was an important variable which distinguished whether or not a person considered moving. The majority of people in the study were satisfied where they were and gave no thought to moving. This study also confirmed an earlier finding of

Lansing and Mueller (1967: 209) that only about one mover in three considers more than one possible destination.

### *The Current State of Internal Migration Theory*

**33.** In 1966, Everett Lee concluded a review of Ravenstein's work with the statement that "this century has brought no comparable excursion into migration theory" (Lee, 1966: 48). While the number of theoretical works on migration published since 1966 is probably sufficient to make this statement no longer valid, the field still lacks a model which is both comprehensive and operational. The theories which try to provide a general understanding of mobility (e.g., Lee, 1966; and Sabagh, Van Arsdol, and Butler, 1969) do not specify a model for use in empirical studies. On the other hand, the models which are most widely used in empirical analysis (e.g., Zipf, 1946; Stouffer, 1940; Lowry, 1966) explain only part of the mobility process at best. While these models have had some success in explaining the variation of migration among migration streams, they fail to explain variations in the propensity to move for different areas and different types of people.

## DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNAL MIGRATION

**34.** Most internal migration is voluntary movement and the major motivations for moving are job opportunities and other economic factors. Lansing and Mueller (1967: 39) found that three out of four household heads in the United States had moved for economic reasons or a combination of economic and non-economic reasons.

**35.** In international migration, political factors are often more important than economic factors. The largest migration streams tend to be generated in times of war and political upheaval. Beijer (1969: 23) estimated that only 5 to 7 percent of the international migration in the two decades following World War II was voluntary. Although this percentage is deflated by the large number of involuntary movers following World War II, the largest migration streams are still comprised of migrants who are generally referred to as involuntary migrants.

**36.** At this point it is useful to re-examine the distinction between voluntary and involuntary migration. In the strictest sense migration can be considered to be involuntary only when a person is physically transported from a country and has no opportunity to escape from those transporting him. Movement under threat, even the immediate threat to life, contains a voluntary element as long as there is an option to escape to another part of the country, go into hiding, or to remain and hope to avoid persecution. Peterson (1969) distinguishes between forced migration, impelled migration and free migration (5). In forced migration, the migrant has no choice but to move. In impelled migration push factors exert a strong influence on the decision to move, although the migrant retains some power to decide. In free migration, the will of the migrants is a decisive element. For the case of refugee movements, Kunz (1973) makes a distinction between those who leave before the deterioration of the military or political situation prevents an orderly departure and those who leave later when the push factors become overwhelming. The former he calls "anticipatory refugee movements", the latter, "acute refugee movements". While both might be considered to be impelled migration, the operation of push factors is far greater in the "acute refugee movements".

**37.** If we were to plot the distribution of moves along an involuntary-voluntary continuum, we would find a predominance of internal moves near the voluntary end of the continuum whereas the international moves would probably be spread out along the continuum with a larger number near the involuntary than the voluntary end.

**38.** Voluntary international migration is also influenced by political factors. Most countries have restrictions on the number of people and the type of people who can enter. Many have restrictions on the places of origin from which immigration is permitted. Many other countries restrict emigration. These restrictions are, of course, effective only if a country is able to detect and punish illegal migrants.

**39.** International migration also differs from internal migration in the distance moved and the other obstacles to mobility. Even when the physical distance is short, international migration often involves a change in culture and language so that the social distance is great. The obstacles to movement and adjustment after the move are likely to make international migration more selective of the young and ambitious than is internal migration.

## THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNAL MIGRATION MODELS TO INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

### A. Gravity Models

40. The gravity models have limited applicability to international migration. The basic assumption of random interaction at a distance which is central to the logic of the gravity models ignores the economic, political, social, and cultural influences on migration.
41. A gravity model would predict that some of the largest migration streams would be between India, China, and the Soviet Union because they are countries with large populations which are close to one another. Australia would be expected to receive many more immigrants from Indonesia and China than from England. This has not been the case in this century.
42. In the nineteenth century when there were fewer barriers to international migration, the major streams were toward areas with low population density and not towards places where there were already large numbers of people.

### B. Location and Cost-Benefit Models

43. Location and cost-benefit models which are built on assumptions about economic determinants of migration may be useful for studying voluntary international migration. Economic factors appear to predominate in voluntary international migration where political influences are minimal.
44. Dorothy Thomas (1941) found that the volume of migration between Sweden and the United States from 1750 to 1933 was highly correlated with the relative economic conditions in the two countries. The greatest volume of migration occurred when there was economic prosperity in the United States and a depression in Sweden. For most of the period of her study, there was political stability in both countries and there were no restrictions on immigration.
45. Cost-benefit models might also have some application to the study of movement within the European Common Market and the Nordic Labor Market. Countries within these market areas allow reasonably unrestrained movement across national boundaries (Beijer, 1969).
46. However, the recent experience of immigration to the United States suggests that a simple cost-benefit model would not be adequate to explain the variations in the volume of migration from different countries. Since 1968, the United States has allowed immigrants from the Eastern hemisphere without regard for national origin up to a limit of 20,000 per country and 170,000 total. Since the United States has one of the highest per capita incomes in the world, economic models would predict a net benefit for migrants from all but the most affluent countries. Yet many countries with relatively low per capita incomes send few migrants to the United States.
47. If we consider countries with similar population size, economic conditions, and cost of travel to the United States, we find large differences in migration. Between 1968 and 1972, Italy and the United Kingdom sent about four times as many migrants to the United States as did France (United States Department of Justice, 1972). The Philippines sent about 30 times as many migrants to the United States as did Indonesia despite its much smaller population size.
48. Clearly there are other important factors which influence migration streams. Since language and cultural differences act as barriers to migration, we would expect larger migration streams between countries with similar languages and cultures than countries where these are dissimilar. In movements from less developed countries the migrants tend to be highly educated relative to those who remain in the country of origin. This implies that the countries such as the Philippines which have high proportions educated relative to the level of development will send relatively more migrants. If economic models could be disaggregated to apply to specific language and cultural groups, they might be more successful in studying voluntary international migration in streams which are relatively free of regulation.
49. Unfortunately even if properly modified, there are few streams today to which such models could be applied. In summarizing the role of economic factors in migration, the International Labour Office (1959, p. 211) pointed out that "no straightforward economic explanation—even if duly qualified by certain psychological considerations—can by itself account for the economic migration phenomena of today. International movements of labour are no longer as they once were, the mere reflection of supply and demand on a competitive market, but are conditioned to a large extent by state intervention in a number of forms."

### C. Matrix Transition Models

**50.** Matrix transition models would appear to be useful because they do not assume that the volume of migration streams follows any strict relation to population size, distance or to economic conditions. Where migration patterns are stable over time, matrix models might be used to predict the numbers of migrants in given streams. The mover-stayer distinction might also be helpful in predicting migration in situations where there are large numbers of international migrants. International migrants have a high propensity to return to their country of origin or, in the case of refugees, to move on to another country. By separating immigrants from the native population and applying different rates of out-migration to each, a more accurate projection is possible.

**51.** Unfortunately, migration patterns are seldom stable over time. A large proportion of international migration occurs during times of political instability and the volume of these flows changes rapidly as the political conditions change. Immigration and emigration restrictions also can change quickly and in directions which may be difficult to predict. Finally, the volume of voluntary movement within a given stream tends to vary with economic conditions at the places of origin and destination.

### D. Stress and Awareness Models

**52.** Stress and awareness models could be useful in the analysis of international migration once they are developed. The basic concept that people do not consider migration unless they experience some environmental stress would seem to be more applicable to international migration than internal migration. A large part of post-World War II international migration appears to have taken place under stressful conditions at the place of origin.

**53.** The concept of stress seems applicable to both voluntary or "free" migration and "impelled" migration. Where stress is high, most people will move and their moves will be viewed as "impelled" migration. Where stress is low, few people will move and their moves will be viewed as "free" migration even though stress may be important in initiating the mobility decision-making process for those movers.

**54.** Stress may arise from threats to one's life, one's source of income, or the ability to live as one is accustomed to do. Although stress is a subjective condition, its determinants are usually objective factors. If these objective sources of stress which lead to international migration could be identified, we might be able to predict the extent to which given changes in a society would influence international migration.

**55.** Awareness space may be the most important factor in determining where a person is likely to move once that person has decided to move. This is particularly true for acute refugee movements where there is little time to consider alternatives. Even with voluntary movement where it is possible to move to any of several other countries, the migrant will tend to go to the country where he has the greatest familiarity from previous experience, friends and relatives living there, or in the case of mass movement, because other people are moving there.

**56.** Not all places of previous residence or locations of friends or relatives may be viewed as satisfactory. In the case of refugee movement, a person forced to make a second move may not consider going back to the first country even though this may be the country of greatest familiarity. The concept of awareness space can be modified to take these situations into account by considering awareness space to be partitioned into two sets of places—those which are viewed as satisfactory residences and those which are not. The choice of destination can then be viewed as limited to those places in the awareness space which are seen as satisfactory alternative residences.

## SUMMARY

**57.** We have reviewed several models of internal migration. For purposes of discussion these have been classified as gravity models, cost-benefit and optimum location models, matrix transition models, and stress and awareness space models. Because international migration is often motivated or restricted by political factors many of the models which work well for internal migration appear to have little relevance to the study of international migration. These comments apply particularly to the gravity and matrix transition models.

58. Economic models may be useful for studying streams of migration where most movement is voluntary movement and the restrictions on movement are minimal. It could be interesting to apply a model similar to that used by Lowry to migration within the European Common Market. It would also be interesting to see if the ability of the model to explain variations in migration could be improved by adding factors to represent the cost of learning a new language or the cost of changing one's style of life to adapt to a different culture.

59. Although they are currently the least developed, the stress-threshold and awareness space models have the potential of being the most useful models for the study of international migration because they can incorporate the political factors which are often the sources of motivation for the large movements of people across national boundaries.

60. Before much model testing can be done in the area of international migration, better data must be collected and made available. Ideally, the United Nations or some other international agency should compile statistics on the number of persons moving between each country and every other country on a yearly basis. To help interpret these data there should also be a survey of the immigration and emigration restrictions in force in each country each year.

## NOTES

- (1) The work for this paper was supported in part by United States Public Health Grant HS-00246 and by a grant from the Ford-Rockefeller Foundations. The author is grateful to Sidney Goldstein and Charles Keely for their comments.
- (2) We shall not attempt to review the migration literature here, but shall focus only on the major theoretical works. For reviews of the literature see Thomas (1938), Bogue (1959), Mangalam (1968), and Morrison (1972). Also Simmons (1968) and Johnston (1971) provide an excellent review of the literature on intra-urban mobility. A few of the major recent studies of migration which we have found to be particularly useful in orienting this project are Lansing and Mueller (1967), Lansing, Clifton, and Morgan (1969) and Butler, *et al.*, (1969).
- (3) Extended discussions of the role of models in migration research can be found in Moore (1966), Olsson (1970), and Gale (1973).
- (4) Further discussion of the search process can be found in Brown and Longbrake (1970), Brown and Holmes (1971), Brown, Horton, and Wittick (1970) and Clark (1970).
- (5) Peterson's typology also includes two other categories which are of less interest for this discussion. "Primitive migration" includes the ranging and wandering of nomadic people. "Mass migration" applies to voluntary movement where the volume is so great that the movement is best described in terms of collective behavior.

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# ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC FACTORS IN THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

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1. Social scientists have hardly explored, let alone adequately researched, the dynamics of international migration\*. The reasons are not hard to find. Though decision-making, the basis of these dynamics, is centrally a problem for social psychologists, when applied to emigration it requires perception and careful synthesis of economic, demographic, sociological and political forces in both the country of emigration and the country of proposed immigration. Researchers are therefore required to “emigrate” themselves from their base disciplines to other “territories” where, with foreign colleagues, they may construct interdisciplinary models to explain the dynamics of international migration. So far, academic researchers have shown reluctance to make such journeys.

2. *Economic* theories on the determinants of emigration are for the most part only variations of those proposed decades ago in which individual decisions to emigrate were “explained” by theories based upon fairly rigid and unrealistic assumptions. The liberal theory of emigration attempted to explain movement on the basis of two propositions: individual free migration is determined by the economic self-interest of the migrant (i.e., “economic man” always acts to maximise his real income), and the economic self-interest of the individual coincides with the general interest (1). There was no place in this liberal, *laissez faire* doctrine for state intervention. In the long run, individual, national and international interests will coincide; any positive action by the state would therefore be a check or hindrance to these interests.

3. The liberal theory of emigration is generally expressed in the same comparative statics which characterises the marginal theory of production. With given capital and natural resources in both countries, labour will emigrate from country A (with lower productivity) to country B until productivities are equated and there will be no incentive for further emigration. The assumptions underlying the theory are so rigid that it can do little more than emphasise that workers will move to countries where the real return for their labour is higher—a proposition underlying most observations concerning contemporary emigration. The difficulty of applying any conclusions based upon marginal productivity theory was underscored by Paul Douglas who, in attempting to measure marginal productivity of labour in Massachusetts, and in two Australian states, had to assume perfect mobility of labour and capital, perfect competition on the labour market, full employment of the factors of production and the absence of state intervention (2)

4. Debate in economics journals during early post-war years on whether trade could be a complete substitute for mobility of capital and labour (migration) was just as unsatisfactory as had been the liberal theory to explain the dynamics of international migration. And for similar reasons. Though the debate involved such eminent economists as Paul Samuelson, Harry Johnston, Ivor Pearce and J.R. Hicks, J.E. Meade finally arbitrated a “no contest” on grounds that the restrictive assumptions underlying factor-price equalisation were unlikely ever to be achieved. Indeed, had Paul Samuelson been content to keep the debate at the abstract level at which A.P. Lerner introduced it in 1933, i.e. that under certain *conditions* trade was a substitute for migration of labour and capital, it would probably have gone unnoticed by all but professional economists.

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(\*) My emphasis in this paper has been on the economic, demographic, sociological and political constraints on emigration, especially by Europeans to Australia. This is done in the sincere belief that concentration upon those aspects of migration, in which some research has been undertaken, will engender more fruitful discussion at the Conference than would general observation on the dynamics of international migration as a whole.

Instead, he applied a Lerner-type model to a *particular* situation—post-war United Kingdom. When the economic heavens fell upon him, Samuelson admitted that he had been rash in drawing “a moral concerning the worth of emigration from Europe out of an abstract simplified model” (3). Abstract it most certainly was, constrained by such assumptions as free trade, free competition, a 2-country/2-commodity/2-factor world, no specialisation and identical production functions in both countries for the same products. Even so, in his summing up of the debate, J.E. Meade thought that given more reasonable postulates, it could be demonstrated that free trade must be *accompanied* by international migration if total production in the international economy was to be maximised. Consistent with his plea for “more reasonable postulates”, Meade then envisaged situations requiring government *control* over international migration:

- 4.1 From countries where demographic conditions were leading to a rapid and uncontrolled increase in population. “Freedom of international migration”, he wrote, “demands some control of domestic births in the countries of emigration so that it does not lead to an unlimited expansion in the total of world population” (4)
- 4.2 Between countries with different domestic policies for the distribution of income and property.

5. Though Meade was pointing the way for fruitful involvement by his colleagues concerned with the economics of international migration, the debate was nonetheless a landmark in the literature primarily because it had emphasised the dangers of applying simple, constrained models to real-world situations. In the case of international migration, as in the case of the marginal productivity theory concerning micro-dynamics, the application was singularly inappropriate. National governments legislate to maintain or improve GNP and real income per head, and will encourage or restrict immigration (and capital inflows) to the extent that it facilitates these objectives. Brinley Thomas was soon to show that the relatively unimpeded mobility of capital and labour across the Atlantic had long since ended (5). Between 1840 and 1914 the “long swings” of economic development were inverse to one another and coincided with a one-way traffic of capital and labour. In one period the marginal efficiency of investment abroad governed the level of activity in Europe and hence the volume of emigration. In another, the marginal efficiency of domestic investment, as well as the supply of loanable funds, dominated the scene and restricted the volume of emigration. But these relationships gradually weakened as the United States became a dominant industrial power, and ended with restrictions on the number of emigrants permitted to enter that country. The Quota Acts of 1921 and 1924 coincided with policies by the British Government to encourage its people to emigrate to British countries overseas. The Empire Settlement Act of 1922, and the supporting trade and tariff agreements between countries of the British Empire, were designed to establish an economic ‘bloc’ (6). Emigration of people and of capital thus became a significant plank in economic policies of Empire countries.

6. Since the 1950’s, research into the economics of migration has moved away from abstract model-building to empirical work on the costs of emigration to the sending country and the gains of immigration to the receiving country. Every migrant brings a measure of education, training and experience which is a clear gain to the country he enters, its cost having been borne by the country whence he came. Attempts to assess such gains and costs have revealed many definitional and accounting problems which have led to widely varying estimates. Similar problems have impeded progress of research into other aspects of migration, although much more could have been done had more scholars been attracted to the field. In Australia, e.g., a country which has received millions of immigrants since 1945, the ‘advantages’ have been little more than tabulated: Available for employment as soon as they arrive, migrants are a necessary mobile element in the workforce. By enlarging the domestic market, immigrants encourage producers to increase their scale of operations, thereby engendering economies of scale and productivity. If businessmen are confident that immigration will be retained at declared levels, their propensity to invest on the basis of expected rising markets will be high. Likewise, the ‘disadvantages’ of immigration have also been merely tabulated, or at best desultory attempts made to assess costs from published statistics: Migrants require the expenditure of large amounts of capital to service their resettlement. As well as causing additions to the capital-deepening process (i.e. improvement of industrial productivity by the use of more capital intensive processes), immigrants make immediate demands upon the capital-widening process (social overheads such as schools, houses, public works, etc.) (7).

7. Economists in Australia, as elsewhere (8), who have attempted to analyse the effects of large-scale immigration have generally found them both difficult to define and very difficult to measure as they spread throughout the whole economy. In his Econometric Model of Australia for 1948-61, J. Kmenta tried to measure the nature and magnitude of the effects of immigration on excess aggregate demand. When he concluded that it was less important than other predetermined factors, another economist, Duloy, criticised his estimates (and by implication, his technique) and reported that his research had shown that immigration *did* have

significant effects on the demand for housing, motor cars and imports, and that these persist for several years after immigrants reach the country (9). Their disagreement largely reflects the difficulties of prosecuting research in this field, as well as the dearth of adequate basic data.

**8.** If the macro-dynamics of international migration have become increasingly conditioned, and complicated, by national immigration policies (and to a lesser extent by national emigration policies), we may well ask whether the micro-dynamics—individual decisions to emigrate—have also been complicated and conditioned by the same policies. Unfortunately, the historical dearth of well-planned research into the micro-dynamics of migration precludes an answer being given to such a direct comparative question. While we may reject the simplistic explanation underlying the liberal theory of emigration as being applicable today, and perhaps even in the nineteenth century, we really do not know why—in the hey-day of free migration when there were relatively few political constraints—some Europeans emigrated to America while others, with seeming similar socio-economic characteristics, stayed at home.

**9.** Decision-making processes concerning emigration is a complicated facet of psycho-social research in which economists can play only a minor role. But here again there has been a dearth of research. Eisenstadt's three-stage, 'model' of the total process: [1] the motivation to emigrate (the needs or dispositions which urge people to move from one place to another); [2] the social structure of the actual migratory process (of the physical transition from the original society to a new one); and [3] the absorption of the immigrants within the social and cultural framework of the new society, remains a conceptual benchmark in migration studies (10). However, Eisenstadt was concerned primarily with the *absorption* of immigrants into the State of Israel, and stage [1] was included in the conceptual framework mainly to suggest the *total* process. Of stage [1], he wrote:

"The literature on migration... abounds in indications that the migrant feels some kind of frustration, or inability to attain some level of aspiration in his original society, where he is unable to gratify all his expectations or to fulfil the rôle of his desire... It is this feeling of frustration and inadequacy, whatever its cause, that motivates migration, and it is the existence of some objective opportunity that makes it possible to realize the aspiration to migrate. For this reason, immigrants also tend to develop certain definite expectations in regard to the rôle that they will fulfil in their new country".

Eisenstadt suggested that the frustrations which probably trigger decisions to emigrate may be due to a variety of causes: over-population, the shrinkage of economic opportunities, the opening up of new cultural and economic horizons and channels of communication, political oppression and so on.

**10.** In 1958, Appleyard and his colleagues at the Australian National University were sufficiently impressed by the logic of Eisenstadt's approach to the micro-dynamics of emigration to make it the basis of a major longitudinal study of assisted British emigrants to Australia (11). About the same time, Frijda and his colleagues in the Netherlands embarked on a similar study of Dutch emigrants to a number of overseas countries (12). Alan Richardson and L.B. Brown, both psychologists, were also exploring the decision-making processes of small numbers of British emigrants (13). The findings of these studies, conducted within a few years of each other, therefore provide considerable insight into the micro-dynamics of emigration.

**11.** The major limitation of conclusions from these studies, fully acknowledged by the authors, is that they relate only to small groups of emigrants between specific countries during short periods. Assisted emigration from Britain to Australia, or from the Netherlands to Canada, was, at that time, a selected movement comprising only persons whom the country of immigration was willing to accept, and financially assist. Not only does this emphasise the importance of political constraints in modern migrations, but means that the decision-making processes described below tell nothing of potential migrants who were unacceptable. It must also be noted that the Appleyard and Frijda studies were longitudinal in character, and the research conducted in Europe, and reported here, relates only to stage [1] of Eisenstadt's conceptual framework.

**12.** Stage [1] of the Appleyard study, 'formalised' Eisenstadt's general observations into an interview schedule of four parts: the socio-economic characteristics of the sampled emigrants (compared, where possible, to those of non-emigrants); the decision to emigrate; expectations of Australia and knowledge of Australia. It was expected that this would test whether the assisted emigrants were different (in terms of socio-economic characteristics) to non-emigrants, whether they were in fact, 'frustrated' and therefore unable to attain desirable levels of aspiration in Britain, how they approached the emigration threshold and the influence which expected differences in real income between Britain and Australia exerted on that, 'approach', why they finally stepped across the threshold and whether they did in fact have formal expectations, and accurate knowledge, of Australia.

**13.** In-depth interviews with 862 families and single adult migrants in their homes just prior to their departure for Australia confirmed the applicability of Eisenstadt's conceptual framework for stage [1]. Respondents tended to feel insecure and inadequate in their social setting and were attracted by the objective opportunities which Australia seemed to offer. While emigration was certainly not the only solution acceptable to Britons who felt this way, it was significant that nearly all the sampled emigrants had been at the emigration threshold for a number of years and accumulated frustrations, rather than specific incidents, finally decided them to step across that threshold. The most common frustrations related to their work situation and the absence of prospects for advancement. Their knowledge of Australia, especially economic conditions such as wages, hours etc., which would personally affect them, was good, as was the feasibility of their expectations. Most had acquired an adequate knowledge of the country's economic and social conditions and related this knowledge to their expectations. Despite differing approaches to the emigration threshold, economic-type reasons dominated replies to open-end questions concerning motives: "The hope for better opportunities for myself and my children" was the main "reason" for emigrating given by over 80% of married couples. And yet, one got the distinct impression that neither frustrations and inadequacies of their social setting, nor even the reasons given for choosing Australia, were compelling inadequacies and reasons, like insufferable poverty, for which emigration was the *only* solution. The breadwinners were predominantly skilled workers who earned a mean £ 13 per week and one-third of them expected to transfer over £ 800 to Australia. Over 37% of all families owned motor cars, 33% owned washing machines and 55% owned television receivers. None was unemployed at the time of decision-making, although at mid-1959 over 400,000 Britons were registered as unemployed.

**14.** British emigrants to Australia in 1959 were moderately well-off; they were travelling from one English-speaking society to another (where institutions, loyalties and "attitudes" were predominantly British) where they would not experience the racial, ethnic and language difficulties experienced by many non-British, non-English-speaking immigrants.

**15.** Appleyard and a colleague, Anna Amera, adopted a similar procedure to investigate the micro-dynamics of Greek emigration to Australia in 1964. Although the majority of Greeks who emigrated to Australia at that time were nominated by close relatives, those studied by Appleyard and Amera were a special group of single workers (50 male and 75 female) who had been sponsored by the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM). The British study, reported above, had revealed that many single British girls treated "emigration" as a working-holiday; if they liked Australia they would stay, if they didn't they would return. Nearly all of them left well-paid jobs in Britain expecting to obtain higher-paid jobs in Australia. Their rather nonchalant attitudes towards the "adventure" (as many referred to emigration) reflected the favourable conditions under which the assisted passage scheme operated, the employment market in Australia and the fact that they would not experience language problems (and very few social and cultural problems) in Australia.

**16.** What a contrast to the motivations and expectations of the single female Greek workers! There was no talk of "adventure". For many emigration was an escape from poverty in the isolated mountain villages whence they came. They wanted steady jobs and regular wages because intermittent employment and wages (if they earned any) did not meet their own and their families' basic needs. In addition, in a dowry system under which a potential groom may demand more money than the family possessed, they were in danger of remaining "on the shelf". The main alternatives were to marry without dowry (socially unacceptable), to move to Athens, Salonica or another large town and enter domestic service, or emigrate. They had chosen the last even though it was literally a journey into the unknown. The prospects of marriage in Australia (where the masculinity ratio of marriageable Greeks is high) may have been good, but the difficulties of coping with the English language were almost unthinkable. ICEM had attempted to prepare them for these difficulties by placing them in a Training School for several months prior to embarkation where they learned basic English, hygiene, and were introduced to modern electrically-operated consumer durables. The course was not easy. Most were only 18 years old and had left school at 12 or 13 and worked as dressmakers or farm labourers. As might be expected, almost every girl in the sample said that poverty in the village and the prospect of regular work in Australia was their *sole* reason for leaving their homeland. Thirty-three of the 50 girls did not expect to take any money at all to Australia simply because they didn't have any.

**17.** The enormity of their decisions to emigrate to a foreign land on the other side of the world, and the dominance of economic-type motives in the decision, were conveyed by 'Helen' who told the interviewer:

"I was born in a village in the mountainous part of Peloponnesos. My family are shepherds and only in the winter are we in the house; during the summer we follow the goats. Most of the people that live

in the village are farmers, but the majority of them have goats as well. There are about 160 families in our village. Nobody's income is enough to survive. The milk and cheese we make from the goats' milk is just enough to keep us from hunger and enough to pay the rent on the grazing land. Every year we borrow money from the bank in order to get bread. When we sell our products we get just enough to pay the bank and then we borrow money again. There is no leisure. We always work. If we are not with the goats we work in the fields and if we are not there we have the housework to do".

Though the setting is entirely different from that for British working-class urban emigrants, Eisenstadt's... "frustration (and) inability to attain some level of aspiration" is clear enough<sup>(14)</sup>. Helen's *expectations* of Australia, though less well articulated than a typical single English girl's, were singularly economic: to get a job, any job, immediately she arrived and to save as much as possible so that she could sponsor her brothers, her sisters and finally her parents and other relatives. The family's future thus depended upon 18-year-old unskilled, uneducated Helen establishing herself in Australia. When she arrived in Melbourne she had only \$11.

**18.** If skilled British workers and their families have traditionally been the migrants most acceptable to Australian governments<sup>(15)</sup>, unskilled southern Europeans have traditionally been towards the end of the acceptability spectrum. Had Greeks been given the same incentives accorded British emigrants, the migration flow would have been much greater. This, of course, reflects the significance of government policies in determining modern migrations. In the mid-1960's Australia's total annual intake was decided on the basis of existing employment vacancies and projected economic growth. The extent to which these needs could not be met by British and northern-European immigrants largely determined the intake of southern Europeans. Thousands of Greeks may stand at the emigration threshold, attracted by job opportunities and higher wages in Australia, America, Canada or a number of other countries, but without the "objective opportunity that makes it possible to realize the aspiration to migrate" (Eisenstadt), emigration cannot take place. The single female workers sponsored by ICEM had been accorded objective opportunities by the the Australian Government because they filled a perceived need—to reduce the high masculinity ratio of marriageable Greeks in Australia, a legacy of past immigration policies.

**19.** Another study conducted for ICEM by Appleyard in 1964, using the same techniques adopted for the British and Greek studies noted above, emphasised that in addition to "objective opportunities" to emigrate there must be opportunities in the proposed country of immigration for economic betterment. This study related to emigration from Spain to Latin America. By mid-1964 emigration to Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay had been reduced to a trickle following a steady flow during the mid-1950's. Indeed, by 1963 emigration from Spain to these four countries had been more than replaced by return migration. Spaniards hadn't stopped emigrating; they had merely changed direction from Latin America to northern Europe as a result of changed economic conditions and employment opportunities in each area. On the one hand, real wages in several main receiving countries had declined: in Argentina, e.g., there had been a 5 per cent decline in GNP during 1963 but a 22 per cent rise in the cost of living between July 1963 and June 1964. Employment opportunities, especially for semi- and unskilled immigrants, had been greatly reduced by rural-urban migration, and countries of destination in Latin America had therefore imposed tighter restrictions on immigration. Skilled and professional workers were still encouraged, but such persons were increasingly reluctant to leave Spain not only because of uncertain prospects in Latin America, but also because of increasing opportunities in Spain arising from improved rates of economic growth. The in-depth interviews with emigrants, and the subsequent high proportion who decided not to go, clearly reflected conditions in Latin America *vis-à-vis* Spain and northern Europe.

**20.** The studies conducted by Appleyard and his colleagues, though they have thrown some light on the macro-dynamics of international migration, have posed more questions than they have provided answers on the micro-dynamics of international migration. L.B. Brown, on the other hand, went to the core of the decision-making process in his small, but significant study of British migrants in 1953. On the basis of Rorschach tests with fifteen English single males who enlisted with the Royal New Zealand Air Force, and with fifteen matched non-emigrants who re-enlisted in the Royal Air Force, he concluded, among other things, that more migrants than non-migrants had feelings of anxiety and showed a greater responsiveness to their environment. The methods used by Brown attempted to assess whether migrants have significantly different personalities (as far as this can be measured by a Rorschach test) than non-migrants. Whatever the significance of the results, his methodology and objectives point the way to highly promising research on the micro-dynamics of international migration. Similarly, a study by Alan Richardson of eighty intending British migrants to Australia, and eighty matched non-migrants, using multi-choice questions on attitudes, concluded that intending migrants appeared to be more ambitious, more motivated and more interested in action and hard

work than non-migrants. A similar study by Frijda in 1955 and 1956 with a large group of emigrants to several overseas countries, and non-emigrants, revealed that emigrants displayed a "fairly profound dissatisfaction with life in Holland", and in some respects had a "somewhat more enterprising view of things". A unique, and fruitful, aspect of the Dutch study was interviews with a number of relatives and acquaintances (e.g. employers) *after* the emigrant had departed. The data from these interviews were then matched with information provided by the emigrant before he departed, thus providing a dossier on each respondent.

**21.** By probing the personalities of respondents, Brown, Richardson and Frijda went some way towards unravelling the complicated question of "real" and "stated" motivations. Appleyard, on the other hand, while he had every right to test the validity of economic theories relating to the micro-dynamics of migration, could not explain motivations in terms of personality characteristics. There is clearly a case for well-organised interdisciplinary research in this important area. As stated in paragraph 1, social scientists have hardly explored, let alone adequately researched, the dynamics of international migration. The most promising line of research is interdisciplinary, beginning, perhaps, with the construction of models, followed by carefully-conceived studies at both the macro- and micro-level. The Buenos Aires conference is an ideal occasion to debate these issues.

**22.** Throughout this Background paper I have emphasised the major importance of political constraints in determining migratory flows, that the choices for potential emigrants in many countries are few, and in some cases non-existent. This point needs to be explored a little further and again I will draw mainly upon Australian material, indicating the bases of policies adopted in recent years by this major country of immigration. This, I hope, will serve to emphasise the complexity of policy determinants (16).

**23.** Between the first settlement in 1788, and 1861, immigration was the dominant determinant of population growth, partly because the high masculinity ratio of immigrants prevented widespread marriage and hence reproduction. The Australian colonies established during this period were British in character, as well as allegiance, and inevitably established British-type institutions and favoured British immigrants. Even the gold-rushes of the 1850's and 1860's, which drew diggers from many parts of the world, did not affect subsequent policies concerning preferred ethnicity of immigrants. By the 1930's Australians were heard to boast that Australia was "more British" than Britain herself. But the same Australians were also concerned about declining reproduction and projections which showed that if birth rates did not improve the total population would decline. In addition, the war of 1939-45 revealed how vulnerable the country was to invasion. Immigration was seen as a means of not only improving demographic trends, and providing workers to service an expanding economy, but also as an instrument of defence against future aggression. To obtain the number of immigrants necessary to achieve these objectives (reckoned to be equal to 1% of the total population per annum), successive Australian governments broke the tradition that immigrants should be predominantly British, and sought persons from all over Europe. The new policy, however, favoured Britishers and northern Europeans. As noted above, southern Europeans were accorded a low priority. There was certainly no place for persons who could not meet the Caucasian racial qualification.

**24.** Thus for more than 20 years, immigration policy proceeded on these broad principles, fluctuations in intake above or below the "1% criteria" depending mainly upon labour demand. The programme was highly organized: offices were established in almost every European country and applicants were tested for skills to make certain that they would fit into the Australian workforce with minimum dislocation. Between 1945 and 1969 over 3 million "immigrants" were absorbed into a base population (in 1945) of just over seven million.

**25.** In recent years, however, governments have questioned those parts of immigration policy which restrict the entry of non-Europeans. Economic ties with Britain have been greatly weakened and Japan, Asia's major industrial power, has become Australia's most important trading customer. Although Australian governments have shown more appreciation of the economic and political aspirations of nearby Asian countries, relations have been impeded by immigration policies which clearly discriminate against non-Caucasians. In 1966, the Australian government made a number of significant changes in its "restricted" immigration policy, the immediate effect being that several thousand Asians in Australia were granted resident status and by 1970 several thousand more had been admitted as immigrants. Even so, the Minister of the day reaffirmed that the changes did not represent any major change in policy, the basic aim of which is to "preserve a homogeneous population".

**26.** Within Australia the objectives of immigration, and the numbers admitted, have recently come under criticism. The defence value of immigration (a central plank in post-war planning) has been questioned,

as have high rates of economic growth as a primary national objective. The use of immigration to sustain high rates of economic growth, so the argument runs, has drained enormous amounts of capital (especially for social overheads) which could have been directed into improving social, environmental and educational amenities of existing Australians.

27. This all too brief sketch of the determinants of Australian immigration policy nonetheless underscores the role of national objectives in deciding the race, ethnicity, characteristics and numbers of immigrants. Indeed, if migration is perceived as having even a minor role in redistribution of the world's population, then a major study should be undertaken on the determinants of policies, especially of countries actively engaged in immigration. Such a survey would reveal that many countries impose severe restrictions on immigration, limiting entry for permanent settlement mainly to overseas-born families of citizens, and to small quotas of highly skilled or professional workers (17).

28. In summary, almost every facet of international migration requires a great deal of further research. We clearly need many more scholars, and greater funding, in order to understand both the micro- and macro-dynamics of this important aspect of population studies.

## NOTES

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Thomas, Brinley, *International Migration and Economic Development*, UNESCO, Paris, 1961.
- (2) Thomas, Brinley, *op. cit.*
- (3) Thomas, Brinley, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
- (4) *Ibid*, p. 27.
- (5) Thomas, Brinley, *Migration and Economic Growth*, Cambridge, 1954.
- (6) Hancock, W.K., *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, Vol. 2, *Problems of Economic Policy*, 1918-1939, Part 1, Oxford, 1940.
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- (8) E.g., Jones, K. and Smith A.D., *The Economic Impact of Commonwealth Immigration*, C.U.P. 1970.
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- (13) Richardson, Alan, "Some Psycho-Social Aspects of British Emigration to Australia", *British Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 10, 1959, pp. 327-37;  
Brown, L.B., "English Migrants to New Zealand: A Pilot Rorschach Study", *Australian Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1956, pp. 106-10.
- (14) Similar motives were stated by rural to urban migrants in Greece. See National Statistical Service of Greece, *Report on the Exploratory Survey into Motivations and Circumstances of Rural Migration*, Athens, 1962.
- (15) Appleyard, R.T., *op. cit.* Chapter 2.
- (16) See, Appleyard, R.T., *Immigration: Policy and Progress*, Sydney, 1971.
- (17) See, Appleyard, R.T. and Visaria, P., "International Migration Policy: Selected Asian Countries", *Proceedings of the International Population Conference, Liege*, 1973, Vol. 3, pp. 417-423.

# THE DETERMINANTS OF 'BRAIN DRAIN'

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## Introduction

1. During the past decade, the "brain drain" or the international migration of highly qualified professional and technical workers from developing to developed countries has become a subject of widespread concern. Professor Brinley Thomas once described it as a 'perverse flow of the factors of production'. The Pearson Commission on International Development, which reported in 1969, described the problem of "brain drain" out of "poor" countries as one of "disturbing dimensions". It noted that the "present flow of skilled and qualified personnel from poor to rich countries actually outnumbers the number of advisory personnel going from rich to poor" (1). The General Assembly or other agencies of the United Nations have periodically debated the "outflow of trained personnel from developing to developed countries" and have requested detailed studies of the problem, its implications for the development of poor countries and the possible measures to tackle it.

2. There exists a wealth of literature on the subject. Already in 1967, some 3,000 books and articles were identified as dealing with the 'brain drain' (2). Since then, the volume of literature has grown rapidly. It is not possible to attempt here a comprehensive summary of the literature, much of which deals with the estimation of the quantitative dimensions and characteristics of the problem. Such quantitative studies are valuable for an analysis of the determinants of the brain drain, about which one often finds an array of plausible and well-reasoned hypotheses and hunches, but sometimes without the requisite empirical underpinning.

3. The recent empirical studies on the subject are largely centered around the intentions and attitudes of students enrolled in the colleges and universities of the United States and/or the immigrant scientists and engineers. We shall review some of them at some length later in the paper. It is not known whether or how many similar studies have been made about the students and immigrant professionals in other "recipient" countries such as Australia, France, Germany, or countries with a large two-way movement such as Canada or the U.K. (3).

4. UNITAR Study: The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) has however, sponsored a multi-national study of (a) students from developing countries studying in developed countries; (b) the stay-ons or the professionals who have stayed on in the developed countries after receiving some education there; (c) the returnees or the professionals who have returned to developing countries after studying abroad; and (d) the employers in developing countries. The study is intended to shed light on the reasons for decisions to (a) study abroad; (b) emigrate (prior to leaving the home country and also subsequently); and the associated factors obtaining in both the developed and developing countries (4). The countries covered in the project include (a) the main beneficiaries, i.e., Australia, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom and the United States; as well as (b) a sample of the losers, i.e. Argentina, Brazil, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Republic of Korea, Ghana, Greece, Pakistan, and Trinidad and Tobago.

5. The professional immigrants to developed countries, who were educated in their country of origin, were not included in the UNITAR surveys because the project is focused on the effects of education in developed countries. The UNITAR questionnaire, designed to be completely self-administered, asks the respondents to rate the importance of various factors that determined their decision to study abroad, to stay abroad or to return home. The analysis of the data promises to provide a useful understanding of the associations between different independent variables—the economic reasons, professional reasons, the socio-psychological reasons related to family and personal factors, political reasons, reasons of living conditions, etc.,

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and the dependent variable—the decision of where to study or where to work. At the time of writing, in February 1974, a draft report, based on some 5,000 interviews of students in the US, Canada and France, stay-ons in the US and France, and returnees in India, Sri Lanka, Republic of Korea, Greece, Ghana, Brazil, Colombia and Argentina, has been prepared by Professor William Glazer of Columbia University. While it cannot be quoted in the paper, when published, it will provide an in-depth view of the differences in the determinants of the “brain drain” obtained in different countries.

### The Validity of the Term ‘Brain Drain’

6. Before we proceed further, a few comments on the term ‘brain drain’ are in order. It is recognised to be a loaded term, with some emotive connotations, and far from precise. Sometimes, it is used to refer to the migration of all “skilled” workers, in which case it becomes too broad. Other criticisms are best summarised by the remark that “not all migrants included under the category ‘brain drain’ have brains, and not all of them are really “drained” to the developed countries”. This criticism suggests the need for qualifications and a careful specification of the problem, which will be noted also in the later discussion. We can justify the use of the term as a brief substitute for the phrase: “the migration of highly-trained professional manpower from developing to developed countries”.

7. It is sometimes suggested that the term ‘brain drain’ can justifiably be used only when the professionals are over-represented in the migrant stream, relative to their importance in the population of the countries of origin. However, that has indeed been the case during the past 10 to 14 years. The number of alien immigrants into the US during the decade 1961-70 (5) was 3.32 million (6), of whom nearly 10.2 per cent were “professional, technical and kindred workers” (7). In 1969-70, 12.4 per cent of the 373,000 immigrants were in the professional category of workers. The corresponding proportions for the Asian and African immigrants were 26.3 and 38.0 per cent, respectively. The high selectivity of immigrants relative to the population of origin or the US population (which in 1960 had only 4.3 per cent classified as professional technical and related workers) is obvious (8). Such selectivity was perhaps less typical of the immigration into other countries, such as France or the U.K., which attracted a large number of immigrants from the Commonwealth countries during the late 1950’s or the early 1960’s (9). However, the various restrictions imposed during 1965 and after have made immigration easier for the professionals than for others even in the U.K.; and while Britain loses highly-trained personnel to North America and Australia, it largely or mainly makes up the loss by attracting substitutes from the less developed countries.

8. Among other things, one must recognise the need to focus attention on “net” immigration rather than on the number of “immigrants” alone. In most cases, the return flows are not large enough to alter the basic profile of the ‘brain drain’ but the need for a simultaneous attention to the data about emigrants should not be overlooked.

### Temporary versus Permanent Migration

9. It is often suggested that the discussion of “brain drain” overlooks the temporary nature of former students’ stay in the developed countries. The international recommendations on migration statistics suggest the *intention* to stay in a country for one year as the basis to classify a person as a ‘permanent immigrant’. Most students, who are enrolled in the American universities or colleges in courses which extend up to or beyond a year, would be classified as permanent immigrants according to international recommendations. According to the current practice in the US, however, they continue to be reported as non-immigrant temporary residents not only during the period of stay but also during the 18 months period of permitted practical training and even beyond, if they file a request for an immigrant visa (a decision on which may take several months).

10. Admittedly, it is not easy to base statistical classifications on “intentions” because they can and do change over time. The identification of the time when a student-visa-holder becomes a non-returnee is difficult. The time which a student spends in the developed country tends to be an important factor influencing the chances of his return to the home country; but it depends also on the field and the level of education sought to be attained at the time of entry. One cannot, therefore, use the time dimension as an indicator of non-return. As a result, even though the actual decision not to return occurs some time before the visa status is altered (and in some cases the initial student visa may be only a convenient means of facilitating intended immigration), there is no practical alternative to the current practice.

**11.** Of course, even those who acquire the immigrant status in the developed country may really plan to return to the home country, after a certain time interval, upon the attainment of certain goals regarding savings or after retirement. We shall review below some recent studies that attempt to examine the intentions about return to the home country and the associated factors. However, it is difficult to distinguish between temporary and permanent migration on the basis of available information.

### Non-Returnee Students and Immigrants

**12.** While considering the "brain drain", it is useful to consider the two major contributory processes of (a) students' non-return and (b) immigration. Of course, the two streams are not independent. At least in the US, a significant part of the immigration of professional and technical workers occurs through the adjustment of status by persons already in the US. A majority of the immigrants from developing countries who adjust their status tend to be former students (who enter the country on a student, i.e. F-1 visa). In 1971-72, for example, a record 48 per cent of the immigrant scientists and engineers and 61 per cent of the physicians and surgeons were already living in the US as non-immigrant "temporary" residents at the time they became immigrants. Students were the largest group among the scientists and engineers; the exchange visitors were the most numerous among physicians and surgeons (10). Reportedly, the adjustment of visa status was even easier to accomplish during December 1, 1965 to June 30, 1968 (the period of transition from the earlier Act to the Immigration Act of 1965) than it is now (11).

### Factors Influencing Migration: Micro vs. Macro

**13.** The rich literature on the 'brain drain' includes several exhaustive lists of factors that lead to the migration of the highly-qualified personnel. One can classify most of these factors broadly into (a) economic (or those related to the monetary remuneration); (b) job or profession-related, including the opportunities for skill-utilization; (c) socio-cultural and (d) personal. The distinction between the economic and the job or profession-related factors might be arbitrary at times. Changes in the working conditions are normally contingent upon the availability of necessary funds and, therefore, on the allocation of economic resources. However, a separate grouping of the job-related factors is intended to help focus our attention on the conditions of scientific and professional work.

**14.** The proposed four-fold classification is probably adequate to categorise the factors or forces that influence the individual's decision to migrate; but underlying them is the institutional framework or setting of the developing countries. The latter may be termed, for want of a better phrase, the macro-forces which determine the supply of and demand for the trained personnel, including the out-turn of educational institutions and the rate of growth as well as the structure of the economy.

**15.** In the discussion below, we shall consider the macro-forces after examining the relative role of micro-factors in the individual decisions to migrate. For this purpose, we shall rely on some of the empirical studies rather than on personal judgments. As already noted earlier, all the studies relate to the professional immigrants or students in the United States, which is the major destination of the immigrants. While the relative role of particular factors *may* be different for migrants to other countries, we shall presume a broad similarity.

**16.** As noted earlier, it is useful to make a distinction between (a) students who do not return to their home country, and (b) other immigrants, although the two groups are not entirely independent. Many of the immigrants tend to be former students, who had returned home after their education and who are re-migrating to the country where they received their higher education. However, we shall first consider the factors that influence the students' decisions to return or not to return to the home country. And for this purpose, let us consider the available data on the responses of students about their intentions to stay in the United States.

### Intentions of Students Reported to the Institute of International Education

**17.** The Institute of International Education in the United States collects, every year, from the foreign students enrolled in more than 2,000 American colleges and universities, information on their "intent to remain permanently in the US". In 1964-65, the data were gathered for 88,719 students, approximately 90 per cent of all students. According to a recent analysis of the data pertaining to 88,556 foreign students, about 31.9 per cent did not respond to the question on their "intent". Among the respondents, however,

about 15.9 per cent reported an intention to stay permanently in the US and only 2.2 per cent were undecided. The non-respondents can be presumed to include a higher proportion of the non-returnees so that the actual rate of non-return would be higher (12). Further, a similar analysis pertaining to 66 per cent of the 121,300 students included in the IIE census of 1968-69 has indicated that 23 per cent of the students intended to remain permanently in the US (13).

18. The IIE data are based on only one question on the "intent" to remain permanently in the US, and the further possible analysis includes only an exploration of some of the characteristics associated with non-return. According to such an analysis, the intended non-return varied "only slightly with broad field of study" although medicine, the humanities and engineering were the fields with the highest non-return rates. The intended non-return rates were higher among undergraduate and doctorate-level students than among Master's-degree students; higher among those in intermediate ages; and higher among self-sponsored students and immigrant-visa holders than among the students or exchange visa holders (14).

### A Survey of 1,400 International Students in the US, 1968

19. A more recent and detailed analysis of a survey of 1,400 students, selected at random from 20 American Universities (15) provides a valuable supplement to the data based on the IIE census. The self-administered questionnaire, prepared by Man Singh Das, asked the student to indicate his plans after completing his studies (a) when he arrived in the US and (b) at the time of survey, i.e., after the respondent had been in the US for several months. According to the results summarised in Table I, only 8.4 per cent of the respondents reported plans to stay in the US permanently, but another 20 per cent planned to stay for two to five years. Both the proportions were much higher for Asian students than for the African or Latin American students. Both the proportions had increased sharply since the respondents arrived in the US and a further increase in the proportion of stay-ons, with the passage of time, seems most probable.

TABLE I - THE REPORTED POST-EDUCATION PLANS OF STUDENTS FROM DEVELOPING AND LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES RESIDENT IN THE UNITED STATES DURING OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1968

Plans on completing studies	All students		Asian students		African students		Latin American	
	On Arrival	At the time of survey	On Arrival	At the time of survey	On Arrival	At the time of survey	On Arrival	At the time of survey
All students	100.0 (1,400)	100.0 (1,400)	100.0 (654)	100.0 (654)	100.0 (372)	100.0 (372)	100.0 (374)	100.0 (374)
(a) Undecided	1.2 (17)	0.7 (10)	1.8 (12)	1.5 (10)	0.5 (2)	—	0.8 (3)	—
(b) Return home	60.8 (852)	40.4 (570)	39.6 (259)	25.4 (166)	83.9 (312)	61.8 (230)	75.0 (281)	46.5 (174)
(c) Stay in US	25.2 (353)	29.8 (417)	35.3 (231)	25.2 (165)	13.7 (51)	28.8 (107)	19.0 (71)	38.8 (145)
(d) Stay in US permanently	1.6 (23)	8.4 (118)	2.9 (19)	15.9 (104)	0.8 (3)	1.3 (5)	0.3 (1)	2.4 (9)
(e) Stay in US for 2-5 years	10.5 (147)	19.6 (274)	19.4 (127)	30.6 (200)	1.1 (4)	8.1 (30)	4.3 (16)	11.8 (44)

Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the absolute number of students.

Source: Man Singh Das, *Brain Drain Controversy and the International Students*, Lucknow: Lucknow Publishing House, 1972.

20. Even more interesting are the responses about the reasons underlying the plan (a) to remain in the US, or (b) to return to the home country. The options provided in the questionnaire to record the reasons for staying on were (a) "greater economic rewards" in the US; (b) "better living conditions" in the US; (c) likely difficulty in finding a "suitable job" in home country; (d) marriage to an American; (e) any other reason (please specify). The alternatives provided as reasons to return home were: (a) scholarship requires return; (b) family and relatives at home; (c) prejudice and discrimination exhibited by Americans; (d) inability to find a suitable job in the US; (e) inability to change visa; (f) any other (specify).

21. Apparently, the students were not explicitly given an option to report more than one reason; and the figures presented in the tables on these topics show some inconsistency with those shown in Table II. However, the greater economic rewards in the US was the most important and better living conditions the second most important reason for the plan to stay on. The proportion reporting living conditions as the reason was the highest among Asian students who also referred to the likely difficulty of finding a suitable job much more frequently than their counterparts from Africa or Latin America.

TABLE II – THE PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ENGINEERING STUDENTS FROM FIVE ASIAN COUNTRIES STUDYING IN THE US IN 1968-1969 ACCORDING TO THEIR POST-EDUCATION PLANS AT THE TIME OF COMPLETING THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Post-Education Plan	Country of Origin				
	India	China	Korea	Japan	Thailand
All	100.0 (136)	100.0 (131)	100.0 (80)	100.0 (55)	100.0 (45)
Return home immediately	5.6	3.4	6.8	32.6	51.2
Work in US for up to 18 months	20.0	9.2	26.0	36.9	30.2
Work in US for more than 18 months but return home within five years	30.4	31.9	38.3	4.3	13.9
Work in US for more than five years	44.0	55.5	28.8	26.1	4.6

Source: John R. Niland, *Asian Engineering Brain Drain*, Lexington (Mass.), D.C. Heath & Co., 1970, p. 149.

22. The latter observation was consistent also with the respondents' reported perceptions of the chances of finding "a suitable job". Nearly 94 per cent of the African students and 84 per cent of the Latin American students reported excellent or very good chances of suitable job opportunities in the home country. The corresponding percentage for Asian students was only 32.

23. The reported differentials between the attitudes and perceptions of students from different continents are indeed plausible. The job market for the well-educated in most African countries is no as saturated as seems to be the case in the Asian countries with a marked imbalance between the supply and demand of the University-educated. The same is probably true in Latin America where the rate of economic advance has been fairly good. The differentials between the salary levels in the US and the Asian countries are much larger than those obtaining in Africa and Latin America.

### Engineering Students from Asia

23. A more intensive and systematic study of the problem of student-non-return has been made by John R. Niland, on the basis of questionnaires completed by 447 graduate engineering students from India, China, Japan, Korea and Thailand, enrolled at 121 universities in 1968-69 (16). Like Das, Niland asked the respondents about their post-education plans (a) at the time they began their graduate study in the US, and (b) at the time of responding to the questionnaire. Table II above shows the distribution of respondent students according to their reported plans at the time of survey. The marked differences in the proportion of students planning to work in the US for more than 18 months or five years, according to the country of origin, are significant. However, the plans at the time of joining the graduate school had undergone significant changes and the proportion of students planning to return home immediately after studies or within 18 months thereafter had declined during the time interval between the start of graduate education and the time of survey. According to the survey responses, nearly 56 per cent of the Chinese and 44 per cent of the Indian students were already planning to stay in the US for longer than five years. According to the general experience, their ranks would swell further with the passage of time.

24. A high proportion of the respondent students indicated that they would prefer to take up research on graduation and the quality of available equipment plays an important role in engineering research. Consistent with this report, research facilities and equipment were rated as an important factor in the basic decision to stay in the US, by at least two-thirds of the respondents from all the five countries. The US salary levels were

rated as an important factor by two-thirds of the Indian and Japanese engineering students. However, the salary differentials are probably an important factor for most engineering students. On the other hand, a desire to live near family or friends in the home country was reported as an important factor influencing the decision to return home in the case of two-thirds of all except the Japanese students.

## Immigrant Scientists and Engineers in the US

**25.** The studies reviewed so far dealt exclusively with students. While their non-return is an important component of the 'brain drain', and the factors influencing the decisions for immigration are indeed indicated by the responses of students who plan to stay permanently in the US, we can now consider the importance of various factors according to persons who had already become immigrants at the time of survey.

**26.** Our data on the subject are based on a survey, undertaken by the US National Science Foundation, of scientists and engineers who immigrated to the United States during February 1964—January 1969 (17). The survey, conducted in 1970, covered about 8,000 aliens reported employed as scientists and engineers in the US or in their last job abroad prior to immigration and resident in the jurisdictional areas (18) of selected field offices (19) of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The survey had a broad scope and sought to gather information about the personal characteristics, the educational history and employment profile as well as the factors related to their international mobility. It involved mailing of questionnaires in June to 2,862 immigrants—1,872 engineers, 944 natural scientists and 96 social scientists. A postal reminder and two mail follow-ups were made in June and July, respectively; those still not responding were contacted by telephone in August. Nearly 26.6 per cent (761) of the surveyed immigrants were reported to be "out of the country or deceased" but of the remainder 94 per cent provided "good responses", which were weighed up for both the sampling fraction and non-response.

**27.** Each respondent was asked to rate the selected 17 reasons according to the importance of each in his decision to become an immigrant. The respondent could rate it as "very important", "important", "unimportant" or not applicable to him. Admittedly, the responses are likely to be affected by the time-lag between the decision to immigrate, actual immigration and the survey. (The duration of time-lag was different for different individuals). It could influence the rating of different factors which can change in the light of actual experiences after immigration as well as the changes in the situation in the country of origin. Despite these reservations, the survey data merit attention as being close to the views and experiences of the immigrants.

**28.** The data have been summarised in Table III below. The reasons have been grouped into four categories: economic, job-related, sociopolitical and personal. The classification of reasons is partly arbitrary. The desire to obtain a higher standard of living and a low salary in the earlier job are classified as economic factors rather than as job-related in the belief that the differentials are a function of the entire economic structure and the costs or prices of various items of consumption. Similarly, a desire "to improve the opportunities open to children" is classified as a socio-political rather than a personal factor because the primary immediate concern is presumed to be the educational opportunities for the children. The responses probably refer to the quality of school and college education and the parents' economic situation would obviously influence the children's ability to avail of them. Yet, the long-term economic prospects (closely related to education) for the children might also be a major consideration and the responses may be grouped with the economic factors. Our classification may, therefore, be considered only one of the several alternatives.

The following highlights of the data deserve attention:

- (a) A desire "to obtain a higher standard of living" was rated as an important factor explaining immigration by nearly 64 per cent of the respondents but only 36 per cent reported too low a salary in their prior job as an important factor. Presumably, many of the respondents recognised that their salaries in the earlier jobs were not low, relative to the prevalent salary levels.
- (b) Among the job-related factors, "insufficient research opportunities", "poor advancement prospects" and "non-utilisation of professional skills" were mentioned as important by 45, 35 and 24 per cent of the respondents, respectively. Many analysts have emphasized the research opportunities as a key factor in the decisions to immigrate.
- (c) Among socio-political factors, some 38 per cent of the immigrants reported the opportunities for children as an important explanation for their decision to immigrate. The dislike of political environment was an important factor for about 24 per cent of the respondents.

- (d) Curiosity about life in the US, classified as a personal factor, was rated as an important consideration by nearly 50 per cent of the respondents, and therefore was the second most important factor after higher standard of living. Perhaps, it is an indicator of the steadily growing American influence in the world since the Second World War. It also suggests the cumulative demonstration effect of migration.

TABLE III - THE PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS WHO IMMIGRATED TO THE UNITED STATES DURING FEBRUARY 1964 TO JANUARY 1969, ACCORDING TO THE IMPORTANCE OF VARIOUS FACTORS IN THE DECISION TO BECOME IMMIGRANTS

Factor Explaining Immigration	Immigrants from All Countries				
	No. of Respondents	Per cent Reporting the Factor to be			
		Very Important	Important	Unimportant	No consideration
<b>A. Economic Factors</b>					
Too low salary	7,434	9.9	26.0	23.1	40.9
Too high taxes	7,263	4.2	13.8	35.6	46.4
Better job opportunities for spouse	7,266	2.6	6.1	23.3	68.0
Higher standard of living	7,444	21.0	42.9	19.4	16.7
<b>B. Job Related Factors</b>					
Skills unutilised	7,182	10.6	13.4	17.4	61.4
No work independence	7,360	6.6	14.7	20.5	58.1
Poor advancement prospects	7,338	15.5	19.7	14.4	50.3
Insufficient research opportunities	7,374	21.1	23.4	17.5	37.9
Low status of profession	7,335	3.4	13.2	25.2	58.2
<b>C. Socio-Political Reasons</b>					
Political environment	7,436	13.4	10.6	28.1	47.9
Social class system	7,324	4.4	7.6	35.2	52.8
Cultural opportunities	7,258	2.8	7.2	34.3	55.6
Better opportunities for children	7,390	18.2	20.2	14.7	46.9
<b>D. Personal Reasons</b>					
Marriage to a US citizen	7,342	5.4	2.7	4.6	87.2
Other family members in US	7,355	3.8	6.6	13.0	76.5
Curiosity about US	7,309	13.2	36.7	25.6	24.5
Weather	7,347	4.5	11.6	41.6	42.2

Source: National Science Foundation, Survey of Science Resources Series, *Immigrant Scientists and Engineers in the United States: A Study of Characteristics and Attitudes*, Washington, D.C., US Government Printing office, 1973, p. 24

29. Before concluding this rather extended discussion of the responses of immigrant engineers and scientists, it must be noted that the data are influenced by their composition in terms of the field of study as well as national origin. The universe studied included 57 per cent engineers, 16 per cent chemists, 9 per cent life scientists, and 8 per cent physicists. Nearly 89 per cent of the group were accounted for by 50 or more persons born in each of the 31 countries. The major countries were the UK, India, Canada, China (including the Republic of China and Taiwan) accounting for 20, 13, 8, 7 and 6 per cent of the immigrants, respectively. Obviously, therefore, the data do not refer to the "brain drain" from the developing countries only.

30. If attention is focused on the immigrants from the main developing countries, one notices that due to an inadvertent error, the sample for the India-born excluded the engineers and included only the natural and social scientists. However, the factors considered important in decisions about immigration were generally similar to those noted above on the basis of responses of immigrants from all countries. Yet, under-utilisation of skills was reported to be an important factor by nearly 42 per cent of the Indian immigrants and 31.8 per cent of the Philippine immigrants. The latter considered the poor advancement prospects as an important factor more frequently (50%) than was noticed for the entire sample. Interestingly, too low salary in the earlier job was an important factor for nearly 64% of the Philippine immigrants, but only 22 per cent of the Indian immigrants. The Filipinos seemed to be more concerned about the job opportunities for their spouses than the Indians.

**31.** Constraints of space preclude an exhaustive analysis of the interesting data available for immigrants from other countries. However, the data for the India and the Philippine immigrants are shown below in Tables IV and V. We shall now turn to a more general discussion of the macro-forces underlying the "brain drain".

### The Demand and Supply of Trained Personnel in the Developing and Developed Countries

**32.** The preceding discussion suggests that the differences in the standards of living, the salary levels, research opportunities, the advancement prospects and the level of work independence between the developing and the developed countries are the main factors underlying the "brain drain". The desire to secure opportunities for the children can be viewed as expressing in a nutshell, though in a futuristic perspective, the migrants' concern about the same factors. The dislike of political environment falls under an altogether different category; and persons who migrate for such reasons can be considered almost like the refugees rather than voluntary migrants (20).

**33.** Any analysis of the underlying macro-forces is bound to be influenced by one's experiences or perceptions of the prevalent situations in the developing country (or countries) and cannot be entirely objective. The discussion below will inevitably reflect the author's observations and experiences in India. Presumably these observations are not altogether atypical, but the possible differences between different countries may at time limit the applicability of certain statements to specific situations.

**34.** Among the major stimulants of the "brain drain" is the excess demand for trained personnel in the developed countries, particularly the US. This is quite widely accepted with respect to the out-turn of physicians and surgeons from the medical schools of the United States. But even with respect to other professionals such as scientists and engineers, the post-Sputnik (1957) era was marked by a sharp upsurge in the American demand. The situation has changed in the early 1970's and the immigration of scientists and engineers to the US during 1970-71 (13,100) and 1971-72 (11,323) was smaller than the record figure reached during 1969-70 (13,300) (21). The modifications of the immigration laws or rules can be viewed partly as responses to the changes in demand and supply (22).

**35.** By comparison, the developing countries normally have a situation of excess supply of scientists and engineers. Under the socio-political pressure of the urban elite, the output of technical training institutions has increased at a rate faster than the slowly-growing economies can absorb. Sometimes, as in India, the number and admission capacities of the engineering colleges were planned on the basis of the projections of investment that have proved over-optimistic. Also, the coefficients used to estimate the demand for engineers were the average rather than the marginal (or incremental) ratios and did not take account of the possibility of substitution or technical change. The estimated requirements of the medical manpower overlook the fact that with the prevalent income levels and the pattern of distribution, the rural population cannot afford the services of doctors trained in allopathic medicine and must rely on the practitioners of indigenous medicine, who are more willing to suffer the inconveniences of rural living (23).

### Salary Differentials

**36.** As for the differences in salary levels, it is probably true that the social marginal product is often not duly reflected in the incomes that the trained personnel can receive or expect in the developing country. However, in relative terms, the differentials between the monetary compensations of the professional or skilled and unskilled workers are generally larger in the developing countries than in the developed countries. The wage and salary levels offered to the professional personnel in developing countries often continue to be at the level which was adequate to attract the former colonial or expatriate personnel; or they were fixed at a time when the trained personnel was very scarce.

**37.** Of course, the omni-present continuing inflation and the practices about the revision of wage and salary levels have lowered the real value of the relatively high incomes. And the professionals in developing countries feel a strong sense of deprivation when they compare their living conditions with those of their peers in developed countries. In a country like Brazil, the professional salaries are said to be more or less on par with those in the US but few countries have chosen to adopt such a policy. Indeed its implications for the pattern of income distribution would not be consistent with the reported preference for policies leading to greater equality or uplift of the poor. While it is true that "so long as the number of interesting jobs, and the level of pay, are so much less in the developing countries than in the developed, so long will the problem (the 'brain drain') remain", (24) the salary differentials reflect the basic differences in the productivities of the

TABLE IV - THE PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS BORN IN INDIA WHO IMMIGRATED TO THE UNITED STATES DURING FEBRUARY 1964 TO JANUARY 1969, ACCORDING TO THE IMPORTANCE OF VARIOUS FACTORS IN THE DECISION TO BECOME IMMIGRANTS

Factor Explaining Immigration	Immigrants from India				
	No. of Respondents	Per cent Reporting the Factor to be			
		Very Important	Important	Unimportant	No consideration
<b>A. Economic Factors</b>					
Too low salary	972	4.7	17.6	23.6	54.1
Too high taxes	948	1.2	1.2	37.3	60.3
Better job opportunities for spouse	937	2.4	9.7	29.2	58.6
Higher standard of living	960	19.1	39.3	22.6	19.1
<b>B. Job Related Factors</b>					
Skills unutilised	982	24.1	17.4	14.0	44.2
No work independence	983	11.6	16.3	15.2	57.2
Poor advancement prospects	960	14.3	15.5	14.3	55.9
Insufficient research opportunities	994	46.0	28.8	8.0	17.2
Low status of profession	960	3.5	10.7	28.5	57.2
<b>C. Socio-Political Reasons</b>					
Political environment	960	7.2	8.3	26.1	58.3
Social Class system	948	2.4	3.6	37.3	56.6
Cultural opportunities	961	2.4	7.2	35.7	54.7
Better opportunities for children	960	23.8	22.6	9.5	44.1
<b>D. Personal Reasons</b>					
Marriage to a US citizen	972	10.6	2.4	5.9	81.2
Other family members in US	961	0	4.8	7.2	88.0
Curiosity about US	926	13.6	30.9	29.6	25.9
Weather	971	3.5	5.9	40.1	50.6

Source: National Science Foundation, Survey of Science Resources Series, *Immigrant Scientists and Engineers in the United States: A Study of Characteristics and Attitudes*, Washington, D.C., US Government Printing Office, 1973, p. 29.

TABLE V - THE PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS WHO IMMIGRATED FROM THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED STATES DURING FEBRUARY 1964 TO JANUARY 1969, ACCORDING TO THE IMPORTANCE OF VARIOUS FACTORS IN THE DECISION TO BECOME IMMIGRANTS

Factor Explaining Immigration	Immigrants from the Philippines				
	No. of Respondents	Per cent Reporting the Factor to be			
		Very Important	Important	Unimportant	No consideration
<b>A. Economic Factors</b>					
Too low salary	458	25.5	38.2	10.7	25.5
Too high taxes	413	2.4	8.2	47.0	42.4
Better opportunities for spouse	413	9.4	18.9	22.3	49.4
Higher standard of living	447	32.7	38.0	17.4	11.8
<b>B. Job Related Factors</b>					
Skills unutilised	418	16.3	15.1	19.8	48.8
No work independence	417	5.8	16.3	20.9	57.1
Poor advancement prospects	431	29.2	21.3	12.3	37.1
Insufficient research opportunities	417	31.4	33.8	13.9	20.9
Low status of profession	432	6.7	16.9	22.4	53.9
<b>C. Socio-Political Reasons</b>					
Political environment	423	19.6	24.1	21.7	34.5
Social class system	423	—	16.1	36.9	47.0
Cultural opportunities	414	1.2	10.6	37.7	50.5
Better opportunities for children	423	40.2	25.3	3.5	31.0
<b>D. Personal Reasons</b>					
Marriage to a US citizen	414	3.6	2.4	1.2	92.8
Other family members in US	412	5.8	15.3	15.3	63.6
Curiosity about US	451	12.9	37.7	30.2	19.3
Weather	422	—	4.5	63.3	32.2

Source: National Science Foundation, Survey of Science Resources Series, *Immigrant Scientists and Engineers in the United States: A Study of Characteristics and Attitudes*, Washington, D.C., US Government Printing Office, 1973, p. 29.

developed and developing countries and the supply of factors of production complementary to labor, or professional manpower. And although the migration of trained personnel probably tends to lower the disparities in material rewards, the latter are unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable future.

### Research Opportunities and Conditions of Work

**38.** The paucity of challenging research opportunities and the limited advancement prospects are, of course, a fact of life in developing countries. In part, these reflect the limited financial resources and tend to be an inevitable concomitant of underdevelopment. The rigid bureaucratic procedures, which place formalities and rules on a higher pedestal than efficiency or productivity, are irksome and the impatience of the professionals who have an opportunity to escape them is understandable. In a situation of accelerating population growth and growth of labor force and limited number of job opportunities, particularly of the preferred white-collar work, the propensity of the bureaucracy to spread its tentacles far and wide causes frequent frustrations and irritations. To maintain his research interests and capability in such an environment, a professional needs a lot of patience, perseverance and ingenuity.

### The Educational Structure

**39.** The literature on "brain drain" includes frequent references to the lack of "relevance" of the education offered in developing countries to the local needs as an explanation of the phenomenon. To some extent, the charge is valid. The quality of education comparable to that available in the developed countries is a widely-shared goal of the educational institutions in developing countries. The curricula are often patterned after the developed countries. These factors tend to make the graduates trained in developing countries easily adaptable, at least after a modicum of supplementary training, to somewhat different conditions in the developed countries.

**40.** However, one often observes a rather strange unwillingness or inability among the persons from underdeveloped countries, trained abroad, to re-adapt to the conditions in their home countries. Often their training tends to be too specialised to be useful in an environment where more generalist skills are in need. As the Pearson Commission pointed out, the "indiscriminate scholarship awards" for study in the developed countries aggravate the problem.

**41.** Another not widely-recognised situation deserves to be noted. At least in India, some of the students, who fail to get admission to courses in engineering or business administration or other similar courses, because of a high degree of competition, go abroad on the basis of their parents' resources. Parents, who have themselves not completed high school or college education, place a very high value on their children being able to go to the US. There is also the expectation that the investment would yield rich dividends if the student can work abroad for a few years (and at least the costs could be covered through employment during the period of permitted practical training). The commercial or industrial firms, many of which have foreign collaboration, place a high value on training abroad. However, in the academic or research community, the antecedents prior to study abroad are not forgotten; and sometimes a conscious effort is made to avoid any over-rating of the training abroad. Such an attitude is not altogether irrational and it is strengthened by the not infrequent tendency on the part of teachers abroad to relax their standards in appraising or recommending students or researchers from developing countries.

**42.** However, many students work much harder abroad than at home; and improve their skills and abilities substantially. They fear and resent the possibility of their being judged by reference to their past, which they would like to be forgotten. They seek "positions and responsibilities commensurate with the level of their academic achievements" (25), but many of the potential employers remain sceptical of their true worth. It is not easy to find or provide short-term visiting assignments in developing countries during which the worth and adaptability of a foreign-trained person can be appraised; and the latter is also unwilling to give up a well-paid job and venture out to face the possible frustrations in an environment where scarcities of even the very basic necessities of life cannot be avoided, at least periodically.

### Alienation from the Family and the Society

**43.** It is sometimes suggested that the students who do not return home, or the persons who emigrate from the developing country, tend to be alienated from their family and the society at large. In a study of 210 male

students from Greece, India, Iran, the Philippines and Turkey, who were registered at Columbia and New York universities during the spring semester of 1969 and had been resident in the US for at least 18 months, Mehri Kekmati found that the non-returnees (or those who expressed an intention to remain in the US upon the completion of academic studies, numbering 100 or 47.6 per cent) were "more likely to be alienated from their family and society" than the returnees. The former also came from "significantly lower social positions" (26).

**44.** It is difficult to appreciate the precise validity of these observations as an explanation of "non-return" because of the possibility of an initial selection. But many of the immigrants to the developed countries, who have worked in the developing countries, are indeed likely to include a significant proportion of the frustrated or alienated persons. Indeed, such frustration or alienation is quite common among the educated in most developing countries. It is difficult to identify any critical level of frustration, which causes emigration. Perhaps, the opportunities are the deciding factor. As for the social class, Hekmati's finding is, *prima facie*, plausible. However, in the survey of immigrant scientists and engineers in the US, discussed earlier, only a very small proportion of the immigrants from India, Philippines or Iran reported their dislike of the social class system as an important factor in their decision to immigrate.(27) It is possible that even if the non-returnees in Hekmati's study belonged to a lower class than the returnees, both would belong to the upper stratum of the society in their home country.

**45.** It is, nevertheless, true that the family ties tend to be an important reason for international students' plans to return home on the completion of their studies. They are a stronger factor than patriotism, the requirements of the fellowship or scholarship or the visa status (28). The latter two obstacles can normally be overcome, at least after a time-lag, and the student can become an immigrant at a later date.

**46.** Among other factors, political persecution or incompatibility with the philosophy of the Government of the home country can sometimes be an important consideration in decisions not to return to the home country or to emigrate from it. Consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, such migration has necessarily to be permitted or tolerated and one can only hope that it would not be too frequent.

## Conclusion

**47.** It is important to recognise that in developing countries, where there is a surplus of highly-qualified personnel and the professionals are under-employed or unemployed, the migration of such persons can hardly have any adverse effect on the economy of a developing country. As the Nobel Laureate Indian physicist, the late Sir C.V. Raman, once remarked, India has an abundance of intelligent and trained personnel, who can be exported to countries where the demand is greater. The 22nd Consultative Committee Meeting for Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia, held in 1972, under the auspices of the Colombo Plan, came to the conclusion that the migration of trained personnel, which is in excess of supply, should be viewed as an 'outflow' rather than as 'brain drain'. The latter can be said to occur only when persons in key positions, with high level scholarship or qualities of leadership and employed in occupations with excess demand, leave the country permanently. Even for such persons, some periods of study or research abroad can provide a convenient means of "recharging their batteries". (29).

**48.** Perhaps because no one is indispensable, it is generally difficult to prove or suggest that any major program of social or economic development in a developing country has suffered or is handicapped as a result of the emigration of its trained personnel. However, insofar as such emigration benefits the migrants as well as the countries of their immigration, and the country of origin has paid a substantial part of the training and education of the migrant, there does exist a strong case for levying a tax on the income of the migrant in the developed country (or from the international organization) (30). Such a tax, to be remitted to the country of origin, should win whole-hearted support from the migrants themselves, whose living standards rise substantially as a result of migration (31).

## NOTES

- (1) *Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International Development*, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1969, pp. 201-202.
- (2) The estimate appears to be based on a bibliography compiled by Steven Dedijer, *Brain Drain and Brain Gain: A Bibliography on Migration of Scientists, Engineers, Doctors and Students*, Lund, 1967. The figure is noted in: UNESCO, *Scientists Abroad: A Study of the International Movement of Persons in Science and Technology*, Paris, 1971, p. 50.
- (3) The UNESCO study cited above refers to "a partial study in the United Kingdom of a sample group of scientists and engineers who had proceeded overseas for lengthy terms". Apparently 678 persons were asked their "reasons for taking a post overseas". Nearly 50 per cent (335), who had returned to the UK, were also asked about their reasons for returning. Unfortunately, the details mentioned in the UNESCO study are not adequate to understand the precise characteristics of the migrants. See: UNESCO, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 61-62.
- (4) Mehri Hekmati and William A. Glaser, "The Brain Drain and UNITAR's Multi-National Research Project on the Subject", *Social Science Information*, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1973, pp. 123-138.
- (5) The reference is to the period July 1, 1960 to June 30, 1970.
- (6) The number of alien emigrants was no more than about 0.15 million. The net alien immigration was about 3.17 million persons.
- (7) See: Richard Irwin and Robert Warren, "Demographic Aspects of American Immigration", in: US Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, Research Reports, Vol. I, *Demographic and Social Aspects of Population Growth*, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing office, 1972, pp. 170-71.
- (8) Judith A. Fortney, "Immigration into the United States with Special Reference to Professional and Technical Workers", *Ibid.*, p. 215. The denominator includes persons with no occupation or the non-workers.
- (9) According to a study by Professor George Tapinos, only 2.1 per cent of the immigrants into France in 1968 were highly skilled. Most of the Indian and Pakistani immigrants into the UK up to about 1965 were unskilled or semi-skilled. See: Pravin Visaria, "The Indian and Pakistani Immigration into the UK", in: I.U.S.S.P., *Sydney Conference: Contributed Papers*, Canberra, 1967.
- (10) National Science Foundation, Science Resources Studies, *Highlights*, Washington, D.C., August 20, 1973 (NSF) 73-311.
- (11) Charles B. Keely, "Immigration: Considerations on Trends, Prospects and Policy", US Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, *Op. Cit.*, p. 194.
- (12) Robert G. Myers, *Education and Emigration: Study Abroad and the Migration of Human Resources*, New York: David McKay Co. Inc., 1972, pp. 92-103.
- (13) *Ibid.*, p. 126.
- (14) *Ibid.*, pp. 98-124.
- (15) Man Singh Das, *Brain Drain Controversy and the International Students*, Lucknow: Lucknow Publishing House, 1972.
- (16) The sample frame was prepared on the basis of the directory compiled by the Indian Embassy in Washington, the lists furnished by the foreign students office or the engineering departments at each of the 20 co-operating universities or the lists of the Institute of International Education in New York. Of the 1,200 questionnaires despatched in November-December 1968, 281 were returned undelivered, presumably due to graduation and movement from the University. The 447 fully completed questionnaires that were returned by April 15, 1969, formed nearly 49 per cent of the questionnaires that apparently reached the addressees. It was felt, however, that some of the non-returned questionnaires also did not reach the addressees and that nearly 60 per cent of those who actually received them responded.
- (17) National Science Foundation, Survey of Science Research Series, *Immigrant Scientists and Engineers in the United States: A Study of Characteristics and Attitudes*, Washington, D.C., US Government Printing Office, 1973.
- (18) The geographic areas of residence covered by these offices were: Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, Delaware, Eastern Pennsylvania and the San Francisco Bay area of California.

- (19) These offices maintain the alien address reports required to be filed annually by all aliens. The selected offices accounted for 30 per cent of all aliens in the United States who registered in January 1969. At least as large a proportion of all immigrant scientists and engineers are believed to have been resident within the jurisdictional confines of the selected offices.
- (20) Some may label such migrants as "escapists" who take advantage of the opportunities, which are denied to their other colleagues. However, such labelling implies inter-personal comparisons that cannot be justified.
- (21) National Science Foundation, Science Resources Studies, *Highlights, Op. Cit.*
- (22) Since February 4, 1971, the US Department of Labor issues certificates for scientists and engineers applying for immigration for work "only if they have a job offer for which domestic workers are not available and their employment does not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of domestic workers similarly employed in the area of intended employment". *Ibid.*
- (23) The usual reports of the shortage of medical personnel relative to population in India do not take account of the practitioners of non-allopathic medicine.
- (24) Charles A. Price, "International Migration" in: W.D. Borrie and Morag Cameron (Eds), *Population Change: Asia and Oceania*, Proceedings of the Sydney Conference, Australia, 21 to 25 August 1967, Canberra: Australian National University, Department of Demography, 1969, p. 128.
- (25) Mehri Hekmati, "Non-Returning Foreign Students: Why Do They Not Return Home", *The Third World*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1973.
- (26) *Ibid.*
- (27) See Tables 4 and 5. The Data for 54 immigrant scientists and engineers from Iran are also shown in the report cited in the Tables.
- (28) See Man Singh Das, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 49-54.
- (29) Thanks are due to Dr. V. V. Bhatt for this telling expression.
- (30) Jagdish Bhagwati and William Dellalfar, "The Brain Drain and Income Taxation", *World Development*, Vol. 1, Nos. 1 and 2, February 1973, pp. 94-101.
- (31) Some of the developing countries such as India or Pakistan actually help other developing countries of Africa or Asia in the recruitment of teachers, doctors and engineers. The recruitment of nationals of developing countries by the international organizations is also not considered a part of the 'brain drain'; and the salaries received by such persons are not taxed in the country of origin.

IV

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION  
AND  
THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

# THE ROLE OF LABOUR MIGRATIONS IN THE LABOUR MARKET AND THE ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE IMMIGRATION COUNTRIES

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## INTRODUCTION

1. This paper deals with the migrations of manual workers that have taken place particularly from the 1950's, from "underdeveloped" (1) countries to the highly industrialized capitalist countries of Northern and Western Europe.

2. These migrations are not without historical antecedents (2): nevertheless, the present migrations differ from others that have taken place to industrialized Europe in that they are on a massive scale, individual migration is frequently temporary (3) and the general conditions ruling in the countries of immigration are of a different nature. They can be compared in many aspects to the migrations from rural areas to expanding industrial regions, characteristic of the history of capitalism.

3. The causes in the country of origin (of the migrant workers) of massive emigration will not be considered here. Suffice it to say that the conditions capable of bringing about large scale emigrations are not new; on the contrary, they have existed for a very long time. Low productivity, low wages, a marked unemployment, and the very existence of underdevelopment, are conditions necessary to but not sufficient for the international migrations subject of this paper to take place. The growing disparity between international productivity levels, living standards and working conditions, are sufficient reason for emigrating; however, massive emigrations have only taken place from the time the highly industrialized countries opened their frontiers to foreign workers because they needed additional labour. The main purpose of this work is to try to explain why this need emerged: we will examine the structural causes of the import of labour. The use of the term "import" implies that the immigration countries have played an *active* part in the development of international labour migrations.

4. We would add that the fact of being caused by the increasing international disparity between living standards is an essential condition for the migrations from the point of view also of the country importing labour: workers who migrate because of significantly lower wage levels in their own countries are the only ones who are prepared to accept wages and working conditions no longer accepted by the workers of the immigration countries. It is this characteristic that makes the admission and recruitment of foreign workers *profitable*.

5. As far as individuals are concerned, labour migrations are generally temporary, or rather, in most cases, the subjective intention is to emigrate temporarily, even though in practice the stay goes beyond the limits originally planned (4). Emphasis is frequently placed on the importance of the temporary nature of the migrations because of the flexibility this gives to the supply of labour in relation to fluctuations in economic activity and geographical, industrial and/or occupational mobility. Nevertheless, this flexibility is not the result only of short stays; it can also be brought about by the application of institutional controls intended to ensure the desired level of mobility (5). The importance of the consequences arising out of the flexibility of the foreign labour force is undeniable. Despite this, if we wish to study the part played by immigration in the labour market as a whole, and its role in relation to the process of economic growth in the country of immigration, it is much more important to consider the *permanent* nature of the migratory flow: the

continued entry of foreign workers who increase the total labour supply available for incorporation in the production process, in each of the successive periods of expansion of economic activity. From this point of view, individual migrants are theoretically interchangeable.

6. Emphasis has been placed on the "advantages" of the temporary nature of the migrations particularly in relation to the adjustment of the total labour supply to variations in economic activity: the so often referred to "export of unemployment" in periods of economic recessions. This "spontaneous" adjustment constitutes a mechanism similar to that which in other countries is effected by way of the rural sector or the self-employed workers sector: in times of recession the rural sector (Japan for example) "absorbs" the unemployed from the industrial areas (in the form of under-employment) and then liberates "excess" labour again when opportunities occur again for employment in industry; this is similar also to the adjustment that takes place by way of variations in the labour force participation rate according to the variations of employment opportunities (U.S.A. for example). In the case of immigration, the emigration country operates in the same way as the rural sector or the self-employed workers sector in the other cases. The adjustment can be made spontaneously or obligatorily by way of the return of the migrant worker and restrictions on the entry of foreigners. This frequently happens, but not so often as is generally thought; the proportion of migrants (in relation to the total migrant population) that returns during recessions varies from country to country and is not of the same order of importance in all of them. In certain cases, admission and recruitment are simply stopped, while the return flow is rather small. The "adjustment mechanism" ceases to operate because of the coming into play of various factors: in particular, the structure of employment (marked functional differentiation between foreign and indigenous workers), social and political aims, systems of social security, governmental control of immigration, etc. It has been found, for example, that (during recessions) in certain countries unemployment is distributed proportionally between foreign and national workers (in proportion to the employed foreign and national labour forces), while the total number of immigrants goes down very slightly, and new entries cease (6).

7. In brief, our main hypothesis is that the *essential contribution* of the foreign labour force to the process of economic growth does not lie so much in the temporary individual stays and the consequent flexibility these give to the supply of labour in relation to the fluctuations in economic activity, as in its capacity to meet the structural need of *additional* labour, by increasing the supply of labour power—and labour hours—available.

8. Conjunctural flexibility, and the periodic renewal of migrant workers constitute *further advantages* of employing foreign labour. To these can be added others, certainly not insignificant, such as discrimination in respect of wages, working and living conditions, manipulability and control of a disciplined labour force on the fringe of trade union and political activities.

9. Discrimination and manipulability (which occur to a varying extent in all immigration countries) are extremely important matters, and they fulfil a social and economic function (7). Despite this, we do not consider they constitute essential characteristics or conditions necessary to making the import of labour profitable. This will be clarified along this paper.

## SHORT TERM ANALYSIS

10. The situation that exists at the beginning of the period during which frontiers are open to migrant workers—the time when active import of labour started—is characterized by the confluence of a number of factors, which in turn constitute the result of a historical evolution. Studying these factors that converge in the initial situation (taking only the basic structural factors into consideration) enables us to give a historical explanation of the import of labour and set down the causes which, in the short term, bring about immigration from the point of view of the importing country. To speak of an "initial situation" is obviously an analytical abstraction since the start of active labour import cannot be accurately determined in all the immigration countries. The initial situation is easier to study in those countries where the start of immigration is more clearly evident and in those wherein general immigration takes the form of immigration of *pure labour power*. This would be the case with countries like Germany and the Netherlands, in contrast with a country which like France, has traditionally been an immigration country (8).

11. Leaving aside the differences (9) between the various immigration countries, the initial situation of this period can be characterized broadly as a situation of "near full employment" in which the number of vacancies exceeds the number of unemployed workers seeking employment.

**12.** To the situation of almost full employment is added the rigidity of the degree of geographical and sectoral mobility. The regions with a high level of unemployment (higher than the national average) and the recessive sectors of the economy (craft industries, small scale trade), and also agriculture, cease to supply the necessary labour for the expanding sectors, or the supply is insufficient in relation to the demand. This trend can be observed in all the immigration countries, although the extent to which it occurs varies from one to another.

**13.** Taking into account the level of employment and the excess of vacancies over unemployment on the one hand, and the degree of rigidity of geographical and sectoral mobility on the other, the immigration countries could be placed along a scale having at the top end "scarcity" of labour in the strict sense (no labour is available for *rapid* incorporation into the productive process) and at the bottom end "scarcity" in the broad sense (the necessary labour could be found but only by paying *significantly* higher wages and providing *markedly* improved working conditions).

**14.** The degree of sectoral and geographical mobility and the rate of labour force participation are determined by various economic and social factors that we will not consider here. Suffice it to say that both stimulation of mobility and encouragement of participation in working life form part of the objectives of the active manpower policies, which are applied to varying extents in all the immigration countries. The results are however very gradual: the increase of mobility and participation is a very slow process. Furthermore, even if they could increase rapidly, the results obtained would in some cases be insufficient compared with the growing demand for labour in the expanding sectors.

**15.** At the same time, not to force greater mobility by increasing the level of unemployment (whether due to acceleration of economic concentration and elimination of marginal industries, or to recessions in economic activity) is a political aim. This aim is related to the more general objective of trying to avoid the emergence of sources of serious class conflicts.

**16.** In brief, it can be said that *in the initial situation an increase in the supply of labour is practically impossible in the short term.* This is a consequence of state intervention in the economy and the implementation of policies for sustained economic growth and full employment since the second world war (10). It is also connected with the development of policies having the purpose of "conciliating" the interests of Labour and Capital.

**17.** Sustained economic expansion has been accompanied by the continuous incorporation of labour force into the productive process, and by the steady growth of real wages, parallel to the growth in labour productivity. There has been a marked increase in the negotiating power of the trade unions: in full employment situations, the power relationships in the labour market change in favour of Labour against Capital. To this there is a most important consequence: wages grow rapidly and their increase *can even exceed (or threaten to exceed) the increase in the productivity of labour.* This is the case with the initial situation of the period we are concerned with.

**18.** Faced with this situation, the implementation of wage control policies is practically impossible (11). Also, national and international factors set limits to the reflection of increased wage costs in prices. We will not examine the obstacles that can put a brake on further development of "cost-inflation" and will content ourselves merely by saying that the situation ruling on the labour market itself constitutes one of these obstacles: as long as the "scarcity" of labour persists, the workers will be in a position to demand and obtain wage increases that compensate for the increased prices of consumer goods, which will in turn aggravate the prices-wages-prices inflationary spiral.

**19.** Economic growth depends on the industrial sector. Nevertheless, the evolution of employment has not been favourable to the latter: employment in the tertiary sector tends to increase more rapidly than in the secondary sector. Expansion of employment in the services sector is connected with the transformations characteristic of advanced capitalism (12), and has been draining off the available human resources, providing an objective opportunity for realization of subjective preferences for non-manual work. The general scarcity of labour has thus been accentuated in the industrial sector, to the extent that, in situations of full employment the workers are able to choose between the various occupations available.

**20.** The same process can also be observed inside the industrial sector: the workers reject the more arduous, dirty and dangerous, less skilled jobs with lower wages and worse working conditions, since there actually exist opportunities for employment in other occupations, which are more attractive from a social and economic standpoint (13).

**21.** Since the scarcity of labour is comparatively more pronounced in industry, we concentrate the analysis of the factors that bring about the import of labour in the industrial sector, always bearing in mind that the situation of *general full employment precedes (at least analytically)* that of scarcity in the industrial sector. It has also to be remembered that the processes that occur in the industrial sector have fundamental repercussions on the economy as a whole (in particular, the multiplication and acceleration effects). Finally, reference should be made to the fact that it is towards the industrial sector that the *large majority* of migrant workers have been oriented in all the immigration countries.

**22.** Against a rigid supply of labour comes up a *growing labour demand*. The increasing demand is caused by three factors: on the one hand, a certain level of profits (historically determined by the high rate of capital accumulation), i.e. an available capital seeking a profitable productive investment and besides an expanding (national and international) market for industrial goods; on the other hand, the *production technique seems to be almost unchangeable in the short term*.

**23.** The production technique (as far as the relative use of labour and capital is concerned) is also a historical product, determined by the availability of labour and the evolution of wage costs in the past. The possibility of changing the production technique, in the sense of increasing the productivity of labour or saving labour, is being restricted by purely technological factors and also by the specific characteristics of the capitalist system. In this system, the introduction of a change having the purpose of saving labour, is conditioned by the relationship between the relative costs of the labour force and the technical modification or the capital good. It depends basically on the capacity of the technical modification or the capital good to reduce production costs. When the relative costs indicate that still the intensive use of labour is *more profitable*, the process of labour substitution is slower compared with what would occur in the event of a response exclusively to an objective and real labour scarcity. In the last mentioned case, the choice criterion would be only the capacity of the technical modification or the capital good to increase the productivity of labour and not its capacity to reduce costs.

**24.** At the beginning of the period of labour import, it was still more profitable to expand production by increasing employment than to introduce technological innovations with a view to saving labour (14). Despite the rapid growth of wages, the increase in unit costs, resulting from an increase in employment, was probably less than or equal to the increase resulting from a change of the production process intended to save labour. For the purpose of expanding production, *it was better in the short term to increase the employed labour force, at the existing wage level*.

**25.** Furthermore, an essential factor is that, in conditions of full employment, the state of power relations in the labour market sets another limit to the introduction of modifications intended to increase the productivity of labour, since the increase in productivity would bring about an increase in wages. Although total production will be the same as what would be obtained by increasing employment, in the short term profits will be smaller because of the higher investment costs caused by the technical innovation or the capital good introduced; the increase in wages prevents the increase in productivity from offsetting the increase in investment costs (15).

**26.** Briefly, in the initial situation there are a series of converging factors that create the necessity of obtaining *additional labour*: a level of profits calling for a profitable productive investment at a time when the demand for industrial goods is on the increase, a production technique that seems to be given as far as the relative use of labour and capital is concerned, and a total labour supply rigid at the existing level of wages, if not objectively impossible to increase. It is the historical result of a rate of accumulation that exceeds the rate of increase in the productivity of labour and the active population on the one hand and the application of full employment policies on the other.

**27.** There seems to be one way only of meeting the need for additional labour: expansion of the total labour supply by importing workers from underdeveloped countries in which there is an abundant labour force ready to *emigrate immediately* in response to employment opportunities in the industrialized countries. We have already said that it is only the workers of under-developed countries who will provide an additional labour force at the *existing wage level*.

**28.** The import of labour is the only solution which, in addition to being convenient, can be implemented rapidly in practice. The employment of foreign workers enables the demand for labour to be met profitably: the labour hours available to the capitalists will increase without this involving an increase in unit costs, or with the smallest possible increase (16).

**29.** This analysis of the determining factors of the import of labour in the “initial situation” allows the conclusion to be drawn that the immigration of labour constitutes an *economic adjusting mechanism*, the utility of which is proved in the circumstances described. Both the import of labour and other complementary mechanisms (increase of labour productivity, application of active manpower policies, control wages, cost inflation), are capable of performing, fully or partially, one or both of the *functions* of the traditional “industrial reserve army of labour”, as characterized by Marx. These functions *are defined in relation to the process of capital accumulation* (and their performance is essential to the continuity of capitalist accumulation).

- 1) They are: the immediate supply of labour hours for the production process, to be used when and where required; i.e. the existence of a flexible and mobilizable labour force, always available to satisfy the needs of the rate of capital accumulation;
- 2) They ensure that the required labour force is incorporated into the production process without jeopardising the continuity of capital accumulation; i.e. to regulate the growth of wages in such a way that wage increases do not exceed the “tolerance margin” limit.

**30.** In practice, the two functions overlap; the usefulness of an analytical distinction arises when, because of the disappearance or marked reduction of the “reserve army”, other mechanisms emerge, capable of performing *only one* of these functions (control of wages or cost-inflation, for example). In conditions of full employment the “new” mechanisms tend to be used complementary. Not all of them arise automatically from the operation of the economic system itself—as was the case of the “reserve army” (17): the implementation of some of these “mechanisms” will be the result of Government intervention in the economy.

**31.** The immigration of labour forces from underdeveloped countries is capable of performing, at least partially, *both* the functions of the “reserve army”: it supplies a flexible and mobilizable labour force, at the existing level of wages. The final weight of the influence on the growth of wages will be conditioned by many factors, operating in opposite directions (18).

**32.** It is precisely due to the fact that the import of labour provides a mechanism capable of performing the two functions of the industrial reserve army (i.e. because of the role immigration plays in the labour market), that we can say that immigration makes possible the *continuance of economic growth*. Furthermore, it helps to solve the dilemma the advanced capitalist countries are facing in trying to reconcile full employment with a rate of increase in wages not in excess of the rate of growth of labour productivity. The extent to which this “mechanism” is made use of varies from country to country in the same way as the use made of the other complementary mechanisms varies.

**33.** Before proceeding with the analysis on the level of the labour market in general, it will be interesting to make some observations on the immigration of labour and the structures of employment and wages. A study of these relationships is indispensable when examining the role played by immigration in the labour market of the immigration countries.

**34.** We have said that immigration enables the total supply of labour available for the economy as a whole to be increased. This general conclusion is not affected by the fact that the foreign labour force is primarily used in the industrial sector while national workers (particularly those who have recently joined the labour force) move to the tertiary sector. In all the immigration countries the contribution of the migrant workers to the growth of employment in industry, particularly in manual work, is very significant (19). It is therefore necessary to examine the structure of employment within the industrial sector. It has to be emphasized that this analysis is made at a level that is less general than the preceding level, and it can be expected that the conclusions drawn from the more general analysis will be confirmed by those of the more specific analysis.

**35.** The empirical studies carried out in various immigration countries show that the contribution of foreign workers to employment in certain industrial branches has been particularly large (20) (generally in the traditional industries). In these, the scarcity of labour was aggravated by the fact that these industries would have lost their “normal” share of the increase in the national labour force. This has occurred in certain industries, phases of the productive process and occupations. It has been possible to offset this loss by the employment of foreign workers (in a higher proportion than in the rest of the industries and occupations). This contribution has been essential, making possible the maintenance in operation of industries which otherwise would have had to cut down or give up production. This aspect has long term repercussions which will be gone into later.

**36.** We have also mentioned that the increase in the total labour force, due to immigration, has a certain influence on the growth of wages. It can be observed, at a less general level of analysis, that this operates *through the wage structure* (21). Foreign workers are mainly employed in some occupations and industries, and it is in these where the pressure on the growth of wages is primarily exerted; this influence then spreads to the other industries and occupations: if the former manage to obtain the required labour force (foreign), at the existing wage level, the latter succeed in attracting the necessary workers (national, and perhaps foreign as well) with the existing wage structure (approximately). This analysis applies as much to the case of the traditional industries versus the dynamic industries as to the “rejected” occupations versus the remainder: the most attractive in social and economic terms.

**37.** The factors that play in the initial situation are repeated in each consecutive period. The availability of labour in the initial period enables the total labour supply to be adapted to the requirements of the rate of accumulation. This, in turn, stimulates the process of accumulation and enables the structural processes to continue their course, *as long as the required labour is available*. The availability of labour in each period, in the short term, and its adjustment to the demand for labour, has an effect on the following period: all go to form the long term; it is therefore possible to carry out a long term analysis of the import of labour.

**38.** The independent economic decisions of each private enterprise tend to generate in each period the need for “additional” labour, which is consequently “imported”. We can say then that the need for additional labour is a *structural need*, which will persist as long as the conditions that arouse it prevail: as long as the rate of accumulation exceeds the rate of increase in labour productivity and in the active population, in circumstances of near full employment.

## LONG TERM ANALYSIS

**39.** The attraction of migrant workers is one method of obtaining additional labour and has the advantage that it can be planned and controlled. The adaptation of the labour supply to the demand in each period of production makes it possible to predict the course of the structural processes. Future employment requirements, in excess of the increase in the active national population, can be estimated taking into account the probable rate of increase of labour productivity and the interaction between the continuous availability of workers (which immigration makes possible) and capital accumulation and investments; a forecast can then be made of the probable long term contribution of the foreign labour force and accordingly the annual average quotas for migrant workers can be laid down. Uninterrupted economic growth is thus assured.

**40.** These forecasts are subject to certain basic factors: the desirable rate of accumulation (in accordance with the national and international circumstances), the rate of labour substitution and particularly, the rate of progression of the processes of economic concentration and industrial specialization and, to a lesser degree, the stimulation of the geographical decentralization of industry.

**41.** The process of economic concentration is also going to influence the rate of capital accumulation and the rate of increase in productivity, and also the rate at which labour up to then employed is liberated. In other words, it is a basic determinant of the changes in the demand for labour. It is therefore to be expected that the process of concentration will have a decisive effect on the *duration* of the import of labour, which seems from this point of view to be a *phase* in the development of the process of economic concentration. The extent to which this process has affected, and will in the future affect the import of labour in the various countries, is a subject for investigation which in our opinion should be gone into in depth.

**42.** The same can be said about the evolution of industrial specialization. It should be emphasized that both the rate of concentration and of specialization depend on many factors and that both can be influenced by Government policies (this occurs also with the geographical decentralizing of industry).

**43.** The long term analysis of the import of labour and its contribution to economic growth, is enriched by carrying out a disaggregated study of the industrial sector. This examination at a lower level of generality shows the relations between the import of labour and the rate of industrial specialization.

**44.** We have already said that the contribution of migrant workers to employment in the traditional industries, at the existing wage level, has been essential (and also in some non-traditional industries, in certain countries). These industries in general are unable to increase their wages significantly with a view to attracting

labour, their tolerance margin being small (they obtain smaller profits per man employed than the rest of the industrial sector). But in any event, if wages could be increased relatively to those of the other industries, this increase would immediately be followed by a correlated increase of wages in the dynamic industries. These "lead" economic growth and cannot run the risk of losing their human resources (since the "scarcity" of labour is general). In a situation of full employment therefore, the traditional industries would not be able to solve the problem of meeting their labour requirements by way of an increase in wages.

**45.** The dynamic industries are responsible for accelerating economic growth in the long term. The development of these industries tends to ensure for the highly industrialized countries their maintenance of a dominant position in the system of international relations. Nevertheless, the traditional industries, which are undergoing a process of profound structural change (modernization, specialization, concentration) reflected in the relative stagnation of their employment levels, are still indispensable : because of the role they play in connection with the creation of added value and with exports, for reasons of security or home consumption, etc. (depending on the country concerned). To dispense with these industries because of labour scarcity would mean today for the advanced countries that they would lose their dominant position in the international market, transforming their present asymmetrical relationship (domination/subordination) into a relationship of mutual interdependence (with "underdeveloped" countries). This fact sets an objective limit to an acceleration of industrial specialization. In this context, it can be said that *the import of labour is a substitute for a policy of investments and industrial specialization* (and also substitutes in many cases a policy of regional decentralization of industry).

**46.** In the long run, the traditional industries too, once transformed, will reduce their labour requirements. The increasing specialization within these industries will also affect the period the import of labour will last. Meanwhile, the employment of foreign workers makes possible the gradual transfer of national human resources to the dynamic industries and the training and education of a more qualified labour force. It can be concluded that the use of a foreign labour force facilitates the adjustment of industrialized economies to the changes in the international division of labour; it can be said also from this point of view that immigration is favourable to the continuance of economic growth.

**47.** The employment of a foreign labour force will last for a varying time in the different industries (and in the different countries), influenced by the structural changes in each of them. An interesting subject of research which should be carried out is precisely to find out how, in accordance with the mentioned changes, the use of a foreign labour force changes, diminishes or ceases in each branch of industry (22), and whether this affects the diffusion of foreigners to other industrial branches.

**48.** Ultimately, the duration of the use of migrant workers in the different industries will be conditioned by their rates of accumulation and productivity increase. It will depend in each industry on the affluence of national and foreign capital, the extent of Government intervention in the establishment of industrial priorities, the self-financing capacity, the evolution of relative costs (labour force - capital goods), the evolution of its competitiveness in relation to its equivalents in other countries, the evolution of the demand for the various industrial products, and above all the development of concentration and specialization. All these factors have an effect on the evolution of the demand for labour. Another factor to be taken into account, obviously, is what will be the evolution of the supply of indigenous workers for the various industries and occupations.

**49.** The question occurs, on the other hand, whether immigration itself does not produce certain effects capable of having an influence on its own duration. In other words, in the long term it is pertinent to examine the *effects* of immigration on the development of structural processes, e.g. the evolution of the technique of production.

**50.** As has already been said, the immigration of labour makes it possible for the total supply of labour to be adapted to the demand, filling the "void" left by the rate of growth of productivity and of the working population. Our hypothesis is that immigration is a concomitant of and not an alternative to the increase in productivity and the progress of labour substitution. It is usually said that the immigration of labour will delay not only the substitution of labour but the increase in productivity, but we can ask whether these processes would accelerate sufficiently in the absence of the labour force provided by immigration. There is no doubt that both processes tend to accelerate in response to labour scarcity and rapidly increasing wage costs. It is also certain, however, that a persistent labour scarcity, added to high wage costs can cause an interruption of investment and trigger off a recession of economic activity. There is no guarantee that in the absence of immigration the substitution of labour accelerates. It has to be emphasized in this connection that persistent scarcity and high wages also have an effect on the prices of capital goods themselves (including

those that are labour saving), which in turn has a repercussion—via the comparative costs—on the rate of labour substitution.

**51.** We can further indicate some factors that contribute by way of immigration to increasing labour productivity (i.e. which would have the opposite effect to that which immigration is thought to bring about). Immigration contributes directly to an increase in productivity since it makes for higher efficiency in the use of resources and improved use of installed capacity. Furthermore, immigration indirectly promotes the introduction of modifications in the production process since it is in periods of rising profits (and not declining profits) that costly modifications in the productive process are put into effect—they are carried out when the necessary financial resources are available and when the “climate” is suitable for investments.

**52.** The influence of immigration on the evolution of the technique of production and on the rate of growth of wages is affected by several factors (23). Only an extremely massive, uncontrolled immigration could have a radical influence on these processes. This is not the present case in the immigration countries, where there is a tendency to exercise increasing control on the number of immigrants.

**53.** It could be said in short that immigration, controlled to a varying extent, ensures not only sustained economic growth but also the smooth development of the structural processes, in the context of a “fluid” labour market. It further makes for the avoidance of “painful” adjustments and sharp class conflicts, which could result from a forced acceleration of economic concentration and labour substitution. Immigration is an alternative to a more radical Government intervention in the economy (always in conditions of full employment and sustained economic growth) which would seek to influence the development of structural process by taking action not in respect of the supply of labour but in regard to the decisions of private concerns. The question as to whether this would be possible without profound changes in the characteristics that define the capitalist system remains an open question.

**54.** Another consequence of immigration has to do with certain social processes linked to the particular structure of employment of the migrant workers: as long as conditions of full employment persist, the rejection by national workers of certain occupations is reinforced and spreads, tending to be irreversible. Only massive unemployment or radical changes in the wage structure (in the opposite sense to present trends), and also a marked improvement of the working conditions in the mentioned occupations, could bring about a “return” of the national workers to them. As long as this does not take place, the employment structure of the foreign and national labour force will tend to be rigidly dichotomic. This peculiar structure of employment also has an important function: the promotion (apparent or real) of national workers to the “best” occupations favours the acceptance of immigration itself by the working class; furthermore, the prospects of individual promotion helps to “reconcile” the interests of workers and employers; the dichotomized structure of employment obscures the “instrument character” of immigration in the service of Capital, and contributes to dividing the working class of which foreign workers actually form part. There is another matter deserving of consideration in depth: to what extent does a dichotomized structure of employment contribute to the creation of separate organizations (trade union, political) by foreign workers and what are their objectives and means of action. The study of the policy of the labour organizations in respect of labour immigration (and how it has evolved) is also of great importance.

**55.** Furthermore, the existence of what we have called “additional advantages” can affect the duration of the import of labour: employers may come to prefer to employ a labour force that is more easily handled and controlled, more timid and disciplined, that accepts the minimum wage and has not joined the labour organizations. The weight of this factor can only be determined empirically in each specific case and it is to be expected that variations from country to country and industry to industry are very marked. These additional advantages are maximized, being also institutionalized, in those countries where there is a tendency to operate measures having the purpose of limiting the individual length of stay and therefore of ensuring the constant renewal of the migrant population; this periodic renewal will have the important consequence of obstructing the integration of foreign workers into the national working class (to which must be added the functional differentiation between foreigners and nationals, already mentioned). A possible result of this situation is a weakening of Labour’s position vis-à-vis Capital in the labour market. Another consequence of the renewal of migrants will be to maximize the profits obtained from the foreign labour force, minimizing the costs for the importing country (economic and social infrastructure). Legal restriction on the entry of families has a similar effect.

**56.** Reference has to be made in this context to the fact that the contribution made by the foreign labour force is enormously increased if it is taken into account that the immigration country does not participate in

any way in the reproduction, socialization, training and education of this labour force: the costs fall entirely on the (underdeveloped) labour-exporting country.

**57.** In conclusion and summarising, it can be observed that the contribution of immigration to the economic growth of the importing countries has been, and is, indispensable. Immigration is not irreplaceable, but has been the only rapid way of meeting in practice the requirements of the rate of capital accumulation. Furthermore, it is the most flexible and convenient "method".

**58.** The international migrations analyzed here contribute to the growth of the industrialized countries from the more general viewpoint of supplying the labour hours necessary for the production process, performing the functions of the "industrial reserve army" and from the more specific but no less important viewpoint of facilitating adjustments in the advanced economies to the changes in the international division of labour (24).

**59.** At the same time, international migrations of this sort help to perpetuate economic stagnation in the emigration countries, they contribute in this way to maintaining if not increasing international social and economic inequality and accordingly the conditions that assure their own continuance.

## THE ALTERNATIVE TO THE IMPORT OF LABOUR

**60.** The alternatives to importing labour are defined as such to the extent that they are able to perform the same functions in relation to the process of capital accumulation. A discussion on the feasibility of the alternatives is meaningful only if a long term view is taken, since one of the causes of the need of importing labour was precisely the impossibility of putting them into effect in the short term.

**61.** We have considered, even though rather briefly, some of these alternatives: acceleration of the rate of increase in productivity and of the substitution of labour by capital, acceleration of concentration, implementation of active manpower policies and of policies aimed at increasing the rate of participation of the population in the labour force, acceleration of industrial specialization, mechanisms for regulating wages (control of wages, cost-inflation). These alternatives have advantages and disadvantages and their development comes up against objective limits imposed by the operation itself of the economic system and by political aims.

**62.** There is another alternative about which we have not spoken: the possibility of substituting the import of labour by the export of capital. Both these "alternatives" are determined by the same basic economic processes: the accumulation of capital and the profitable use of accumulated capital. Nevertheless, the feasibility of their "interchange" also depends on objective factors, linked to the functioning of the economic system. Each of them consists in a specific response to a specific need, so that voluntary "interchange" is very difficult.

**63.** If we want to analyze to what extent this interchange is feasible, we have to consider to what extent the immigration countries can *increase* their export of capital (since all of them have been traditional capital exporters), and to what extent these capital flows can be directed at will towards the emigration countries of today (with an "excess" of labour force).

**64.** The export of capital can be in the form of direct private investment or private or official loans ("aid").

**65.** Direct investment may consist of a partial transfer of activities abroad, the setting up of subsidiaries, the purchase of companies already established in the country receiving the capital. All these forms are a part of the overall strategy of a firm in relation to its profitability prospects (short or long term).

**66.** In general, the suggestion of "interchanging" voluntarily the import of labour and the export of capital relates to direct private investment (although not exclusively), and very often takes the concrete form of a proposal to export capital, it being invested in the emigration countries in order to develop there traditional industries or phases of production—because wage costs are low and labour is abundant.

**67.** Direct investment abroad is limited by various factors we will not go into here, which result in its being preferable in many cases for the firm to invest in its own country instead of exporting its "excess" capital. To these general factors that influence on investments abroad have to be added other specific factors that restrict the export of capital in the case we are concerned with here: the substitution of the import of labour by an increase in the flows of capital to the emigration countries.

**68.** These specific restrictions are:

I. Since not all firms are able to export capital (depending on the kind and size of the undertaking, financing facilities etc.), those that can do so are not necessarily those that import labour; on the other hand there are no mechanisms for "redistributing" excess capital.

II. The emigration countries are not necessarily those that are most suitable for receiving capital (from the point of view of the firm) having in mind the geographical, economic and legal conditions, etc.: a firm that imports labour from one of them may be exporting capital to another country. The two "alternatives" do not rule each other out; both are determined by the overall strategy of the firm in relation to profitability.

III. The export of capital cannot have the same flexibility as the import of labour: it cannot be temporary like immigration. The latter can be adjusted much more easily to the fluctuations in the demand for labour.

IV. Social factors (mentioned above), which tend to trigger off irreversible developments in the absence of radical structural changes, make it difficult to adapt the active national population to the new situation: the increased export of capital would cause qualitative changes in the demand for labour in the countries that are today importing labour, since the "rejected" occupation will not necessarily be those that are exportable (due to the existence of complementary occupations and phases of production, for example).

V. The transfer of phases of production or industries abroad is not always technically possible and furthermore, despite the advantages (abundant labour and low wages), there are disadvantages and additional costs which will restrict an increase in the export of capital (due to the lack of an adequate infrastructure, transport costs, lack of qualified personnel, etc.), because the operation will not be profitable from the point of view of the firm.

**69.** All these restrictions prevent the interchange of "alternatives" from being easy (25); they mean that it can only take place in specific cases. In what cases this substitution has been and is taking place, and due to what causes, and what its consequences are in respect of the development of the international migrations we are analyzing, are matters that should be investigated. Furthermore, a most important subject for study is what are the long term trends—can it be, for example, that the development in economic concentration and industrial specialization is going to favour the export of capital rather than the import of labour?

## NOTES

- (1) Those countries (and/or regions) whose economic system is not integrated, where average productivity is low and conceals big differences between sectors, industries and regions, and whose economy is highly dependent on the foreign market. We include those that are generally referred to as "less" developed countries.
- (2) A very full description of the historical background of migrations to the industrialized European countries is given in S. Castles & G. Kosack, *Immigrant workers and class structure in Western Europe*, Oxford, 1973, Chapter 2.
- (3) As is mentioned later this is not always the case.
- (4) See in this respect, W.R. Böhnig, *The economic effects of the employment of foreign workers: with special reference to the labour markets of Western Europe's post-industrial societies*, Working Document, OECD, Manpower and Social Affairs Directorate, February 1973, in which the author develops a notion on the "maturing" of the migratory flows, during which process, inter alia, the average stay of the individual migrant tends to lengthen.
- (5) This flexibility is essential in that it will enable structural requirements in different branches of production to be met. This is discussed later.
- (6) This has clearly been the case in Holland. Adriana Marshall, *The import of labour (the case of the Netherlands)*, Rotterdam University Press, 1973, Chapter 4.
- (7) M. Nikolinakos, *The economic foundations of discrimination in the F.R. of Germany*, in *Foreigners in our Community*, published by H.v. Houte y W. Melgert, Keesing publishers, 1972.
- (8) The rates of activity of the migrant population are indicative of this situation: in Holland between 80 and 90 per cent of immigrants are active (the Mediterranean countries); in France, approximately 50 per cent.
- (9) The differences between the various immigration countries can be very marked. It is to be noted that while in some countries immigration starts *after* a rather long period of labour "shortage", in others, constant immigration prevents the shortage occurring (Switzerland, for example).

- (10) We always refer to the European countries that are considered in this paper; in particular, to the manipulation of effective demand, with a view to its continuous expansion, to the control of unemployment and the regulation of fluctuations in economic activity.  
We would point out that, throughout this work, when full employment is mentioned, we mean in fact near full employment, as defined above; the same applies to the word "scarcity", which is always to be considered as having a relative meaning—relative to the rate of accumulation of capital and the profitable investment of accumulated capital.
- (11) For example, in Holland, where wages control had been having success, this policy collapsed definitively precisely at the beginning of the period we are considering. See Adriana Marshall, *op. cit.*, Chapter 2.
- (12) On the one hand, the development of the social services; on the other, the development of activities linked to monopolistic transformations: expansion of the sector of distribution of goods and money; finally, the enormous increase in government activity.
- (13) We will revert to this matter later.
- (14) It is understood that we refer here to an *acceleration* of substitution of labour since, at any one moment, concomitantly with the increase in employment as a result of the use of foreign workers, changes in the production technique are taking place which save labour.  
In this context, it should be emphasized that the structure of property in industry can constitute an impediment to the introduction of technological innovations. See Denis Maillat, *The economic consequences of the employment of foreign workers: the case of Switzerland*, Working Document, OECD, June 1973.
- (15) This will occur in the best of cases from the capitalist point of view. In the worst of cases (for the capitalist), the situation in the labour market will enable also the share of the workers in the gains from growing productivity *to be increased*. It should be added that these observations assume that it is not possible to transfer the increases in costs to prices to a greater extent than this has been done in reality.
- (16) This occurs irrespective of whether what we have called "additional" advantages are derived or not from the employment of a foreign labour force.
- (17) The "reserve army" is a *necessary product* of the process of capitalist accumulation, and also a condition necessary to the existence of the capitalist mode of production.
- (18) The mere fact of obtaining labour at the existing wage level would slow down the growth of wages; nevertheless, other factors such as stimulation of accumulation, efficiency in the use of resources, stimulation of new demands for labour, act in opposite directions. A study of these influences is more relevant in the long term and only an econometric study can give a final answer.
- (19) See S. Castles & G. Kosack, *op. cit.*, Denis Maillat, *Structure des salaires et immigration*, Dunod, 1968, Adriana Marshall, *op. cit.*, etc.
- (20) Denis Maillat, *op. cit.*, Adriana Marshall, *op. cit.* (cases of Switzerland and Holland).
- (21) Denis Maillat, *op. cit.*; Adriana Marshall, *op. cit.*
- (22) An interesting example of the "temporary" use of foreign labour in accordance with the structural changes in industry, is provided by the Mining industry in the Netherlands, where the proportion of foreign workers increased during the time it was necessary to maintain production, but started to diminish as the time approached when the mines were finally going to be closed down.
- (23) An excellent synthesis of all the factors that play a part in the relationship between productivity and immigration is to be found in W.R. Böhning, *op. cit.*, Castle & Kosack, *op. cit.*, and for Switzerland, Denis Maillat, *op. cit.*
- (24) There are other "lesser" (but not insignificant) for example, beneficial effects for the immigration country: the introduction of new consumption habits in the emigration countries by the migrants who return brings about a growing demand for imported products which the immigration country will supply.
- (25) With regard to the feasibility of increasing the export of capital in the form of loans, reference should be made to the fact that private loans are subject to restrictions similar to those that restrict direct investment and that official loans (aid) meet with other restrictions: the granting of loans and grants is subject to commercial, political, strategic and moral considerations which do not necessarily favour the emigration countries. Furthermore, it has to be emphasized that official aid, rather than increasing, tends to diminish (as a proportion of the combined gross national product of the industrialized countries).

# INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

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## I. INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT

1. Development is defined by some authors as synonymous with economic growth or more specifically to *per capita* income growth. Others prefer to think of development as a socio-economic process and define it as economic growth accompanied by some welfare provisions like, for instance, that no worsening of the income distribution should occur when development takes place. Such concepts try to define development, in terms of its economic and social desirability, as something worth striving for. However, for us development is not some sort of award but a historical category, by means of which a better understanding of the process of economic and social change in our epoch can be gained.

2. Development is first of all the difference (or sum of differences) between the developed and the not developed countries *nowadays*. Such differences are essentially qualitative, although their outer effects may be listed and quantified. The basic difference between capitalist industrialized countries and countries which are not industrialized and which have a half-capitalist and a half-precapitalist economy is structural. It cannot be overcome by economic growth, seen as a merely quantitative change. A not developed country may grow economically and become even less developed than it was before. That may happen, for instance, if the growth is occasioned by the expansion of exports of colonial wares, while the consequent increase of imports helps to eliminate domestic manufactures.

3. Developed and not developed countries are *both* results of the Industrial Revolution, as it took place during the last century, until nearly 1930. While industrialization changed the economy and the society first of Great Britain and then of other countries of West Europe, of North America and of Japan, other countries, first of Latin America and South and East Europe and later of Asia and Africa, became specialized as primary producers. In fact, the Industrial Revolution changed not only Great Britain, Germany, United States, Japan and some other countries into "workshops of the world" but changed also Italy, Russia, Brazil, Argentina and others into specialized producers of cereals, meat, coffee and so on. The international division of labour established in this way is the real origin of the present division of the world in countries which are developed and not developed (or underdeveloped, less developed or as you may call them).

4. Development means, therefore, the process by which colonial economies (i.e. countries specialized in the production of colonial wares) break away from the "ancient" international division of labour. Such process was not feasible, before 1930, for all or the majority of not developed countries, but only for some of them, which—like the US or Japan—could jump to the other side of the fence only because the amount of primary producers was steadily being expanded, by the incorporation into the international division of labor of new countries. So, while Germany, the United States and Japan were increasing, by their industrialization, the international demand for raw materials and some colonial foodstuffs, at the end of the last century and the beginning of the present one, the opening up of new producing areas in Black Africa, in Asia and in Latin America expanded their supply.

5. By 1930, the "ancient" international division of labour could not be expanded much more. There were no new areas with significant productive potential which could still be opened up. At the same time, the Great Depression of the thirties lowered the level of international trade: output and employment decreased sharply in the industrialized countries, reducing their demand for colonial goods. In *some* not developed

countries, the demand for manufactured goods was kept at its previous level and began to be satisfied by means of import substitution. In this way, several countries started to break away from the "ancient" international division of labour and, by implication, they began to form a new one.

6. International trade remained at a low level until the end of World War II and even afterwards it recovered quite slowly. During this period—1930/1945—quite a sizable number of countries developed their economies through import substitution. After 1945 many more countries freed themselves from (political) colonial ties and some of them, like the Philippines, Taiwan and Nigeria, started also to develop (1). These countries invested most of their resources in industries directed towards the domestic market and neglected, to a certain extent, the expansion of the output of colonial wares. Although the foreign exchange derived from exports of these wares was still quite important to finance the importation of machinery, components etc., there is no doubt that their trade with the industrialized countries grew much less than the trade among these last ones. Between 1950 and 1965, the exports of not developed countries to developed ones grew at a yearly rate of 5.2 per cent while the exports of developed countries to each other grew at a yearly rate of 9.4 per cent (2).

7. The slow growth of the demand for colonial wares in the post-war period can be ascribed mainly to two facts: a) the income elasticity of demand for most foodstuffs tends to be low at higher levels of income; given the high levels of income already reached in most developed countries in the fifties, their demand for most foodstuffs grew since then at a much smaller rate than their incomes; and b) many technical innovations brought about the substitution of natural materials by synthetics; the demand for many colonial raw-materials—like cotton, wool, rubber—increased at relatively low rates; the only significant exception was oil, the trade of which grew at great leaps. The exports of not developed countries, excluding major petroleum producers, to developed countries grew, between 1950 and 1965, at a yearly rate of only 4.2 per cent (2).

8. The economic growth of not developed countries that did not develop was held back by their slow expansion of exports. That, however, was not the case of the countries that did develop. These were able to sustain growth rates which were much higher than the increase of their foreign trade, as long as the scope for import substitution allowed the diversification of output. From a certain level of industrialization onwards, several countries which did not take part in the original (pre 1930) Industrial Revolution became significant exporters of manufactured goods. Between 1953-55 and 1963-65, the value of manufactures exported from developing countries increased per annum 8.6 per cent, climbing to 12.5 per cent from 1964 to 1965, to 13.2 per cent from 1965 to 1966 and to 16.3 per cent from 1966 to 1967, while the exports of food and raw materials increased at yearly rates of 2.6 per cent (1953-55 to 1963-65), 3.2 per cent (1964 to 1965), 4.2 per cent (1965 to 1966) and —2.2 per cent (1966 to 1967). The share of exports from developing countries in world exports of food and raw materials decreased from an average of 36.3 per cent in 1958-60 to 32.0 per cent in 1966, while during the same period, the share of the exports from developing countries in world exports of manufactures increased from 3.8 per cent to 4.4 per cent (3).

9. The strong rise of the exports of manufactures from not developed countries after 1960 heralds the emergence of a new group of semi-industrialized countries in the international division of labour. In 1966, the exports of category A manufactures (i.e. all manufactured goods except oil products and non-ferrous metals) from all not developed countries to the so called developed market economies amounted to 4,115.1 million dollars, of which 60.1 per cent came from only 8 countries: Hong Kong, India, Algeria, Yugoslavia, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Taiwan (4). In the original study by the UNCTAD, the hypothesis that "a certain degree of industrialization may be an essential condition for a rapid increase of the exports of manufactures" was tested with data from 48 countries. In fact, no correlation was found between the degree of industrialization in the beginning of the period 1960-1966 and the increase of exports of manufactures during this period (4). But, taking just the eight most significant exporters of manufactures, mentioned above, six of them had the highest degree of industrialization (15 or more per cent of their Gross Domestic Product originated from Manufacturing), while only two of them—India and Algeria—belonged to the intermediary level of industrialization (10 to 14 per cent of the GDP from Manufacturing).

10. Although the "new" international division of labour is emerging only since 1960 and is still far from being completed, it is the product of a process of development which started in the thirties. The main "cause" of this process may be ascribed to the depression and World War II and, more generally, to the exhaustion of the possibilities of further geographical expansion of the capitalist economy. The Colonial Revolution after World War II and the spread of centrally planned economies in Europe and Asia may have stimulated the process. Many former colonies, after becoming politically independent, found support in centrally planned economies for development.

## II. THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

**11.** The Industrial Revolution inaugurated a new type of economically motivated mass migration which was previously unknown. Migrations before the Industrial Revolution originated mainly from religious or political persecutions or conquest. Such migrations continued afterwards and they still take place but it is only since the last century that we know of large numbers of people leaving voluntarily their places of birth to settle somewhere else—in another town, province or country—in order to get a better reward for their work. “Voluntarily” is used here, of course, to the extent that it applies to the individual and its conscious motivation. “Voluntary” migrations are brought about by so-called “push” factors, which means that in the places of origin, economic and social changes “push” these migrants away. In this sense, no or very few migrations could be considered entirely “voluntary”. Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between migrations which have at their origin political changes—like wars, conquests or revolutions—and migrations originated by socio-economic changes, like the abolition of serfdom, the transformation of peasants into wage-workers and of land in a commodity.

**12.** Before the spread of Industrial Capitalism, most individuals were born into a community and would not leave it, even if they were to gain by it, because they would not be easily accepted by any other community. The Industrial Revolution freed the individual from his community: it gave to some peasants land as private property and to the others the freedom to sell their labour power at any place; it freed slaves and released them from plantations and freed artisans and traders from their guilds. In any place where Industrial Capitalism took roots, the individual was torn away from his former community and put into the market as employee or independent producer. This made of him a potential migrant. Not only because it could be advantageous for him to go to some other market but also because markets, unlike pre-capitalist communities, were generally open to newcomers.

**13.** The Industrial Revolution increased thereby the geographical mobility of people and made this mobility necessary by concentrating in space the new industrial activities. The Industrial Revolution separated manufacturing from agriculture, transferring the first to some urban spots, which became therefore industrial towns. External economies are the main reason why new factories are set as close as possible to the older ones, with which their relations are complementary. The use of available facilities—ports, roads, electrical supply etc.—is another cause of industrial concentration in space. But capital could concentrate in cities only because labour would join it there. Previously, the traders would have to go to rural hamlets and “put out” work there, since the available workers were still tied to agriculture and, in general, to the rural world. The Industrial Revolution put both, capital and labour, on the move, originating that way voluntary economically-motivated migrations.

**14.** The distinction between internal and international migration is, to some extent, a formal one. National boundaries can be created where none existed before and can also be removed. In that way, the migration from Ireland to England was internal during the last century but became international after 1926. On the other hand, migrations which were international before the unification of Germany and Italy became internal afterwards. Nevertheless, international migrations are subjected to a stricter surveillance and regulation by both governments, of the sending and of the receiving country, than internal migrations generally are. This difference, the only one which is really significant, became important, however, only after the end of the period in which the original Industrial Revolution took place, i.e., after World War I. Until then, international migrations were largely free. Labour recruitment through international migration became a respectable business, practiced by agents of colonization companies and navigation lines in many emigration countries with the due permission of governments.

**15.** During the last century and the first two or three decades of the present one there were, of course, a large number of different types of migration flows but two of them were particularly important. One was what could be called “cityward” migration, the other “agricultural” migration. “Cityward” migration resulted from the process of industrialization in general and occasioned the urbanization of a large proportion of the population in all countries where the Industrial Revolution took place. In Table I are collected the percentages of the population of 56 countries which, in 1920 (around the end of the period of Industrial Revolution), were living in agglomerations of 20,000 or more inhabitants, which may be properly considered “urban”. The first groups of 12 countries, which had more than one third of urban population, were those where the Industrial Revolution went farthest, in the form of industrialization or as expansion of capitalist agriculture in countries like Australia, New Zealand and Argentina. In all of these countries, intensive “cityward” migrations took place. Most of these migrations were internal, but in “empty” countries, like

those three, Canada and the United States, where there was not a sufficiently large rural population that could be mobilized, the "cityward" migration came largely from abroad.

16. In Great Britain, where the Industrial Revolution started, the "cityward" migration was mainly internal, although many workers came from Ireland after the 1846-48 famine, but at that time Ireland belonged to the United Kingdom. The same was probably true in France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Migrants came from rural areas, where the old peasant communities were being replaced by market-oriented farmers: tenants in Great Britain, small proprietors in France, large land-owners in Eastern Germany. Manufacturing activities were eliminated from the rural areas by the competition of factory products and this kept rural earnings low and made redundant a sizable proportion of the labour force. It could happen, however, that the outflow from the rural areas was bigger than the amount of redundant labour, occasioning scarcity of manpower for agricultural production. This happened for instance, in Eastern Germany, where Polish migrants replaced those who migrated to the industrial towns of the Ruhr (5).

TABLE I - PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION IN AGGLOMERATIONS WITH 20,000 OR MORE INHABITANTS  
1920 (DECREASING ORDER)

1. Great Britain	64	28. United Arab Republic	18
2. Belgium	49	29. Czechoslovakia	17
3. Australia	49	30. Greece	17
4. Germany (Federal Republic of)	47	31. Finland	17
5. Netherlands	45	32. South Africa	17
6. United States	42		
7. Eastern Germany	40		
8. France	37		
9. Argentina	37	33. Brazil	13
10. Austria	36	34. Romania	12
11. New Zealand	36	35. Mexico	11
12. Canada	34	36. Venezuela	11
		37. Algeria	11
13. Italy	32	38. Soviet Union	10
14. Hungary	32	39. Iraq	10
15. Denmark	32	40. West Malaysia	10
16. Uruguay	30	41. Israel	10
17. Chile	28	42. Ceylon	10
18. Spain	26	43. Ecuador	10
19. Switzerland	25	44. Bulgaria	9
20. Cuba	25	45. Philippines	9
21. Sweden	23	46. Iran	8
22. Norway	23	47. Yugoslavia	7
23. Japan	23	48. Taiwan	7
		49. Colombia	7
		50. Morocco	7
24. Syria	20	51. India	6
25. Portugal	20	52. Peru	6
26. Turkey	19	53. China	5
27. Poland	18	54. Thailand	5
		55. Burma	5
		56. Korea	4

Source: UN Population Studies n° 44 - *Growth of the World's Urban and Rural Population 1920-2000*, New York, 1969.

Another important source of "cityward" migration was the large increase in the natural growth of the population that happened in Europe at the same time as the Industrial Revolution. "The population of the United Kingdom almost doubled between 1800 and 1850, almost trebled between 1750 and 1850. The population of Prussia (1846 boundaries) almost doubled from 1800 to 1846, as did that of European Russia (without Finland). The populations of Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Holland and large parts of Italy almost doubled between 1750 and 1850, but increased at a less extraordinary rate during our period; that of Spain and Portugal increased by a third" (6). Since at that time the great majority of the population in all these countries was rural, a great strain was put on their agrarian structure, in order to accommodate a much increased population. As was already mentioned, in the countries where the Industrial Revolution was taking place, the agrarian structure was changing and, in fact, expelling people. The population growth, therefore, enlarged in these countries "cityward" migration and also "agricultural" migration.

17. The second group of countries in Table I ended up in 1920 with one fourth to one third of their populations urban. In some of them, like Italy, Switzerland, Sweden and Japan, the Industrial Revolution started

quite late, while in others, like Uruguay, Chile and Cuba, it did not start at all. But that does not mean that they were excluded from the Industrial Revolution, in its international character. In fact most of these countries participated in the Industrial Revolution, but as primary producers. Only some of them were able to join the "workshops" and become industrialized. The others remained as primary producers and their cities became mainly commercial centers, which could not absorb all the labour surplus from the rural area. That is how part of the "cityward" migration of these countries crossed the frontiers and became international.

**18.** Italy has been an important emigration country during the last 100 years. Since the unification of the country over 9 million Italians emigrated. During the first period (1871-1911), most emigrants came from the North of Italy, where feudalism was abolished prior to the unification and a prosperous commercial agriculture developed. Of course, many migrated from the countryside to Italian cities, but quite a sizable number went to urban centers in France and Switzerland and overseas to New York, S. Paulo and Buenos Aires. In the second period (1911-1967), the market economy expanded in the South of Italy, originating powerful migration flows towards the already industrialized North (where industrial employment increased from 2.61 million in 1901 to 4.4 million in 1911) and to other countries. Between 1911 and 1967, 4.92 million emigrants left Italy, but 5.33 million left the South. That means that whatever was the emigration from the North it was more than compensated by the immigration from the South (7).

**19.** The third group of countries, in Table I, had at the end of the period between one sixth and one fifth of their population in urban agglomerations. Most of them make up the fringe of industrial Europe. Some of them were important primary producers, like Poland, Egypt and South Africa. None of them started to industrialize significantly before 1920. To the extent that their rural areas became the seat of a market-oriented agriculture, "cityward" migration flows started and that explains their relatively high degree of urbanization, in comparison with other non-industrial countries like Mexico or the Soviet Union. Some of these "cityward" flows overspilled: "The countries of Eastern Europe have been a traditional source of manpower for the West since the turn of the twentieth century. First, there was migration within Europe, chiefly from the overpopulated regions of German and Russian Poland to Germany, where the growing industrial centers of the Ruhr and Westphalia offered special attractions. Secondly, a far more powerful flow of migrants went across the Atlantic: five million Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs and Magyars entered the United States during the twenty-five years ending in 1925" (8).

**20.** The fourth and largest group of countries, in Table I, had a small percentage of their populations in urban agglomerations, in 1920. Practically all of them were primary producers around that time. The big difference between them and the countries of the third group, was that the Industrial Revolution touched only slightly their economies, creating in each of these countries a relatively small and highly specialized External Market Sector. Coffee in Brazil and Colombia, cocoa in Venezuela and Ecuador, rubber in West Malaysia and tea in Ceylon were produced by a tiny proportion of the rural populations of these countries, the majority of which remained closed in the more or less self-sufficient Subsistence Sector. The migration flows occasioned by the Industrial Revolution in these countries were mostly of the "agricultural" type: workers were somehow detached from their subsistence communities and forced or induced to migrate to plantation or mining areas. Some of these movements fall under the heading of international migrations. For instance: "From India the migration to Burma, Malaya and Ceylon, as well as the interesting movement to Fiji, have been mainly movements of human merchandise, although the effects of political control have made the transactions less frankly commercial between these areas. There have, of course, been other movements of Indians: merchants from Bombay and Calcutta, money-lenders from Southern India and the various, more specialized professional or occupational categories such as clerks for the government services or the railways, and Sikh Police; but the main movements of Indians have been movements first of indentured Indian labour recruited under government-sponsored schemes, which were designed to secure an adjustable flow of cheap and willing labour, allocated fairly between the different estate owners who contributed to the cost of moving" (9).

**21.** The most important international migration flows of the "agricultural" type were those that crossed the Atlantic, bringing thousands of European peasants to North and South America, where they became commercial farmers or agricultural labourers. Emigration from Europe is estimated in annual averages as follows: in 1846-50: 256,000 (199,100 from the British Islands); in 1866-70: 345,900 (170,800 from the British Islands and 83,400 from Germany); in 1886-90: 737,700 (214,800 from the British Islands, 134,200 from Italy and 97,000 from Germany); in 1906-10: 1,436,700 (402,400 from Italy, 265,400 from Austria-Hungary-Czechoslovakia and 211,600 from Russia, Poland etc.); 1926-30: 555,600 (162,300 from the British Islands; 89,400 from

Italy and 75,500 from East Europe (10). The British Islands provided most overseas migrants almost to the end of the XIXth century. The main cause, besides the strong natural growth of the population, was the thorough elimination of the old peasant communities, which was done before and on a much larger scale than in any other European country. The emigration figures quoted above show quite clearly how the transformation of rural life spread to Germany in the sixties, to Italy in the eighties and further to the East (Austria-Hungary, Poland, Russia) in the beginning of the XXth century.

**22.** Most of these migrants went to the US, Argentina and Brazil, where many of them became agricultural producers. Their output of meat, cereals, coffee, and wool went back to Europe through the channels of international trade and, being cheaper due to the superior quality of the natural resources in America, helped to reduce the reproduction costs of the labour force in Europe. European capital followed European labour to the New World and was invested mainly in public facilities—railways, ports, gas and electricity—which were essential to the extension of the international division of labour between West Europe and America. But the international division of labour was also extended to countries where there was enough native labour—like Mexico, Egypt or India—so that no international migrations were needed. In countries like these most “agricultural” migrations were internal, but were also quite sizable. Jorge Balán (11) made an important comparative study of Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, in which he showed that the same expansion of the External Market Sector was made in Brazil and Argentina with European immigrants and in Mexico with internal migrants, which were brought for the cultivation of *benequén* to Yucatán, of tobacco to the Vale Nacional, of coffee to Chiapas and for mining to the North of Mexico.

**23.** The Industrial Revolution was since its inception a world phenomenon. It required a deep change of the spatial distribution of activities and therefore of the population too. Most of this change was urbanization and took place inside each country. But, due to differing levels of population growth, agrarian transformation and industrialization in each country, population transfers between countries became necessary or, at least, convenient. Such transfers helped to adjust some countries to their role in the international division of labour. It helped emigration countries to bear the hardships of agrarian transformation without the benefits of industrialization and it helped “empty” countries to fulfil their role as agricultural producers. International migration, together with international trade and international capital transfer, was part of a process of international integration which evolved under the auspices of liberalism until it was ended by the world crisis of the thirties.

### III. DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS

**24.** During the 1920's, legislation restricting international migration was adopted by the United States and during the next decade the depression induced most other countries to take similar steps. Between 1930 and 1945 all aspects of international integration—trade, capital transfer and migration—almost ceased to operate. It must be stressed that it was precisely this unprecedentedly long interruption of international economic relations that first enabled some not industrialized countries to develop. In the post-war period, international relations were slowly resumed, but in several countries the process of development was kept alive by political measures of protection against foreign competition. In these countries, industrialization went on and occasioned large-scale internal migrations, mostly “cityward” migrations. Between 1950 and 1960, the population in agglomerations of 20,000 inhabitants and more grew yearly, in the whole world at 3.6 per cent, in Europe at 1.7 per cent, in North America at 3.2 per cent but in South Asia at 4.3 per cent, in East Asia at 4.6 per cent, in Africa at 5.4 per cent and in Latin America at 5.5 per cent. The percentage of total population in such agglomerations increased, between 1930 and 1960, from 14 to 61 per cent in Israel, from 12 to 21 per cent in Turkey, from 9 to 18 per cent in Yugoslavia, from 14 to 29 per cent in Taiwan, from 14 to 29 per cent in Brazil, from 15 to 35 per cent in Mexico and so on (12). These countries show, in 1960, a degree of urbanization similar to that in 1920 of the countries that were at the center of the Industrial Revolution.

**25.** It is curious that these mass movements inside so many countries seldom crossed international boundaries. Apart from resettlements due to political causes, there were hardly significant international migrations during the last decades in Latin America, Africa or Asia. The small amount of Paraguayans and Bolivians that migrate to Argentina or Colombians that come to Venezuela cannot be compared with the movements between the centers of the Industrial Revolution let us say from 1850 to 1930. In Africa, there are a lot of migration movements which became lately international as a consequence of the many new nations which were created there during the last 20 years. But most of these movements are “agricultural” migration

flows which are still produced by the "ancient" international division of labour and not by development. So, for instance, "in Africa migration on a large scale has been a corollary of vigorous economic development, to a large extent, by a heavy flow of capital from Europe, particularly from metropolitan powers to their African territories" (13). Although the word "development" is used in this quotation, it refers obviously to the expansion of mining and agricultural activities oriented towards the markets of industrialized countries. The same is true for South-East Asia, where the international migrations induced by the "ancient" division of labour ceased, without being replaced by any other. The former colonial powers favoured the immigration of cheap labour into their territories. After these countries became independent, they took measures to halt such movements. In most countries that are really developing there seems to be no shortage of native labour which could justify large-scale immigration.

**26.** One important factor which undoubtedly helps to explain the absence of large international migrations produced by development is the strong acceleration of natural population growth in most developing countries since World War II. As is quite well known, mortality fell steeply in most of these countries, while fertility remained at its previous high level. The result was a rise of annual growth rates to the vicinity of 2 to 3 per cent. Such rates are even higher than those reached in West Europe last century. But an abundant supply of labour would not have been a sufficient reason to restrict immigration before 1930. Irish workers migrated to England and Polish workers to Germany, while English and German migrants went to America.

**27.** Hong Kong and Israel seem to be two outstanding exceptions to the rule that development brings about internal but not international migrations. But, immigration into these two developing countries is to a large extent politically motivated. Immigrants to Hong Kong are not foreigners; they come from the People's Republic of China and are accepted in the Crown Colony because they are considered repatriates. The same can be said about the Jewish immigrants that come to Israel from Arab countries or from the Soviet Union. This inflow seems to be a factor that speeds up the rate of development in Hong Kong and Israel, which is therefore remarkably high. In Hong Kong, the large labour supply kept wages very low and made possible high profits. Capital accumulation was accelerated by the investment of past profits and the inflow of foreign capital, attracted by the high rates of profit. Israel receives large scale economic aid from Jewish communities abroad. Given the low rate of natural population growth in Israel (very different from most other developing countries), the heavy inflow of foreign resources would certainly occasion a sharp scarcity of manpower, were it not for immigration.

**28.** The most important international migrations nowadays are those from Mediterranean countries—Italy, Spain, Algeria, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Yugoslavia—to France, Germany, Switzerland and some other West European countries. These migrations are of the same type as the immigration of Irish and West Indians into Great Britain and of Puertoricans and Mexicans into the United States. The migration from developing to developed countries could be understood as an overspill from internal migrations brought about by development (in the sending countries, of course, since the receiving countries are already developed). But such an interpretation seems unwarranted. Development means first of all industrialization and, therefore, an increase of urban demand for labor. If a growing proportion of those leaving agriculture go abroad, then development is not taking place at a sufficient intensity. Emigration seems not to be caused by development but rather by the lack of it.

**29.** Foreign workers in most West European countries do not face very attractive conditions: they are often forced to take unskilled, badly paid jobs; they usually cannot bring with them their families and their sojourn is strictly limited by contract; they are not supposed to stay in the receiving country and assimilate; they are often discriminated by the native population and sometimes even by trade unions (14). If they put up with all this, then the economic advantage of emigration must be big indeed. And that seems to be the case. "The possibility of securing employment at wages three and four times higher than in Spain was a strong inducement for migration for laborers whose consumption standards did not adjust to such high wages on a permanent basis and who sought emigration as a way to finance their families' well-being in their home country" (15). If such is the motivation, in Spain and other sending countries, their rate of development is at least below the level required to adequately use their labour potential. In other words, if the space of development is going to be accelerated, emigration is expected to decrease.

**30.** That may already be the case of Italy, where rapid development seems to be catching up with the growth of the labour force and the outflow from agriculture, particularly in the South. Between 1951 and 1961, 160,000 Italians left yearly the country, out of which 140,000 came from the South; between 1961 and 1967, the yearly emigration fell to 100,000 and the outflow from the South rose to 200,000 per annum (16). The

North is obviously absorbing now half of the outmigration from the South, whereas before its net balance was negative. A prognosis by the ILO says: "With continued economic growth it may be anticipated that emigration from Italy will continue to decline" (17). The same should be true also for other countries, but in some of them—like Spain and Greece—the repression of the labour movement may keep wages artificially low in contrast with most West European industrialized countries. In such conditions, emigration may go on longer, despite development.

**31.** Development does not occasion significant international migrations because it is—at least until now—an essentially *national* process of structural change. Industrialization produced by development is not conditioned upon international integration, as it was during the Industrial Revolution, but it strives to change the international division of labour by relying primarily on the domestic market. In such conditions, developing countries cannot create foreign sources of raw materials nor open up foreign markets. If there is still empty land somewhere it is in developing countries, which hope to populate it with their own people. For small countries, however, development cannot be accomplished without economic integration. Some attempts to integrate small developing countries are under way and if they are successful, development may become international, at least at a regional scale. This opens the possibility of transfer, between the integrating countries, not only of commodities but also of capital and labour. The possibility that development can bring about international migrations should therefore not be ruled out. But we know of no actual experience yet.

## NOTES

- (1) The study of the economic evolution of 28 not developed countries between 1948 and 1963 showed that 12 of them managed to develop during this period. See Singer, Paul. *Dinámica de la Población y Desarrollo*. Mexico, Siglo XXI, 1971.
- (2) Lary, Hal B. — *Imports of Manufactures from Less Developed Countries*. New York, NBER, 1968, p. 2.
- (3) UN Conference on Trade and Development. *Commodity Survey 1968*. New York, 1968.
- (4) Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Comercio y Desarrollo. *Estudio sobre el Comercio de Manufacturas de los Países en Desarrollo 1968*. New York, 1969.
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- (7) Sylos-Labini. — *Problemi dello Sviluppo Economico*. Bari, 1970.
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- (12) UN, Population Studies nº 44. — *Growth of the World's Urban and Rural Population 1920-2000*. New York, 1969.
- (13) ILO, *International Migration 1945-1957*. Geneva, 1959.
- (14) Castles, S. and Kosak, G. — "The Function of Labour Immigration in Western European Capitalism". London, *New Left Review* 73, 1972. Becker, R., Dörr, G. and Tjaden, K.H. — "Fremdarbeiterbeschäftigung in Deutschen Kapitalismus" and Schiller, G. — "Die Auswanderung von Arbeitskräften als Probleme der Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung", *Argument* 68, Karlsruhe, 1971.
- (15) Roman, M. — *The Limits of Economic Growth in Spain*. New York, Praeger, 1971.
- (16) Sylos-Labini, *op. cit.*
- (17) ILO, *Manpower Aspects of Recent Economic Developments in Europe*, Geneva, 1969.

# THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENTS OF WORKERS, CAPITAL AND GOODS

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The international movements of the means of production and of products are interrelated in a minimum number of definite ways which this paper will set forth in an attempt to motivate and to guide future research into this important area. In particular, we shall explore the extent to which the world can forego *any* international movements of workers, without losing any of the purely economic benefits (higher real incomes) of that migration. This, it seems to me, is the most important question inasmuch as international migration imposes obvious and often severe hardships on most of the workers involved, including their competitors in host countries. We undertake therefore to develop a framework capable (i) of measuring the economic gains of international integration in particular cases and (ii) of mapping the alternative combinations of trade, migration, and foreign investment that achieve a given level of integration, as measured and defined by the economic gains. We shall begin with a brief reference to the main body of literature that currently bears on these matters.

## 1. THE HECKSCHER-OHLIN TRADE THEORY

1. An important body of existing formal literature (for references to it and discussion see, e.g., Bo Sodersten pp. 45-109) discusses the special conditions under which trade in products alone not only perfectly substitutes for any migration of workers, but of all other primary factors as well. These conditions ensure what we might call the *effective* integration of the partner economies in question: all of their prices as well as real factor wages (rates of pay, of profit, of rent, etc.) are equalized internationally, even though all factors remain in their home countries (cf. Paul A. Samuelson 1953-4). The first condition for effective integration to hold is obviously that some (though not necessarily all; cf. Samuelson 1953-4) products are freely mobile internationally, in the sense that their prices are the same in both countries, a condition that requires free and costless international trade in goods. In addition, movement of goods substitutes perfectly for movement of factors only if both countries use the same constant-returns production technology (see below § 21 and 35-38) and if the relative factor endowments are not too different, in which case full specialization supervenes in advance of completely effective integration.

2. Of these three conditions, the first is quite unrealistic: all countries do not know and exploit a common technology. The second condition is also counterfactual, but because products are so numerous in the real world, it does not really contribute to the vast international disparities in real wage rates that induce international migration. The numerousness of products means that even small countries (e.g., Denmark, Belgium, etc.) can fully realize scale economies by concentrating on a limited number of products. The third condition says, in effect, that product trade alone can integrate only those international economies the member countries of which have similar factor endowments and so would feel relatively little need to integrate.

3. The third condition raises another important problem as well, namely the *willingness* of countries to exchange products up to the limits of full specialization, characterized by the phasing out of given industries. To put the matter slightly differently, a large amount of two-way trade is necessary to substitute for a small amount of worker migration even if all three conditions for factor-price equalization can be assumed (cf. W. P. Travis 1964, Chs. 1-4). The large volume of trade becomes unstable, however, as particular industries demand and receive protection. This process (cf. Travis, 1972) throws other industries out of international competitive equilibrium, whereupon they demand protection in turn. The final result, judging from the

history of commercial policies in most countries, is to eliminate the type of international exchange (of capital intensive for labor-intensive products) that would close international disparities in real wages. Indeed, the richer countries clearly view migration as an adjunct of customs policy in rescuing national labor-intensive and inefficient industries.

4. The ability to trade products and to trade capital services directly, through indirect or portfolio international investment, would eliminate the problem of complete specialization if the universal-technology assumption were valid. Using the model in section III below it is easy to show that the inability to trade any given factor's services directly (notably labor's) is binding whenever technology differs (as it does) from country to country.

5. Fortunately, as we shall see in the following section, all factors' services *can* be directly traded, even though it is obvious that not all factors can migrate. Completely effective integration can be achieved through international trade combined with international direct and indirect investment alone, and thus by means of the international movement of goods alone; this form of effective integration requires none of the special Heckscher-Ohlin assumptions.

## 2. FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND TRADE IN FACTOR SERVICES

6. Imagine a plant or factory operating in country A, where it hires workers residing in country A. Suppose that its capital equipment is entirely owned by citizens of country A and that the factory transforms materials supplied by other plants located in country A to make a product which is sold exclusively in country A. Suppose now that the plant is physically transplanted (a form of direct foreign investment) to country B, where it hires only workers residing in (and presumably citizens of) country B. The plant continues, moreover, to patronize the same suppliers and to serve the same clients as before. That is, it transforms materials shipped to it from country A and it sends back to country A its entire output. Because the owners of its capital equipment continue to reside (let us suppose) in country A, the corresponding dividends and interest payments are also remitted to country A. The plant's entire wage bill is now paid to country B, however.

7. Obviously we could describe the second situation above as one in which country A simply imports labor services, via the direct overseas investment involved, rather than, as in the former situation, purchasing all labor services domestically. The situation is perfectly equivalent to one in which the B workers would commute daily to country A to work and return home again at night. The workers do not need actually to commute, however: the shipment of machines and raw materials to B and of finished products to A performs the same function.

8. Suppose next that country A borrows from country B the machines with which it equips the above cited plant or factory. Country B can be said in such a case to have invested *indirectly* in country A or, what comes down to the same thing, to be selling currently capital services to country A. It does not matter, obviously, that the plant is physically located in country B and happens also to purchase there labor services from country B.

9. The above examples envisage a (manufacturing) plant which does not directly employ any primary factor other than capital and labor. Nothing prevents us from imagining the plant to be engaged in some form of agriculture or mining, and thus to employ local third-factor services as well as capital and labor.

10. We see, though, that the employment of labor and of local land is tied to some extent and that a particular country B might lack sufficient labor of its own to export, through foreign investment, a given amount of its land services. In this case some labor would have to migrate or commute internationally in order to export all of country B's third-factor services. Obviously such migration took place during the period in which vast new lands were discovered and settled. That phase of world settlement now seems to be completed.

11. An interesting special case helps to illustrate the interrelationship among the international trade of goods and of labor and capital services. It is the case exactly opposite to that assumed by the Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory, namely that in which the two partner countries exchange internationally *only* capital and labor services, and no products. Suppose that country A has plants in country B, that they hire country B's labor services only, and that country A's citizens meanwhile invest indirectly in enterprises (located in country B) of country B's. Suppose further that all the overseas production of country A's plants is repatriated, so that nothing but capital services is sold to country B, and that no ordinary merchandise exports are sold

by either country. Although A's goods are shipped from country B to country A in this example, those goods are *not* internationally traded. Country A balances its purchases of labor services from country B therefore entirely by its sale of capital services to that country.

**12.** In such a world (trade in factor services only), only the *relative* prices of factor services can be equalized unless both countries employ the same technology. Can relative factor prices always be equalized? That question (in this special case) turns on the international mobility of goods. We note that about half of any given country's income is typically spent on movable goods and that total returns to capital are typically one half of national income. Trade in factor services only require movement of goods in one direction, moreover. We can conclude that the international movement of goods alone would suffice to export any desired proportion of the available capital services of any given country, in return for labor services.

**13.** In fact, of course, countries may exchange products as well as factor services. If it is technologically superior to country B, country A can profitably sell some of its goods to country B, in return for factor services. In the limit, country A might hire, through direct foreign investment and indirect foreign borrowing, *all* of country B's primary factor services (labor, capital and various types of land).

**14.** A curious seeming paradox could arise (depending on the relative sizes of the countries' labor forces and the extent of country A's technological superiority over country B) if some goods were immobile internationally: workers might migrate from the *richer* to the *poorer* country simply to consume locally supplied services there. This would happen, of course, if the richer workforce were insufficiently numerous to supply the immobile products demanded at their post-trade level of real income. This case and that in which a given country lacks sufficient workers to export, through direct investment, its third-factor services are the only ones in which direct and indirect foreign investment would ever fail to transfer internationally, without worker migration, any desired amount of direct factor services.

**15.** Foreign investment, then, is able in every important case completely to substitute for international worker migration as a means of reaping the full gains from economic integration. Foreign investment can do more than can worker migration, however. Migration alone can equalize relative factor returns in all countries only if technology is everywhere the same and if all but one factor are mobile. Foreign investment automatically applies the technology of one country to all the factors, including land and capital, of the other country and thus prevents the stranding of any immobile factor supplies as the mobile factors seek higher earnings elsewhere.

**16.** The above proposition does not, of course, mean that all forms of foreign investment are better than any form of international worker migration. Certain forms of foreign investment though are certainly better than any form of migration as a means of deriving all the real benefits (we shall define those in the following section) of international economic integration. We need to examine the exact impact of specific forms of foreign investment on the sentiments of national independence and sovereignty, for example, in order to see which forms transact the largest amount of factor services for a given perceived sacrifice of non-economic objectives.

**17.** The bad press suffered by direct foreign manufacturing investment often results from the practice of tying such investment to commercial-policy and foreign-exchange considerations. In many cases direct foreign investment is courted as a way to substitute for imports and the foreign investor is granted customs protection in the market of the host country. Such schemes always turn sour as the local subsidiary fails to export (its costs are always too high because its scale is too small) and yet remits foreign exchange to the home office. The subsidiary's failure to export goods means, of course, that the direct investment fails to export labor services from the host country, beyond those exchanged for the subsidiary's locally vended, and expensive, output. The home office, to the extent that its foreign subsidiary is partly locally owned, usually stipulates that the subsidiary must not produce exports to compete with its own products in world markets and, for the same reason, tries to keep its productive and commercial secrets from leaking to the host country.

**18.** Obviously much better forms of direct investment in labor-exporting countries can be devised. One of the more promising is that in which the host country provides (a form of indirect lending) the necessary industrial infrastructure (commercial and industrial buildings) for rent, against foreign exchange, to foreign producers. Those producers might be required to pay their local wage bills also in foreign exchange, in which case, of course, they would automatically be obliged to produce in the host country for world, rather than for local, markets and thus to export from the host country the labor services employed there.

19. This scheme has several important side advantages, notably regarding the transfer of technology and the sharing of risk. As the host-country entrepreneurs gain more and more experience in renting to foreign producers, they will incidentally learn a considerable amount about their technology, markets, etc. Eventually those entrepreneurs might use their facilities directly to satisfy local as well as foreign demand for the products in question. Much pragmatic research involving the design and marketing of such facilities, the training of local staff, etc. needs to be done, of course. The following section sets forth the general methods necessary to evaluate their economic effectiveness.

### 3. DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF THE GAINS FROM FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT AND MIGRATION

20. It is possible, under reasonable assumptions, both to define and to measure the economic gains from international commerce migration, trade and investment. The methods that we shall briefly discuss in this final section indicate that many trading pairs (e.g., the EEC and North Africa, the U. S. and India, the U.S. and the rest of the world, etc.) either do or could reap substantial gains from foreign commerce. The EEC and North Africa, for instance, must already be realizing substantial gains from worker migration, even though those gains do not depend on migration but could be secured through direct foreign investment. All forms of Indo-American international commerce are miniscule, on the other hand, even though the prospective returns to opening up such commerce are very large (cf. John D. Cambon).

21. The problem of evaluating the real economic gains from foreign trade is an old and very difficult one (cf. Samuelson, 1950 and 1956). A highly general scheme is necessary in order to ensure that the gains made by one group (e.g., the workers who sell their labor services to another country) offset any losses suffered by other economic agents (e.g., workers in the countries that import labor services). In practice such losses must be made good through some form of social policy and we need to know, in addition, whether any practical and objective compensatory policies exist. Thus, in addition to the pragmatic research called for to devise efficient forms of foreign investment, considerable research should be devoted to analyzing and measuring the gains from such schemes. The following system is intended to indicate a possible line of approach. The approach consists, in its practical application, of using ordinary fitted aggregative production functions (fitted before foreign investment, migration and trade are opened up or expanded) to estimate the gains from expanded foreign commerce as between any two actual or prospective trading partners. On the theoretical side, the suggested approach guarantees, subject to only one assumption, that the estimates of real-income gains correspond to true gains in welfare possibilities. The gains estimates can thus be compared with one's subjective estimate of the non-economic costs (loss of the sense of sovereignty, etc.) of the best foreign-investment or migration scheme that effectuates the necessary international exchange of products and of factor services.

#### A Model of Foreign Investment, Migration and Trade

22. The two countries integrating their economies through some combination of foreign investment, trade and migration have the joint endowment supplies of factor services indicated by the vector  $W = (W_1, W_2, \dots, W_r)$  where  $W_k$  is the joint (world) supplies of the  $k$ th ( $k = 1, \dots, r$ ) factor service and where  $r$  is the total number of factors primary to both countries. Country B employs directly, in its home and overseas plants, the amounts,  $P_k$ , of the  $r$  factor services specified by the foreign-employment vector  $P = (P_1, \dots, P_r)$ . Country A therefore employs the factor-service amounts  $(W_k - P_k)$  specified by the vector  $(W - P)$ . The vector  $W$  is considered to be fixed and given during the time period under scrutiny. Country B's actual endowment supplies,  $E_k$ , of each factor service, specified by the vector  $E = (E_1, \dots, E_r)$ , are also fixed and given during the time period. The difference between  $E$  and  $P$  is the result, therefore, of the foreign investment or foreign migration policy in effect, as explained §§ 6-19, above.

23. We wish to know how setting  $P$  with respect to  $W$  affects potential world welfare. World welfare is described at any given moment of time by the utility—distribution vector  $u^W$ :

(Def. 1)  $u^W = (u_1, \dots, u_w)$

is the vector indicating the level,  $u_m$  ( $m = 1, \dots, w$ ), of utility felt, subjectively, by each of the  $w$  persons belonging to country A and country B. The subjective utility indicator  $u_m$  is thus a *scalar* measure.

24. The scalar  $u_m$ , which marks person  $m$ 's subjective appreciation of his own happiness or satisfaction, can safely be considered to be a function of the allocation of all  $n$  products among all  $w$  members of the world

community. Thus

$$(1) u_m = U_m(D)$$

where

(Def. 2)

$$D = \begin{vmatrix} d_{11} & \dots & d_{1w} \\ \cdot & & \cdot \\ \cdot & & \cdot \\ \cdot & & \cdot \\ d_{n1} & \dots & d_{nw} \end{vmatrix}$$

is the  $n$ -by- $w$  matrix showing the amount,  $d_{ig}$  ( $i = 1, \dots, n$  and  $g = 1, \dots, w$ ), of the  $i$ th product which the  $g$ th person uses up, invests, stores away, throws away, or otherwise disposes of (except, of course, through a gift to some other person, whose disposition of the product would already be counted elsewhere in  $D$ ) during the given time period.

**25.** The scalar measures  $u_m$  cannot be added, of course, to obtain any scalar measure of general social welfare. This is because they are perfectly ordinal indicators, whereby each person ranks only his own private utility levels. In order, however, to summarize social demand,  $d_i^w = \sum_{m=1}^w d_{im}$ , for each

( $i = 1, \dots, n$ ) of the  $n$  products we can construct the following product-availabilities, utility set for any given utility-distribution described by definition 1:

(Def. 3)  $D^w(u^w) = \{d^w = D / U_m(D) \geq u_m, m = 1, \dots, w\}$

is the set of all vectors  $d^w = (d_1^w, \dots, d_n^w)$  of amounts  $d_i^w$  ( $i = 1, \dots, n$ ) of products which could be distributed in at least one way  $D$  (cf. definition 2) among the  $w$  members of the world community to make, in the sense of equation 1, each person  $m$  ( $m = 1, \dots, w$ ) feel at least the level  $u_m$  which the utility-distribution vector  $u^w = (u_1, \dots, u_w)$  described by definition 1 specifies.

**26.** The boundary of the product-utility set  $D^w(u^w)$  is, of course, the community indifference curve (surface or hypersurface, as the case may be) first discussed by Tibor N. Scitovsky. Professor Samuelson (1950, 1956) pointed out that such indifference hypersurfaces must surely intersect in practice, given the idiosyncrasy of individual tastes for products. That means of course that in general the sets  $D^w(u^w)$  are not *comparable* and so fail to rank alternative different utility distributions, e.g.,  $u^w$  and  $u'^w$ , unambiguously, as a true real-income measure would require.

**27.** A change in international migration, investment and trade policy, meanwhile, is certain not only to change the world utility distribution, but to make some people worse off than they were before the change, no matter how many others benefit or to what degree. In principle, as Samuelson points out, policies can be ranked, according to ascending real-income levels, by allowing, in each case, the winners to bribe the losers until everyone's welfare position is improved. In practice of course such universal welfare bazaars would be too difficult to organize to serve as a practical means of evaluating policy.

**28.** While tastes for final products (consumer and investor goods) are doubtlessly idiosyncratic, relative preferences for underlying primary-factor services (notably those of labor and capital) may well be identical among different individuals. The measurement of the gains from foreign investment, trade and migration requires fortunately only this type of interpersonal taste identity, not the complete identity of tastes for products. The lack of factor-bias in tastes means that alternative trade policies can be ranked directly by means of a scalar real-income measure that is fairly simple to derive and estimate in practice.

**29.** We propose therefore the following *factor-service* utility sets, as a way for circumventing Samuelson's criticism of the *product-utility* sets of definition 3:

(Def. 4)  $F(u^w, P)$

is the set of all factor-service input vectors  $f = (f_1, \dots, f_r)$  of factor-service employments  $f_k$  ( $k = 1, \dots, r$ ) each of which vectors is capable of producing at least one vector  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n) = d^w$  of output amounts  $x_i$  ( $i = 1, \dots, n$ ) which could be allocated in at least one way  $D$  (cf. definition 2) among the  $w$  members of the world community to make, in the sense of equation 1, each person  $m$  ( $m = 1, \dots, w$ ), feel the level  $u_m$  of utility which the utility-distribution vector  $u^w$  of definition 1 specifies, and of doing so *even though* country B must employ of each factor service  $k$  ( $k = 1, \dots, r$ ) no more than the amount  $P_k$  which the given foreign-employment vector  $P = (P_1, \dots, P_r)$  stipulates.

**30.** The *employment-constrained, factor-service utility sets* of definition 4 work as follows. Suppose that a given utility-distribution vector  $u^w$  is specified in the manner described by definition 1 and that two alter-

native foreign-employment vectors  $P$  and  $P'$  are determined by two alternative foreign migration and investment policies. We have then two alternative factor-utility sets;  $F(u^W, P)$  and  $F(u^W, P')$ , respectively. We might find that the world endowment vector,  $W$  is not a member,  $W \notin F(u^W, P)$ , of the former utility set, in which case the utility-distribution  $u^W$  is unattainable under the policy determining  $P$ . On the other hand, we may find that  $W \in F(u^W, P')$ , in which case we can say that shifting from policy  $P$  to policy  $P'$  has rendered  $u^W$  feasible.

**31.** In order to compare directly any two alternative foreign-employment policies it is necessary to rank alternative utility distribution vectors, e.g.,  $u^W$  and  $u'^W$ , despite the purely subjective nature of each private measure  $u_m$  ( $m = 1, \dots, w$ ) of utility. The following hypothesis permits us to rank any collection of utility distributions in terms of levels of a single scalar number that we call  $g$ :

(Hyp. 1) There exists at least one function (whether or not we know its form)  $g = G(f; P)$  having associated sets (we can call them *factor-service input, real-income sets*)  $F(g, P) = \{f | G(f; P) \geq g\}$  such that, for any given specification of the maximum amount,  $P_k$ , of each ( $k = 1, \dots, r$ ) factor service employed by country B and thus for any fixed foreign-employment vector  $P = (P_1, \dots, P_r)$ , either  $F(u^W, P) < F(g, P)$  or  $F(g, P) < F(u^W, P)$  or else  $F(u^W, P)$  equals  $F(g, P)$  for all sets  $F(u^W, P)$  described by definition 4 and therefore for all levels of the scalars  $g, u_1, u_2, \dots$ , and  $u_w$ .

The symbol  $<$  in hypothesis 1 is the proper-inclusion sign. For any two sets  $S_1$  and  $S_2$ ,  $S_1 < S_2$  means that every element of  $S_1$  also belongs to  $S_2$  but  $S_2$  has elements that are not in  $S_1$ . Hypothesis 1 asserts therefore that, for any fixed foreign-employment vector  $P$ , all sets  $F(u^W, P)$  are mutually *comparable*, regardless of the specification of the utility-distribution  $u^W$  (cf. definition 1).

**32.** The function  $g = G(f; P)$  that guarantees the comparability of the different factor-utility sets may be called the *factor-service social-preference function* for the fixed stipulation  $P$  regarding foreign employment of each factor. The incomparability of the product-utility sets  $D^W(u^W)$ , while it rules out the existence of a social-preference function for endproducts,  $d_i^W$ , does not rule out the existence of functions  $g = G(f; P)$ . Their empirical specification is therefore of paramount importance in studying international migration, investment and trade.

**33.** The specification of the factor-service social preference functions for different foreign-employment policies (that is, policies determining or constraining the foreign employment vector  $P$ ) is an area for extremely promising research. We conclude therefore by showing how to justify and to derive such functions in a sampling of cases. These cases are classified according to the pattern of international technology that prevails, which we must define.

## Technology

**34.** To specify the sets  $F(u^W, P)$  we need obviously to show how both demand (as summarized by definition 3) and supply conditions determine the form of such sets. Only then can we cast about to see whether practical methods exist for actually estimating the employment-constrained social preference functions defined in hypothesis 1. Our examples will be based on the following quite comprehensive definition of production technique and of technology:

(Def. 5) The economic representation,  $t_j$ , of the  $j$ th production *technique* ( $j = 1, \dots, N$ ) is a (column) vector:  $t_j = (f_{1j}, \dots, f_{rj}; x_{1j}, \dots, x_{nj}) = (f_j; x_j)$  of required factor services,  $f = (f_{1j}, \dots, f_{rj})$ , and of net outputs,  $x = (x_{1j}, \dots, x_{nj})$ , produced within the fixed and given time period over which the technique  $j$  in question is defined;

(Def. 6) Technology,  $T$ , is the set of all techniques, defined for a common production period (day, year, etc.), and known by either country A ( $T^A$ ) or by country B ( $T^B$ ) or by both country A and country B jointly ( $T^A \cup T^B$ ):

$$T = (t_1 \dots t_N) = T^A \cup T^B = \begin{array}{|c} f_{11} \dots f_{1N} \\ \cdot \quad \cdot \\ \cdot \quad \cdot \\ \cdot \quad \cdot \\ \hline f_{r1} \dots f_{rN} \\ \hline x_{11} \dots x_{1N} \\ \cdot \quad \cdot \\ \cdot \quad \cdot \\ \cdot \quad \cdot \\ \hline x_{n1} \dots x_{nN} \end{array}$$

The total number,  $n$ , of products is selected in such a way as to ensure that any two or more production techniques are additive:

(Def. 7: *additivity*)

$$t_j \in T \text{ and } T_v \in T \Rightarrow (t_j + t_v) \in T$$

for all subscripts  $j$  and  $v = 1, \dots, N$  which alternatively denumerate the same set,  $T$ , of  $N$  production techniques. The process  $(t_j + t_v)$  is a *composite* technique, consisting of one or more *indecomposable* techniques.

(Def. 8: *technical inefficiency*)

The technique  $t_h$  ( $h = 1, \dots, N$ ) is inefficient in country A if, for any  $j = 1, \dots, N$ ,  $t_j \in T^A$ ,  $t_h \in T^A$ ,  $f_j \leq f_h$ , and  $x_h \leq x_j$ .

The corresponding criterion applies also to country B.

In order to describe *international technological disparity* we invoke:

(Hyp. 2)  $t_j \in T^B \Rightarrow t_j(a_j) = (f_j; a_j x_j) = t_j^A \in T^A$

where:  $a_j$  is a non-negative scalar number,  $a_j < 1 \Rightarrow t_j^A \notin T^B$ ,

$a_j > 1 \Rightarrow t_j \notin T^A$ , and  $j = 1, \dots, N$ .

Hypothesis 2 permits us conveniently to describe any given pattern of international technological disparity by a single vector:

(Def. 9: *Technological disparity*)

International technological disparity is the vector  $a = (a_1, \dots, a_N)$  of technical disparity coefficients  $a_j$  ( $j = 1, \dots, N$ ) defined in hypothesis 2.

Although hypothesis 2 appears to have a very special form, in practice it will never be restrictive inasmuch as one can always augment a given input requirement  $f_{kj}$  ( $k = 1, \dots, r$ ) of any given technique  $j$  ( $j = 1, \dots, N$ ) by a fictitious amount without increasing that activity's efficiency relative to any other activity producing the same net output vector  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ .

## Foreign Trade, Migration and Investment when Technology is Universal

35. Our first special case illustrating the use of the sets  $F(u^W, P)$  to measure the benefits of international migration and investment assumes, with the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, that  $T = T^B$ , i.e., that both countries use country B's technology exclusively. Using definitions 3, 5, and 6 we can derive, from any given utility distribution  $u^W$  described by definition 1, the set  $F(u^W, P)$  of definition 4. We do so by means of the following auxiliary definitions. Note that  $x^A$  and  $x^B$  are net output vectors of country A and country B respectively and that  $f^A$  is the vector of the factor service amounts employed by country A:

(Def. 10: country A's input-output set under B's technology)

$$F^B(x^A) = \bigcup_{j=1}^N \{f^A \geq f_j \mid (f_j; x_j) \in T^B \text{ and } x_j \geq x^A\}$$

(cf. definitions 5, 6 and 7)

(def. 11: country B's input-output set)

$$F^B(x^B) = \bigcup_{j=1}^N \{P \leq f_j \mid (f_j; x_j) \in T^B \text{ and } x_j \geq x^B\}$$

(Def. 12: the world's employment-constrained input-output set for the given vectors  $P$  and  $x$ )

$$F^B(x, P) = \{f \geq (F^A + P) \mid f^A \in F^B(x^A), P \in F^B(x^B), \text{ and } x \geq (x^A + x^B)\}$$

(Def. 13: the world's employment-constrained factor-utility set)

$$F^B(u^W, P) = \{f \in F^B(x, P) \mid x \in D^W(u^W)\}$$

(cf. definitions 3 and 12)

and

(Def. 14)  $F^B(u^W) = \{f \in F^B(u^W, P) \mid 0 \leq P \leq f\}$ .

Note that if  $T^B$  truly equals  $T$ ,  $F^B(u^W, P)$  equals  $F(u^W, P)$  in definition 4 and the sets  $F^B(u^W)$ , via the factor-income sets  $F(g, P = f)$  of hypothesis 1, therefore fit country B's factor-service, social-preference function

$$(2) \quad g = G^B(f) = G(f; p = f)$$

**36.** The final task is to compare the sets  $F^B(u^W)$  and  $F^B(u^W, P)$  in order to examine the impact of foreign migration and investment policy on world income  $g$ , as measured by country B's ordinary aggregative national-income production function, equation 2 (cf. Paul H. Douglas and Mark Nerlove). To make this comparison we first define as sets of alternative foreign employment vectors the conditions governing international specialization in production:

(Def. 15: *production* specialization set for a given production vector  $x$  and factor-service input vector  $f$ )

$$P(x, f) = \{P = f | f \in F^B(x, P)\}$$

and, via definition 3,

(Def. 16: *utility* specialization set for a given utility-distribution vector  $u^W$  and factor-service input vector  $f$ )

$$P(u^W, f) = \{P \leq f | f \in F^B(u^W, P)\} = \{P \in P(x, f) | x \in D^W(u^W)\}$$

Formula 2 above measures prospective gains from international economic integration under free-trade for any international investment and migration that guarantees that  $P$  lies in  $P(u^W, f)$ .

**37.** If, moreover,

$$(\text{Hyp. 3}) P(u^W, f) = \{P | 0 \leq P \leq f\}$$

so that

$$(3) \quad F^B(u^W, P) = [F^B(u^W) \cap \{f | f \geq P\}]$$

then equation (2) serves to measure the gains of international economic integration for *any* foreign investment and migration policy,  $P$ , operated in conjunction with free trade in products.

**38.** While in fact the sets  $P(u^W, f)$  are rather "narrow", hypothesis 3 serves to focus on their importance. Sets analogous to the sets  $P(x, f)$  can be observed in the context of any closed national economy and they can be used in turn to estimate the configuration of the set  $P(u^W, f)$  that would apply to any specified world factor-service input vector  $W = f$ . For this it is necessary only to hypothesize that the shape of the sets  $P(u^W, f)$  is independent of the utility distribution.

### Foreign Trade, Migration, and Investment when Technology Differs Internationally

**39.** International technological disparity,  $T^A \neq T^B$  (cf. definitions 5, 6, and 9), implies potentially very large returns to policies affecting  $P$ . definitions 5 and 6 provide directly:

$$(\text{Def. 17}) F^A(x^A) = \bigcup_{j=1}^N \{f^A = f_j | (f_j; x_j) \in T^A \text{ and } x_j \geq x^A\}$$

and

$$(\text{Def. 18}) F(x, P) = \{f \geq (F^A + P) | f^A \in F^A(x^A), P \in F^B(x^B), \text{ and } (x^A + x^B) \geq x\}$$

whereupon, by definitions 3 and 4:

$$(4) \quad F(u^W, P) = \{f \in F(x, P) | x \in D^W(u^W)\}$$

Define next the sets

$$(\text{Def. 19}) F^A(u^W) = \{f \in F^A(x^A) | x^A \in D^W(u^W)\}$$

which, via the factor-income sets  $F(g, P = 0)$  of hypothesis 1, fit country A's aggregative national-income production function:

$$(5) \quad g = G^A(f) = G(f; P = 0)$$

**40.** If country A is technologically superior to country B, then by hypothesis 1:

$$(6) \quad F^B(u^W) = AF^A(u^W)$$

and, in relationships 2 and 5,

$$(7) \quad G^A(f) = AG^B(f)$$

The aggregative relative international efficiency multiplier  $A$  can be computed simply by comparing pretrade national incomes,  $G^B(E)$  and  $G^A(W - E)$ , and correcting, via equation 7, for pretrade differences in factor employment,  $E$  and  $(W - E)$ . Thus  $A$  for the EEC *vis-à-vis* Morocco appears to be about 3, for the U.S.

*vis-à-vis* India to be about 6 (cf. Cambon), for the U.S. *vis-à-vis* its rest of the world to be about 2, and so forth (a promising field for more detailed and comprehensive research).

41. There are many patterns  $(a_1, \dots, a_N)$  in definition 9 capable of explaining any given level  $A$  of aggregative technological superiority, of course. We consider the simplest pattern, namely:

(Hyp. 4) In hypothesis 2,  $A = a_1 = a_2 = \dots = a_N$

which implies not only relationship 6 but also the fundamental relationship for studying the resource-saving potential of policies determining  $P$ , namely

$$(8) \quad F(u^W, P) = \left[ \frac{1}{A} [F^B(u^W, P) - P] + P \right]$$

To study the potential real-income impact of those policies we first re-invoke relationship 3 and then use hypothesis 1 to write

$$(9) \quad F(g, P) = \left[ \frac{1}{A} [F(g, P = f) - P] + P \right]$$

Next we recall that the sets  $F(g, P = f)$  can be derived directly from country B's aggregative production function, fitted before the change in policy  $P$ . Finally, we point out that hypothesis 3 is not binding so long as  $P \in P(u^W, f)$ , which can always be effectuated by means of a flexible foreign-investment policy and, in any event, is always true for  $P = 0$  and  $P = f$ .

42. Hypothesis 4 is strong. In general, whatever the value of the aggregative relative international efficiency multiplier  $A$  determined by equation 7, the individual coefficients  $a_j$  ( $j = 1, \dots, N$ ) will vary around some average close to  $A$ . Whenever  $a_j$  exceeds unity, country A should be assigned the operation of the  $j$ th technique and whenever unity exceeds  $a_j$ , country B should operate the technique in question. This is the principle of *absolute advantage*. Applying it to the construction, via definitions 7, 8, 11, 17, 18, and 19, of the sets  $F(u^W)$  will indicate the best foreign-employment vector  $P$  to choose as a function of any given pre-existing international technical disparity vector  $a = (a_1, \dots, a_N)$ , as described by definition 9.

43. So long as every  $a_j$  in definition 9 exceeds unity (and regardless therefore of the actual distribution of the  $a_j$ 's with respect to  $A$ ), direct application of formulas 8 and 9, will always supply conservative estimates of the prospective gains from foreign migration and investment policies affecting  $P$ . The reader can see, by experimenting with given initial values of  $P$  (notably that  $P = E$ , B's national factor service endowment-supply vector) and values of  $A$ , that the returns to foreign migration of workes (which always come from countries with low  $A$ 's) are very high indeed. That is the first point to make in suggesting definitions to guide further research on the economics of *international* migration. The second is that absolutely no international migration is required fully to realize those returns.

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# MIGRATION OF MANPOWER VERSUS MIGRATION OF CAPITAL A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (Methodological Analysis)

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## INTRODUCTION

1. The international migration of manpower is not a new subject since Adam Smith and even more so Ricardo and Stuart Mill analysed the problem when studying "the international mobility of the factors of production".

2. The results of migratory movements can be expressed, at any given moment, in terms of the number of foreigners in each developed country (stock) and the number of arrivals and departures each year (flows).

### Brief Classification of Types of Migration

3. It would seem useful to classify migrants into three broad categories in terms of the reasons for their moving to the developed countries.

4. (a) Immigrants wishing to set themselves up with their families on a permanent basis in some other country. This population movement can take two forms: immigrants from other developed countries who emigrate for personal and/or economic reasons, and highly-qualified immigrants from the developing countries who have completed their higher education in the developed countries (brain drain).

5. (b) Migrants from other developed countries accompanying direct investment by their companies in other industrialised countries. These are generally senior staff who bring their families, and work for varying lengths of time in the subsidiary before returning to the parent company. This specialised category is of a temporary nature and is one of the results of the increasing internationalisation of business firms.

6. (c) Migrants from the less developed countries as a supply of labour. Except where the country concerned has birthrate problems (as in France), only the worker—generally in the labouring class—moves, leaving his family behind in the home country.

7. These three migration categories cover the estimated 10 to 12 million foreigners estimated to be living in the industrialised European countries (1). The active foreign population, i.e. disregarding other members of the family, was about five million at the end of 1972.

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(\*) Both the above are consultants at the Development Centre. The Organisation takes no responsibility for the views expressed by the authors or for any errors in the text.

**8.** Settlement immigration is still going on in a certain number of countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and also Great Britain because of her historic links with the Commonwealth countries. But we are solely concerned with migration from the two viewpoints of the inflow of workers and, in particular, those from the less developed countries around the Mediterranean moving to industrial continental Europe (in other words not including Finland or Great Britain and Ireland).

### Characteristics of the Migration of Workers from Developing Countries

**9.** (a) The reason why these foreigners are taken in by the host country is *purely economic*, namely the shortage of manpower, particularly in industry. The fact is that each of the European industrialised countries in turn comes up against the problem of a possible check to its growth because of the scarcity of the labour factor (2). This problem is due to a number of causes but primarily to the very low or non-existent rate of increase of the total and active indigenous population. In addition, there is the trend for working hours to become shorter, for the school-leaving age to be raised and for education to be enjoyed by more and more people, coupled with a growing distaste for industrial work and for manual work in particular (3).

**10.** The industrialised countries are therefore faced with a choice of three possible options if their GNP (gross and per capita) is to continue to grow. These options are:

- (a) to substitute capital for labour since annual production generates a constant share of savings to be invested (assuming a constant propensity to save);
- (b) to invest abroad; or
- (c) to invest in the domestic economy but to import foreign labour to man the factories.

**11.** Since the Second World War, industrialised countries in Europe have been more inclined to take the last of these three options and it is for this reason that the problem of migrant workers arises once full employment is attained and industry is unable to draw further reserves from the agricultural sector. Austria, for example, began to recruit labour abroad in 1962 (4) and the Netherlands did so in 1963 (5).

**12.** Once this approach is taken it has a cumulative effect. Industry employs more and more foreign workers and goes farther and farther to find them, depending, of course, on the demographic and employment situation in the country concerned (6). Germany is a case in point, where the number of Italians tripled between 1959 and 1960 (going up from 4,000 to 13,000) and then increased to 40,000 in 1961 and to 100,000 in 1963; the number of Yugoslavs in Germany went up more slowly, not reaching 100,000 until 1968. Portuguese and Turks arrived in 1960 and Moroccans and Tunisians in 1970 (7).

**13.** That the phenomenon is a matter of economics, due to the scarcity of indigenous manpower, is clear from the legislation on foreign workers entering the country. There is no attempt to control or restrict the arrival of foreigners as such, which would be the object of immigration legislation; instead it is designed merely to protect the jobs of the natives of the country concerned and to ensure that foreigners are not employed in their place.

**14.** This is frequently the case in French legislation. An employer must first apply to the Agence Nationale de l'Emploi (National Employment Office) which is allowed three weeks to find a French or foreign worker already resident in the country; it is only then that application for the admittance of a foreign worker may be made to the Office National de l'Immigration (National Immigration Office). Whilst, except in Belgium's case, the other European countries do not have this requirement to look for a national first, they all operate the system of the work permit which is issued by the employment authorities only if the job cannot be done by a resident (native or foreigner) (8).

**15.** (b) The second feature of this form of manpower immigration for purposes of occupying existing and vacant jobs is its temporary nature (contrasting with the permanence of settlement immigration). This explains the restrictions which European countries place in the way of the arrival of the whole family (except in France's case, which encourages it for population reasons).

**16.** It should be added that, for the present, very little, empirically speaking, is known about this assumed feature of migratory flows since statistics are kept of the arrivals but not of the departures of foreigners (except in Germany's case) and the only way of knowing whether migrants are tending to settle in the host country or to return to their country of origin after staying varying lengths of time would be a direct survey analysing the lives of migrants over a sufficiently long period. In France's case a study of this kind covering the

years 1962 to 1967 gave the following results (9): 25 per cent of migrants leave within one-and-a-half years of their arrival and 50 per cent within six years. Unfortunately, the period covered by the survey is too short to provide a measure of the number who settle (at least for the remainder of their active life) or of the factors which explain why they do not return to their country of origin (10).

## The Present Situation

17. A rough measure of the results of this increasing use of foreign workers to augment the indigenous labour force may be obtained from the following table which shows that in 1971 male and female workers from the less developed European countries and from North Africa totalled at least 4,300,000. (Great Britain is not included in these figures for the reasons given earlier) (11).

Host Country 1971	Italy (1)	Spain (2)	Portugal (3)	Greece (4)	Turkey (5)	Yugoslavia (6)	Algeria (7)	Morocco (8)	Tunisia (9)	Finland (10)	Total
<i>EEC (Continental Europe)</i>											
Germany	405	183	55	261	424	469	2	11	10	4	1,824
Belgium 1967	68	25	2	2	7	—	2	13	0	—	123
France 1972	230	260	370	5	18	50	377	92	44	—	1,451
Luxembourg	11	1.7	6.3	—	0.4	0.4					19.8
Netherlands	9	15.5	2.6	1.1	18.5*	6.2*					52.9
Sub-Total	723	485.2	435.9	273.1	467.9	525.6	381	121	54	4	3,471
Austria	1.5	0.3	—	0.6	21	128				1	152.4
Denmark	0.6	0	0.2	—	5.8	4.4					11
Norway	0.3	0.2	—	—	0.4	0.7	—	0.4	—	0.1	2
Sweden	4.2	2.5	1.1	8.5	2.3	23.0				111	152.6
Switzerland	340	132	2.6**	5.6	10.5**	21.0**					511.7
Total	1,069.6	620.2	439.8	287.8	507.9	702.7	381	121.4	54	116	4,300

Source: Germany: *Ausländische Arbeitnehmer* 1971 (Foreign Workers)—Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (Federal Employment Office), September 1972, Tables 4 and 10.  
France: Columns (1) to (6) see note\*\*; columns (7) to (9): 1971 estimates based on Ministry of the Interior Statistics (Foreigners in France).  
For all other countries: "Recent Development Trends in Inter-Migratory Movements" Manpower Division, O.E.C.D.

Notes: \* W.R. Böhning, *Migration of Workers*. Tables 3-6, 1970.  
\*\* Low figure based on renewals and first issues only.

## The Problem

18. From the viewpoint of the developing countries from where these workers come, the obvious question is: instead of sending workers to the developed countries, would it not be better to attract their capital investment? This would mean capital following labour instead of the reverse. *This question is analysed in the second document.* (See below p. 159.)

19. Developing and developed countries are in contrasting situations with regard to this problem. The source countries have the right of refusal since they can veto emigration or foreign investment but they have no power of initiative since the decision-makers in either case are the developed countries. It is they who decide whether or not to recruit foreign labour and it is the firms in these countries that decide whether or not to invest abroad, and if so whether in a developed or a developing country.

20. Knowing, therefore, the conditions in which a developing country might gain by substituting foreign investment for emigration is not the full answer. The question remains of whether the developed countries also find this reversal in the movement of the two factors to their advantage. The purpose of this paper is to attempt to provide the information that is needed in order to answer this question.

21. It is important to point out that this study is in no way concerned with the foreign workers already in Europe. The question is that of the conditions in which a strategy for economic growth might, in the future, be based on foreign investment instead of the importation of more foreign labour.

## The Method

22. The ideal approach would be a complete cost-benefit analysis in which all the variables in the problem were measured. This is even more impossible than usual in the present case because the problem involved means calling into question the entire industrial process. Instead we shall attempt:

- (a) to tabulate the principal likely consequences of this alternative;
- (b) to draw the distinction between aspects coming under the headings of "private" and "social" (or collective) benefit, the latter being, of course, the more important.

23. For this purpose we shall apply the usual tools of economic analysis, in other words the neoclassic instruments of static analysis which suppose that all the assumptions in the model of pure and perfect competition are validated.

24. Here we should point out that we shall not be dealing explicitly with the possibility of replacing migration by the substitution of capital for labour since this eliminates the developed-developing country relationship. Our problem is that of the "migration of physical capital" which we will be calling "(direct) private investment". But this does not imply any assumptions with regard to the legal form of such foreign investment in a developing country (whether by joint-venture or otherwise), nor the local legislation designed to control and supervise it. We shall suppose solely that the legislation allows the foreign investment to operate on a viable basis and profits to be paid to the investor (just as the importation of labour implies that foreign workers have the right to transfer part of their earnings).

## SECTION I THE DIRECT EFFECTS AND ADVANTAGES OF MIGRATION OF MANPOWER OR CAPITAL IN THE SHORT TERM

25. Analysing the effects of the migration of labour and/or investment is a complicated matter since each of these two phenomena implies an *increase* in the factor concerned. It is difficult to allow for two simultaneous growths and we shall therefore study them separately.

### (a) Direct effects and advantages of the migration of manpower


#### *Effect on production*

26. The effect of the arrival of foreign workers (without an associated movement of physical capital) is the same as that of any exogenous increase in a factor of production: *domestic production goes up*. This increase is the result of the increase in the productivity of the domestic stock of capital (assumed to be constant). In graph 1, capital stock  $K_0$  producing  $OABK_0$  before immigration, produces  $OA'B'K_0$  after allowing for a certain marginal physical productivity of capital shown by line  $PPM(K)$ .


27. This change in the relative productivity of capital and labour causes a change in the relative return to the two factors: the wage rate goes down. This dual production and distribution effect is shown in graph 2, which is similar to graph 1 but in which the phenomenon is shown from the labour factor viewpoint. The marginal physical productivity of labour when the capital is  $K_0$  [ $PPM(L, K_0)$ ] gives a total output of  $OCDL_0$  when labour employed is  $OL_0$ . If immigration increases by  $M = L_0L_1$  the labour factor used, total output becomes  $OCEL_1$ , which is an *increase in output of  $L_0DEL_1$*  over the situation without immigration. The wage rate then moves down from  $OS_0OS_1$ .

#### *The benefits for the host economy*

28. For defining social benefit from the viewpoint of the host economy the distinction between settlement immigration and temporary migration of workers is vital. In the former case, in which the immigrants become permanent members of the community, the direct social benefit is equal to the direct production effect: through immigration the economy enjoys an increase in production. It is even true to say that "collectively" each of the two groups in question benefits from an *increase in welfare*. The residents (i.e. the natives of the country concerned plus earlier permanent immigrants), previously sharing production  $OCDL_0$ , now share production  $OCEFL_0$ , i.e. *a collective increase represented by triangle DFE* (return on capital from the additional production). The new permanent immigrants themselves receive remuneration equal to  $L_0FEL_1$ . It may be assumed that this is higher than what they were receiving in their country of origin since that is precisely why they left it (13).



Graph. 1



Graph. 2

29. The situation is different for temporary immigration. In this case the host economy can decide whether to bring foreign workers or not. This decision should be based upon a comparative study of the *welfare of the residents alone* (natives of the country and earlier immigrants) with and without such migration. Foreign workers are paid for the work they do. In graph 2 they increase output by  $L_0DEL_1$  and receive wages equal to the rectangle  $L_0FEL_1$ , which has to be paid from the national product. *The benefit for the host economy is therefore the balance only: triangle DFE*, in other words, the additional profit accruing from the increase in output.

30. An important point here is that whereas the measurement of this gain depends on the validity of the assumptions in the neoclassic competition model, its definition does not. If a given output is possible with migrant workers which would not be possible without them (direct effect) the benefit for the non-migrants is equal to such output less the remuneration paid to the foreign workers.

### (b) Direct effects and advantages of the migration of capital

31. In the case of capital investment abroad, it is clearly the country in which it is made that benefits from the direct production effect (14). The direct gain—disregarding the indirect effects (externalities)—is represented by the total wages paid to the employees who are natives of the country concerned and the direct taxation on the profits of the foreign company and on the income of expatriate employees (15). The direct cost of this foreign investment for the host country is precisely the gain to the investor's country of origin, i.e. *profit after direct local taxation*.

32. This leads to the two following conclusions:

- (1) An economy stands to benefit by investing abroad rather than at home (*without bringing in foreign manpower*) if the rate of return on the foreign investment is higher than its physical productivity at home.
- (2) An economy tends to gain by investing abroad rather than at home, in the case where foreign workers are imported, if the rate of return on investment abroad is higher than that at home.

### (c) The conflict between manpower immigration and investment abroad

33. Industrialised countries with stationary indigenous manpower resources have to divide national savings between investment at home and abroad in order to draw the maximum "advantage" from them (production at home plus net profit abroad).


34. If there are perfect competition conditions on the domestic capital market, firms will allocate the money to be invested in such a way that the private return on their investment at home is equal to the private return on their investment abroad.

35. Private return on investment at home is expressed as the marginal productivity of domestic capital (see line  $PPM(K, L_0)$  on graph 1).

36. Defining private return on investment abroad is difficult. If the international capital market is perfect this return is no more and no less than the marginal productivity of foreign capital and, from the viewpoint of a single investing country, it is constant. Personally, we cannot agree with this assumption and feel that it is more realistic to suppose that productivity will decrease because of two limitations applicable to the individual investor: firstly, he will tend to stay within that industry with whose technology and commercial background he is familiar (and the return on investment varies with industry), and secondly, an investor will consider only a limited number of projects in a limited number of foreign countries.

37. This situation is shown in graph 3; the industrialised economy has to allocate investment capital equal to  $K_0K_1$ .

- (1) With no manpower imports, firms opt for situation A, in which  $K_0A'$  is invested at home and produces  $K_0DAA'$ , and  $A'K_1$  invested abroad to yield  $A'AEK_1$ . This situation gives the economy its maximum *gain* (represented by  $K_0DAEK_1$ ).
- (2) But, as we have seen, importing manpower increases the productivity of capital. In this case firms will elect for situation C in which  $K_0C'$  is invested at home to produce  $K_0D'CC'$  whilst,  $C'K_1$  is invested abroad to produce  $C'CEK_1$ . Less is therefore invested abroad by an amount equal, in this case, to  $A'C'$ .



Graph. 3

38. This is important since it shows that an exodus of adults from developing countries because of a lack of capital could help to create a vicious circle with a cumulative effect because it would diminish the attractions of such countries for investors.

39. This result can, in fact, be perceived intuitively: a certain number of firms would probably be interested in the possibility of investing in a developing country, provided that:

- (1) they did not find that the manpower needed to make the investment project work had left the country; or
- (2) if the higher wages necessary to secure workers at home reduced the return on their investment; or
- (3) the opportunities of substituting capital for labour called for too high an amount of capital investment so that the project was either out of the question or no longer economically feasible.

40. Graph 3, however, brings out a further point, i.e. the divergence between private interest and social gain. As we have already said, the gain to society from the immigration of foreign workers is represented by their production less what they are paid. Taking their remuneration to be represented by the shaded part, the productivity of capital (i.e. the *social gain*) is now represented by straight line FB and not D'C

(representing *private* advantage). In this case, the situation maximising social gain is not C, but B, in which B'C' would be *additionally invested abroad*. This divergence between private and social gain is measured by triangle BCG.

41. This conclusion may appear to be self-contradictory but it can thus be seen that the market mechanism, with the immigration of foreign workers, tends to *swing, from a given moment onwards*, the allocation of investment in favour of investment at home rather than abroad.

## SECTION II THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF MANPOWER AND CAPITAL MIGRATION

42. Clearly, the primary problem is the dynamic and cumulative aspect of an industrial strategy based on the employment of foreigners or on international investment. Unfortunately, the data on which analysis might be based become very elusive and difficult to measure particularly with regard to investment abroad.

### Part 1: Long-term effects of manpower migration

43. The arrival of foreign workers causes three dynamic effects, firstly on the rate of growth, secondly on productivity, and lastly on rates of activity.

#### A. Effect on rate of growth

44. The immigration of foreign workers increases the growth rate of the host economy for two reasons.

1. Firstly, given a constant domestic saving rate, part of the production gain will be invested. This effect is automatic.
2. Secondly, the transfer of remuneration along with the change in real earnings benefits the companies (capital factor) which have a high propensity to invest (self-financing).

45. Another factor may also operate to the benefit of the host economy. Foreign workers are known to send part of their wages back to their country of origin in order to support their families. The problem is that of whether these transfers also include the "voluntary *savings*", which is the second reason (after the need to find a job) for workers to emigrate. If these savings are not transferred and find their way, instead, into the banking system of the host country (savings banks, etc.) it is that system which enjoys the benefit of these savings until the worker returns to his own country.

46. In the case of investment abroad, the developed country benefits, as far as capital formation is concerned, only from the first effect and then only on that part of the profits which comes back to the country of origin.

#### B. Effect on productivity

47. Whilst the alternative of importing workers means a higher growth rate for the host economy through increased capital formation, it may be wondered whether it does not have the opposite effect through reduced productivity of the branches of the economy in which they work.

48. Here there are two contrary theories:

1. Foreign workers may slow down the transfer of native wage-earners from unproductive to more productive industries. Also their presence could be used to avoid having to rationalise production or find ways of substituting capital for labour.
2. Conversely, it may be thought (16) that the amount to be invested is limited by the domestic propensity to save and that elasticities of substitution are different in different industries. If those using migrants instead of substituting capital for labour are low substitution-elasticity industries, they increase production and at the same time *liberate money for investment* in the high substitution-elasticity industries which can then increase production more rapidly than in the opposite case. The result is that the apparent productivity of labour in industries with foreign workers increases less rapidly than in the others but that the productivity of the economy as a whole increases more rapidly.

49. Verifying suppositions in this field empirically is very difficult and because of the poor quality of the data available, the results have to be treated with caution.

50. A study made by J. L. Reiffers on foreign workers in Germany using a method enabling the increase in overall productivity to be split into that attributable to improvements in the productive processes in the indus-

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GROWTH RATE FOR THE PROPORTION OF FOREIGN WAGE EARNERS IN EACH INDUSTRY AND THAT FOR PRODUCTIVITY AND CAPITAL PER HEAD OF POPULATION IN THE SAME INDUSTRY

Industry	Foreign wage-earners as a percentage of all wage-earners in the industry		Average Annual Growth Rate			
	1962	1968	of the percentage of foreign wage-earners 1962-1968 (1)	of productivity 1962-1968 (2)		of capital per head of population 1962-1967 (2)
				added value per active person	added value per hour worked (hourly productivity)	
02. Agricultural and food products	4.5	5.2	2.45	4.4	5.1	4.2
03.A Solid mineral fuels	16.9	16.1	-0.8	0.3	2.25	-1.2
03.B Gas	1.7	1.7	0.0	6.6	8.6	5.9
04. Electricity, etc.				5.1	6.8	10.9
05. Oil, natural gas and motor fuels	2.2	2.6	2.8	4.9	6.3	
06.A Building materials	15.7	16.5	0.9	3.7	4.6	9.7
06.B Glass	6.6	7.1	1.3			
07. Iron ore and iron and steel products	16.3	18.2	1.9	8.5	9.4	4.6
08. Non-ferrous minerals and metals	18.0	15.9	-2.0	4.2	4.4	3.2
09.A Primary metal products	8.8	11.0	3.85	4.75	5.7	
09.B Mechanical machinery and appliances	6.0	7.3	3.2	6.2	7.6	
09.C Electrical machines and appliances	5.7	6.3	1.8	5.7	8.0	7.5
09.D Motor vehicles and bicycles	12.5	14.0	2.0	5.75	7.5	
09.E Shipbuilding, aerospace, armaments	2.2	2.8	4.4	5.0	6.5	
10. Products of the chemical and rubber industries	6.6	7.6	2.4	6.25	7.25	
11.A Textiles	4.8	6.7	5.9	4.4	5.6	8.6
11.B Clothing and apparel	4.85	6.6	5.3	3.35	4.2	
11.C Leather	3.4	6.1	10.2	3.0	3.85	5.75
12.A Products of the timber industry	7.0	12.0	9.5	6.2	7.2	
12.B Paste, paper and board	3.9	6.3	8.4	6.0	7.2	
12.C Newspapers and periodicals, publishing	2.4	3.3	5.7	1.0	1.7	7.8
12.D Products of sundry industries	7.0	9.5	5.4	4.9	5.9	
13. Building and public works	19.1	22.4	2.7	4.7	5.5	9.8
14.A Transport	2.7	3.4	3.9	2.45	3.6	2.9
14.B Telecommunications	0.85	0.5	-8.5	4.1	5.15	8.4
15. Housing services	3.3	6.7	12.5	2.3	2.7	
16. Other services	3.2	5.2	8.2	1.4	1.9	8.0
Distribution and trade	5.0	3.9	-4.1	2.9	3.3	9.3
Total for non-agricultural sectors	7.4	9.6	4.4	4.2	5.0	6.7

(1) Worked out from census data.  
(2) Worked out from annual averages (Source: INSEE).  
Important Note: The proportion of foreigners in the various industries shown in this table may be subject to major error. The figures have been estimated from the results of the census by industry categories. Transfer from one nomenclature to another can produce only very approximate results.  
Source: Commissariat Général au Plan: (6th Plan) Report by the Commission on Employment (Volume II) (La Documentation Française, Paris 1971), pages 62-63.

tries concerned and that due to changes in employment structure reaches the following conclusion: "since 1961 the employment of foreign workers has been better distributed among the various industries. All in all, over the whole of the period, there has been a net structural gain (for industry) whereas the distribution of German workers has been less rational." (17).

51. From the figures for France shown in the above table, it is clear that the aggregates given do not suggest that productivity is lowered by the influx of foreign workers (the coefficient of correlation between columns (3) and (4) is 0.087) or that the increase in capital per head of population is diminished (the coefficient of correlation between columns (3) and (6) is 0.38). In fact it can be seen that the number of foreigners has increased in certain industries with a below-average increase in productivity (e.g. "leather" and "newspapers and periodicals, publishing") but also in other industries where productivity has gone up more steeply than the average (timber, paper and board, iron and steel and mechanical machinery and appliances). One is inclined to agree with the author of the report that "the effects of immigration on productivity seem to depend more on the industrial strategy of the firm within the industry than on the intrinsic qualities of foreign workers." (18).

## Part 2: Long-term effects of capital migration

52. This subject has already been fully dealt with in the literature and we shall therefore be very brief. There would appear to be two principal effects relating firstly to additional demand and secondly to the balance of payments.

53. Recent investigations tend to show that investment abroad creates additional demand for exports from the country of the investor (19). This is a dual effect since apart from the demand within the domestic productive system it has a positive effect on the trade balance. A side effect is that this additional demand tends to create jobs for the natives of the countries concerned (20) which should—at first analysis—help to maintain full employment of a slowly increasing indigenous active population or continue to induce manpower transfer from the less productive to the more productive industries.

54. The effect of long-term capital flows on the balance of payments is not the same. Provided the productive capacity of the capital investment is maintained by the amortization process, the enterprise set up abroad will generate a continuous flow of profits back to the investing country. This (in principle) permanent effect contrasts with the temporary nature of transfers from foreign workers' wages, which automatically cease when they go home again or bring their families over to join them.

## Part 3: Lessening of the conflict between immigration and foreign investment

55. In the long term, the conflict between the migration of workers and foreign investment tends to lessen since the extra growth possible because of immigration increases national savings. Higher national savings, assuming constant propensities to invest at home and abroad, mean more foreign investment. In other words, the *static* effect studied above could well be offset by a *dynamic* effect over time (21).

56. Here an important point needs stressing. This offsetting effect means that at the end of a certain period the country of origin of the foreign workers should receive the foreign capital that it failed to receive because of the emigration of its nationals, provided it is selected as a possible country to invest in. This means, from the viewpoint of its *economic development*, it could well recover lost time. But from the viewpoint of the *well-being* of its population, the situation is different: the economic value (discounted) of the production potentially lost is such that there is very little likelihood of its being offset by the "well-being" value of the production obtained when the capital stock makes up lost ground (distribution problems).

57. The phenomenon of offsetting over time, in terms of capital flows, coupled with the fact that the reasons for investing abroad are of many kinds and are not governed solely by the importation of foreign manpower, and the fact that developed countries are both importers and exporters of capital, explains why an instantaneous cross-section analysis does not produce any conclusive results.

58. The following table correlates capital exports and imports expressed as a percentage of domestic investment with rates of migration and growth in active population. The only remark this calls for is that the only

RATE OF EXPORT AND IMPORT OF CAPITAL AND RATE OF GROWTH OF NET IMMIGRATION  
AND OF THE ACTIVE POPULATION IN SELECTED DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1964-1968)

Country	Capital Exports K Domestic investment %	Capital Imports K Domestic investment %	Net capital Imports K Domestic investment %	Net immigration rate (1/1000)	Growth rate of active population %
U.K.	19.0	11.7	-7.3	-.6	.2
Netherlands	13.2	11.6	-1.6	.8	1.1
U.S.A.	12.9	.6	-12.3	2.0	1.8
Sweden	8.2	8.5	.3	3.0	.5
Germany	3.8	8.8	5.0	2.9	.3
Canada	3.8	21.6	17.8	6.0	2.6
Belgium	3.7	16.5	12.8	2.6	.6
France	2.4	3.4	1.0	2.5	.8
Japan	1.1	.8	-.3	.0	1.3

Source: O.E.C.D., Labour Force Statistics.  
O.E.C.D., Studies on the Financial Markets, Sweden.

four countries which are net exporters of capital are at the same time those with the lowest immigration rate. Conversely, there would not appear to be any relationship between net capital flows and the growth rate of a country's active population.

### SECTION III THE EXTERNAL EFFECTS (EXTERNALITIES)

**59.** This analysis of the two possibilities must clearly take into account the external effects generated in each case. For brevity's sake we shall confine ourselves to listing them, since they are not very well known.

#### Part 1: The external effects of the migration of people

*A. Social gain:* of which there are five main kinds.

**60. a.** *The skills of foreign workers*

Contrary to what is generally thought, a relatively high percentage of migrant workers is *skilled when it arrives*. Eighteen percent of those entering France in 1967, for example, were skilled (22). If their skill is in fact used by French companies and if the country of origin has paid for the training involved, this is a *de facto* grant from a developing to a developed country, the gain to the latter being measurable in terms of the cost to the community of creating the same level of skill in a native of the country concerned.

**61. b.** Foreign workers may also (at a given moment) help to remove bottlenecks in the productive process. In that case, they render productive (and profitable) all the capital that would have been blocked, upstream and downstream, without their productive work at these key points. This social gain—which has to be taken into account for the whole period during which the bottleneck would, without them, persist—is far from being reflected by their earnings.

**62. c.** Foreign workers contribute to direct income tax revenue. This contribution should be measured in relation to some of the social costs that they may entail (listed below).

**63. d.** In some cases, foreign workers are not in competition with (and do not substitute) the manpower in the country concerned. The classic theory, therefore, of a labour market in which demand can always be satisfied by an increase in earnings is upset—in the short term and in the light of market and demand structure at a given moment—by the subjective utility of the social status of certain jobs, which are disdained by the nationals of the country concerned as “socially undesirable”. A typical case is refuse collection which tends to be done exclusively by foreigners (75 per cent of those doing this job in Paris being immigrants). This attitude on the part of the indigenous population has reached such a point that in some Swiss towns householders themselves have to take their refuse to the incinerating plant. The disinclination to do certain jobs, however, is not restricted to those that are badly paid. In the Paris area, for example, there are not enough asphalt workers and street pavers to be found at rates of Fr. 2,500 and 4,000 per month respectively compared with a minimum salary of some Fr. 1,000 (23).

**64. e.** By taking unskilled jobs in certain industries, foreign workers release such indigenous manpower as is still employed for such work, which can then move to jobs that require higher skill and are better paid. This effect is far from insignificant and possibly explains why trade unions make no special effort to defend the employment of natives in unskilled jobs since the presence of foreigners opens the door to promotion for indigenous workers having the required skills. Foreign labour also contributes to inter-sectoral manpower mobility; this means that there is then some flexibility of employment but this is primarily because of foreign labour so that the economy is saved the cost of generating the flexibility should this have had to be achieved by increasing the mobility of indigenous workers.

*B. Social costs:* Social costs come under five headings.

**65. a.** Firstly there is the investment borne by the host country in housing the foreign workers (24). Here very careful study is required of the conditions under which the building of this housing is financed. In the French case, for example, it is the foreign workers themselves who finance this expenditure by the difference between the family allowances they receive (at the rates prevailing in their country of origin) and the amounts they would receive if they were nationals of the country they are working in. (In this respect a gain would accrue to the host country if they left without being replaced.)

**66. b.** To what extent do foreign workers entail health costs borne by the community over and above their health insurance contributions? Apart from certain specific and limited cases (tuberculosis among Africans, for example), it would appear that their "sickness rate" is lower, by age group (a fundamental factor), than that of the indigenous population. This would therefore constitute a gain rather than a cost.

**67. c.** The situation with regard to industrial accidents is perhaps different. Industrial accidents are known to depend on the extent to which working conditions are unsafe and also on the physical and mental state of the worker. If, as is probable, foreign workers suffer more accidents than natives, it has to be understood that the community is, in two ways, merely reaping what has been sown: inadequate safety measures by private enterprise (private cost transferred to the community) and the poor living conditions that it tolerates for foreigners.

**68. d.** Reference should also be made to the cost borne by the community to help the foreign worker to adjust to his new environment (language instruction, etc.). In addition, if he brings his family, there is the cost of adjustment in terms of the education of the children.

## Part 2: The external effects of investment abroad

**69. A.** Investment in a developing country should normally contribute to that country's industrial development and this may be said to represent "a positive utility for the advanced countries" (25).

**70. B.** On the other hand, a policy of growth based on investment in developing countries from which foreign workers are obtained implies three external disadvantages for the developed country:

(a) firstly, the cost represented by direct taxation on the profits which the investing country does not receive (since they are levied by the country in which the investment is made) but which it would have received if the investment had been made on its own territory (26);

(b) secondly, an increase in its external dependence with regard to its consumption, not (any longer) of raw materials, but of manufactured products (the basic assumption still being that the end product is produced to be consumed in the developed country);

(c) thirdly, the social cost—a corollary of the above—consisting in the strain placed by such a strategy on the balance of payments. If part of the production of manufactured goods takes place in a developing country instead of in the developed country using foreign labour, this means that the developed country has goods to trade. This calls for an effort on its part to maintain its trade balance through additional exports in another sector.

## CONCLUSIONS

**71.** The above analysis is an attempt to outline the factors involved in choosing between two strategies for economic growth in the developed country: importing manpower or investing abroad.

### The problem of industrial adjustment

**72.** In view of the number of phenomena involved and the difficulty (if not impossibility) of measuring their relative importance and the consequences of their mutual interaction, switching from the present strategy, which assumes a more or less inexhaustible reserve of manpower in the other parts of the world, to a strategy based on investment abroad using surplus savings (once indigenous and foreign manpower already resident is fully employed) implies in the final analysis a double gamble, firstly on the possibility of maintaining the growth rate and secondly on the possibilities of sectoral adjustment between the industries in the economy concerned.


**73.** This latter point calls for brief comment. Putting a stop to further immigration would mean that the firms in the developed countries would have to face a new situation with regard to increasing production. They would have either to produce on the spot by substituting capital for labour or to produce abroad and re-import that production.

Much production, however, is not "transferable". The "transport cost" component of the finished products becomes a key criterion which is in no way dependent on the presence or absence of foreign workers in the industry. This means that the industries that will attempt to "transfer" will not necessarily be those in which foreign workers are now employed; the extreme example is the building industry which is precisely

that employing the largest number of migrants and is, at the same time, not transferable by definition. Thus slowing down or halting immigration altogether would necessarily bring about a far-reaching structural change in the distribution of indigenous manpower by industry, those which transfer releasing manpower which should switch to the non-transferable sectors. Such a change would mean a radically new trend in the inter-sectoral hierarchy of earnings with all its economic and social consequences, to say nothing of location-of-industry problems. It is, however, impossible to foresee the breadth and timescale of such an intersectoral change; possibly the advanced economies have an unsuspected adaptive capability but it is also possible that such a change would precipitate a full-scale economic and social crisis.

#### The lack of trade-off for the developed countries

74. In view of this inter-sectoral adjustment problem and the fact that the immigration of temporary workers increases the growth of the host country with the two results that have been discussed (gain in net production and, at the same time, a reduction in foreign investment), there would seem to be no advantage to developed countries, in the medium term and as long as their *goal continues to be maximum growth in national income*, in exchanging foreign workers against foreign investment. In other words, *there is no trade-off between the two alternatives* since the immigration-foreign investment relationship takes the following form for the developed country (graph. 4, below):



Graph. 4

75. Point A represents the maximum amount of investment made abroad in the absence of immigration (it corresponds to the situation of graph 3 and amount of foreign investment  $A'K_1$ ).

Point B represents the situation at which, under the effects of immigration, all investment is made at home (on graph 3 this would correspond to the displacement of line  $D'C$  in such a way that it intersects axis  $K_1$  at E).

76. But it should be noted that this relationship *does not* constitute a situation of indifference in the country concerned: *its rate of growth increases* as it moves away from situation A towards situation B. In other words, it is in the interest of the developed country to find itself as close as possible to B.

If it is accepted either that there is an incompressible minimum of foreign investment or else, which is more likely, that the total of immigrants  $OM_{max}$  represents the threshold beyond which social costs outstrip the gain, this optimum situation is represented by point C.

## REFERENCES

- (1) One estimate for foreign workers in O.E.C.D. Member countries (excluding Japan, Iceland and Great Britain) gives a figure of 4,485,598 (a). To this must be added 179,300 in Great Britain (b), i.e. a total of 4,665,000.
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  - (b) W.R. Böhning, *The Migration of Workers in the U.K. and the European Community*, Oxford University Press, 1972. p. 49.
- (2) cf. C.P. Kindleberger: *Europe's Postwar Growth, The Role of Labour Supply*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1967.
- (3) cf. "La Désaffection à l'égard de l'emploi industriel" (The Growing Distaste for Industrial Employment) in: Commissariat Général au Plan (6th Plan): *Rapport de la Commission Emploi* (Report by the Employment Commission), Volume II. La Documentation Française, Paris 1971, pages 285-301.
- (4) K.D. Mayer, "Foreign Workers in Switzerland and Austria", *European Demographic Information Bulletin*, 1971, No. 3 pp. 99-104.
- (5) A.J. Marshall-Goldschvartz: *The Impact of Labour, The Case of the Netherlands*, University Press, Rotterdam, 1973, pp. 24-26.
- (6) On the cumulative aspect of the recruitment of foreign workers, see W.R. Böhning's excellent analysis in *The Migration of Workers in the U.K. and the European Community*, Oxford University Press, 1972. Chapter 4.
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- (8) See O.E.C.D., Manpower Committee: "Recent Developments and Trends in Intra-European Migratory Movements", duplicated. There are no regulations of this kind within the European Economic Community (where the principle applied is freedom of movement of manpower) or in the case of the Northern countries (Finland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway) which have an agreement on a common manpower market.  
There are also certain bilateral agreements (e.g. that between France and Algeria) providing for different conditions.
- (9) D. Courgeau: "Les départs, hors de France, des travailleurs étrangers: un essai de mesure". (An Attempt at Measuring Departures of Foreign Workers from France) *R. Population*, July 1968.
- (10) It is for this reason that, with the help of the Development Centre, two students of Orleans University are now extending D. Courgeau's study to cover a ten-year period—1962-1972.
- (11) According to W.R. Böhning (*op. cit.*) "a middle class and white-collar worker immigration" is involved (page 50). Since, in his eyes, this would be more in the nature of "permanent" immigration, we are justified in excluding these 47,00 people (Table 3.8, page 49).
- (12) The argument here is based on the following research:
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  - R.A. Berry and R. Soligo: "Some Welfare Aspects of International Migration", *JPE*, September 1969.
  - A.E. Jasay: "The Social Choice Between Home and Overseas Investment", *Eco. Journal*, March 1960.
  - G.D.A. McDougall: "The Benefits and Costs of Private Investment from Abroad: A Theoretical Approach", *Bulletin of Oxford Institute*, 1960.
- (13) M.V. Reder (*loc. cit.*) stresses this point (see page 224).
- (14) On the direct effects of foreign investment see the outline given by G.L. Reuber: *Private Investment in Development*, (Clarendon Press 1972), Chapter 3. See also J.H. Dunning, *Studies in International Investment* (G. Allen & Unwin, 1970), W.B. Reddaway, *Effects of U.K. Direct Investment Overseas: Preliminary and Final Report* (Cambridge University Press 1968).
- (15) The case of indirect taxation can be seen in two ways: it implies a direct gain in the case of exported products but for products sold at home there is a transfer from the consumer to the State, the analysis of which needs to take the possible alternatives into account.
- (16) This idea was suggested to us by Professor I. Little.

- (17) J.L. Reiffers: *Le Rôle de l'immigration des travailleurs dans la croissance de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne de 1958 à 1968* (The Role of Worker Immigration in the Growth of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1958 to 1968). ILO Project Algeria 14, March 1970, duplicated, 206 pages (quotation from page 177).
- (18) Commissariat Général au Plan (6th Plan) *Rapport de la Commission de la Main d'Œuvre* (Report of the Manpower Commission), Vol. 2, page 49.
- (19) W. B. Reddaway: *Effects of U.K. Direct Investment Overseas*, Interim and Final Report (Cambridge University Press 1967 and 1968). G. C. Hufbauer and F.M. Adler: *Overseas Manufacturing Investment and the Balance of Payments*, (U. S. Treasury Department, 1958). J. N. Behrman: *Direct Manufacturing Investment Exports and the Balance of Payments* (National Foreign Trade Council, 1968). G. L. Reuber: *Private Investment in Development* (op. cit.).
- (20) See Harvard Business School Study: *U. S. Multinational Enterprises and the U. S. Economy*, in: "The Multinational Corporation—Studies on U. S. Foreign Investment" Part I (Department of Commerce, March 1972).
- (21) A formal demonstration of the feasibility of such offsetting is given by F. Bourguignon, *Imports of Labour and Export of Capital*, (Trade Workshop of the University of Western Ontario, 8th November, 1973) Part II.
- (22) These are Spanish, Greek, Italian, Moroccan, Portuguese, Tunisian, Turkish and Yugoslav people: 18, 158 "skilled and white-collar workers" out of the 99,343 brought in. [National Immigration Office: *Statistiques de l'Immigration 1967* (Immigration Statistics), calculations based on Table 4, page 13.]
- (23) These details were kindly given by Mr. Petit of the Employment Studies Centre.
- (24) It should be remembered that in the case of temporary worker arrivals, the productive capital already exists. This does not apply in the case of permanent immigration (see E. J. Mishan and L. Needleman "Immigration, Excess Aggregate Demand and the Balance of Payments", *Economica*, May 1966).
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- (26) *Ibid.*

# EMIGRATION VERSUS FOREIGN INVESTMENT: A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE FOR CERTAIN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES \*

(Methodological analysis)

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## INTRODUCTION

1. International mobility of capital has been recommended (1) as an alternative to the employment of foreign workers in European industrialised countries. Indeed, it might be argued, though the statement is a gross simplification, that the best alternative for industrialised countries with a manpower shortage, assuming that recruitment from abroad ceased to be possible, would be to transfer part of their activities to countries with an easier labour market situation. Of course, things are not that simple. Because of the non-transferability of certain activities and the effects of the relative distribution of factors of production on the pattern of international trade, a total and final stoppage of the immigration of foreign workers into European industrialised countries would imply radical restructuring of their economy. It is nevertheless true that such a measure could be expected to result in an appreciable increase of investment by those countries in others that are better placed as far as human resources are concerned. At least that is the teaching of economic theory at the most general level. It is also fairly certain that, because of their proximity, the countries from which foreign manpower currently emigrates would be the ones to benefit from such exports of capital.

2. Thus, from the viewpoint of countries supplying manpower to industrial Europe (or perhaps from the viewpoint of all potential manpower-supplying countries) there appears to be a degree of conflict between emigration and foreign investment. In the event that both would contribute to economic development, it is worthwhile stressing the existence of this conflict. The fact that a reduction in emigration might be accompanied by an increase in foreign investment, and vice-versa, should be borne in mind by the negotiators of bilateral or multilateral agreements affecting international movements of the factors of production.

3. It is not the object of this document to resolve the question of whether migration or foreign investment is more favourable to development. Such a clear-cut conclusion seems out of the question in the present state of our statistical and analytical knowledge, especially since we do not know what the alternative really is for the countries from which foreign manpower is coming. Our object here is to give an analytical framework into which such a study might fit. The purpose of this paper, in fact, is to show to what extent foreign investment and temporary emigration are analogous, to set down the preliminary questions which are so often forgotten but which have to be answered before the relative value of the two phenomena may be assessed, and, at a more fundamental level to consider how they may influence the growth of a particular economy. Put simply, the problem tackled is as follows: a given territory has a certain exogenous stock of foreign capital and is offered a certain number of jobs (also exogenous) in foreign countries for its nationals. What are the comparative effects of an increase in that stock of capital and in that number of jobs on the development of that particular territory?

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\* This paper is a summary of part of a wider study on foreign investment and emigration sponsored by the OECD Development Centre. The Organisation takes no responsibility for the views expressed by the author.

4. It is perhaps worth repeating at this point that this paper refers only to countries supplying manpower to the European industrialised countries—in other words countries where the migration problem may well arise in the form set out above—and, principally, to those countries which are, at present, at an early stage of development. One final point of clarification is that the term “foreign investment” as used in the study covers firms (or establishments) in which all the capital is foreign-owned. The problems raised by the pattern of capital ownership in these firms will be dealt with in ‘the Conclusion’.

## GENERAL COMMENTS

### The similarity between foreign investment and temporary emigration, and the basic question of “labour surplus”

5. For a given territory, temporary emigration and foreign investment are both equivalent to the creation of employment although its location, remuneration and exact nature differ in the two cases. On this basis, therefore, the two phenomena may be expected to have similar effects upon the economy in question. The gain to the community from the new jobs is roughly speaking, equal to the earnings (and profits) generated by the jobs less the previous earnings of the workers who directly, or indirectly (by chain substitution) take them up. Leaving aside for the time being the problem of a proper definition of migrants’ salaries from the viewpoint of the country of origin, the ultimate gain to the economy thus depends directly on the state of the labour market. In conditions of full employment every worker has an opportunity cost which may be equated roughly to his previous earnings. In an economy with permanent underemployment this opportunity cost is nil, provided any new job means the number of workless, registered or otherwise, goes down by one.

6. This being so, before any attempt can be made at an economic evaluation of manpower or capital movements it is necessary to assess the opportunity cost of the various types of jobs offered at home or abroad or, in other words, to take the exact measure of labour surpluses (and shortages (2)) in the country concerned. There is no question here of joining issue in the controversy on the concept or the measurement of labour surplus or of reviewing the labour market situation in the various countries supplying manpower to industrial Europe. Our own research on visible unemployment in those countries suggests that the assumption of a genuine labour surplus is correct in certain of them and was so until recently in others. It therefore seemed best, first to examine the proposed alternatives in the context of a labour surplus economy and secondly, to work out how the conclusions reached had to be modified to take into account the opportunity cost of newly recruited labour. It must however be pointed out that evaluating labour surpluses and shortages goes far beyond the simple analysis of emigration and should be made the first priority in most of the countries considered.

### The ambiguities of the “human capital” approach in the field of emigration

7. According to some authors, the opportunity cost related to the emigration of a worker in fact consists in the whole of the human capital invested in him by his community of origin, or in the case of temporary emigration, the interest on this human capital accruing to the host country and consequently irretrievably lost to the country of origin. It has even been suggested that host countries should compensate the countries of origin for this special type of “disinvestment”. This reasoning appears faulty or, at the least, should be used with more discernment. To apply it generally, as seems to have been done by some authors, presupposes that a child’s birth and upbringing are purely economic acts—an investment whose productivity will be the work which the newborn child will one day perform. It seems difficult to accept these premises in the contemporary moral, social and political setting (the birth control policies in certain countries, incidentally, are in complete contradiction with this “productive” view of the birth rate). It is however true in some cases, as has been indicated above, that the departure of a productive individual means a loss of production that only a new human investment can offset (departure of highly-qualified or skilled workers, etc.). Here, indeed, there is a loss of human capital, but the loss cannot exceed the cost of replacing it, i.e. the amount necessary to train someone from the population available to be equivalent, interim of production, to the migrant (3). It is not easy to visualise cases where the cost of replacement would be equal to the total amount necessary for the migrant’s growth from birth to the state prior to his departure, as certain advocates of the “human capital” approach maintain. The approach is not without some justification: on the contrary it provides a formula for establishing the exact opportunity cost of the migrant; but it must be used with discernment if only to avoid arriving at figures which, were they not so artificial, would weigh overwhelmingly against emigration.

## Effects of emigration and foreign investment on development and welfare

8. In a closed economy, growth is generally measured in terms of national product and income per head of population. The increase in national product expresses the rate at which productivity in the country has improved. The increase in income per head is a more accurate yardstick, because it reflects the very purpose of this growth: the welfare of the population. In an open economy, where part of the productive capital belongs to people from other countries and whose citizens are temporarily or (permanently) absent, calculating the rate of development presents certain problems. National or domestic product, and national income in particular, no longer constitute equivalent yardsticks and may mask more complex concepts.

9. Assuming, for instance, that the whole labour surplus of a country is gradually absorbed through (temporary) emigration and that the productive capacities of the country remain unchanged, income per head will increase for a period but not because of any real growth in national economic potential. This *welfare effect* must therefore be differentiated from the *development effect* which might be due to emigration but for which there has to be an increase in productive capacities. The welfare effect may be one of the major consequences of emigration, but it is important to be clear about the individual and collective options implied in an evaluation of emigration and its effect on development based solely on the criterion of national income per head. The same type of questions may be put, though perhaps more ambiguously, with regard to foreign investment: what would one say, in the final outcome, of an economy whose productive capital was mainly in the hands of foreign investors?

10. The difference between welfare and development effects becomes vital if the employment offered abroad to natives of a particular country is on a temporary basis as compared with the long-term objectives that those responsible for the economy may reasonably be supposed to have in view. In other words, can a particular country build its development policy on a permanent float of its nationals working abroad? Similarly, can a country secure increased welfare for its people by relying solely on an increasing flow of foreign investment? It would be more logical to assume that, for long term growth, a country's major objective would be to develop its own productive capacities and not merely to allow collective welfare to improve momentarily through factors over which it has no control. In other words the comparative effectiveness of foreign investment or temporary emigration on the economic development of a given country should be measured in the following way: if investment stopped in X years time, or if the industrial countries stopped employing foreign workers in X years time, what would the national product and income per head then be? Although this criterion is to some extent invalidated if the structure of capital ownership of "foreign" firms or the possibility of permanent emigration is considered, it does however show the need to differentiate between the effects to be expected from temporary migration and from foreign investment, and not to base their evaluation solely upon the ambiguous concept of national income (4).

11. The influence of foreign investment and of emigration respectively on the productive capacity of a given country could best be studied by integrating both into a given model of economic growth and observing the changes they bring about. However, in view of the differences between the countries involved, and the fact that models either do not exist or are inadequate, it is more practical to study the influence of foreign investment and emigration (a) on the overall growth of an economy through a conventional model for a single sector, and (b) on the structure of that growth through a dualistic economy model which, in varying degrees, seems appropriate to the countries concerned. The interaction between the two types of phenomena would then need to be studied and also any influence that foreign investment and emigration may have on certain external constraints on development, such as the balance of payments. Lastly, as already pointed out, it will be assumed at the outset that there is a manpower surplus or, more precisely, that there is no loss of production associated with a new job or emigration.

## FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND EMIGRATION IN AN ECONOMY WITH LABOUR SURPLUS

### Influence of emigration and foreign investment on the overall growth of productive capacity

12. Given an unlimited supply of manpower, it is natural, from the overall economic growth viewpoint, to regard capital as the main limiting factor on development. In these circumstances, the influence of emigration or foreign investment on growth can be analysed by means of a Harrod-Domar model in which capital stock would be divided between domestic and foreign capital and national income would consist essentially

in the production derived from the capital (less the profits repatriated by the foreign investors) and the wages transferred by the migrant workers. It is clear that temporary emigration and foreign investment may encourage and even accelerate growth, mainly through its effect on productivity of domestic capital, national income and savings. These different effects will be considered in turn, before attempting an overall assessment of the influence of these two phenomena on the economic growth of the countries concerned.

### Transfer of technology and skills

**13.** The productivity of domestic capital may increase, in the course of time, as a result of the technological progress that is involved in the very process by which the capital is accumulated. To the extent that the rate of this accumulation is increased by emigration and foreign capital, both may contribute indirectly to an increase in the rate of economic growth. They may, however, have direct effects on the productivity of local capital.

**14.** Technology transfer associated with foreign investment is of two types: the technology that is itself introduced by the foreign investor for his own purposes, which can hardly have any major impact on the productivity of domestic capital, and that generated as a result of the relations between a foreign firm and local industry. A foreign investor will often find it useful to improve the production methods of his local suppliers and he may thus directly increase domestic productivity. A similar advantage is not offered by emigration.

**15.** Emigration however, like foreign investment, is likely to increase the average skill of manpower at no cost to the economy concerned. From this viewpoint the two phenomena are completely on a par, but the increase in the productivity of domestic capital (or of manpower) which they may induce is dependent upon:

- the real opportunities they offer for acquiring skills (level of skill—number of opportunities);
- the extent to which domestic industry is able to utilize the special skills that are developed;
- the rate at which manpower rotates between the foreign firm and the rest of the economy in the case of foreign investment, and between host country and country of origin in the case of emigration (foreign workers returning home).

**16.** It is unfortunately difficult to analyse all the results of the effects which have been listed. There is no adequate methodology for integrating those effects fully into a development theory. Empirically, it is possible—but this is all—to observe the existence of those effects in certain cases though there is no way of quantifying them (5). These transfers of technology and know-how associated with movements of factors of production, however, should be given priority in research.

### Income resulting from emigration and from foreign investment

**17.** From the long-term growth viewpoint, the main contribution from foreign investment and temporary emigration is the increase in savings available for the purposes of productive investment. These additional savings are partly due to the additional income generated in the two cases and partly to the amount saved out of that income.

**18.** Taking as a common basis of evaluation the number of jobs created at home or offered abroad, the first problem is to compare the income arising from foreign investment with that from emigration. In the case of a migrant the income to be taken into account for the job he does is that part of his wages which he sends home (and the savings he brings back on his return), and not the total wage received abroad. This follows directly from the distinction already made between the welfare and development effects. From the latter standpoint only the repatriated wages are involved, since only they can produce an additional flow of domestic investment. As regards foreign investment, on the other hand, the income from the jobs created consists not only of the wages received but also in the related revenue accruing to the host country, (which may be evaluated on the basis of the wages paid): charges payable on wages, direct taxes (6), and in a perhaps less tangible way, the profits reinvested in the host country.

**19.** This definition of revenue that is “utilisable” (for purpose of development) is in itself relatively interesting. On the assumption, for the sake of argument, that the alternative is a local job in a foreign firm or a job abroad, and further that the opportunity cost of the jobs is nil (we are assuming there is a labour surplus), the comparative income levels referred to in the previous section would suggest that foreign investment is likely to generate more “utilisable” income than emigration, and this would, in certain cases, be conclusive.

Unfortunately, the choice offered to countries of emigration does not consist in an equal number of local jobs or jobs abroad, and, besides, the amount of savings from local income would probably not be the same as that saved abroad. A further point is that this comparison has no effect at all upon the welfare derived from either of the alternatives.

### Savings derived from emigration and foreign investment

**20.** As regards savings sent home by migrants, a first distinction needs to be drawn between transfers for the maintenance of the family at home, which do not in theory constitute savings, and money sent home purely for savings purposes (this is generally the primary object of temporary emigration) (7). In this connection, money may be saved either in the home country or in the host country with different economic consequences in the two cases. A final point for consideration is the variation in end-use to which the migrants will put their savings when they finally come home.

**21.** Stress has often been laid on the non-productive nature of investments by returning migrants. Here the question is simply whether migrants use their savings for consumer good and thus *consumer* resources or for purposes of productive investment, possibly indirectly. To regard the purchase of land for instance (and, more generally, the purchase of an already existing capital goods) as non-productive, is to ignore the fact that neither does the land have to be produced nor has there been any consumption of resources in the economy concerned, and, furthermore, that the proceeds of the sale may be used by the vendor for more productive purposes. Instead of looking upon this type of transaction as wholly non-productive, it would be more logical to proceed on the initial assumption that it gives rise to genuine savings, at a rate more or less equal to the national rate. On the other hand, the purchase of consumer goods, of whatever kind, would be a zero rate of savings, and any repatriated savings invested in productive transactions (workshops, machines, tractors, lodgings) would constitute a rate of saving approaching unity (account must also be taken of the collective opportunity of the type of direct investment made by the returning migrant). All in all, therefore, the rate of savings from emigration income depends entirely on the share that consumption, in the true sense of the term, absorbs in the end-uses to which the income is put.

**22.** Seen in this light, the problem of whether the rate of savings from emigration is higher than the national rate or not becomes a purely empirical question. There is very little information available on the use which migrants make of the income they transfer, but one of the main reasons given for emigrating is to accumulate a certain amount of capital, it seems logical to conclude that the share of consumption in the end-uses to which savings are put is small, and that therefore the rate of savings out of emigration income could well be considerably higher than the national figure.

**23.** This, of course, only applies in cases where the migrant makes a single transfer of all the savings he has accumulated abroad, but if expatriate workers have accumulated savings in the economic system of the home country, the repatriated income has two possible utilisations. It constitutes a gross increase in national savings, for as long as the migrant is abroad, regardless of the use to which the migrant eventually puts his income, and when he does return, the income will either retain or lose its savings value depending on whether it is invested productively or spent in consumption. In the latter case, however, the community in the home country will have benefited from the savings during the period between accumulation and use, to an extent varying with the discount rate in the economy concerned and the average time that migrants stay.

**24.** To sum up, productive savings generated by emigration income will depend on:

- what part of the income goes to maintain the family at home;
- the extent to which savings are accumulated in the economic system of the home country; and
- how far savings are not spent on consumer goods.

In the absence of empirical data, the value of these savings cannot be assessed with accuracy.

**25.** As regards income from foreign investment, however, there is every reason to believe that the rate of savings is higher than the national rate. Foreign capital is generally invested in the most modern area of the economy accounting, directly or indirectly, for a large share of national savings, both public and private. Savings generated by foreign investment, however, differ from savings derived from emigration in the sense that they are made primarily by the state and the foreign investors themselves (reinvested profits). A study of the effects of this difference is beyond the scope of this document. It should, however, be noted that

profits reinvested by foreign firms in the host economy cannot properly be considered as participating fully in the development of the productive capacity of that economy, and this fact reduces the "effectiveness" of savings directly generated by foreign investment.

**26.** So far, we have considered only the direct contribution to national savings of foreign investment and emigration. If, however, it is accepted that there is a positive correlation between that rate of national savings and the level of national income per head, the two phenomena may be said to have the indirect effect of accelerating economic development through the additional income they generate. In the case of emigration, this effect is greater because fewer individuals share the national income. If it were possible to show a firm correlation between rate of savings and income per head in the less-developed economies concerned, this would also prove that emigration, rather than foreign investment, is the real *accelerator* of economic growth.

### Overall effect of foreign investment and emigration on economic growth

**27.** To sum up what has been said, it is clear that, in the presence of a labour surplus, emigration and foreign investment cannot fail to make a positive contribution to the development of a given country's domestic productive sources by increasing the national income. It should however be noted that their contribution to the development of national productive capacities may be higher than their direct contribution to national income, because the rate of savings in both cases may be higher than the rate of savings from income derived from purely domestic sources. Through their effects on the productivity of domestic capital and on the national rate of savings the two phenomena may also accelerate the rate of economic growth.

**28.** In accordance with the criterion referred to in paragraph 10, the development of a country whose nationals are temporarily employed abroad may be measured, not by the product of national resources, but by the income they generate *plus* that earned abroad by temporary migrants. Whilst this is contrary to national accounting practice which regards migrant workers as *residents* (whose production and income are credited to the national product of the host country), it nevertheless reflects the temporary aspect of emigration. Adopting this criterion, emigration offers the added advantage over foreign investment, that it may be the cause of a reduction in population growth.

**29.** This may be a direct effect to the extent that some migrants, arriving on a temporary basis, may settle in the country of adoption (and at the same time re-apply all their savings from the jobs initially offered abroad, since it may be assumed that the settler will not send money back to his home country). Indirectly, temporary emigration may also slow down natural population growth through:

- the lower birth rate among the migrants (a fact which is generally accepted by demographers);
- a reduction in the number of marriages, and, consequently, of births in the home country, because of the large number of bachelors who emigrate;
- transmission of family planning information by returning migrants.

If these effects are appreciable, they may contribute to the development of the country of origin, and they may also release resources previously earmarked for a birth control policy.

**30.** Besides their contribution to development, emigration and foreign investment directly contribute to an increase (possibly only temporary) in the welfare of the resident population by increasing its income. Here again emigration has an added effect because it reduces the number of residents. This factor could be of importance in a comparison between foreign investment and temporary emigration. Assuming that migrants enjoy a far higher standard of living abroad than they would have had at home, emigration may mean that a country's development target (in terms of national product per head) would give its population a higher welfare than if the objective had been set by a policy based on increased foreign investment.

**31.** The simple economic model which we have just studied has outlined the major effects of foreign investment and of temporary emigration on the development of an economy's own resources. In the light of the preceding remarks, it is clear that a true evaluation of the effects of these two phenomena cannot be measured solely by their contribution to national income, as has been so often advanced by writers on the subject. This is an important conclusion from this short analysis. It would not be possible, however, to compare and measure the relative effectiveness of foreign investment and of emigration without analysing their effects on the various types of development which they promote, and whilst retaining the assumption of a manpower surplus.

## Structural effects of emigration and foreign investment

**32.** The model we have used for the study of foreign investment and emigration is a global one and related exclusively to supply. The two phenomena should now be analysed taking into account the *dual* aspect of the economies concerned and the demand structure.

**33.** The development process of a dualistic economy in its "take-off" phase (absorption of labour surplus) is simple. The unlimited labour supply in the traditional sector (usually the rural sector) drains off to the industrial sector which, the demand situation so permitting, is the prime mover of economic growth. As the labour surplus in the traditional sector is absorbed (rural exodus) wages in that sector rise to marginal productivity level. In a subsequent phase in the process, the rural sector itself becomes profitable in the eyes of investors and this may bring about a more balanced growth.

**34.** During the "take-off" phase, it is clear that emigration and foreign investment may have major effects on the demand structure, as also on the absorption of surplus labour in the traditional sector and on the movement away from the land.

**35.** The influence of foreign investment and of emigration on this movement is very complex, especially if the existence of important pockets of urban unemployment (or under-employment) is taken into account. Diagram 1 shows the different flows of manpower which emigration and the creation of new urban jobs by a foreign investor may generate. The diagram shows that the effects of the two phenomena on the allocation of manpower resources in a dualistic economy depend directly on:

- the structural composition of migrants and of workers recruited by the foreign investor:
- the rate of reaction of the internal migration process to the heightened probability of jobs in the urban sector (that is to say the increase in the number of jobs and/or the decrease in urban unemployment and under-employment);
- the rate of rotation of migrants, and the jobs they take up when they return.


**36.** In the present state of our statistical and analytical knowledge of internal and "external" migration, it is impossible to give any indication of the extent of these flows. The most that can be said is that foreign investment and emigration have speeded up the rural exodus. In the take-off phase of an economy this lack of knowledge is of little importance. Indeed, except where foreign countries or foreign investors recruit "scarce" manpower in an economy (emigration of skilled workers already in jobs, etc.) no loss of production is involved. But in subsequent phases of the process of development (or if there is no manpower surplus), knowledge of the flows is of primary importance for assessing the loss of production due to the two phenomena under study.

**37.** In view of the fact that foreign investment generally goes into industry, the demand it generates mainly relates to industrial intermediate goods and services from the "modern" sector of the economy. It may consequently be thought that foreign investment will more or less rapidly form a centre of industrial growth. This does depend, of course, on whether local enterprises are able to satisfy the demand, and also on whether it is possible and economically viable for the foreign investor to obtain his supplies locally.

**38.** The second type of demand generated by foreign investment materialises through the channel of the wage-earners it employs and the public authorities. It is difficult to know, with any certainty, what type of goods this demand will concern, but it may be assumed that since it stems from the most dynamic sector of the economy, it will be far more concerned with industrial goods than with demand from the economy as a whole.

**39.** As for emigration, it may also be thought that the internal demand it generates is oriented more towards industrial or other durable goods (housing, in particular) than towards foodstuffs, at least if wages sent home to support the family are disregarded. Indeed, even if migrants' savings are used for acquiring durable goods that already exist (or more exactly "capital" goods: land, business, housing), the vendor's elasticity of demand will probably be higher than that of the average population.

**40.** The effect on the economy of demand generated by income from emigration or from new urban jobs, should not be underestimated. The boom in housebuilding, and its consequences in certain countries supplying foreign labour, is an instance of its considerable potential (and could serve as proof of the economic influence of emigration). Even so it seems however that the stimulating effect on industry that may be expected from the establishment of a foreign firm may, in certain cases, be higher in the less developed countries.



Manpower flows generated by the creation of new jobs and by emigration.

41. Alongside the growth in the demand for industrial goods, foreign investment and emigration—and the rural exodus which they cause—may create imbalance on the food market. This is particularly true of the less developed territories where elasticity in the demand for foodstuffs in relation to income is high, even if the rural exodus should not lead to a reduction in agricultural output. This effect should be less marked in the case of emigration because food probably forms only a small part of the demand from migrants. Besides, it is evident that this problem is bound up with the process of industrial development as such, and is not peculiar to emigration or to foreign investment. Foreign investment may, however, be more directly involved, being more intrinsically associated with industrial development.

42. To sum up this brief analysis of the structural effects of foreign investment and emigration, it is not possible to do more than stress the importance of their possible effects on demand and, in particular, that of the stimulus imparted to industry by foreign investment. Any definite conclusions on the effects of emigration on demand is made impossible by the same difficulties as those encountered when studying its effect on savings. If demand for industrial goods may be considered as a “permissive” factor with regard to general economic growth as studied above, the two phenomena may also help to unshackle development in certain cases.

#### Effects of foreign investment and emigration on the balance of payments

43. Foreign investment and emigration may also help to dispose of another factor that may restrain development: a deficit in the balance of payments. Income from emigration is usually earned in foreign currency, and, what is more, in “strong” currencies (at least in the European context). This advantage clearly exists regardless of the use that returning migrants may make of their income. Even in the most unfavourable case where the whole income is spent on the consumption of imported goods, the home country would still benefit from the customs duties which would constitute a net credit in foreign currency. The contribution made by foreign investment to the balance of payments depends on the purpose of the investment. According to G. Reuber (9), foreign investment may be classified under the following headings:

- export-oriented investment,
- import substitution investments,
- investments whose sole target is the local market.

It is clear that only the first two types of investment help the balance of payments through their current earnings particularly if they involve reduced imports of intermediate goods. The contribution made by foreign investment to the balance of payments of the host country therefore depends primarily on the scale of investment generating and supplying local demand. Here again it would be natural to assume that this scale should vary in inverse proportion to the degree of development of the country concerned.

44. To wind up this brief review of the structural and indirect effects of foreign investment and emigration on development, there appears to be no grounds for radical modifications to the conclusions at which we had arrived with regard to their contribution to general economic growth. It would even appear that the potential stimulus to industry and the contribution to the balance of payments generated by both processes could make this contribution even greater than that apparent from a general analysis of the problem. This can, of course, only be true on the assumption of a manpower surplus which has been our premise up to this point.

## FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND EMIGRATION IN AN ECONOMY WHERE THE LABOUR SUPPLY IS LIMITED

**45.** To what extent would the foregoing conclusions have to be altered in a case where there is marginal productivity of labour in all sectors of the economy, or where substitution of labour for capital is still possible in all fields of production. To give a full answer to this question would mean integrating foreign investment and temporary emigration into a model of complex growth, which would soon lead to insurmountable analytical difficulties. In any case, the state of our statistical knowledge would render such a sophisticated exercise relatively pointless, particularly since our earlier conclusions may be modified without recourse to such a model.

**46.** Leaving aside any production losses due to foreign investment or emigration, their effect on the general growth of national productive capacities remains fundamentally the same. The increase in national income (less production losses), the possible increase in savings and in the rate of savings, the increase in the efficiency of manpower and capital through technology transfer and training and the reduction in population growth have already been considered in detail and do not call for major revision if the manpower surplus assumption is dropped.

**47.** The question remains of whether production losses resulting from foreign investment and emigration may be of sufficient importance to wipe out the otherwise positive effect on the development of the domestic resources of the country concerned. According to economic theory, any capital contribution generates additional revenue, however small, even when profits repatriated by investors are deducted from it. This, however, is only true in the long term and conditional on certain adjustments to the domestic economy. In the case of emigration, if none of the workers taking jobs abroad settle down there permanently, and if every temporary migrant transfers his savings to his home country, the community can only benefit. It is surely highly unlikely that a person will emigrate temporarily without a substantial increase in income and therefore in savings. To what extent, however, are the two conditions satisfied?

**48.** If, moreover, we take the indirect and structural effects of the two phenomena into account, and in particular the rural-urban migration which they may generate (diagram 1), it is clear that the effect of foreign investment and emigration may *in the long run* be *negative*. It is therefore vitally important to have at least some approximate knowledge of the following: composition of the migratory flow out of the country, process of rural-urban migration, consumption patterns, etc.

**49.** This is not the place for a detailed study of the structural effects of foreign investment and emigration in cases where they involve production losses. It is in fact not difficult to see that the effects described earlier would remain more or less unchanged, although their relative importance might vary with the degree of development of the country concerned. It may, for instance, be shown that the contribution to development derived from foreign investment and emigration is more clearly industrial when the country concerned has already reached a fairly advanced stage of development. It is also true, however, that the extent of the effect they may have on the growth of national productive resources varies inversely with the level of development, and that it may be completely nil in the long run (at least in the case of emigration). Clearly, at a specified level of development, their effectiveness also depends on the conditions associated with them.

**50.** In the circumstances, it is clear that the economic balance of foreign investment and emigration in a given country depends directly on its economic situation and on their specific nature in the country concerned. There would therefore be little point in drawing any general conclusions or attempting to qualify emigration or foreign investment as a "good" or a "bad thing". On the assumption of a labour surplus, both have been shown to have positive effects and empirical research has confirmed that this assumption was realistic in certain specific cases. Before this conclusion could be extended to the case of more advanced countries a study of empirical data would be necessary. It is, however, certain that there exists a certain margin, even after the labour surplus is absorbed, within which foreign investment and emigration may prove of real benefit to economic development.

## CONCLUSION

**51.** This theoretical analysis has highlighted the many similarities between temporary emigration and foreign investment, at least in cases where the latter is regarded as a foreign enclave with the domestic economy.

It has also shown the beneficial effects that both may have on national economic development, at least in the first phases of the development process.

**52.** This beneficial influence common to both suggests that there may be some sort of trade-off between the two in terms of a given development objective. In other words, a particular objective might be achievable either as a result of the inflow of foreign capital or of an increased migratory flow or possibly by a combination of the two. If it were possible to measure the relative effectiveness of foreign investment and of emigration in relation to development, and also to know which of the two policies the industrial countries tend to force upon the countries of emigration, it would then be possible to determine the policy which would best suit the interests of the countries of emigration. Several major problems, however, remain to be solved before policy recommendations of this sort can be made.

**53.** For one thing this paper has considered only foreign investment where the capital is held entirely by foreign nationals. If a development project were being financed jointly by foreign and domestic capital, this might materially affect the analysis. To what extent could such a joint investment be regarded as part of domestic resources or as a foreign economic enclave? If it is possible to regard such a project as one in which foreign and domestic capital are complementary and which, therefore, even partially contributes directly to national productive capacities, then foreign investment in this broader definition offers a considerable advantage over emigration (which does not raise the same problem of definition). The reply to the question is not easy to produce and would appear to depend primarily on certain policy options that are included expressly or by implication in the management of the national economy.

**54.** The other fundamental question is whether the problems outlined in this document may be resolved from the empirical data available. Our own research at the O.E.C.D. Development Centre (the theoretical aspect of which is, in part, summarised in this paper) would incline us to the pessimistic view, at least if the countries concerned by the problem are considered as a whole. As we have pointed out before, the differences between the countries and the specific nature of foreign investment and emigration in the various countries rule out the possibility of any general conclusions. It is nonetheless true that an evaluation of all the available data and of the part-answers such data might furnish, is of paramount importance. Unfortunately the work which we have undertaken with that end in view is not sufficiently far advanced for an overall picture of this kind to be presented.

**55.** If research on foreign investment and emigration were to be concentrated on one particular country the results might well be more clearcut. Most countries do in fact have models applying to development or models for evaluating investment projects. However imperfect these models or evaluation criteria, data on shadow-wages, reference exchange rates, etc., would allow partial answers to be given to the questions raised in this document, and probably enable the relative importance of the effects of foreign investment and emigration in a given economy to be established. In our opinion, this is the direction that research into these two problems—and we hope we have shown how important such research is—ought, in the future, to take.

## REFERENCES

- (1) See G. Gallais-Hamonno and F. Bourguignon, above p. 145.
- (2) Because of the heterogeneity of the labour force, the two may coexist.
- (3) Account should also be taken of the "cost" involved in this operation in terms of time.
- (4) An illustration of the way in which statistics in relation to emigration analysis may be misleading is the case of Portugal where income per head rose by 5.2 per cent between 1960 and 1970 whereas the rate of development was only 1.3 per cent. This of course assumes that there were no production losses because of emigration.
- (5) The real gain, however, from transfers of experience appears to be very small.
- (6) Indirect taxes cannot be included in this income, because they merely redistribute existing income.
- (7) At least according to enquiries made in certain countries.
- (8) Excepting of course that part that goes to support the family at home.
- (9) *Private Foreign Investment Development*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973.

V

DEMOGRAPHIC IMPLICATIONS  
OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

# THE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT MIGRATION MODELS ON AGE STRUCTURE AND FERTILITY

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## 1. Foreword

1. The economic and social effects of international migrations depend largely on their demographic effects. In the first place there are the *direct* consequences that loss or acquisition of population have on the structure—and principally the sex and age structure—of the population of the countries the migrants leave and join. It is well known that the proportion of the population of working age is closely connected with the relation between productivity per worker and income per head; that the ability of a society to provide for collective needs in the field of health, education and recreational activities is conditioned by the ratio between the “working” and the “dependants” in the population (the so-called “dependency ratio”) (1); and finally, that changes in the age structure of the population have important effects on the level of demand for many consumer durable goods. Many more such relations could be enumerated, but—I repeat—these implications are too well known and too much discussed to require stressing.

2. In the second place—and it should be clear that this is not a scale of effects ordered according to importance, but a simple and almost mechanical succession of phenomena—there are the effects which through changes in structure (of sex, age, marital status) have *indirect* repercussions on the demographic processes (nuptiality, fertility and mortality) of the population. These changes—to which must be added others, not demographic but sociological in nature, connected with the “selectivity” of migrations and phenomena of assimilation—act on the intensity and temporal distribution of population processes and thus cause further variations in structure which will be cumulative with those directly caused by migrations, and both together, by means of a mechanism of repetition, reflect on subsequent processes.

3. A discussion of the demographic effects of international migrations cannot, therefore, avoid going into both the orders of problems briefly outlined, that of *direct* and that of *indirect* effects. We did, however, place limitations on the task entrusted us, both for reasons of time and in order not to repeat results already achieved in the past by other workers. We refer in particular to the study of Tabah and Cataldi, in 1963, on the demographic effects of immigration, which, besides a more recent work by Keyfitz (which, however, is based on a different method and aims to obtain different information from our own and that of Tabah and Cataldi) on certain demographic effects of migrations, is one of the few examples of a scientific treatment of the subject we have to discuss (2).

4. We shall state immediately that our discussion will concentrate on the demographic effects of emigrations, at least as far as the direct consequences of migratory movements on the age structure of the population are concerned. This aspect of the problem will be developed by analysing a hypothetical situation, according to criteria which will shortly be explained. The effects of migrations on fertility, on the other hand, will be treated in a more general context, not excluding immigrations. It will be readily understood, however, that the approach in this case cannot be empirical—except within the limits of a generic analysis of natality or general fertility—: the problem cannot be subjected to experimentation without recourse to complex simulations, taking into account a vast range of possible alternative hypotheses from the almost complete lack of exact information about many demographic (and non-demographic) characteristics of migrants connected with their aptitude to procreate—but this is a point of view which is still in need of clarification and it will require a much longer time before this is done.

## THE EFFECTS OF EMIGRATION ON AGE STRUCTURE

### 2. Method

5. Among the factors which determine changes in numbers and structure of a population, migrations have a special place, for several reasons, of which one is particularly important. Insofar as it is an expression only of individual and social "will" (3), there are no "*a priori*" uncontrollable obstacles to migration processes, unlike the cases of fertility and mortality, which are basically regulated by biological and physiological factors. In the end while it is always possible to choose whether to migrate or not to migrate, it is impossible not to die, or for a woman to procreate outside her childbearing period. Moreover—and this is the most important point—whilst mortality and reproduction of a population obey general laws which vary in time and are dissimilar in different areas of the world, as a result of long-term historical and environmental circumstances, migrations, by their very nature, do not obey any demographic "law" but depend on social, economic and legislative factors, often strongly linked to temporary economic historical and environmental situations. The consequence of this basic difference is that the natural components of population growth (reproduction and survival) evolve slowly and regularly without sudden changes; while on the other hand, with the social element (migrations) irregularity and sudden variations are, almost always, the rule.

6. The fact that the demographic effects of migrations—and especially those of emigration on the population of the country of origin—have very rarely been treated with scientific precision, as was observed at the European Demographic Conference of 1972 (4), is probably explained by the peculiar character of migration.

7. However, although there is no precise demographic *typology* of migratory movements, and although there are no quantitative data on many of its characteristics which make it possible to define them exactly (5), it cannot be denied that some aspects of migration phenomena fall into categories which do not differ too much in space and time; among these are the sex and age structure of migrants (6). It is thus possible, at least within the limits of a very much simplified model which excludes violent temporal changes in migration, to study the demographic effects of migration using statistical data relating to particular national experiences, thus avoiding a resort to completely arbitrary working hypotheses. The results obtained, although they cannot be generalized, will at least yield a sufficiently significant framework of reference.

8. The model we have chosen for our work is very simple and not basically different from those used in similar studies (7); we have chosen a base population, with a given age and sex structure, and projected it, according to certain laws of mortality and fertility, for a period of 150 years (8) according to three different assumptions: a) zero migration, i.e. a closed population; b) and c) an annual migration, at constant age-specific rates, drawn from concrete experiences. Obviously the comparison between the results of hypothesis a) and of hypotheses b) and c) will indicate the different paths of demographic development produced by the currents of emigration at the assumed levels of fertility and mortality.

9. In practice, we have made six projections, three for the male population and three for the female population; the results for the population as a whole are obtained by aggregation.

10. We add that the period of 150 years covered by these projections has been divided into three sub-periods of equal duration but different rates of mortality and fertility. During the first 50 years—period 0—mortality and fertility remain constant at their starting levels; during the second 50 years—period 1—mortality decreases, while fertility remains constant; in the third period—period 2—mortality continues to decrease and fertility also decreases.

### 3. Hypotheses for the development of mortality and fertility

11. It is implicit in what has been said that the base population has not been chosen from actual populations. In order to be able to identify changes in the age structure of a population by the procedure described, it is not sufficient to assume only an expectation of life at birth, reproduction and emigration. The age-structure depends not only on the values of these quantities after the start of the projection but also on their past development. It is thus necessary to start with a population which has not yet suffered losses by emigration (or additions by immigration) and which has been "purged" of the effects of past evolution of mortality and fertility—in other words a stable population. In this case, the age and sex structure of our population at time 0 is that of the model "South" of the stable populations of Coale and Demeny (9) at mortality level 15, with an expectation of life at birth for females of 40.0 and for males of 38.5 years, and

gross and net reproduction rates amounting respectively to 3.00 and 1.75. As will readily be understood, given the high fertility levels, this population has a very young age structure, with a mean age of 24.7 years.

12. We should note that the characteristics assumed for the base population are not entirely artificial. Demographic situations of this type have existed during the first decades of this century in emigration regions of Mediterranean Europe, and they are not appreciably different from the conditions that existed, not many years ago, in the countries of North Africa and certain zones of Latin America.

13. The development of the expectation of life at birth and reproduction rates during the three sub-periods is given in the following table, by five-year intervals.

t	Period 0	Period 1									
		52.5	57.5	62.5	67.5	72.5	77.5	82.5	87.5	92.5	97.5
$e_0^f$	40.00	40.00	42.50	45.00	47.50	50.00	52.50	55.00	57.50	58.75	60.00
$e_0^m$	38.49	38.49	40.63	42.87	45.11	47.37	49.62	51.86	54.10	55.21	56.23
R	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
$R_0$	1.75	1.75	1.85	1.94	2.03	2.12	2.21	2.29	2.37	2.41	2.45

t	Period 2									
	102.5	107.5	112.5	117.5	122.5	127.5	132.5	137.5	142.5	147.5
$e_0^f$	61.00	62.00	63.00	64.00	65.00	66.00	67.00	68.00	69.00	70.00
$e_0^m$	56.83	57.33	58.31	59.78	61.25	62.21	63.17	64.14	65.11	66.08
R	2.85	2.70	2.55	2.40	2.25	2.15	2.05	1.95	1.85	1.70
$R_0$	2.37	2.27	2.15	2.09	1.95	1.89	1.81	1.74	1.66	1.54

14. The table requires some brief comments. We decided to assume an evolution of expectation of life at birth during the 100 years of mortality decline based to some extent on a development, recognized as typical. It will in any case be readily admitted that an initial value of  $e_0$  lower than 40.0 years was unacceptable (10), as this would be indicative of economic and social conditions so unfavorable as to compromise any possible development in health organization. It is well known, moreover, that the most rapid increase in expectation of life in general takes place between 40 and 55 years, after which the gains become progressively slower; first on account of the difficulties in creating a more advanced health and welfare organization, and then—at the higher levels—on account of the limited progress of medical science. These considerations explain the different rhythm of increase assumed for  $e_0$  during the second and third fifty-year periods of the projections.

15. The survival rates connected with each level of expectation of life have been taken, directly or by interpolation, from the Princeton model life tables (11) relevant to the model "South" to which the base population belongs.

16. As regards fertility, we confine ourselves to giving, below, the age-specific rates in five-year age-groups corresponding to initial ( $R = 3.00$ ) and final ( $R = 1.70$ ) reproduction levels.

Age	R = 3.00	R = 1.70	Variation (%)
15-19	83.40	59.12	-29
20-24	270.50	192.71	-29
25-29	299.15	205.57	-31
30-34	255.82	138.47	-46
35-39	193.05	77.64	-60
40-44	100.40	37.89	-62
45-49	27.21	5.82	-79

As can be seen, it has been assumed that fertility will fall more rapidly in the higher age groups. The timing of fertility thus changes with time, and the mean age of fertility during the last 50-year period falls from 29.9 years to 28.3 years.

17. We should add that we have assumed that there is no difference in the demographic behaviour of emigrants as compared with those who remain: the "mobile" and the "settled" populations in our model exhibit identical fertility and mortality.

#### 4. Hypotheses on emigration

18. It has been assumed that the base population was subjected, for the whole 150-year period, to a continuous flow of emigration at constant age-specific rates which varied in the two models. These models were drawn from Italian experience for the periods 1920-25 (Model "A") and 1951-61 (Model "B") (12), and are sufficiently representative of a possible basic "typology"—(this term should be understood with the due reservations)—of modern emigrations, as regards sex ratio and age composition. The average rates of net emigration by five-year age-groups are given in the following table.

ANNUAL AGE-SPECIFIC NET EMIGRATION RATES (EMIGRANTS P. 1000 POPULATION)

Age	Model "A"		Model "B"	
	M	F	M	F
0-4	-1.55	-1.62	-1.81	-1.25
5-9	-1.44	-1.37	-1.61	-0.76
10-14	-2.79	-2.10	-2.16	-1.22
15-19	-7.73	-3.92	-3.52	-2.70
20-24	-22.67	-6.78	-5.08	-4.07
25-29	-16.82	-5.97	-5.15	-3.89
30-34	-8.41	-4.08	-3.65	-2.84
35-39	-5.01	-2.83	-2.19	-2.09
40-44	-3.99	-1.90	-1.44	-1.77
45-49	-3.04	-1.55	-0.98	-1.58
50-54	-1.70	-1.53	-0.44	-1.22
55-59	-0.65	-1.39	-0.04	-0.85
60-64	-0.23	-1.18	+0.08	-0.84

19. Both models show characteristics which may be considered as typical of international emigrations, in terms of net flows, though at different rates, a marked excess of males over females, a bell-shaped age structure with a maximum in the age-groups 20-24 and 25-29 years, and highest net female emigration at the more advanced ages.

20. In Model "A", however, emigration is much more intense and has more marked anomalies than in model "B". The average overall annual rate of emigration, in fact, is nearly 0.50% in model "A" (0.61% for males, 0.31% for females, (given the structure of our base population of departure)—a relatively high value, though still far from the highest values observed in some European countries and in Italy itself during the last century. In model "B", on the other hand, it amounts to about 0.23% (0.27% for males, 0.19% for females); the more intense migration is seen in age-specific rates, if we exclude childhood rates for males, and look at both sexes separately. The first model, however, differs from the second mainly in its structural characteristics: the disproportion between the sexes among the migrants, in favour of males (the M/F ratio of the average annual rates is 2.1 in model "A" and 1.2 in model "B"); the more pronounced peak values in the age distribution, especially for males, with a stronger concentration in the central age-groups (male emigrants aged 20-29 amount to 53.4% of all emigrants in model "A", and 38.0% in model "B"); for men relatively higher rates at the older ages, bringing about an older age structure of migrants (mean age 24.4 years in model "A", against 19.0 years in model "B"), while the opposite is true for the women, who in model "A" show a younger age structure (mean age 21.8 years, against 24.2 years); finally, a smaller relative importance in both sexes of the rates for the first age-groups, together with a clear lag, as compared to model "B", in the inversion of the M/F ratio in the distribution of age-specific rates.

21. These characteristics clearly define the different types of emigration underlying the two models. Model "A" corresponds to distant emigration—and in fact during the period 1920-25 Italian emigration was predominantly overseas—where the move is difficult and risky, rarely repeatable and essentially individual

in character. It is well known that modern emigration is essentially an individual phenomenon, and this is also a characteristic feature of Model "B". It is easy to see, however, that the second model is mainly one of short-distance emigration, intracontinental and less difficult, and that a much greater part is played by moves of family units, as witness the rates for infants and slightly older age groups.

22. Before concluding this brief illustrative note on the two models, we must at least mention—though the problem would deserve much more than a mention—the ambiguity of net measures of emigration (emigrants less those who return home), and the dangers of using these in the analysis of demographic behaviour—a problem more important perhaps in the study of indirect than of direct effects of migration. It is, however, difficult to find a satisfactory solution. It is obvious that, working on the basis of net flows, the annual number leaving are considered as definitive emigrants; in reality no distinction is made between different types of emigration, nor of the length of migrants' stay abroad, which varies considerably at different times. What really counts for demographic purposes is the number of person/years lived in the population or outside it, and thus added to or lost by the population, and this figure is approximated by a balance of the "initial population + arrivals — departures" type—such as is normally used—only over a very long period of time.

## 5. The results of the projections

23. We shall now look at the results of the six projections. For each period they have been summarized in a series of indices which describe the development, of the stable base population both as regards total numbers and also its structural and dynamic components, on each of the three hypotheses. We have adopted the following symbols:  $S(x, x + n)$  indicates the proportion of individuals of age  $x, x + n$ ; DRT the total dependency ratio ( $S(0,14) + S(65 +)/S(15,64)$ ); DRG the dependency ratio of the young population ( $S(0,14)/S(15,64)$ ); DRV the dependency ratio for the elderly population ( $S(65 +)/S(15,64)$ ); IST the stability index ( $S(15,39)/S(40,64)$ );  $b$  the birth rate;  $m$  the death rate;  $r'$  the rate of natural increase;  $r$  the actual growth rate.

### I) Period 0

#### 1) Model "A"

24. During the first period (see tab. 1), in which the components of natural increase remain unchanged, the effects of migration on age structure are different for the two sexes. Emigration seems to have had a very slight effect, on the female population, though it makes the age structure slightly older (low decrease in  $S(0,14)$  and increase of  $S(65 +)$ ) as compared with the initial population. However, it should be stressed that these are practically unnoticeable changes, which modify the dependency ratios and the stability index only slightly.

25. The structural effects of emigration on the female population have thus no repercussions worth noting on the number of births—but what repercussions there are, are likely to increase births, in view of the variation in  $S(15,49)$  and in IST, whence the slight increase in the birth rate.

26. The persistently large number of births and the large number of departures among the adult and elderly population lead, on the other hand, to a younger age structure of the male population, with a marked increase in  $S(0,14)$  (+ 7%) a strong decrease in  $S(50 +)$  and consequently, more marked increases in DRT and DRG; The tendency to a younger age structure is also apparent at working ages, as witnesses the considerable increase in IST (+ 22.55%).

Because of the higher proportion of young men in the male population, the death rate has decreased.

27. It is perhaps interesting to note—although it may already be clear, in view of the simplicity of the mechanism—that the basic changes, where they are important, take place within a very short time, as may be seen from the indices, given below, relating to the male population at short intervals.

	$t = 2.5$	$t = 17.5$	$t = 32.5$	$t = 47.5$
DRT (%)	79.17	87.02	88.36	87.38
DRG (%)	73.42	80.78	82.05	82.01
DRV (%)	5.75	6.25	6.31	5.37
$r'$ (‰)	18.87	20.08	20.02	20.38

TABLE 1 STRUCTURE AND GROWTH CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CLOSED POPULATION AND THE POPULATIONS WITH EMIGRATION AT BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD 0.

	Population with emigration											
	Model "A"						Model "B"					
	t = 2.5		t = 47.5		Variation (%)		t = 2.5		t = 47.5		Variation (%)	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Closed Population												
S (0,14) (%)	40.54	40.12	43.77	39.83	+6.81	-0.73	40.75	40.09	40.91	39.76	+0.39	-0.82
S (15,49) (%)	47.93	47.39	46.51	47.42	-1.65	+0.11	47.70	47.42	47.86	47.55	+0.34	+0.27
S (50,64) (%)	8.37	8.87	6.85	9.01	-19.60	+1.58	8.40	8.86	8.10	8.99	-3.57	+1.47
S (65+) (%)	3.17	3.66	2.87	3.75	-10.59	+3.02	3.15	3.63	3.13	3.70	-0.64	+1.93
DRT (%)	77.64	77.89	87.38	77.24	+10.37	-0.72	78.27	77.69	78.70	76.86	+0.55	-1.07
DRG (%)	72.01	71.38	82.01	70.59	+11.70	-1.05	72.65	71.23	73.11	70.33	+0.63	-1.26
DRV (%)	5.63	6.51	5.37	6.63	-6.61	+2.47	5.62	6.46	5.59	6.54	-0.53	+1.24
IST	2.232	2.146	2.644	2.133	+22.55	+0.09	2.216	2.139	2.307	2.133	+4.09	-0.27
e <sub>0</sub> (years)	38.49	40.00	38.49	40.00	0	0	38.49	40.00	38.49	40.00	0	0
n (%)	44.05	44.80	45.01	45.01	+0.47	+0.47	44.54	44.10	44.10	44.10	-0.99	-0.99
m (%)	24.14	25.90	24.72	24.72	-4.17	-4.17	25.55	24.64	24.64	24.64	-3.56	-3.56
r (%)	19.91	18.87	20.38	20.38	+8.00	+8.00	18.91	19.56	19.56	19.56	+3.44	+3.44
r (%)	19.91	15.63	16.21	16.21	+3.71	+3.71	17.68	17.43	17.43	17.43	-1.47	-1.47
R <sub>0</sub>	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	0	0	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	0	0
R	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	0	0	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	0	0

TABLE 2 STRUCTURE AND GROWTH CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CLOSED POPULATION AND THE POPULATIONS WITH EMIGRATION AT BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD 1

	Population with emigration											
	Closed Population						Population with emigration					
	t = 52.5		t = 97.5		Variation (%)		t = 52.5		t = 97.5		Variation (%)	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
S (0,14) (%)	40.54	40.02	42.21	41.55	+4.12	+3.82	43.45	39.86	45.35	41.77	+4.37	+4.79
S (15,49) (%)	47.95	47.52	46.61	46.05	-2.80	-3.09	46.79	47.35	44.72	45.89	-4.43	-3.08
S (50,64) (%)	8.38	8.84	7.97	8.55	-4.89	-3.28	7.06	9.06	6.98	8.40	-1.13	-7.29
S (65+) (%)	3.13	3.62	3.21	3.85	+2.56	+6.35	2.70	3.73	2.95	3.94	+9.26	+5.63
DRT (%)	77.53	77.43	83.20	83.16	+7.31	+7.40	85.70	77.28	93.41	84.20	+9.00	+8.95
DRG (%)	71.96	71.00	77.32	76.10	+7.45	+7.18	80.60	70.67	87.71	76.94	+8.82	+8.82
DRV (%)	5.57	6.42	5.88	7.06	+5.57	+9.97	5.01	6.61	5.70	7.26	+13.77	+9.83
IST	2.232	2.146	2.313	2.223	+3.64	+3.61	2.616	2.142	2.631	2.239	+0.57	+4.52
e <sub>0</sub> (years)	38.49	40.00	56.33	60.00	+46.35	+50.00	38.49	40.00	56.33	60.00	+46.35	+50.00
n (%)	44.39	42.85	42.85	45.02	-3.57	-3.57	45.02	43.79	43.79	43.79	-2.73	-2.73
m (%)	24.39	24.39	15.61	15.61	-35.81	-35.81	24.78	15.82	15.82	15.82	-37.80	-37.80
r (%)	19.95	19.95	27.44	27.44	+37.54	+37.54	20.24	27.89	27.89	27.89	+48.27	+48.27
r (%)	19.95	19.95	27.44	27.44	+37.54	+37.54	16.16	23.96	23.96	23.96	+40.00	+40.00
R <sub>0</sub>	1.75	1.75	2.45	2.45	+40.00	+40.00	1.75	1.75	2.45	2.45	+40.00	+40.00
R	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	0	0	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	0	0

2) *Model "B"*

**28.** The effects of emigration on the age structure in model "B" are similar to those in model "A" as regards the direction of the variations. These are slight for males; thus the situation after 50 years is not very far from stability. We find, in this case too, that the male age structure is younger, although—on account of the less pronounced anomalies in the age structure of the migrants—it is more evenly distributed over the ages. The female population shows a slight increase in the proportion of "working" age and in the older age groups. Natality decreases slightly because of the loss of women of reproductive age (IST: -0.27%); mortality also decreases, but at a higher rate, so that natural growth increases.

II) *Period 1*

**29.** The effects of the strong decline in mortality—which has the same effect as an increase in fertility—(see tab. 2) increases in the closed population the proportion of people aged 0-14 years and the elderly, aged over 65 years. There is thus a noticeable increase in both DRG and DRV, while the variation in IST is smaller. The smaller number of females in the childbearing ages resulting from the increase in S(0,14) and S(65 +) causes a lowering of the birth rate, although the level of reproduction remains unchanged.

1) *Model "A"*

**30.** The introduction of emigration leads to an accentuation of the effects of the decline in mortality; in the male population the groups S(0,14) and S(65 +) become larger in proportion and the increase in the dependency ratios is thus stronger. In the female population the situation is slightly different: compared with the closed population only the group S(0,14) shows a greater increase. As regards natality, emigration seems to have resulted in a lower decline, because in the "open" population the proportion of women of childbearing ages has decreased less relative to the other age-groups.

**31.** Logically, the still younger age structure of the population leads to a larger decline in mortality. The rate of natural increase consequently increases slightly faster, reaching the maximum level recorded during the 150 years at the end of this second period.

2) *Model "B"*

**32.** Similar considerations apply to the effects of emigration in model "B". The most important differences between the two migration patterns, particularly in the male population, seem to have exercised their greatest influence during the first fifty years.

**33.** As far as structural changes are concerned, however, we must point out that the change in the expectation of life has had greater effects than in the previous model. Substantially, during this second period the emigration pattern of model "B" seems to have had a relatively greater impact on the age structure and rate of increase.

III) *Period 2*

**34.** In the third period, it will be recalled, a further increase in the expectation of life at birth is accompanied by a considerable decrease in fertility (more than 40% in the gross reproduction rate). These changes (see tab. 3) lead to a decrease in the proportion S(0,14); the process of aging of the population, which derives from this, contributes to a lowering of the dependency ratios DRT and DRG and increasing DRV; moreover, the decrease in IST together with the more modest rise recorded in the group S(15,49) indicates that the losses due to the decline in fertility also involve the age group 15-39 years.

1) *Model "A" and model "B"*

**35.** Emigration reduces, slightly, the tendency to an aging of the population—though for males this attenuation is more marked for Model "A"—; it also favours a smaller decrease in natality, together with a larger fall in the death rate, and consequently acts as a brake to the fall in the rate of natural increase.

6. *Overall view*

**36.** We shall now try to draw some general conclusions from the results obtained in the six projections, the for whole period under study.

TABLE 3 - STRUCTURE AND GROWTH CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CLOSED POPULATION AND THE POPULATIONS WITH EMIGRATION AT BEGINNING AND END OF PERIOD 2.

	Closed Population						Population with emigration											
	t = 102.5			t = 147.5			t = 102.5			t = 147.5			t = 102.5			t = 147.5		
	M		F	M		F	M		F	M		F	M		F	M		F
	Variation (%)			Variation (%)			Variation (%)			Variation (%)			Variation (%)			Variation (%)		
S (0,14) (%)	42.35	41.62	35.26	34.47	-16.74	-17.18	45.74	41.90	38.67	34.83	-15.46	-16.87	42.97	41.87	35.95	34.73	-16.34	-17.05
S (15,49) (%)	46.53	46.08	50.50	50.01	+8.53	+8.53	44.51	45.84	48.96	49.71	+10.00	+8.44	45.94	45.99	49.96	49.86	+8.75	+8.41
S (50,64) (%)	7.89	8.41	9.75	10.22	+23.57	+21.52	6.83	8.29	8.39	10.04	+22.84	+21.11	7.76	8.26	9.38	10.06	+23.45	+21.79
S (65+) (%)	3.23	3.89	4.49	5.30	+39.01	+36.25	2.92	3.97	3.97	5.42	+35.96	+36.52	3.32	3.88	4.51	5.35	+35.84	+37.89
DRT (%)	83.76	83.52	65.97	66.04	-21.24	-20.93	94.77	84.75	74.36	67.39	-21.54	-20.48	86.19	84.34	67.96	66.90	-21.16	-20.68
DRG (%)	77.82	76.39	58.52	57.23	-24.80	-25.08	89.08	77.42	67.43	58.31	-24.30	-24.68	80.01	77.18	60.38	57.97	-24.54	-24.89
DRV (%)	5.94	7.13	7.45	8.81	+25.42	+23.56	5.69	7.33	6.93	9.08	+21.72	+23.87	6.18	7.16	7.38	8.93	+22.65	+24.72
IST	2.326	2.222	2.015	1.937	-13.74	-12.84	2.654	2.258	2.336	1.980	-11.96	-23.23	2.435	2.260	2.059	1.974	-15.42	-12.18
e <sub>0</sub> (years)	56.83	60.00	66.08	70.00	+16.28	+16.67	56.83	60.00	66.08	70.00	+16.28	+16.67	56.83	60.00	66.08	70.00	+16.28	+16.67
n (C <sub>00</sub> )	40.84		27.86		-31.78		41.82		28.81		-31.11		40.79		27.94		-31.50	
m (C <sub>00</sub> )	14.06		7.24		-48.51		14.19		7.07		-50.21		14.23		7.31		-48.57	
r' (C <sub>00</sub> )	26.78		20.62		-23.00		27.64		21.71		-21.46		26.71		20.70		-22.50	
r (C <sub>00</sub> )	26.78		20.62		-23.00		23.64		17.55		-25.76		24.72		18.78		-24.03	
R <sup>0</sup>	2.37		1.54		-35.02		2.37		1.54		-35.02		2.37		1.54		-35.02	
R	2.85		1.70		-40.35		2.85		1.70		-40.35		2.85		1.70		-40.35	

TABLE 4 BIRTH RATES AND PROPORTIONS OF WOMEN IN CHILDBEARING AGES IN THE "CLOSED" POPULATIONS AND "OPEN" POPULATIONS DURING THE THREE FIFTY-YEAR PERIODS OF THE PROJECTIONS

	Effects of immigration (I)						Effects of emigration					
	Closed population		Population with immigration		Closed population		Population with emigration model "A"		Closed population		Population with emigration model "B"	
	n	S (15,49)	n	S (15,49)	n	S (15,49)	n	S (15,49)	n	S (15,49)	n	S (15,49)
t = 2.5	44.7	49.06	44.5	48.92	44.1	47.39	44.8	47.37	44.5	47.42	44.1	47.55
t = 47.5	44.7	49.06	46.2	49.97	44.1	47.39	45.0	47.42	44.1	47.55	44.1	47.55
Variat. %	0	0	+3.82	+2.15	0	0	+0.45	+0.11	0	-0.90	-0.90	+0.27
t = 52.5	44.7	49.00	46.3	49.94	44.4	47.52	45.0	47.35	44.1	47.52	44.1	47.52
t = 97.5	43.1	47.47	44.1	48.32	42.8	46.05	43.8	45.89	42.7	45.82	42.7	45.82
Variat. %	-3.58	-3.12	-4.75	-3.24	-3.60	-3.09	-2.67	-3.08	-3.18	-3.14	-3.18	-3.14
t = 102.5	42.4	47.40	43.9	48.57	40.8	46.08	41.8	45.84	40.8	45.99	40.8	45.99
t = 147.5	31.3	49.91	32.8	51.26	27.8	50.01	28.8	49.71	27.9	49.86	27.9	49.86
Variat. %	-26.18	+5.30	-25.29	+5.54	-31.86	+8.53	-31.10	+8.44	-31.62	+8.41	-31.62	+8.41

(I) Data from: L. Tabah and A. Cataaldi, *op. cit.*

37. The changes occurring in the age structure of the population during the whole 150 years are quite marked, given the rapid change assumed for fertility and mortality.

38. The role played by emigration in this evolution has, in fact, been slight: the changes occurring at the beginning of the projections, when mortality and fertility rates were assumed constant, were soon absorbed and the effects of emigration, when components of natural growth change, are not sufficient to affect appreciably variations in the age structure caused by changes in mortality and fertility.

39. As a result, the differences between the age structure of the closed population and the population with emigration are slight at the end of 150 years, and this is confirmed by the values given in the following table, showing the relative differences between the age structure of the closed population, taken as a base, and the population subject to migration, for the two models of migration, at the beginning and the end of the projections.

	Males				Females			
	Model "A"		Model "B"		Model "A"		Model "B"	
	$t = 2.5$	$t = 147.5$						
S ( 0,14) (%)	+1.98	+9.67	+0.52	+1.97	0	+1.04	-0.77	+0.75
S (15,49) (%)	-1.34	-3.05	-0.48	-1.07	-0.04	-0.60	+0.06	-0.30
S (50,64) (%)	+1.79	-13.95	+0.36	-1.74	+0.57	-1.76	+0.45	-1.57
S (65+) (%)	+1.26	-20.44	-0.63	-9.62	-0.55	+2.26	-0.82	-0.94

40. Only for the males of model "A" are there appreciable differences; for the women of model "B" they are of no importance.

41. Changes of some note in age structure are to be expected, therefore, only when there is considerable emigration, especially when this is characterized by marked anomalies in age distribution. This latter factor, rather than the rate of flow, seems to be important. This is shown also by the differences recorded at the end of the first fifty-year period, not only between the results obtained for the two models, but also between male and female age structures in the same model. In a high mortality situation, involving infant and elderly age-groups disproportionately, an age-distribution of net emigration in which the initial and final age-groups assume greater importance, as is the case in the female population, leads to an older instead of a younger age distribution, even though the effect is slight.

42. It is obvious that the situation is reversed as soon as mortality declines, when gains in survivals are disproportionately great among infants and elderly persons. Female emigration also leads to a younger population, as the results show and as could be inferred from theory. Children and adolescents are involved only marginally in emigration, rates of emigration only become significant—particularly in Model "A"—after the age of 15 and reach maximum values around 25 years of age. As a result, the loss of migrants increases the proportion of the very young age-groups relative to all the other groups. As has been justly observed (13), the departure of emigrants—mortality and fertility levels remaining the same—has effects comparable with those of a reduction in infant mortality or an increase in fertility.

43. These conclusions should provide an answer to any proposal for a demographic policy tending to favour emigration as a remedy for too high a natural growth rate. The age structures, will not be appreciably different whether or not there is emigration; emigration leads to a higher proportion of young—accentuating the effect of a decline in mortality or attenuating that of lower fertility—and thus to less advantageous DRT and DRG ratios; the negative influence of emigration on DRV—deriving from a greater increase in the number of the elderly—seems, on the other hand, to depend on the emigration pattern assumed (it is, in fact, found consistently only for the female population) (14). Moreover, the stronger the current of emigration and the more anomalous its age structure—in the sense indicated above—the higher is the proportion at younger ages and the DRT and DRG ratios.

44. On the demographic level, thus, a policy of emigration, though obviously immediately reducing the actual growth rate, favours natural increase and leads to a less advantageous age structure—from the economic and social point of view—than would have been the case in the absence of emigration.

45. We shall add, in conclusion, that immigration—according to the results of Tabah and Cataldi (15)—has demographic effects similar to those just described, as is clear from the dependency ratios for the female population which we give below (16):

Projections of Tabah and Cataldi					Our Projections				
	<i>t</i>	DRT	DRG	DRV		<i>t</i>	DRT	DRG	DRV
Closed popul.	2.5	74.89	69.80	5.09	Closed popul.	2.5	77.89	71.38	6.51
	147.5	68.47	61.06	7.41		147.5	66.04	57.23	8.81
	%	-8.97	-12.52	+45.58		%	-15.21	-19.82	+35.33
Popul. with Immig.	2.5	75.99	71.01	4.98	Popul. with Emigr. M. "A"	2.5	77.88	71.34	6.47
	147.5	70.77	66.21	4.56		147.5	67.39	58.38	9.08
	%	-6.87	-6.76	+7.68		%	-13.47	-16.89	+34.87

46. It goes without saying that even if the effects are similar, the underlying mechanisms are completely different: the younger age structure of the population is caused by the immigration of women of child-bearing age resulting in an increase in the birth rate or compensating for the effects of the decline in fertility.

## EFFECTS OF MIGRATIONS ON FERTILITY

### 8. General

47. We now come to the effect of migration on fertility. As was stated at the beginning, for obvious reasons, it is difficult to give quantitative results in this case. In any dynamic model of the type adopted here, fertility is a parameter; it is thus set "a priori" and the model can provide no information concerning natality. In any case, changes in structure caused by migration, when the reproductive behaviour of the "mobile" and "settled" populations are the same, directly affect only the birth rate; fertility may be affected indirectly as a result of the disturbances caused by structural changes in the "marriage market" produced by migration.

48. Therefore, we can deal with fertility only on a speculative level—which means, turning our attention to the characteristics of migrations not considered in our model.

49. We recall, however, the quantitative estimates in our calculations and the study of Tabah and Cataldi, which will serve as a basis for discussion. In Tab. 4 we show the birth rates (together with the proportions of women of childbearing age) for "closed" and "open" populations, in the case where there is immigration or emigration. The differences which develop between the values for the "closed" and those for the "open" populations depend—reproduction rate and expectation of life being equal—on the changes caused by migration for the age structure of the population, which we have already examined in detail. We shall point out—as a corollary to what has already been mentioned—two facts to be borne in mind:

- a) neither emigration nor immigration seems to have any significant effect on natality, as is apparent from the final values in birth rates for the "closed" and "open" populations—they are quite near to one another;
- b) where R is falling, both emigration and immigration tend, slightly, to slow down the decline in natality levels.

50. On this basis, we will examine the factors which are modified by the existence of migration, and which directly influence the fertility level in the countries of origin and destination, factors which have been omitted in our model.

#### I) Structure by marital status and nuptiality

51. Little or nothing is known of the structure by marital status of migrants. The countries of emigration, even when they publish statistics on the marital status of expatriates—and this is rare—do not combine this information with data on age, which would be essential to obtain more than a very general knowledge of this subject. Information on both topics has been provided, in recent times, by some countries of immigration (France and West Germany, for instance) but referring only to working population.

52. It is generally believed that there is a predominance of single persons among migrants, when they are compared with countries of origin or destination, but this is a myth (17) which must be investigated. It is quite possible that single persons prevailed in a type of emigration such as is described by the first of our

models (model "A"); it is, however, doubtful whether this still holds true for recent emigration (model "B") at least within the European area. Both Livi Bacci (18) and Böhning (19) maintain that there are no significant differences in the structure by age and marital status between migrants and the populations of origin and destination. If this opinion were true, the structure by marital status of emigrants would have no effect on the fertility and natality of the countries of origin and arrival; if, on the other hand, the first hypothesis, were true, the larger proportion of the single in the migrant population would lead to higher reproduction levels, and thus a higher birth rate, in the population of origin, while the opposite effect could appear in the country of destination. These effects, therefore, are cumulative with those caused by changes in age structure.

**53.** More complex is the situation with regard to nuptiality. We should distinguish at once between countries of emigration and countries of immigration, and we continue to assume that the demographic behaviour of the "mobile" and "settled" populations is identical. In countries of emigration the structural characteristics of migrants can have two types of effect on nuptiality: for the sake of simplicity we shall consider the effect on the level of nuptiality rates (20) and the second on the age distribution of marriage.

**54.** Emigration will reduce nuptiality and lead to a fall in reproduction and natality levels: among the marriageable population the sex ratio will be much less favourable to women than would be the case in the absence of emigration, and the results of this imbalance become more important as differences between male and female emigration in the 15-30 year age-group increase.

**55.** The second type of effect arises because the age distribution of the single males and females who emigrate will be different from those of the marriageable population in the country of origin. If we assume that the age structure of single migrants for both sexes is similar to that of model "A", a situation might arise in which age differences between spouses could increase, and marriages would thus potentially become less fertile. Thus emigration, through its effects on nuptiality, would tend to reduce reproduction and birth rates.

**56.** The situation could be exactly the same, *mutatis mutandis*, for countries of immigration, if matters were not complicated by the behaviour of immigrants in respect to marriage in the country of destination. Several assumptions could be put forward in this regard and the two extremes would be (a) that choice of partner is completely independent of nationality, or (b) that the immigrants form an isolate. In the latter case, immigration, by increasing the single population, could have a slight negative effect on natality, but should not significantly affect reproduction rates in the country of arrival. In all other cases—and we apologize for the generalization, but more exact information would not only be difficult to obtain (21) but not very important—the effect of immigration on nuptiality and thus on reproduction and birth rates is likely to be positive.

## II) Selectivity of emigration and assimilation of immigrants

**57.** The problems connected with what is commonly called "selectivity" of emigration and with the assimilation of immigrants are of basic importance in judging the demographic effects of migration on the populations of origin and arrival. Although many contrasting theories have been put forward on the subject of "selectivity" (22), very little is known about it, both because of the absence of systematic studies and the extreme difficulty of carrying out strict comparative analyses. This is certainly not the place to discuss these theories, nor to establish to what extent they are justified. We consider, however, that it is possible to assert—and this is what interests us at present—that "selectivity" is closely connected with the type of emigration—and thus with environmental circumstances which are historically defined and differentiated.

**58.** Long-range emigration overseas (such as that of the first decades of this century), uncomfortable, risky and not repeatable—such as underlies our Model "A"—is certainly selective in some demographic characteristics (mortality and fertility) as well as in socio-economic and psychological characteristics and it has been suggested that the level of selectivity increases with increase in the difficulty of emigrating (23). In fact, emigration caused a marked biological selection among the women who left Italy for the United States at the beginning of the century, the incidence of sterility among them was markedly lower than among the married women of both the countries of origin and destination (24). But is it possible to imagine a biological selection at work in contemporary emigrations? A more acceptable hypothesis would be that at present, emigration, is a differential phenomenon as regards demographic characteristics, while there is far-reaching selectivity as far as socio-psychological characteristics are concerned. The limited information we have on the matter indicates that, economic and environmental situations being equal, the impulse to emigrate is stronger among higher socio-cultural groups (25).

**59.** Through "selectivity" then, the demographic behaviour of the "mobile" population differs from that of the "settled" population; the effects on fertility are, however, in a direction opposite to the nature of the selection. If this is biological, emigration clearly reduces the reproductive potential of the population of origin more than through structural effects only; if it is socio-psychological, it is possible to suppose that individuals who emigrate are to some extent already receptive to new "norms" of behaviour involving family planning, and are thus probably a group with lower fertility than those remaining in the country of origin.

**60.** We turn to the countries of immigration and thus to the problem of assimilation. In general, because of economic and socio-cultural differences between countries of emigration and immigration, the fertility of immigrants is higher than that of the native population (26). The consequences of this higher fertility are, obviously, greater the larger the socio-cultural differences, and the more lasting the longer and less complete is the process of integration of the immigrant population in the new society. But how long does this process take? Once again it is impossible to give exact answers. The experience of Italian emigrants to the United States during the first half of the century suggests that, in the past at least, the process took some time: around 1920, when the United States closed the doors on immigration, the ratio between the gross reproduction rate of women born in Italy and that of U.S. native white women was 104%—in favour of the Italian women—and not until 1936 did the reproduction rates of the two populations reach equality. It is clear, however, that this is a special case, and that, once again, it is not possible to formulate general hypotheses, as the influence of different historical and environmental factors was very important in this field.

## 9. Overall view

**61.** Although we are aware that any conclusions on such complex phenomena are open to criticism, and in spite of the perhaps excessively schematic nature of our analysis, we consider it possible to assert that factors not included in the model on which the projections are based must bring about effects which, in the majority of cases, agree with those found in the projections and accentuate their effect. However, we must stress two exceptions: (a) emigration has negative effects on nuptiality in the country of origin, and these will be the stronger if the numbers of definitive emigrants is larger and their stay abroad longer. Reproduction and birth rates will then fall. It is conceivable that in the population with an emigration pattern defined by model "A", these changes will be more noticeable and will lead to an attenuation of the large differences in age structure between "closed" and "open" population as they appear in the projections; (b) a further negative effect on the reproduction rate of the population of origin results from the biological selection of emigration. In this case the populations with an emigration pattern of model "A" will be the most affected.

## FINAL REMARKS

**62.** The demographic effects of emigrations on the age structure of the population of origin have been analysed by means of a model representing a situation which is highly simplified, but not arbitrary and which takes account only of sex-age-specific emigration rates among the many other differential factors in migration. The factors not included in the model are discussed in order to assess more fully the effects of migrations on fertility. In spite of the schematic character of the analysis, the results seem acceptable.

**63.** It is obviously possible to construct a more sophisticated model; we are convinced, however, that advances in the study of the demographic effects of migrations can come about only through research designed to fill the serious gaps in our knowledge of the differential behaviour of migrants. In our opinion it is important also to overcome a further obstacle to analysis, which in view of its complexity we have merely mentioned up to now—a solution has to be found to the problem of a typology of emigration and its duration, the consequences of which, especially with regard to fertility levels, may be more important even than the differences in the behaviour of the migrants.

## NOTES

- (1) See for example: B. Walsh, "An Empirical Study of the Age Structure of the Irish Population", *Economic and Social Review*, January 1970.
- (2) L. Tabah and A. Cataldi, "Effets d'une immigration dans quelques populations modèles", *Population*, 4, 1963.  
N. Keyfitz, "Migration as a Means of Population Control", *Population Studies*, 25 (1), 1971.  
We may also mention two studies of the United Nations Population Division which deal with the demographic effects of migrations:  
— "De quelques aspects quantitatifs du vieillissement des populations occidentales", *Bulletin Démographique des Nations Unies*, 1, Dec. 1951;  
— "The Population of South America 1950-1980", *Population Studies* n° 21, New York, 1955.
- (3) In reality the term "will" is very ambiguous. It is clear that not all emigrations in the past have been voluntary, and the act of emigrating rarely depends on a choice which is not forced, i.e. not caused, by the economic and social conditions of the environment—there is often no alternative to emigration. And in any case it is hardly possible to define the "will" of a society. The term has been used for simplicity, and does not refer to any particular sociological theory.
- (4) M. Livi Bacci, *The Countries of Emigration*, General report of the IV theme of the Second European Population Conference, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, August 1972.
- (5) We refer particularly to the marital status characteristics connected with age and sex, the size and composition of families emigrating in family units, the number of children born and the duration of marriage.
- (6) This is, of course, applicable only to international migrations and cannot be extended to internal ones.
- (7) We wished, on the other hand, to follow as far as possible the pattern of the study of Tabah and Cataldi, not only because of its logical character, but also to provide ourselves with a framework of reference for the demographic effects of immigrations which will not be dealt with, at least in this first part of our research.
- (8) The choice of a period of 150 years depends mainly on the fact that a shorter period would not have allowed us to show substantial variations in the age structure of the population.
- (9) A.J. Coale and P. Demeny, *Regional Model Life Tables and Stable Populations*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.
- (10) Tabah and Cataldi in the study referred to started from a value of  $e^0 = 30.0$ . The question, however, is not very relevant for the purposes of the model.
- (11) A.J. Coale and P. Demeny, *op. cit.*
- (12) Both the age distributions of emigration rates are taken from: A. Golini, "Sulla valutazione dei movimenti migratori secondo l'età", *Atti della XXIV Riunione Scientifica della Società Italiana di Statistica*, Roma, 1964.  
The values for the period 1951-61 are taken from original estimates by Golini; those for the period 1920-25 are calculations made by Golini from base material taken from: L. Livi, "Computo della distribuzione degli emigrati e dei rimpatriati secondo l'età (sessennio 1920-25)", *Annali di Statistica*, Series VI, vol. III, Roma, 1929.
- (13) M. Livi Bacci, *op. cit.*
- (14) We observe that our results do not confirm the indications given by Livi Bacci in the work quoted pointing to a general negative influence of emigration in DRV.
- (15) L. Tabah and A. Cataldi, *loc. cit.*
- (16) The projections of Tabah and Cataldi refer to women only.
- (17) W.R. Böhning, "The Social and Occupational Apprenticeship of Mediterranean Workers in West Germany", in M. Livi Bacci (ed.), *The Demographic and Social Pattern of Emigration from Southern European Countries*, Firenze, Dipartimento Statistico-Matematico dell'Università, 1972.
- (18) M. Livi Bacci, *The Countries...*, *op. cit.*
- (19) W.R. Böhning, *loc. cit.*
- (20) It should be noted that the expression "level of nuptiality" which we have used for the sake of simplicity, is ambiguous. It is in any case doubtful whether it is possible to speak of the nuptiality of a population: it would be better to distinguish between male and female nuptiality. Moreover,

only in the case of definitive migrations is it possible to be certain that it is the level which is affected. Temporary migrations, in fact, alter the timing of marriage rather than the level of nuptiality. It is clear, however, that alterations in timing can lead to alterations in levels, and in any case the results for fertility are in the same direction.

- (21) A successful attempt to study various alternatives in the behaviour of immigrants in relation to nuptiality in the country of arrival may be found in: R. Nadot, "Effet de l'immigration sur la natalité en France depuis 1953", *Population*, 3, 1967.
- (22) See: C. Gini, "La teoria europea e la teoria americana delle migrazioni internazionali", *Economia e Commercio*, 2, 1946;  
—, "La théorie des migrations adaptives", in: *Etudes Européennes de Population*, Paris, I.N.E.D., 1954.
- (23) M. Livi Bacci, *op. cit.*
- (24) M. Livi Bacci, *L'immigrazione e l'assimilazione degli italiani negli Stati Uniti*, Milano, Giuffrè, 1961.
- (25) See, for example, J. Galtung, "Componenti psico-sociali nella decisione di emigrare", in: *Emigrazione e industria*, Milano, Il Mulino, 1962.
- (26) We note that C.V. Kiser ("Fertility Rates by Residence and Migration", *Proceedings of the International Population Conference*, Vienna, 1959) observed for migrants within the United States a higher fertility rate for native women as compared with immigrants, when there was some homogeneity between the areas of departure and arrival.

# MIGRATION AND POPULATION CONTROL

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## Introduction

1. This paper is concerned with migration as a means of population control (1). At first blush it seems that migration can have no effect at all on the global problem of population growth because migration just moves the problem from one place to another. Nevertheless from a more local perspective, which we shall adopt herewith, one might hope to relieve population pressure and keep growth within acceptable limits if the excess population can be induced to migrate. Indeed such has been the case historically in societies with high growth potential, and we shall examine some instances below. Moreover some countries, notably Indonesia, have attempted to relieve pressure in one overcrowded part of the country (Java) and build up other underpopulated areas (Sumatra) by fostering migration. Such policies have their counterparts in the population distribution policies of many other countries. It will be our task to assess the promise of such policies, especially insofar as they are alternatives to fertility control. Furthermore we shall attempt to isolate those lines of research which will advance our understanding of the relationship between migration and population growth, thus clarifying the policy issues.

2. It is widely recognized among those who have advocated migration as a means of population control that in large countries massive numbers of people have to move in order to have any significant effect (UN, 1953). Thus Davis (1951) estimates that hundreds of millions of Indians would have to migrate over a twenty year period in order to compensate for population growth, and as Kuniyan (1962) points out this would more than take up the whole shipping facilities of the Indian Ocean. Similarly Sukarno's transmigration target, designed to compensate for the population growth of Java, involves 1.5 million migrants per year, or 5 000 per day—again a wholly impractical figure given present resources (Heeren, 1967; also Widjojo, 1970). Besides (UN, 1953) even a twenty year migration stream would not correct the ultimate causes of the problem, and because of this migration is clearly no substitute for fertility control. The efficacy of the migration strategy for smaller national or regional populations, where it may be practicable, remains an open question.

3. A trenchant theoretical analysis of the effects of migration on population growth has recently been given by Keyfitz (1971). In his model age-specific fertility and mortality are treated as exogenous, and in this sense Keyfitz's analysis is based on narrowly demographic grounds. Nevertheless his results, which are summarized in the next section, must form the starting point of any rigorous policy analysis. We then go on to consider various empirical analyses of the interrelationships between migration and population growth which have been carried out in connection with theories of economic development. These studies treat all variables—fertility as well as migration—as endogenous. They help to broaden our policy perspective and to indicate directions in which Keyfitz's and other models should be extended. This is done in the final section where a tentative assessment of migration as a means of population control is also made.

## Keyfitz's model

4. Keyfitz exploits the integral equations of the Lotka model of population dynamics (Keyfitz, 1968; Coale, 1972; Bourgeois-Pichat, 1968) to assesses quantitatively the impact of age-specific migration over limited periods of time, and of migration streams that are continued indefinitely into the future. He assumes that age-specific fertility and mortality remain constant, and he takes a long-range view, focusing on the ultimately geometrically increasing population under these conditions. The framework adopted by Keyfitz clearly does not require these assumptions and we shall see in the final sections how they might be relaxed.

5. *Outmigration over a limited period of time.* First note that no amount of outmigration over a limited period of time has an effect on the ultimate rate of increase,  $r$ . For  $r$  is determined by age-specific fertility and mortality alone and is not affected by the age distribution or total population on any specific date.  $r$  is the only real root, and largest root in absolute value, of the equation

$$\int_0^{\infty} e^{-ra} p(a) m(a) da = 1 \quad (1)$$

where  $p(a)$  is the proportion of women surviving to age  $a$  ( $p(0) = 1$ ), and  $m(a)$  is the rate of bearing female children at age  $a$ . (If  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are the minimum and maximum ages of child-bearing, respectively,  $m(a)$  is zero outside the age interval  $(\alpha, \beta)$ .) The basic equation of Lotka's theory holds that

$$B(t) = G(t) + \int_0^t B(t-a) p(a) m(a) da \quad (2)$$

i.e., that births at time  $t$ ,  $B(t)$ , are the result of births to women who were alive at time zero,  $G(t)$ , plus births to those women who were born  $a$  years ago ( $B(t-a)$ ) survive to the age  $a$  at  $t$  ( $p(a)$ ), and have children now ( $m(a)$ ), integrated over all  $a$ . Furthermore

$$G(t) = \int_0^{\infty} n(a) \frac{p(a+t)}{p(a)} m(a+t) da \quad (3)$$

where  $n(a)$  are the number of women aged  $a$  at time 0. Under these conditions we know that : 1) a stable age distribution,  $c(a)$ , is ultimately reached; 2)  $B(t)$  ultimately becomes

$$B(t) = Qe^{rt} \quad (4)$$

3) the total population,  $N(t)$ , becomes

$$N(t) = \frac{1}{b} Qe^{rt} \quad (5)$$

where  $b$  is the birth rate in the stable population. The constant  $Q$  is affected by the initial age distribution. It is given by

$$Q = \frac{\int_0^{\infty} e^{-rt} G(t) dt}{\int_0^{\infty} a e^{-ra} p(a) m(a) da} = \frac{1}{k} \int_0^{\infty} e^{-rt} G(t) dt \quad (6)$$

where  $k$ , the denominator of  $Q$ , is the mean age of childbearing in the stable population. The rate and path of convergence to geometric growth depends on the initial age distribution as well as  $p(a)$  and  $m(a)$  (2). These transient fluctuations in  $B(t)$  and  $N(t)$  have been extensively studied by Coale (1972; see also Keyfitz, 1972).

6. Following Coale (1972) we can use the linearity property of equation (2) to decompose  $Q$  into the sum (integral) of the contributions to  $N(t)$  of each woman in the initial population. Let  $Q(a)$  be the contribution (of the descendants) of a woman aged  $a$ . Then

$$Q = \int Q(a) n(a) da \quad (7)$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} Q(a) &= \frac{1}{k} \int_0^{\infty} e^{-rt} \frac{p(a+t)}{p(a)} m(a+t) da \\ &= \frac{1}{k} v(a) \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

say, where  $v(a)$  is Fisher's reproductive value of a woman aged  $a$ ;  $v(0) = 1$  by equation (1). Thus the subtraction (or addition) (3) of  $\Delta n(a)$  individuals aged  $a$  through migration adds  $\Delta n(a)Q(a) = \Delta Q = k^{-1} v(a) \Delta n(a)$  to  $Q$  and changes the trajectory  $N(t)$  by the amount

$$\Delta N(t) = \frac{1}{bk} v(a) e^{rt} \Delta n(a) \tag{9}$$

This is the fundamental result of this first part of the analysis.

7. Using equation (9) and numerical values of constants and functions estimated from data on Mauritius and Barbados (which are typical of countries that may aspire to use migration as a strategy) Keyfitz is able to make two sorts of comparisons of the effects of finite duration age-specific migration. First he calculates the effects on the trajectory  $N(t)$  of migration at different ages. Note that migration of women beyond the reproductive age has no effect at all since  $v(a) = 0, a > \beta$  (remembering  $m(a) = 0, a > \beta$ ). This is as it should be because a woman contributes to ultimate population growth only through her descendants.  $v(a)$  rises from a value of one at  $v(0)$  to a maximum around age 17, where it is 1.8 in Mauritius and 1.4 in Barbados, then falls off toward zero. Thus a migration policy should aim at women around 15 to 25 in providing incentives for migration since it is with these ages that the policy will have the greatest ultimate effect. Second by solving (9) for  $\Delta n(a)$  in terms of  $\Delta N(t)$  Keyfitz calculates how many women of a given age would have to migrate in order to compensate for a specified amount of population growth. Again migration of women around 17 years old achieves the maximum effect.

8. Two qualifications to this argument are in order. First, as Keyfitz emphasizes, the analysis does not take account of family structure. A woman past the reproductive age has no effect according to equation (9), but she may take 15 year old daughters with her, thus producing the same result as if she had left at 15 and had her daughters out of the country. Second, the result is valid only for times say 50 to 100 years in the future. Using Mauritius schedules the departure of 1000 women 15-19 year olds reduces the population at time  $t$  by  $-1679 \exp(0.0305t)$ , an obviously absurd result for  $t = 0$ .

9. *Continued stream of outmigration.* An indefinitely continued stream of out-migration will have an effect on the ultimate rate of growth. Emigration is equivalent to sterilization or death since in all three cases there are no more descendants, and only descendants count. Thus a continued stream of out-migration at a given age can be thought of as either reducing age-specific fertility or creating a discrete drop in the survivor function,  $p(a)$ , at that age (4). Suppose a proportion  $f = f(x)$  of the population migrates when reaching age  $x$  ( $0 \leq f \leq 1$ ). Define

$$u(a - x) = \begin{cases} f & \text{if } a \geq x \\ 0 & \text{if } a < x \end{cases} \tag{10}$$

Then the new ultimate rate of growth,  $\bar{r}$ , now satisfies

$$\int_0^{\infty} e^{-\bar{r}a} p(a) (1 - u(a - x)) m(a) da = 1 \tag{11}$$

or, substituting (10) into (11), evaluating the integral, and solving for  $f = f(x)$ ,

$$f(x) = \frac{\int_0^{\infty} e^{-\bar{r}a} p(a) m(a) da - 1}{\int_x^{\infty} e^{-\bar{r}a} p(a) m(a) da} \tag{12}$$

Equation (12) then defines  $f(x)$  as a function of any given level of growth  $\bar{r}$  and can be used to calculate the amount of outmigration at age  $x$  that would be required to achieve any desired rate of growth  $\bar{r}$ . In order to achieve a stationary population, *i.e.*  $\bar{r} = 0$ , equation (12) specializes to

$$f_0(x) = \frac{R_0 - 1}{\int_x^{\infty} p(a) m(a) da} \tag{13}$$

where  $R_0$  is the net reproduction rate.  $f_0(x) = (R_0 - 1) / R_0, x < \alpha$ .

**10.** Here Keyfitz's results are dramatic. For again using Mauritius schedules, and approximating integrals by sums, Keyfitz calculates that to hold the population down to a growth rate of 2% per year—a drop of 33% from the current 3.05% per year—42% of each cohort must leave on reaching the age of 25, or 28% must leave on reaching age 20. To achieve stationarity for Mauritius, where  $R_0 = 2.349$ , 57% of all girls would have to leave before reaching reproductive age. Keyfitz concludes, not without justification, that “It is mere fantasy to envisage such an amount of emigration to be continued indefinitely for any large population”. Surely the required amount of emigration exceeds by far the record emigrations from Java, and other countries where migration policy has been used to try to control population growth. Thus the notable lack of success of Indonesian transmigration policy must be attributed to the magnitude of the migration that must be induced as well as the bureaucratic difficulties involved in organizing it (Widjojo, 1970; Heeren, 1967; Keyfitz, 1971). Nevertheless the required high rates are not out of line with rates that have been observed in some countries historically, at least over the short run. Before accepting Keyfitz's pessimistic conclusions let us put the whole problem of emigration and population growth in broader perspective so that we can see the extent to which those conclusions depend on the restrictive assumptions of his model.

### Migration, population growth, and economic development

**11.** As alluded to above the high rates of migration required in Keyfitz's model to have a significant impact on population growth are by no means unprecedented in historical experience. Rural-urban migration is often high enough to cancel the rural population growth implicit in the high fertility and decreasing mortality. Of course then the urban areas may grow too rapidly, which is part of the problem in Java (5). On the other hand if there are rural-urban fertility differentials, due to e.g. lessened economic productivity of children in urban areas, or attitudinal and educational differences (Mueller, 1973); or if there is increased effectiveness of birth control programs in cities (Lapham and Mauldin, 1972); or if migration postpones the average age of marriage or diffuses urban attitudes back to the countryside (Mueller, 1973), the overall rate of growth in a country may be diminished over time.

**12.** All of these considerations lead us to examine the interaction between migration and population growth within the context of the broad social processes of urbanization and economic growth. They lead us to consider a dynamic process in which migration has short term effects on urbanization and development as well as on population growth, which in turn affect subsequent fertility as well as migration, and so on. The importance of analyzing the mutual effects and feedbacks of economic and demographic processes, where migration is often the key, has long been apparent to social scientists (including Malthus and Adam Smith; cf Meade, 1967 for a more recent statement). Even a cursory review of these issues, however, would take us beyond the scope of this paper, so we must confine ourselves to noting two recent studies which illustrate the kind of analysis we have in mind.

**13.** D. Friedlander (1969) has examined the interaction between fertility decline, rural-urban migration, and external migration during the Demographic Transition of several European countries. Using Davis' (1963) theory of Multi-phasic Response, D. Friedlander postulates that all three responses will be used in rural areas to cope with the strain induced by high fertility and lowering mortality. However the preferred mix of responses will depend on a society's potential for industrialization and economic growth; these latter factors determine the society's “absorptive capacity for population growth” during the transition period. Thus Friedlander finds that in Sweden, where industrialization was slow and late, rural-urban migration was relatively weak, fertility declined relatively rapidly, and there was substantial emigration, altogether producing low population growth and a quick transition. On the other hand in England and Wales, where cities had great absorptive capacity due to rapid economic and industrial growth, there was heavy rural-urban migration, moderate external migration and quite slow fertility decline, and consequently rapid population growth during a prolonged transition. The points to note are: 1) migration of one sort or another played a substantial role in relieving rural population pressure; 2) the scale and efficacy of migration as a response depends on the broader social processes of industrialization and economic growth; 3) population growth and urbanization are important components and conditions of economic growth; and 4) fertility decline depends on trends in economic growth which are in part determined by migration. In brief, in comparing fertility decline and migration as strategies to deal with population strain, timing and social and economic conditions are crucial factors.

**14.** This analysis is reinforced and elaborated in S. Friedlander's (1965) study of the role of emigration in economic growth in Puerto Rico after the Second World War. The situation in Puerto Rico during the 1940's was representative of many less developed countries: an extremely high rate of population growth (more than 3% per year) due to high fertility and declining mortality threatened to cancel the gains of any economic

progress. Instead a very large amount of emigration to the United States, averaging approximately 2% of the population per year in the period 1950-1960, kept the actual rate of growth down to an acceptable 0.6% per year (6), thus enabling Puerto Rico to escape from its "low-level income trap". During the same period income per capita rose substantially and the economy grew rapidly. Concomitant with these broad, inter-correlated economic and demographic processes, as Friedlander shows in his thorough and detailed analysis, were a moderate decline in fertility, an upgrading of the remaining labor force, a change in the occupational structure favorable to growth, and a reduction in unemployment. All of these key variables in the economic growth of the Island can be linked directly to the volume and age-occupational composition of the emigration stream. Thus we have a complex economic-demographic process in which emigration reduces population growth and alters the composition of the labor force, which allows per capita income (and investment) to rise, which in turn (may) depress fertility (further controlling population) enough for the cycle to persist, thus eventually leading to a higher level economy and a slower growing population. The special relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States should not obscure the general relationships which are corroborated in Kindleberger's (1967) study of labor mobility and economic growth in postwar Europe and Hardin's (1971) analysis of migration from East to West Germany.

## Conclusion

**15.** On the basis of the preceding analysis several general conclusions concerning the effectiveness of migration as a means of population control may be drawn. First, while no amount of migration over a limited period of time can have any effect on the ultimate rate of growth as long as fertility and mortality remain constant (Keyfitz), migration may keep population growth down long enough to allow economic and social processes to lower fertility and hence ultimately the intrinsic rate of growth. That is: migration may buy enough time to allow other means of population control to work (cf. Davis, 1951, p. 224; and UN, 1953). Second (D. Friedlander and S. Friedlander), these indirect effects of migration will depend on social and economic condition in the specific country involved. As a practical matter it seems that governments alone will not be able to supply enough resources to move the large number of people necessary to reduce population growth and stimulate development. Migration policies are likely to work only where economic and social structure generates the bulk of incentives. Whatever its other benefits it does not seem that migration policies will have any major effects on large, fast growing populations because of the large numbers of migrants required (Keyfitz). Third, in the long run migration cannot substitute for fertility control. However over a more limited horizon migration and fertility control policies may have strong, mutually supporting interactions, and these policies should not be looked at as strict alternatives to one another.

Finally, some lines of future research which will help to clarify the policy issues can be suggested. Extension and elaboration of Keyfitz's approach can form the basis of any rigorous analysis of the effects of migration on the growth and age structure of the population. Analysis of short run effects of migration can be made by adding to equation (5) terms associated with the complex roots of equation (1). Indeed most of the necessary calculations have already been done by Coale (1972) (7). The effects of changing fertility schedules can also be carried out within the Lotka framework (Keyfitz, 1968; Coale, 1973). Still dealing with strictly demographic processes, it would also be interesting to develop two-sector (rural-urban) models coupled by migration. No doubt many authors at this seminar will call for further research on the interrelations between migration, fertility, urbanization, and economic growth. Of course such research is sorely needed if we are to assess responsibly the social and individual costs of migration policies. I trust it is not redundant to close by remarking on how few theoretically and methodological sound studies there have been of migration and population control.

## NOTES

- (1) I would like to thank J. Durand, R. Easterlin, R. Hardin, E.P. Hutchinson, and E. van de Walle for useful discussions on this problem.
- (2) In populations like that of Indonesia convergence is relatively rapid, though still on the order of several generations, given fixed  $p(a)$  and  $m(a)$ .
- (3) This part of Keyfitz's model is symmetric as between immigration and emigration, although we are concerned largely with the latter.
- (4) In the previous case, migration over a finite period of time, only the initial age distribution but not  $p(a)$  was affected.
- (5) In Japan the consequence of long rural-urban migration seems to be higher urban fertility than rural (cf. Kuroda, 1973).
- (6) These estimates do not take age-structure into account.
- (7) Functions analogous to  $V(a)$  need to be estimated from data of specific countries.

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VI  
MIGRATION AND SOCIETY

# MIGRATION, ETHNICITY AND RACE RELATIONS

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## Migration, ethnicity and race relations

1. Although many multi-racial and ethnically pluralistic societies today are not the outcome of contemporary population movements, almost all situations of race and ethnic contact have arisen as a consequence of past migration. Some countries have racial and ethnic minorities that are indigenous and have retained distinctive characteristics over many generations. However, the increasing scale and ease of air transportation today is facilitating large-scale movements of population, both legal and illegal, between countries with very different cultural traditions and levels of economic and social development. Before considering migration in the context of race and ethnic relations, it is necessary to examine some general aspects of the sociology of migration in industrial and post-industrial societies. This will involve a multivariate approach in the context of general systems theory. The distinctive features of such an approach are:

- 1) recognition that societies are complex socio-economic and socio-cultural systems in constant process of adaptation to internal and external sources of change, in which factors conducive to order and to conflict co-exist;
- 2) recognition that adaptation is achieved through positive and negative information feed-back in which members of a society, individually and collectively, learn from experience and modify behaviour accordingly or, failing this, persist in behaviour patterns entrenched in past experience, which lead to non-adaptive responses and unproductive conflict (Buckley, 1967).

## Sociology of migration

2. From a sociological point of view, the distinction between international and internal migration is somewhat artificial. Factors which encourage or inhibit geographic mobility frequently transcend the artificial boundaries of nation-states. However, the latter have the power legitimately to impose restrictions on population movement across borders through political and administrative controls on immigration and emigration. Through the issue of residence and work permits, some countries, such as South Africa, exercise control over internal migration in the same way, but this is less frequent than the control over international movements. Therefore, internal migration tends to be more responsive to the economic and social conditions that encourage migration. Nevertheless, there is an increasing tendency for employers to tap sources of unskilled and skilled labour outside their own country and for the informal social networks that encourage migration to transcend national boundaries.

3. Sociological research in various countries has demonstrated the relationship between the flow of migrants and factors such as distance, *per capita* differences in income levels, rates of unemployment, intervening opportunities and competing migrants (Jansen, 1970). Various attempts have also been made to generate a typology of migration. One such typology distinguishes between migration in primitive and more advanced societies and further differentiates types of migration by the factors impelling them. Migration may be further classified according to its consequences. Certain types of migration may be innovating and others conservative with regard to the maintenance of culture patterns and social systems (Petersen, 1958).

4. It has been conventional to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary migration and to assess the relative importance of "push" and "pull" factors in describing and explaining particular migrations. Implicit in most sociological studies of migration is the assumption that human beings are normally sedentary and require some inducement to move. Societies tend to be represented as closed systems in which inward and

outward population movements are sources of instability and disequilibrium. These assumptions are questionable in the light of contemporary conditions in advanced industrial and post-industrial societies. Geographic, occupational and social mobility are functional prerequisites of an advanced society. Large scale movements from rural areas, giving rise to a significant net gain to urban areas, are characteristic of the early stages of industrialization. However, migration in advanced industrial societies tends to take the form of multi-way exchanges of population between urban areas. The net gains and losses as a consequence of these exchanges of population are small compared with the total movement (Jackson, 1969).

5. As long as there are still substantial economic differentials within and between countries, net movements will tend to favour the more highly industrialized areas. However, almost everywhere an exchange or "circulation" of labour and consequent high return movements of workers and their dependents are found. Return migration and an oscillation of people between rural and urban areas, or between more than one urban location of residence, are increasingly characteristic of contemporary migratory movements (Mayer, 1961; Richmond, 1968; Nagata, 1973).

6. The present state and future prospects for migration in the context of race and ethnic relations cannot be considered without reference to world population problems. Three aspects must be considered. Firstly, there is the question of world population growth and its effects on non-renewable resources. Secondly, the uneven distribution of the world's population at the present time combined with differential rates of natural increase giving rise to a "population explosion" in certain regions of the world, already relatively overcrowded. Thirdly, the uneven distribution of the world's wealth and productive capacity in which the large majority of the world's population has been falling relatively farther behind the standards of the affluent minorities in Western Europe and North America (Forrester, 1971; Meadows, 1972; Cole, 1973). These factors all generate powerful sources of conflict and pressure to migrate.

7. Attempts to encourage fertility control in developing countries have already been interpreted by some militant Third World representatives as a further attempt to maintain them in a state of subjugation. Even if the gloomy neo-Malthusian predictions of those forecasting a total collapse of the world's economic system are unjustified, there is little doubt that a combination of more effective fertility controls and resource conservation will be essential in the future. Meanwhile, the differential distribution of population and of wealth will continue to provide a dynamic force encouraging migration from the less developed to the more advanced countries of the world. As the latter move into the post-industrial phase of economic development, their own labour requirements will decline. Technological innovations that enable automation and computerization to replace human beings in previously labour intensive occupations will diminish the demand for immigrants, even in those countries that have been traditional reception areas, such as the United States, Canada and Australia. Political and administrative controls over immigration will probably get tighter and advanced societies will endeavour to relate immigration policies to their own population and economic goals (Böhning, 1972; Klaasen and Drew, 1973). The latter are likely to move increasingly toward the maintenance of equilibrium rather than growth.

8. Within and between countries in the post-industrial phases of economic development, there will continue to be a substantial flow of migration of the exchange type, i.e., a multi-way movement of population between urban and metropolitan centres in which the net gains and losses are a small proportion of the total movement. Such exchange migration is generally made up of relatively well educated people with similar demographic and other characteristics who simply replace each other in the respective economic and social systems. When these societies achieve stable equilibrium and cease to be governed by the belief that economic growth is essential, the need for net additions to population by migration will decline. At the present time, metropolitan centres continue to grow rapidly as a result of both external and internal migration, generating a dynamic interdependence between urban centres and their respective hinterlands (Forrester, 1969; Warming, 1968).

9. Some immigration from Third World countries may be perceived as necessary by advanced countries for diplomatic reasons and as a "safety valve" in the face of population pressures in developing countries. However, even large scale movements from the Third World to advanced societies would not resolve the major crises that are now imminent in the face of exponential rates of population growth and resource consumption. There is an urgent need for a radical redirection of scientific research applied to problems of food production, the discovery of new energy sources, and to finding ways of limiting pollution and ecological damage, etc., while, at the same time, permitting large scale investment in manufacturing and other industries that will directly benefit the inhabitants of the developing countries.




Figure 1. — A systems model of population dynamics and migration.




Figure 2. — The components of ethnicity.

**10.** The distribution of wealth and income within advanced societies will continue to be debatable questions of political and social policy. However, if these countries can reach a stable equilibrium in terms of their own economic growth, this will provide the necessary breathing space during which the less developed countries can begin to catch up. It will be necessary for them to go through at least some of the stages in the processes of urbanization and industrialization previously experienced in Western Europe and North America. It seems unlikely that these countries will be able to make the “quantum leap” into a post-industrial, leisure-oriented society without first eliminating the abject poverty now characteristic of such a large part of the world’s population. The greatest challenge facing social scientists in World Population Year is how the goals of zero population growth and economic equilibrium can be made compatible with improved material standards for those now living near the poverty line and with a more equitable distribution of the world’s wealth and resources in the future.

**11.** The role of international migration in this process will be a complex one. Among the highest priorities should be a reversal of the “brain drain” so that the professional, scientific and managerial skills that have served to enhance the wealth of the Western world can be used to benefit the Third World in the future. One of the most valuable contributions to the improvement of race and ethnic relations throughout the world would be the voluntary rotation of highly skilled personnel from Western countries in the service of the Third World countries contributing to their development and welfare. This would be a reversal of present trends in which migrant labour from developing countries is exploited in the interests of those already more affluent (Rex, 1973).

**12.** Factors influencing population growth and movement may be represented in terms of a systems model, as illustrated in Figure 1. For any country or region, population growth (or decline) depends upon the combined effects of natural increase and net migration. Rates of fertility and mortality are partly determined by the sex and age composition of the population in question, but are also closely related to the level of education and the quality of health and other social services available. Immigration is also influenced by the age structure, the availability of services and by the *per capita* level of income, relative to that of other countries or regions. It is also affected by the level of unemployment and, above all, by the demand for labour generated by industrial activity and growth. The latter is generally mediated through official immigration policies which may positively encourage or discourage immigration from selected countries, or of persons with certain skills or qualifications. Immigration may also be assisted, in some cases, by financial aid with fares, where long distances are involved. Emigration is generally subject to less direct control but may be discouraged by welfare and regional development programmes designed to prevent loss of population from certain areas. The availability of housing may be a factor encouraging or discouraging migration. An important feedback loop to note is that linking education with out-migration. Higher education increases the propensity to migrate and the distance moved. It follows that in advanced countries with a high level of education, there is a substantial amount of internal and external migration, much of it taking the form of a replacement population for those moving out of a given locality. Education also reduces the demand for labour, due to the adoption of automation and other less labour intensive methods of production. However, it may create a demand for certain types of unskilled and service employment that better educated people are reluctant to undertake.

### Minorities, ethnicity and pluralism

**13.** It is evident from the above consideration of population movements that there can be no simple relation between migration and patterns of ethnic relations. The concept of ethnicity is itself a complex one. Although the ethnic characteristics of an individual are generally regarded as ascribed, they are by no means static or unchanging attributes. Ethnicity is a dynamic concept which is responsive to changing situations. This is particularly evident when there is culture contact through migration. Ethnic boundaries persist despite the fact that some people move from one ethnic group to another and undergo a change of ethnic identity (Barth, 1969). The relationship between the various components of ethnicity are illustrated in Figure 2. Although ethnicity involves the sharing of cultural beliefs, values and behaviour patterns, these may be the result of contact and interaction rather than the ascribed basis of definition. The relationship between language and culture is important in this respect. A common language is one basis on which ethnic identity may be maintained and is an instrument for the transmission of culture. It may also be one of the diacritical symbols that facilitate boundary maintenance between ethnic groups. When ethnicity is more than a mere categorization, it also involves elements of social organization which in turn give rise to systematic interaction with other groups on a basis of social and economic exchange, cooperation, opposition and competition.

14. Multi-ethnic societies that have arisen as a consequence of past or recent migration may exhibit varying degrees of conflict and cohesion. Conflict may arise out of competition for scarce resources, the differential distribution of power within the society, fundamental opposition of basic value systems and inherent contradictions in the values held and the institutions serving them. Such conflict may coexist with the counter-vailing forces promoting greater order and stability. These may include economic interdependence and exchange relationships emerging in the market context, the emergence of an underlying consensus on basic values that encourage tolerance of diversity, together with the translation of coercive social controls into legitimated authority, accepted by the various ethnic groups concerned (Schermerhorn, 1970).

15. The representation of a social system, particularly one in which there is migration and ethnic variation, as either a "conflict" or a "consensus" model is misleading. These are complementary rather than alternative ways of representing processes of social order and change. Competition for scarce resources only takes place when there is some consensus on the value of the resources in question. The overt expression of many conflicts is constrained by an underlying consensus concerning the appropriate means toward their resolution. They may be institutionalized, as in a parliamentary democracy, or ritualized in various ways. Fundamental conflicts over the distribution of power may not be effectively constrained in this way but lead to a redefinition of the social order in terms of alternative sets of values. When power shifts from one group to another, various means are adopted to generate a new consensus. These involve a manipulation of the "master symbols of legitimation" until new forms of authority are firmly established (Mills, 1959). Opposition and dissent are never entirely eliminated and remain a potent source of further change. The relationships between power, conflict, consensus and change are illustrated in Figure 3. A specific application of this paradigm to a situation of migration and race relations may be found in my own study of Bristol, England (Richmond, 1973).




Figure 3. — Model of conflict, order and change.

16. Despite ideologies that favour conformity to the dominant elite or absorption into a common "melting pot", immigration rarely gives rise to the complete assimilation of minority groups. Even after several generations, immigrants and their descendants tend to retain some distinctive attributes that define their ethnic identities and place constraints upon occupational achievement and social mobility. This gives rise to systems of ethnic stratification and to occupational specialization by ethnicity within the economic system. Evidence suggests that reward disparity and social segregation, when combined with a differential distribution of power, lead to less frequent overt conflict but, when such conflict manifests itself, it tends to be more intense and violent. When immigrant groups and other ethnic minorities are more closely integrated and

there is less differentiation of power and status, conflict may be more frequent but is less likely to erupt violently (Newman, 1973).

17. Some advanced societies that have admitted significant numbers of immigrants from countries with different linguistic and cultural traditions have shifted the ideological emphases from complete assimilation to a more realistic acceptance of some degree of pluralistic integration (Borrie, 1959; Richmond, 1967; Roberts, 1972). Nevertheless, there is considerable variation from one country to another in the extent to which immigrants are assisted in the initial stages of adaptation to the receiving society and in the degree to which they are permitted or encouraged to retain distinctive ethnic identities and to retain these in the second and subsequent generations. The study of immigrant adaptation requires a multivariate approach (Brody, 1970). The major components of a multivariate model of the immigrant adaptation process are outlined in Figure 4.




Figure 4. — Multivariate model of the immigrant adaptation process.

18. Situational factors in the receiving society will have an important bearing upon the subsequent modes of adaptation of immigrants. Demographic factors include the sex and age structure of the receiving country, including dependency ratios, rates of growth of the labour force, etc. The stage of urbanization and industrialization will have an important bearing upon the capacity to absorb immigrants and the specific occupational and other skills in demand. Government policies with regard to the admission of immigrants, including the total size of the immigrant movement and its composition in terms of place of origin and qualifications, will reflect both the social structural determinants of geographic and social mobility, together with the attitudes and values of the dominant groups within that society. Another important influence will be the degree of ethnic pluralism and social stratification already prevailing and the ways in which immigration may modify these.

19. Interacting with the situational determinants will be the premigration characteristics of the immigrants themselves. Among these the education, technical training and prior experience of urban life exhibited by the immigrants will be important determinants of subsequent patterns of adaptive behaviour. The demographic characteristics of immigrants will be significant, particularly the degree of similarity or dissimilarity to the receiving society. The age, sex and ethnic characteristics of the immigrants may reinforce those of the receiving society or modify them in ways which may shift the balance of numbers and power. Auspices of immigration are also important in determining subsequent modes of adaptation. Immigrants may be sponsored by close relatives, be relocated as part of a refugee movement or respond to a variety of inducements offered by governments and travel agencies who encourage international migration. The original intention and motivation of the migrants will also influence the probability of permanent settlement and the propensity to maintain previous cultural attachments or to adopt the language and cultural characteristics of the dominant groups in the receiving society.

**20.** The major intervening variable in the process of adaptation is length of residence in the receiving society. The adaptation process itself can be divided into the overt behavioural or objective aspects and the subjective or socio-psychological aspects. The objective aspects include economic integration, acculturation, social integration at the primary and secondary levels, together with integration into the political system. The latter includes the eventual acquisition of citizenship and participation in the political life of the receiving society through the exercise of the franchise, etc. On the subjective side, adaptation involves achieving some degree of relative gratification with life in the new country, the internalization of new beliefs and values, together with a gradual identification with the new country. The latter will include the gradual modification of ethnic identity and varying degrees of commitment to the country of adoption. In addition to length of residence, the level of education of the immigrant population and a culturally or psychologically determined predisposition to maintain ethnic social distance appeared to be the major determinants of the specific types of accommodation to the experience of migration, giving rise to a variety of different modes of immigrant adaptation (Goldlust and Richmond, 1973).

**21.** At the risk of some oversimplification, contemporary international migrants may be placed in one of the following categories:

1. *Assimilating permanent settlers:* Immigrants in this category already have or quickly acquire linguistic and cultural characteristics similar to that of the receiving society and are absorbed into the economic and social systems with minimal status dislocation and without generating ethnic stratification. Examples include movements between the United States and Canada and between "white" members of the British Commonwealth.
2. *Pluralistically integrated permanent settlers:* Immigrants in this category are readily distinguishable from the majority or dominant group in the receiving society and continue to retain many of the linguistic and cultural characteristics brought with them from the former country. Their absorption often gives rise to a system of ethnic stratification with varying degrees of occupational and social mobility in the first and subsequent generations. Examples include many countries in South East Asia, together with some European and Asian communities in North America.
3. *Quasi-migrants:* This category includes all those who established temporary residence in another country, frequently leaving dependents at home, and who rotate or oscillate between one or more countries. They include many "guest workers" in European countries, together with students and others who have "working vacations", and those whose motive for migration is travel for its own sake.
4. *Transient migrants:* This category is similar to that of the quasi-migrant in that they do not establish permanent residence. However, this is more often a family migration and is characteristic of those with high managerial, professional or technical qualifications that are in demand in various countries. They include the employees of multi-national corporations, together with many doctors, nurses, teachers, scientists, etc. who regard international migration as a concomitant of career mobility.
5. *Permanent repatriates:* These include all migrants who have lived or worked abroad and have now returned to the country of origin for permanent resettlement. Re-integration into the country of origin frequently involves similar processes of adaptation to those experienced in the original migration. This category includes those "returnees" who were disappointed in their original expectations, or were unable to adapt to the new country, together with others who were successful and fully satisfied with their experience of migration. The latter may include some who retire to the country of birth.

## Race and racism

**22.** The migration of highly visible populations physically distinguishable from those of the receiving society is a special case because of the racist attitudes that prevail in many societies. The concept of "race" is still a highly controversial one. Despite a near consensus among biologists and social scientists concerning the inappropriateness of dividing human populations into discrete categories based on physical or other attributes, racism persists as an influential ideology in many societies (U.N.E.S.C.O., 1968; Van den Berghe, 1967). The fallacy that human beings can be allocated to specific racial groups on the basis of superficial characteristics such as skin colour is further compounded by the widespread belief in the inherent superiority and inferiority of the groups in question. Although differential opportunities for inter-marriage have given rise to distinctive gene-pools, these correspond only very roughly to conventionally defined racial differences. Social scientists generally agree that, in practice, "races" are social categories in which certain physical charac-

teristics have been arbitrarily selected and given symbolic importance in the allocation of human beings to social roles (Banton, 1967). The ideologies associated with racism provide elaborate theological, biological and sometimes sociological rationalizations for the stigmatic view of certain racial characteristics. At the same time, these ideologies endeavour to legitimate institutionalized forms of racialism which may persist over several generations forcibly segregating populations and differentially allocating them within the educational and occupational opportunity structure of the society (Shibutani and Kwan, 1965; Rex, 1970).

**23.** In examining the problems created by racism, two separate and distinct issues arise. Firstly, what are the conditions under which racist attitudes become endemic and widespread in a particular culture and racialist policies and practices institutionalized? Secondly, what are the factors which account for the differential propensity of certain categories of the population to internalize such attitudes and actively endorse racism rather than reject and oppose racism? The first question involves an examination of the historical context in which racism emerges and the particular structural and situational conditions that are conducive to its expression. Although earlier examples of incipient racism may be traced, it seems that its most serious manifestations emerged with the mass migration of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which coincided with the imperialist policies of many western European countries. The colonial expansion of these countries involved the near extermination of many indigenous populations in the New World. In territories deemed suitable for European settlement, there followed the coercive segregation of those who survived, the importation of slave and indentured labour, and the development of ideologies that justified the perpetuation of the subordination and segregation of the non-European members of the population (Williams, 1966). In parts of Africa and Asia not deemed suitable for permanent European settlement, political domination was combined with the exploitation of labour and natural resources to provide the raw materials for the rapidly expanding industrial economies of Europe. The elaborate religious and pseudo-scientific theories that were developed to explain and justify these systems of exploitation have persisted to the present day and are still widely held, despite their discreditation by responsible authorities. They continue to provide a convenient mythology in support of policies that discriminate against racial minorities and immigrant groups in many countries (Mason, 1971).

**24.** A recent development has been the adoption of racist counter-ideologies by subordinated minorities in advanced countries and by some Third World countries pursuing discriminatory policies against national, ethnic and racial minorities within their borders. Notwithstanding the lack of any scientific justification for treating human beings as if they could be placed in clearly defined racial groups, it is not surprising that concepts such as "Black Power" and "Red Power" should have a powerful appeal to underprivileged and exploited minorities (Blauener, 1972). Such ideologies serve to redress the stigmatic nature of former racial and ethnic definitions of identity. In the case of newly independent countries, resentment against racial and cultural minorities who, in many cases, had achieved economic status and political influence under the sponsorship of former imperial powers, generates considerable hostility toward these minorities, in some cases leading to their eventual expulsion (Plender, 1972).

**25.** Notwithstanding the widespread nature of racist ideologies or counter-ideologies and their manipulation by political leaders, they are not uniformly accepted. The evidence from a variety of socio-psychological studies suggests that personality factors, early socialization experience and subsequent feelings of security or insecurity in the performance of social roles may determine the extent of racial prejudice exhibited by particular individuals. Among the factors found to be associated with a greater propensity to express racial prejudice are authoritarianism, anomia and alienation, rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity, status insecurity and very marked upward or downward social mobility (Blalock, 1967; Bloom, 1971). Situational determinants include the degree to which racial minorities are perceived as threatening and competing for scarce resources such as employment, housing or welfare benefits. Questions of relative rather than absolute status deprivation appear to be important in determining whether racial and ethnic groups engage in confrontation and overt conflict of a violent type. Marginal members of the dominant group may feel themselves threatened by the actual or potential upward mobility of members of the subordinated groups.

**26.** Whether a situation of inter-ethnic and inter-racial conflict or tension gives rise to widespread violence of a collective nature, including riots, rebellions and overt revolutionary activity, will depend upon a complex inter-play between many forces. Some of these are conducive to violence and others constrain such outward expressions of underlying conflict. The inter-relation between these factors is illustrated in multivariate model form in Figure 5. Racist and chauvinistic ideologies maintained by dominant elites and superordinate strata in a society will tend to promote violence, particularly if they are accompanied by opposing counter-

ideologies of the minority groups. However, the impact of these ideologies will be mediated through the mass media which may play down, or sometimes inflame, the attitudes of the opposing groups. The ideological factors will be further modified by the selective response to them by the populations concerned which, in turn, may depend upon a variety of socio-psychological and personality determinants. Actual level of material, social and cultural differentiation may be less important than perceived levels and consequent feelings of relative rather than absolute deprivation. In this connection, the distinction between individual and fraternal, or in this context specifically interethnic, deprivation is likely to be important. Evidence suggests that violent rebellion is particularly likely to occur in situations where a minority group has experienced a sense of relative deprivation of economic, social and political status, compared with other groups adopted as reference models in that society (Gurr, 1970).




Figure 5. — Factors associated with individual and collective violence in race and ethnic situations: a multivariate model.

27. Needless to say, the differential distribution of power between dominant and subordinate ethnic and racial groups will be contributory, although violence often breaks out precisely when the balance of power is beginning to shift slightly more in favour of the 'under-dog'. Institutionalized forms of racism and discrimination will also be conducive to violence, although the monolithic use of coercive power, such as that of the police and military, may temporarily inhibit or quell violence, as will the para-military techniques of riot control that have been developed in recent years (Feagin, 1973). This is because the 'cost' of any violent outbursts may be seen as too great. However, such coercive measures do nothing to remove the underlying causes of conflict and tension and may simply lead to a displacement of energy into other forms of deviant behaviour, individual crimes of violence, homicide, suicide and other symptoms of generalized alienation on the part of minorities. More effective social controls include efforts to involve minority groups in programmes of local community action designed to ameliorate social conditions and achieve constructive citizen participation in civic action and local politics.

### Neo-colonialism

28. Reference has been made to the imperial expansion of Western European powers in the nineteenth century and the situations of political subordination and racial stratification that were created. The aftermath of these colonial regimes is still to be observed in the patterns of economic dependency and migration between the less developed and the more industrially advanced regions of the world. A classical situation

of "colonialism" exists when the population of a given territory is subject to invasion and external control using coercive means. The land and resources, both material and human, are exploited for the benefit of the imperial power. In some cases, there may be forced labour and involuntary migration in order to ensure an adequate labour supply for the development of mines, plantations or other economic activities controlled by the colonists. The impact of colonialism frequently has a devastating effect on the culture and way of life of the indigenous population. Selected members of the colonized population may be educated and socialized into the way of life of the dominant group in order to provide a cadre of intellectuals, teachers and administrators who will act as agents of the colonial power maintaining effective political and social control. In due course, these same indigenous elites may form the spear head of an emergent nationalistic movement which displaces the colonizing power and assumes political authority in the newly independent country (Richmond, 1961; Deutsch, 1953; Wallerstein, 1966).

**29.** However, the consequences of colonialism may still be observed in the economic dependency of the Third World countries and in the segregated and subordinated position of racial minorities in Western societies. The latter may encourage proletarian migration from former dependencies in order to supply unskilled labour for industries which are unable to provide wages and working conditions sufficiently attractive for their own workers. Furthermore, the economies of the developing countries of the Third World may remain geared to the supply of raw materials for the more advanced countries. In recent years, the provision of a variety of service functions, particularly tourism, for the more affluent countries is also linked to the former colonial status. Under these conditions, the better educated inhabitants of the Third World may be tempted to seek improved opportunities for themselves in the advanced countries, thereby contributing to a "brain drain" (Adams, 1968).

**30.** The attitude of Western societies toward immigration from former colonial dependencies and other less developed areas of the world has been distinctly ambivalent. So long as distance and the costs of international travel restricted the numbers likely to want to migrate, the Western countries were relatively liberal in their interpretation of citizenship and other qualifications for admission. However, since the end of the Second World War, air travel has become increasingly practicable and the credit towards its cost available, albeit at high interest rates. Large scale movements of population from developing countries have been encouraged by travel agents and others perceiving profitable opportunities in this movement. As a consequence, both legal and illegal migration to various countries in Western Europe and North America is now widespread. These are now subject to stricter controls but the complete exclusion of such workers is not perceived as in the interest of the advanced countries. Shortages of labour at all levels of skill from the professional down to the semi-skilled factory and construction worker, together with various manual and service occupations, have been met by immigrant labour from various parts of Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and some less developed areas of Southern Europe. In many cases, the economic costs of this type of immigration has been kept at a minimum by not fully incorporating the immigrant workers into the complex welfare oriented social systems of the receiving society. Such immigrants have frequently not been eligible for the housing, health and other social welfare benefits available to the indigenous populations of advanced societies. In many cases, long residence qualifications or citizenship are prerequisites for such benefits (Rex, 1967; Castles and Kosack, 1973).

**31.** The situation of racially and ethnically distinct immigrant minorities in some advanced societies is further aggravated by the discouragement given to permanent residence. The rotation of "guest workers" in some European countries provides a constant supply of relatively unskilled labour generally separated from their own families and subject to strict control over length of residence, political representation, etc. Such a system may be described as a form of "external *apartheid*". As experienced in the Republic of South Africa, *apartheid* is a system which enables a small white minority to maintain political and economic control over the Black, Coloured and Asian inhabitants that make up 90 % of the population. This is achieved by legislation that provides a strict control over location of residence, type of employment, political activity and social behaviour of the non-white population. There are also severe penalties for white South Africans who breach laws that restrict social interaction with non-whites, outlaw miscegenation and limit freedom of political organization. One of the features of the system is the temporary migration of labour from neighbouring African countries and the Bantustans (which are officially regarded as the legitimate "home" of the African population) to urban areas, white farms and mining areas controlled by national and international corporations. Such a system minimizes the overhead costs that would normally be involved in the provision of permanent family housing, unemployment, sickness and pension rights for a permanent labour force in a modern society (Adam, 1971). There is some resemblance between this system and that operated by some

European countries that permit the migration but not the permanent settlement of immigrants from certain countries. The situation leads to the creation of an industrial 'reserve army' susceptible to exploitation by advanced societies (Rex, 1973).

### Conclusion: research needs

**32.** There will always be a need for specialized studies that address themselves to fundamental theoretical issues in the social sciences that have implications for migration and inter-ethnic relations. In psychology, there is a need for further work on the motivational factors influencing the propensity to migrate, as well as further research on the dynamics of racial and ethnic prejudice. In sociology, further research is needed on the relation of geographic to occupational and social mobility, as well as on the institutional factors creating and perpetuating systems of racial and ethnic stratification. Social historians have an important contribution to make in studying patterns of migration and their consequences for cultural and social change, together with the genesis and spread of racist ideologies. Geographers and demographers need to develop more sophisticated models of population growth and distribution and to examine their consequences for urbanization, sub-urbanization and human ecology. In this they will need, also, to draw upon the work of economists concerned with the supply and demand for labour, resource utilization and conservation and the political economy of welfare services in developing and advanced societies. Political scientists should also address themselves to questions of immigration policy and its relation to other aspects of domestic and foreign policy in a comparative framework, together with studies of the public administration of services designed to assist the integration of immigrants or to minimize the possibility of inter-ethnic tension arising from international movements of population.

**33.** If specialized studies, from the point of view of particular academic disciplines, are to be of value to planners and administrators contributing, in the long run, to the solution of some of the momentous problems facing mankind in the last quarter of the twentieth century, they must be brought together within the framework of a general systems approach. Only in this way will the practical and operational implications be fully understood. In this context, the development of systems models and the computer simulation of economic, demographic and social behaviour has great potential application (McMillan and Gonzalez, 1973). At the same time, the fundamental values underlying political and social policies must be fully explicated and incorporated into the analyses undertaken by social scientists. As Sir Geoffrey Vickers has pointed out, "value questions tend to be masked beneath the vast ramifications of our instrumental judgments, judgments of how best to achieve some already agreed end... choices based on major judgments of value tend to be masked behind the frequent threats latent in the instability of our system. Too often, we can justify what we do by some manifest disaster that will otherwise overtake us" (Vickers, 1970). Our task for the future should be to find ways of anticipating much sooner the potential disasters and finding ways of developing constructive policies that will fulfill our positive goals rather than merely avoid our negative ones.

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# INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

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**1.** The present era is the golden age of human migration, though migration is by no means a new or recent phenomenon. At all times, people have shown a natural propensity to settle not in places where they were born, but in places to which they were attracted by greater wealth, comfort, well-being and civilisation, or at least in places where they thought these benefits were to be found. But in the 20th century, migration has become a universal mass phenomenon. Roads, sea routes, transcontinental railway lines, and above all aeroplanes which are becoming faster every year, and which transport more and more people at lower and lower fares, encourage easy and uncomplicated travel. Thus to-day, at any given moment, many groups are in the process of migrating.

**2.** There are many different kinds of international migration. For deep-rooted reasons which are connected with the very nature of our modern civilisation, the human race suffers from a continual desire to be on the move. Political insecurity and historical changes, and the world-wide recognition of human rights, impel ever-larger groups of people to abandon the countries of their birth and enable them to find refuge elsewhere with reasonable ease.

In addition to these political refugees, we should mention the other types of more or less voluntary exiles. Intellectual workers who make up the "brain drain" do not always leave their own countries easily. The search for places where they can apply their knowledge profitably is only one reason for their migration. Political reasons are not the least important causes.

Students are also increasing in numbers. They disseminate modern knowledge and science and are the most active and systematic agents in the process of acculturation operating at the highest intellectual level and in the spread of technology throughout the world, which results in improved communication of ideas.

Tourism is different, but just as important; it is now a world-wide phenomenon. Expenditure on tourism encourages a real international redistribution of income—very often to the advantage of the least developed countries—and through cultural and social exchanges, encourages closer relations between peoples. People in the receiving countries, seeing groups of prosperous tourists arrive, "flinging their money around" and who act and think differently from themselves, become aware of their backwardness and poverty and attempt to find a remedy.

However, the principal type of migration is labour migration. Frontier-crossing commuters and seasonal workers change the very nature of an international frontier, which sometimes tends to become almost symbolic. But such migrations only affect countries with common borders. The movement of migrant workers now tends to affect more the poor, pre-industrial countries which "export" some of their surplus labour to the industrialised countries. This is a widespread phenomenon which planners must take into account, because of its deliberate and systematic nature.

There are thus many kinds of migration, with many different motives: political, cultural and economic. But the results are the same: a move through the mixing of people, and an increase, in both quantity and quality, of inter-cultural contacts.

**3.** The striking fact about migration to-day is that it has become a truly universal mass phenomenon, both because it affects an ever-growing number of people and because it now reaches social groups which traditionally were relatively immobile. In becoming universal, migration has also become more democratic. For geographical mobility is only one aspect of social mobility. The widespread nature of migration also reflects a positive desire to rise in the world. At present the annual migratory flow consists of more than 600,000 persons; tourists, who number about 170 million a year, are not included in this figure. In 1970, 126.5 million people crossed the frontiers which separate the USA from Canada and Mexico. 45,000 frontier-

crossing commuters and 7,200 seasonal workers also enter the United States annually, on a more or less regular basis. At the moment 11 million aliens live in Europe, 4.2 million in the USA and Canada. More than a million African emigrants have settled in other countries of Africa. During the twenty years 1950-1970, the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) arranged the transport of some 2 million migrants, of whom, however, half were refugees. Israel exists only because of immigration from practically all over the world. During the next ten years she expects about a million Soviet citizens, having already absorbed about 1.7 million people. At the same time, more than a million Arabs have been exiled.

Over a million French citizens live outside their national boundaries; but 3.7 million aliens live in France, i.e. 7.1% of the total population, not counting 1.3 million naturalised French who have become more or less assimilated. In the twenty years 1951-1971, about 4,250,000 Italians left the south of Italy. 1,700,000 settled in the north, but 2,550,000 emigrated to other countries. Many more examples could be given.

4. Migration today, as a mass phenomenon, affects all countries, except possibly the socialist countries about which information is lacking. We must analyse the currents, movements, and "types" of migration so as to bring out the dominant factors without getting lost in a mass of detail which need not detain us. A proper analysis of types of migration is necessary in order to illuminate the social changes which form the subject of this paper.

We may mention internal migration in passing. Even if international migration is regarded as only an extension of internal movement and is sometimes only a different response to similar situations, internal migration (flight from the land, or migration between cities) is caused by social phenomena which are specific to each case. But, intercontinental migration is clearly different. It involves international relations and considerably changes national and regional balances.

The growth in population in the developing countries tends to drive an ever-growing number of people abroad, chiefly adult males unable to find an adequate livelihood in their own countries. International migration from the developing countries to the West is the direct result of an anarchic, and uncontrolled growth of population. It is an extension of the flight from the land and gives it an international dimension. It leads to a triple change: social, economic and cultural, for these men and women emigrate in more than a physical sense. They bring with them their vocational skills, their economic needs, their social horizons, their forms of collective representation, their ideals, their beliefs, in short, their whole culture. These mass migrations affect the course of history, both in the countries of emigration and of immigration. Their departure leaves gaps in the labour force, both manual and non-manual; but when they arrive in their new countries they arouse suspicion, activate a defensive response on the part of the indigenous population and create a serious minority problem. They drain their own countries of skilled labour and brain power; and lead to xenophobia and racialism being manifested in the countries of destination.

5. In fact, the majority of international migrants are young, and are the most talented of their generation. For only select groups migrate. They need courage, intellectual suppleness and the desire to make a new life for themselves. The most adaptable are also the most adventurous. Moreover, the operation of the labour market and the legal measures taken both in the host countries and the countries of origin lead to a situation in which it is essential for the immigrants to possess certain qualifications. On the one hand, the host countries encourage only the settlement of trained workers who can meet their particular needs. In some cases they assist in occupational training, even in the country of origin, and impose their own standards of selection on applicants for emigration. But on the other hand, the countries of origin, concerned about the fate of their citizens, do their best to restrict "uncontrolled emigration" and only allow more or less "dependable" persons to go abroad. So that, as both parties have the same interest, the result is that only very highly skilled workers migrate from one Western country to another, and those who go to Western Europe from Mediterranean and North African countries already possess a certain degree of skill. Thus, in some European countries and systematically in all the Mahgreb and African countries, migration drains off all the skilled workers. The most highly skilled European workers go to North America or Australia and are replaced by labour from Mediterranean or African countries, less skilled, certainly, from a European point of view, but quite highly skilled by African standards. These in turn are replaced in their countries of origin by unskilled workers from rural areas.

Emigration in fact creates acute social problems which are common both to the countries of origin and the countries of destination. The depopulation of the Tunisian, Algerian and African rural areas is the obverse of the phenomenon that fills the suburbs of Paris, Marseilles and London. Nevertheless, it is worth pausing for a moment to look at the changes in the social structure in the countries of origin, for migration overseas is felt on at least three levels. It affects mainly the young; it alters the position of certain minorities, particularly in the North African countries; and it deprives these countries of a considerable proportion of their elite.

6. Since it is mostly the young who emigrate, the social structure of the countries of origin is considerably upset. Of the 4,250,000 people who left Southern Italy between 1950 and 1971, 65 % were workers of whom 85 % were male. In Tunisia, unemployed young men are systematically encouraged to leave; in the south, and in the area around the former military base of Bizerta, whole villages are literally depopulated. The village of Menzel Djemil is a typical example. The same thing occasionally happens in Algeria, particularly in the East.

Of course, in densely populated countries, such emigration is welcomed with satisfaction by those who take a Malthusian point of view. But we must examine the consequences objectively, for it is always the best who tend to be the first to leave.

This tendency is sometimes dramatic, it destroys certain traditional social balances. Mass departures in certain regions prevent the younger generation from replacing the older. Traditional skills, methods of cultivating the land, and the time-honoured relations between society and the environment, are seriously affected. Emigration is a powerful factor in breaking up the economic and social structure of a country and in attacking its culture\*. In this connection, the example of the Jewish communities in Tunisia is highly relevant: of 60,000 Tunisian Jews, about 55,000 left the country between 1956 and 1970, of whom 25,000 went to France and 30,000 to Israel. The intellectuals, doctors, craftsmen and businessmen left rather more speedily because they were younger. But the old people, the women, and those without qualifications stayed behind. The Jewish community lost all its vitality. The community will probably disappear very shortly, and this obviously bodes ill for the continuation of certain forms of plural society. Each time a minority disappears the spirit of social tolerance suffers.

7. The brain drain has been the subject of a large-scale international study carried out during the past few years by UNITAR, and some conclusions are already available. What is important for us is to emphasize once again the consequences, both quantitative and qualitative, of this phenomenon which is draining the countries of their natives. It is an unexpected but real form of aid provided by the least developed to the most developed countries, whether it is migration from Europe to North America or that which brings skilled African and Asiatic workers to Europe. In 1968, UNESCO gave figures for the Arab world: 10,000 white-collar workers, 5 to 7,000 of whom are highly skilled, emigrate each year from 8 countries of North Africa and the Middle East. In 1967, Arab emigration amounted to about a quarter of the total for the whole of the Third World. This results in an estimated loss of 20,000 dollars per person, or 100 million dollars for the Arab world alone. In Egypt, 58.5% of the emigrants in 1966 were scientists and engineers, and 70% of these held doctorates. Examples can be multiplied.

- This state of affairs, apart from creating an intellectual vacuum, and a transfer of elites, indicates unsatisfactory conditions in the countries of origin and also a serious spiritual malaise which has reached crisis dimensions during the last twenty years by acculturation and the spread of technology—but, this is a universal and enduring phenomenon. The Spanish writer Alvaro was already troubled by it some eleven centuries ago, when the "brain drain" was flowing towards the Arab countries; he wrote in the *"Indiculus Luminosus"*: "Who today studies the Gospels, the Prophets and the Apostles? Alas, the most talented young Christians know no literature and no language besides Arabic. They read and study Arab books with avidity, they spend vast sums of money to fill the libraries with them, and everywhere sing the praises of Arab learning." The intellectuals and advanced technicians of the Third World who today press towards America or Europe are continuing in the ancient traditions of previous centuries of those scholars who travelled to Damascus, Bagdad or Cordoba, Byzantium, Rome or Athens. To-day's crisis has been caused by the increased scale of migration. It shows that modern civilisation has a certain universal world-wide quality. Acculturation has succeeded so well that intellectuals, who have trained their minds to a certain level, are ready to abandon the links with their own communities and become part of the brain drain: a transfer of skills, but one that is caused by an insufficient transfer of culture in the opposite direction.

8. The economic results of migration are extremely important, both for the host countries and the countries of origin. It is difficult to estimate or give figures for the economic effects of the brain drain, but the effects of labour migration are set out in a good many published studies. Employment, economic expansion, the balance of payments, are all shown to have benefited. Italian emigrants in 1972 sent home 745,000 million lira; 324,000 million came from workers who had recently left their homes, and 421,000 million from emigrants who had been settled for some time and seemed to have no intention of returning home. Some 120,000 million lira are transferred to Sicily each year in this fashion, and the importance of this sum can easily be imagined.

In the Maghreb countries, Africa and Latin America, emigration is often regarded as a potential source of income. Figures confirm this; Tunisia, though it has only recently begun to send workers to Europe, draws

\* Certainly it deals a mortal blow to some minorities.

about a million dollars a year from this unexpected form of export of human capital. It has even opened saving accounts in France, providing for hard currency transfers in both directions. In 1969 more than 2,300 accounts contained 150,000 dinars, of which 8,000 dinars were transferred to Tunisia.

Often, however, the hopes of those in power in the developing countries have been disappointed, for nearly all this money is spent on consumer goods and little goes into savings. In the south of Italy, consumption per head is one third of that in the centre and north of the country, whilst income per head is only one half. In Tunisia and Algeria any savings are invested in small agricultural or craftsmen's holdings. The bulk of the money earned in France goes on the purchase of cars (often rebuilt) and on the construction of buildings which may or may not have functional value, but which always are a form of luxury consumption.

The situation is much the same in Yugoslavia, where 45% of the emigrants who went abroad in 1970 did so in the hope of earning enough money to supply their immediate housing needs, e.g. 32% wanted to build, or finish building, a house; 6% wanted to buy a flat.

The sociological importance of this cash flow is greater than its economic importance. It is expressive of success, modernisation, social and economic progress—though always at an individual or family level. A whole complex of new needs is created, as much for the migrant worker's family and friends, as for himself. Detailed studies should define the extent of these economic and social changes objectively. As far as we know, no such socio-economic balance sheet of migration has yet been drawn up. Economists who hope to invest emigrants' savings should first learn to allow for the corrupting influence of the consumer society.

9. Also, despite appearances, the influence of immigration on the host countries is scarcely less important. For many centuries migration was "permanent" in character; the emigrant settled with no hope of returning. Nowadays emigration appears to be temporary. It is a kind of exile which the emigrant hopes will be brief and which he is prepared to put up with for a time. Regular returns, often each year, to the country of origin, the transfer of money, emigration by individuals rather than families, all these mean that powerful links with the home countries remain unbroken. Whole countries have been populated with far fewer emigrants: viz. the New World, New Zealand and Australia. Today, in spite of the larger numbers involved, migration has little effect on the growth of population, except in a few countries. This is because the emigrant generally considers that, essentially and fundamentally, he belongs to his country of origin. The umbilical cord is never cut and he does not really seek assimilation in the host country. There is no melting-pot, or almost none.

Obviously, the ease of travel, the spread of air travel to all classes, with low fares bringing travel within the scope of the masses, accounts for the new situation of the emigrant and even alters the status of "minorities". The psychology of the emigrant has changed considerably and he is also regarded differently by the citizens of the host countries. Aware that he is only living there for a limited time, he does not make much of an effort to adapt. He regards his exile in a different light. The natural tendency to band together in ethnic, linguistic and religious groups is accentuated. In turn, defence mechanisms such as racism and xenophobia arise, and can, alas, be seen almost everywhere in Europe today.

Thus the new arrival finds himself unwillingly in a climate of non-acceptance. For the host society is not necessarily hospitable. He is, by definition, the "other", the alien. His very presence creates even greater tensions because the Western world tends to restrict foreign workers to the most menial tasks, generally thought to be the lowest and the worst paid. The result is, often enough, that the proletariat, minorities, coloured people and foreigners are lumped together. Class prejudice feeds and is fed by the endemic prejudices of race and religion. People remember that the North African is not a Christian, that other Africans are black. But, basically, they forget, with varying degrees of disingenuousness, that the emigrants are being subjected to a process of economic and social exploitation. The emigrant thus provides an alibi for the liberal conscience.

It has often been reckoned that there is a threshold beyond which this process becomes inevitable. A figure of 10% has been put forward.

But is this really so? Is there really this fatal threshold? Could there not rather be some qualitative approach, in terms of situation, collective consciousness, balance of power, exploitation...?

It can only be regretted that the opportunities of emigration are thus being lost. How many cultural exchanges are nipped in the bud? The possibility of learning from the "other" by discovering him and opening a constructive and fruitful dialogue with him, is not even perceived. There is no desire to overcome the difficulties, little generosity, or even intellectual curiosity, so that people do not notice that by regarding the migrant as an alien, they eventually become alienated themselves. There can never be enough thought given to this subject.

10. Migration all too often results in the migrants joining the proletariat. Many recent studies have drawn attention to this vital problem. What is loosely called migration of workers is, all too often, a migration of

peasants who simultaneously change countries, climates, work patterns, ways of life, standards of living and outlooks on the world. Often such people, descendants of rulers of the steppe, the savannah, or the great forests, end up in Nanterre or Aubervilliers. A natural life in a natural environment is succeeded by an artificial life in a mechanised environment. Time experienced as duration gives way to time regulated by the clock. City lights seem very pale, false and tawdry by comparison with the tribal palavers and collective experiences of former days.

As well as the break-up of time-space relations, there is also the break-up of the family and the strangeness of the new society and culture. Worse, migration is too often a dream followed by disillusion. For when he leaves home, the emigrant has idealised his new life so much that the reality is hard to accept. Lacking information, he has dreamed of cars, beautiful women, marvellous shows and fine clothes. But the rapid and lasting social advance that he has longed for is often painfully slow in coming and the awakening is as rude as the dream was delightful.

The world he has to deal with is new and foreign; this is not a serious matter in itself. But what is far more serious, it is as unwelcoming as possible; the immigrant knows himself to be exploited and feels himself to be hated. Bernard Granotier, in a remarkable study, has attempted to give figures for the exploitation of workers who have emigrated to France. He estimates the net profit to the French economy of immigrant workers at 1,000 million French francs. What is shocking is that this financial exploitation is accompanied by every conceivable form of racial persecution and xenophobia, which has reached a crisis point during the past few months. Serious studies of this phenomenon are still infrequent, but Jean Stoetzel, in his admirable work "The French and the Immigrants" noted already more than 20 years ago that 58% of French people questioned believed that the presence of foreigners "caused difficulties". Public opinion polls since then have only confirmed the deep-rooted hostility to migrant workers.

Thus, rejected by the society supposed to "welcome" them, the immigrants naturally tend to band together according to their natural affinities. This is in order to compensate for their rejection, but it certainly does not encourage any dialogue between them and the host society. The study published in France in 1969 by Cornaton is clear on this point. No European country as yet seems to have developed a policy designed to achieve definite aims and the question remains how integrated migrant workers can be without assimilation. How can they be used and at the same time respected? To put the question in these terms is, ultimately, to state that the ethical problem of respecting the foreign worker goes hand in hand with the legal problem of protecting him.

**II.** Now, the legal status of non-nationals is one of the most serious and delicate questions of the present time. It arouses the interest and concern of international organisations (Commission for the Rights of Man, United Nations, UNESCO, ILO...) and also of certain countries.

In fact, the problems are difficult and complex. Public attention has been directed more towards the problems caused by illegal migration. The economic expansion of the industrialised countries, combined with the difficulties of under-employment in the developing countries, has resulted in the development of hundreds of uncontrolled and clandestine methods of migration, alongside legal emigration. "Agencies" have been set up to "help" people cross frontiers or obtain passports. As the distinction between what is legal and illegal is difficult to establish, a "trade" begins, is regularly condemned and as regularly restarted.

The illegal immigrant worker is an ideal labourer because he has chosen to be exploited and therefore works hard. This is possible, obviously, only because in most developed countries, political and social legislation applies as of right solely to citizens of those countries. For twenty years the ILO has constantly urged countries employing foreign workers to adopt a policy which would promote equality of opportunity, of wages, conditions of employment for manual and non-manual workers, in short to abolish all discrimination. The ILO is clear-sighted in working for a social policy which would allow immigrants to be reunited with their families. "The reuniting of migrant workers with their families who have remained in the country of origin constitutes an essential factor of their well-being and social adaptation in the host country. Prolonged separation and isolation are a cause of tension and distress, as much for the immigrants as for the members of their families whom they have left at home, and prevent them from leading normal lives. This vast number of migrant workers, deprived of social relations, living on the fringes of the host community, creates many well-known social and psychological problems, which in their turn determine to a large extent the community's attitude towards them". (ILO document on Migrant Workers, p. 29).

There is very little social legislation to protect the migrant worker. The countries of origin sometimes connive at this, and are almost always unconcerned about it. An immense task remains to be carried out, systematically, to improve the lot of migrant populations and to recognize their equality with citizens of the host country in regard to human rights, union rights and—why not—political rights. But deficiencies in schooling,

health and housing are dramatic: this is where we must begin if we really want to turn to positive advantage what, in international migration, is often only seen as a negative and alien phenomenon.

**12.** The greater homogeneity of the world brought about by migration has resulted in a quicker circulation of ideas and an improved knowledge of other people. Never before, perhaps, have there been so many "others" about. And perhaps never before so little known: migration helps to create a plural society and to show the diversity of cultures in their true light. The presence in our midst of different communities is conducive to humility and modesty, as well as a source of enrichment. The plurality of cultures is fruitful because it creates a dialectic of revelation. Each group expresses itself in its own cultural language, but in the end there is a great risk of remaining confined within it. It is the shock of meeting others that reveals, through the differences, what we ourselves are. Each culture is reflected in the eyes of others, and my glance reveals the other in turn. Each is a mirror.

If the presence of minorities is found to be so very uncomfortable, as tendencies to racial prejudice and xenophobia show it to be, it may be because they present us with an image of ourselves which is not always as flattering as we could wish. So the tensions created by the presence of the "other" may be regarded as "reagents" or "revelations".

It is true that important social changes which encourage migration are taking place both in the countries of origin and in the host countries. Cultural pluralism must be understood and dealt with in terms of actual situations. What counts in the long run is not so much the image that a group forms of itself, as that which the society, within which it exists, has of it.

All sociological surveys are unanimous on this point. Workers almost always admit that, even if their stay in the host country has lasted only one or two years, they have "changed" during this period. This feeling increases as the stay becomes longer. At first, only their style of dress changes, subsequently their attitudes and even their deepest values alter. The necessity of learning to handle a new language is extended to technical improvements. Anxiety to adapt to their environment, modification of social, family, and even religious behaviour, the appearance of new needs, the influence of the mass media and of the cultural and political environment, all involve the immigrant in a frantic search for a new cultural identity. Often the result is to rediscover the old one, or to go beyond it. Even when they return home, what they have learnt remains with them.

Though different, the cultural dynamic of the host countries is nevertheless considerable. There are a thousand details to show that, in spite of everything, Europeans and Americans have been influenced by other cultures much more than they like to admit. How many European couples, clasped in each other's arms on a Saturday night to the beat of the blues, realise that they are in fact paying homage to the gods of Africa?

**13.** We conclude this brief and superficial examination by suggesting a few possible subjects for future research.

(a) Our first concern should be to coordinate our knowledge and our research more closely. Both countries and international organisations desire to elucidate and deepen their knowledge of the many questions relating to the policy and position of immigration. We cannot say that this work is being carried on in conditions of anarchy, but there is a certain lack of coordination.

The ILO, UNESCO, the Sub-Committee for the Protection of Minorities and the Struggle against Discrimination, the European countries, and OECD, are all working to codify and analyse these questions. There are grounds, it seems to us, first of all for making as exhaustive an inventory as possible in order to render the research as valuable as possible by coordinating it. A complete card-index would be most useful and welcome.

(b) There are also grounds for attempting to construct, on the basis of monographs and some carefully chosen case studies, a socio-economic balance sheet of labour emigration. This could be the theme of an international conference (round table, seminar) which would attempt, with the aid of figures if possible, to set out its advantages and disadvantages. A cost-benefit analysis would be extremely valuable to the responsible authorities, both in the host countries and in the countries of origin.

(c) One of the characteristics of migration to-day is the setting up of separate communities in the host countries. Relations between the two societies are extremely difficult to understand. The chief question on the agenda is how to "integrate, not assimilate" migrant populations. An examination from the point of view of applied social psychology would be most useful here.

(d) Finally, bearing in mind the difficulties of non-nationals, it would be appropriate to study the measures that must be taken, both before leaving the country of origin and after arriving in the host country, in order to make the integration of migrant populations easier, and to turn to the greatest possible advantage the variety of ideas and cultures that the emigrants bring with them.

# THE RETURN OF THE EMIGRANTS

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1. The number of Spaniards regarded as emigrants in 1970 has been estimated at about three and a half million. The majority—especially as far as emigration to Europe is concerned—represented a rural structure both according to the level of occupation, attitude, behaviour, and as to geographical origin, employment plans, etc. A similar state of affairs can be observed from the emigration records of other countries in the Mediterranean area: basically, Italy, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia.

Any study primarily concerned with return emigration would be reduced to a mere description of the phenomenon if it did not take into account the structure of the departing group as well as their possible modification in the host society. In that sense it is more a new immigration rather than the return of an old emigration. Return will in fact be the central theme and other emigration data such as geographical origin and occupational composition etc., will be touched on only as they affect this theme. This study will be tantamount to an analysis of the processes of *differential readaptation* of more or less heterogeneous migratory groups. This heterogeneity—both on departure and during the period of emigration—will necessarily comprise certain diversities in degree of readaptation to the society of origin. The record of such diversities may at the same time be considered as *differences in exploitation* of the migratory process in societies regarded as less industrialized.

Obviously, if the emigrant has not adapted to any other society it is difficult, in his case, to speak of readaptation to the society of origin once he has returned to it. He comes back as he went, with no appreciable alteration in his system of standards and values. At the same time there will be neither the conflict nor the progress comparable to that occasioned by more able and better trained structures.

## 1. THE EMIGRATION-RETURN UNIT

2. Since the European continental emigrant—in distinction to the trans-continental migrant—apparently moves with a marked *feeling of transitoriness* (1), it is reasonable to claim a dialectical relationship between emigration and return. So we are dealing with a *return emigration*. The “adaptation” of the emigrant to the host society will depend on his attitude of expectation to this. Consequently, behaviour during emigration (consumption, savings, change, social contact, apprenticeship, etc.) must have a vital relationship to return to the home country. Similarly, it is reasonable to analyse probable correlations between these forms of behaviour and the *different forms of readaptation* to the society of origin. Naturally, both extremes will depend on other factors, such as rural or urban origin, family structure, occupation, etc. Consequently consideration of these will form an important part of the explanation of the return itself. Also important is a previous analysis of the migratory groups in relation to the factors mentioned.

### 1.1. Geographical origin

3. It is normally acknowledged that the origins of the Mediterranean emigrant are predominantly rural. This conclusion seems all the more accurate in view of the fact that many emigrants from an urban environment have used this simply as a platform for further emigration; that is, this is an emigration by stages, from the country to the town and from there to another country. Nevertheless, the geographical/rural origins of the emigrant cannot be uniformly asserted. There is in fact a positive correlation between this fact and the degree of economic development of the country concerned. Thus Italy, Spain, Greece and Yugoslavia record more agricultural continental emigration than Turkey or Portugal. Table I shows the statistics of

TABLE I. REGIONAL ORIGIN OF EMIGRANT (1966-1971) (PERCENTAGES)

	1971	1970	1969	1968	1967	1966
<b>Italy</b>						
North	11.8	10.2	11.1	10.2	13.8	22.2
Central	13.3	13.1	11.2	10.0	13.5	14.4
South	50.2	52.3	55.0	54.0	47.2	44.1
Sicily and Sardinia	24.7	24.4	22.7	25.8	25.5	19.3
<b>Spain</b>						
Northwest and West	37.4	35.7	31.6	39.3	62.9	44.5
Northeast and East	9.2	9.4	9.5	7.3	6.4	6.8
Madrid	6.9	4.7	4.8	4.0	4.2	6.7
South	45.7	49.6	52.4	49.2	26.1	41.2
Islands with Ceuta and Melilla	0.8	0.6	1.7	0.2	0.4	0.8
Greece	51.5	54.1	61.8	55.4	58.5	62.6
Central	14.7	14.0	11.2	7.3	5.1	5.1
Epirus	10.9	11.0	10.1	14.5	14.0	11.0
Attica	10.4	8.5	6.2	11.4	13.2	7.8
Peloponnese	4.3	3.9	3.6	4.3	4.8	5.4
Crete, Ionian and Aegean Islands	8.2	8.5	7.1	7.1	4.4	8.1
<b>Yugoslavia</b>						
Slovenia	4.7	4.8	6.6			
Croatia	23.7	19.0	19.0			
Vojvodina	12.2	8.9	10.5			
Bosnia and Herzegovina	24.6	25.9	25.9			
Serbia	16.0	13.3	13.7			
Montenegro	1.8	2.4	2.4			
Kosovo	7.2	11.1	9.6			
Macedonia	9.8	14.6	12.3			
<b>Portugal</b>						
North	28.0	30.1	32.6	35.0	19.7	33.1
Central	54.8	53.1	37.9	51.6	65.6	58.9
South	17.2	16.8	29.5	13.4	14.7	8.0
<b>Turkey</b>						
Istanbul and Thrace	22.4	21.4	20.3	24.0	43.6	36.5
Ankara and Central Anatolia	23.2	22.9	23.8	23.0	16.0	20.8
Anatolia-North	13.8	16.7	16.1	14.4	10.8	13.0
Anatolia-West	25.0	26.5	23.8	19.7	11.0	14.9
Anatolia-East	7.8	4.3	8.0	9.9	10.0	8.3
Anatolia-South	7.8	8.2	8.0	9.0	8.6	6.5

*Source:* Drawn up by us on the basis of data from the "Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung": *Ausländische Arbeitnehmer* (Foreign workers), 1968, 1971. Nuremberg.

origin of emigrants to Germany between 1966 and 1971, which can be applied with slight variations to other countries.

It will be observed, also, that a higher proportion of emigrants come from the most agricultural and economically most backward regions of Italy (the South, with Sicily and Sardinia), Spain (Galicia and Andalusia), Greece (North), etc. At the same time, the percentage taken up by Slovenia, the most highly developed region of Yugoslavia, is lower. The same does not seem to be true of Portugal and Turkey. In both countries, although the origins may be predominantly rural, large percentages of emigrants are concentrated round the major cities of Lisbon, Oporto, Istanbul, Ankara and Smyrna.

What has already been said about emigration to Germany is valid, on average, for continental emigration in general. Thus the maps of continental emigration drawn up by Spain show the greatest migratory density in Andalusia, Galicia and the West. Migratory densities in excess of five per thousand were recorded in these areas in 1969 (2).

## 1.2. Occupational structure

4. Although the proportion of "artisans, industrial workers and unskilled workers" may be high—for instance, in the region of 56.3% for assisted emigration to Europe in 1970 (3)—the participation of skilled personnel from the same countries which recorded the most distinctly agricultural migratory quotas (with the

possible and relative exception of Italy) has been observed thus, "the German Office of Employment in Turkey handled some 29,600 skilled emigrants in 1971: i.e. 46% of the total. No other Office could produce such high results, in the other emigration countries..." (4). However, in Greece "it was possible to engage skilled personnel in only limited proportions... The same thing happened during 1971 in Spain which was far lower than in other countries" (5). The same source of information also referred to the growing difficulties in recruitment of skilled personnel in Yugoslavia. At the same time, the data collected *during emigration* reflect a higher proportion of skilled workers among the Turks than among other nationalities (6).

With regard to return and to the long-term progress of emigration it is important to study the possible correlation existing between the degree of qualification and the probability of occupational and social promotion. Analogously the first factor could be correlated with aspects as vital to a *policy of return* as change of attitude, apprenticeship, children's education, consumption, etc.

### 1.3. Family structure

5. In contrast to what happens in trans-oceanic emigration, not only from Spain but also from Italy, etc., it seems that "emigration to Europe is composed fundamentally of males, the most familiar situation being that in which the man is accompanied by wife and children. It is also characteristic of emigrants to the European countries that they come exclusively from the active male population: 86.5% are men and 99.3% are between the ages of 15 and 55" (7). Thus 36% of Spaniards working in Germany in 1968 (compared with 24% of Italians, 21% of Greeks, 29% of Turks and 23% of Portuguese) were bachelors, while the great majority of married men were accompanied by their wives (8).

Civil status undoubtedly constitutes an important variable in the emigrant's adaptation to the host society, and, ultimately, in his readaptation to his society of origin. Although this variable is of strategic importance in explaining his return, the modest contributions made to the analysis of emigrant repatriation—for example those made in March by the International Seminar of Employers in Athens in 1966—have disclosed others without which any study of this subject must be defective and incomplete. Thus, the analysis of return must necessarily include the explicit consideration of many factors which antedate the return itself *but which govern it*. This is true, for instance, of the savings/consumption factor without which it is impossible to speak of *types of readaptation* of the returning emigrant.

### 1.4. Savings/consumption

6. Other studies have proved the existence of a positive correlation between ruralism and an inclination towards saving, or a reduction in consumption. *The life-style of the rural emigrant, socially isolated, is controlled by reference groups which lie outside the host society.* It allows for less possibility of interaction and apprenticeship. Obviously, migratory policy must take this correlation into account in order to ensure better progress for emigration, especially as regards return emigration. It is clear from the compilation of data relating to savings that "factors of monetary policy which modify willingness to transfer them to the society of origin" must be taken into consideration. "Thus in 1968 transfers from Germany dropped by approximately a hundred million DM, although the percentage of foreign workers had increased considerably" (9). That is, savings data cannot be satisfactorily obtained simply on the basis of information relating to remittances of foreign currency to the country of origin.

In the cost-profit ratio of emigration, foreign currency remitted is normally considered as profit, although there are major reasons for the discovery of appreciable losses in emigration: for example the unprofitable export of a labour force and naturally many other factors, such as insufficient degree of development, rigidly stratified social structure, etc. In any case, the *immediate advantage*—from which others can be derived, such as the actual reform of social structures—for society seems to be the importation of foreign currency into economies which are generally suffering an adverse balance of trade: "The consequences of these remittances to our development should be evaluated properly. In 1969 and 1970 they amounted to more than one fifth of the total income from exports of goods. The sum of 21,646,850,000 pesetas, the amount of foreign currency remitted by postal order between 1960 and 1966 by our workers, is greater than the sum of the nominal capital of all Spanish private banking in 1965." Arturo López Muños calculates that the net income derived from emigration between 1959 and 1969 is also in excess of the total income from long-term foreign capital if "other income proceeding from emigration" is duly accounted for (10).

The International Monetary Fund (11) calculated the quantity of foreign currency imported by emigrants in 1966 at 481 million dollars for Spain, 877 million for Italy, 161 million for Greece and 18 million for Turkey. The amount of these remittances could well justify, with regard to the return, their being channelled towards greater progress and the consequent readaptation of the numbers who return. The idea of the foundation

of a Bank of Emigration has been aired from time to time. However, apart from some plans of far less scope—some Spanish Savings Banks, for instance, which financed the periodical *La Région* in Europe with the intention of attracting emigrants' deposits—nothing appears to have crystallized in favour of the group of returning emigrants.

The relationship indicated between the type of emigrant, (the more economical, the more rural he is) and consumption, is involved, in its turn, with another important factor in emigration, of very considerable importance for the emigrant's adaptation to the host society and readaptation to the society of origin: social contact with the host majority.

### 1.5. Social contact

7. The observation of the powerful socio-cultural exclusion of the foreign emigrants is commonplace. However, "as his urbanization proceeds, certain tendencies to step outside the peculiarly ritualistic framework are also recorded... as the urban culture of migratory groups increases, the necessity for integration progresses equally" (12).

Social contact, then, varies in parallel with other variables. At the same time, it constitutes an important factor of the learning process and of occupational promotion itself, although this entails a reduction in savings and consequently in the remittance of foreign currency. However, this immediate disadvantage may be sufficiently compensated by the longer-term profit related to the greater import of technical skills and new systems of standards and values common to the more industrialized societies. From this aspect it is possible to understand the importance attached, in the field of migratory policy, to the group's capacity for social interaction. This, then, constitutes a very valuable phase of emigration for the improved progress of the returning emigrant.

Despite the relative homogeneity of Mediterranean migratory groups, they interact with the host majority in differing degrees. This type of contact differential has been noted, although only in a rudimentary and indicative fashion, in Germany (13). A more interpretative and comprehensive analysis would be an interesting chapter in the study of the return of the emigrant.

### 1.6. Social mobility and promotion

8. *In relation to his return*, the Mediterranean emigrant seems to be more concerned with the accumulation of foreign currency than with occupational promotion. At the same time he prefers the multiplication of hours of overtime to the sacrifice of some time and money to various training courses. He does not appear to be as much interested in social mobility in the host society, in relation to which he feels himself in a fringe situation, as in economico-social improvement in his society of origin. Here his most frequent aims are generally related to the purchase of a flat, agricultural machinery, bank savings, self-employment, etc. (14).

It will therefore be understood that only 6% of foreign workers employed in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1968 were in the specialist grade (15).

Nevertheless the percentage of foreigners who are not regarded as unskilled is greater: that is, those who may also be included among "skilled personnel". However, the foreigner is generally classified simply as labourer "both due to lack of technical know-how and because he is more useful and profitable in labouring occupations" (16).

### 1.7. Social deviation

9. It can, in principle, be maintained that on the continent of Europe the Mediterranean emigrant develops conformist behaviour patterns. At the same time the Press has often reported the antipathy felt towards him by the worker of the host society. He is accused of lack of worker solidarity and facile agreement to the employers' offers. This effect is more apparent in migratory groups which are traditionally less educated in the standards of trade union freedoms. Thus N. Abadan observed that "the fact that the Turks had been less affected by dismissals... can be explained in various ways... (among others) by a preference among employers for those who are reputed not to be affiliated to any trade union, not to put forward claims and to have acquired great working discipline and to be content with modest accommodation" (17).

As far as criminal conduct is concerned, migrant minorities are basically the victims of the majority prejudice concerning their presumed higher rate of delinquency. This prejudice has been shown to be false, although, on the other hand, the migrants' delinquent structure is more violent than that of the host society itself:

specifically as regards severe physical injury, murder, manslaughter, etc. (18). However, it appears that such differences in the deviant behaviour of majorities and minorities—not only where common lawlessness is concerned—tend to disappear, the less rural and better “industrially” trained the latter are.

Accordingly, deviancy increases, although its violence diminishes, as the migrant group becomes industrialized: that is, becomes familiar with the standard of values considered appropriate to an industrial society. Moreover, greater conflict and deviation continues to be related to greater social interaction and a higher level of aspiration. Adaptation to the host society has to leap, in some way, the barrier of conflict. This, even when it occurs in the form of common crime, though deplorable, has its uses. One of these is precisely that of closing the gap between minorities and majorities. Greater interaction with the host society also entails greater probability of education and promotion in both the social and occupational fields, although deviation may also increase, including common delinquency. At the same time, the statistical goodness of the emigrant should not be regarded as something exclusively positive, nor, in fact, is conflict exclusively negative.

## 2. THE RETURN

**10.** The “laissez-faire” policy so habitual to emigration apparently continues to accompany it right through to the return. The returning emigrant is abandoned to his fate, which in many instances cannot be without its trials in a milieu which he has left some time before and which is better known by those who have not emigrated. Moreover, employers—at least in some countries—are apparently not always eager to take on the returned “who, after spending some time outside Portugal, feel entitled to claim a higher wage” (19). In many cases “the temptation to emigrate again is great” (20). In any case, the absence of any policy for returned emigrants must aggravate the readaptation of the emigrant to his society of origin. At the same time, this society neglects the better use of the resources imported by the returning group: that is, their investments, knowledge, etc.

The difficulties referred to can also be explained, if we consider the great poverty of studies on the returning emigrant. An analysis of this situation should include better information—numerical, in the first place—of the phenomenon, as the basis of a possible typology. Naturally, with a view to better integration of the returning emigrant and the elaboration and application of the appropriate measures, regard will have to be paid to the returning emigrant’s motivation, duration of emigration, factors mentioned already (geographical origin, occupational structure, deviation, etc.), etc.

### 2.1. Numerico-descriptive survey of the returning emigrant

**11.** In general a tremendous deficiency exists in the simple numerico-statistical records on the returning emigrant. This has been explained, for instance, by indicating the difficulty in defining the actual concept of the “returning emigrant”. However, this difficulty is easily disposed of within the framework of a nominal definition. As we know, the term in question is conventionally defined in this way. For instance, it would be possible to discard those who returned within six months (since in this case one cannot really describe them as “emigrants”) or who return for a period of less than six months (since in this case one cannot really describe them as having “returned”).

The defects in the statistical records are also due to the fact that those who leave one host country do not always return to their country of origin but go to another country which plays host to foreign labour. Thus, during the economic crisis of 1966/67, many people left the Federal Republic of Germany and went to Switzerland, the Netherlands, France, etc.

The survey is undoubtedly one useful method of recording returned emigrants. A unique instance of this is the great survey organized by the Central Institute of Statistics in Italy in April 1969 (21).

The necessary data—not only as regards mere numerical records, but including other characteristics as well—can be obtained and collected as follows:

- (a) *By the direct method* (primary data): survey of a sample of returned emigrants, for example, taken from among those who in the 1970 population census and the 1965 municipal census indicated foreign domicile over the previous five years, or those who, according to data held by government agencies (for instance, in Spain, the *Dirección General de Seguridad*), obtained a passport between 1965 and 1970; strategic surveys of employers, social workers, returning emigrants, etc.

- (b) *By the indirect method* (secondary data): data in the hands of consulates, labour exchanges, aliens' offices in the country of immigration, publications by centres for the employment of foreign personnel and their corresponding agencies in the Mediterranean area. Naturally, the data held in the various Ministries of Labour, Institutes of Immigration, etc., would be very useful.

An estimate of the number of returned emigrants in terms of "net emigration" is, moreover, only of limited descriptive interest. Such estimates are not able to distinguish between those who "have left and returned" in the period in question and those who "return having left *before* the period in question". Due to the lack of official data on the subject, it is imperative to conduct a survey. In the one conducted by the Central Institute of Statistics of Italy it was estimated that between 40 and 50% of returning emigrants had emigrated for more than one year. In approximate figures, 12% had stayed away five years; 5% between four and five years; more or less the same percentage between three and four years; 10% between two and three years, etc.

The German Department of Employment and Unemployment Insurance published the following figures: 17% of male foreign workers stayed less than two years; 26% between two and four years; 31% between four and seven years; 26% more than seven years (22). The same source indicated a percentage in excess of 60 among Spaniards who stayed more than four years in the Federal Republic of Germany. Of course it is quite possible that the first plans of the emigrant with regard to a speedy return were slowly deferred: especially in the case of married men, and still more, those with children. On the other hand it is very difficult to understand the results of surveys (for instance the one carried out by the Spanish Institute of Emigration) *made before* emigration was undertaken: "The Spanish Institute of Emigration published some time ago the results of its study made in 1966 among emigrants to Europe. 99.3% of the workers planned to return to Spain. 46.7% wanted to remain abroad for up to one year; 24.2% from one to two years; only 6.3% wanted to spend more than five years away" (23).

## 2.2. Typology and explanation

**12.** An important typology of return emigration can be produced according to the duration of stay in a foreign country. This is a crucial variable, since time must be an important factor in the explanation of the phenomena of adaptation and readaptation. Despite the general isolation of the emigrant he cannot remain completely untouched by the effects of contact with the majority group and, in a wider setting, with other types of remuneration, assistance, system of freedoms, life-style, etc.

The classification of "type" of returning emigrant may also conceal a great explanatory potential based on the factors already discussed: geographical origin, occupational structure, family structure, consumption, deviation, etc. These are factors which must stand in a definite relationship to the different "types" of readaptation to the society of origin.

On the other hand, the classification of the returning emigrant on the basis of the following model is of undoubted usefulness

A	B	C	D
Place of birth	Domicile immediately prior to emigration	Most frequent domicile abroad	Present domicile

The various alternatives are 1)  $A = B$  but  $B \neq D$ , that is, the position of a man who does not return to the place of birth or of residence prior to emigration; 2)  $A \neq B$  but  $B = D$ , a case where the man had previously emigrated within the country, returning to the place which represented his jumping-off point for departure abroad; 3)  $A \neq B$ ,  $A = D$ ; 4)  $A \neq B$ ,  $B \neq D$ .

The above model, which is a variation of the one used by José Hernández Alvarez, can be precisely applied to the explanation of different types of readaptation of the returning emigrant.

## 2.3. Motivation

**13.** The motivation for the return will be different among the different types of emigrants, despite their marked uniformity. Thus the image of the society of origin as evidence of some significant economic growth will be a contributory factor in motivating the return home. This may, for instance, be the cause of the progressive drop in net Spanish emigration to the rest of Europe: this effect cannot be as easily observed with regard to other, less developed countries. Thus "the distrust of Turkish workers emigrating to Germany vis-à-vis the possibilities of the labour market in their country of origin is considerable" (25). So it will be

understood that, according to a survey run by Professor Tuna in Istanbul (26), the main cause of return can be attributed to family reasons, economic considerations playing a less decisive role: that is, for instance, having found suitable work in Turkey, the probable expectation of finding it, etc.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to observe the great deficiency of surveys on the motives for return and the interpretation of the results. It is necessary to distinguish and differentiate between those who, for example, though they may have stated "family reasons" as their motive for return, may *also* have returned for economic reasons. This observation is true of many studies made on the subject of the return of the emigrant, the results of which have in any case been roughly tabulated.

In a survey concerning returned Spanish emigrants—who were employed in large metallurgical industries around Barcelona and came from Germany, who had been away for at least six months, who had worked predominantly in industry, males, etc.—it was observed that "the most numerous group (46/90) is that of those who returned by force of adverse circumstances (poor remuneration and work, dispute or dismissal, want of accommodation, problems of family re-grouping, disappointment). Those who returned of their own accord numbered 23 (marriage, obtaining employment in Spain or the hope of so doing, "love of country"; 11 said they had fulfilled their objective in leaving). The remaining 23 had returned for other negative reasons, but not always as adverse as those of the first group: they were tired of being abroad, home-sick, afraid of losing their former home (disposed of in absence), termination of redundancy in the factory in Spain... In one form or another family reasons played the principle role in the decision to return to Spain, sometimes expressed as difficulties in family re-grouping or accommodation in Germany, and in other cases as a desire to be reunited with the family which had remained in Spain" (27).

The above list of causes and contributory causes does not appear to sub-divide in terms of any factor: for example, family, economic, etc. (no doubt for lack of method). Nor is the interaction of the motivating factors for the return expressed. It is accordingly understandable that—as has been pointed out—it is impossible to obtain a sufficiently differentiated picture of the emigrant's motives for return. Thus it is equally impossible to obtain a clear idea on this point by perusing the results of the Italian survey referred to.

TABLE II. BREAKDOWN OF RETURNED ITALIAN EMIGRANTS UNDER MOTIVES FOR RETURN (IN PERCENTAGES)

	Returned 1962-68	Returned after a single stay abroad
Expiry of contract	36.7	25.3
Employment in Italy	12.2	17.4
Family reasons	19.6	26.4
Reasons of health	22.4	25.4
Companions	6.8	4.2
Other reasons	0.2	1.3

It may well happen that the heading "Employment in Italy" is connected with "Family reasons", "Reasons of health", etc. These, in turn, may have influenced the employer's attitude in the sense of "non-renewal of contract" etc. Moreover, the motive behind the decision to return is not always exclusively economic, although it may be attributed to economic reasons at the interview. Apart from such reasons as "Have found work in my own country", "Have already fulfilled my economic aims", "Wished to take up an independent profession", etc., the decision may in fact depend on clearly social factors: for example, failure to adapt to the country of immigration, with the consequent home-sickness for his own country, etc.

The above makes it clear that as yet there has been no sociological investigation of quality on this subject. It has been handled on the level of simple description and the surveys carried out have not applied any explicit theoretical standards. Thus, the questionnaire has been limited to a series of questions without any explanatory coherence and consequently of limited scientific significance.

## 2.4. Social reintegration

14. As we mentioned before, the emigrant's readaptation in his own country does not seem in reality to involve very acute problems. This is due to the expressly rural structure referred to. If, owing to this fact, it was difficult for the emigrant to adapt to the society of immigration, it is difficult to speak of readaptation to the society of origin. Obviously the problem will be aggravated by having to suffer unemployment as soon as he returns to his own country.

The importance of a study of the rural-urban factor in the analysis of the processes of adaptation and readaptation has already been underlined. Any consideration of this last phase of the migratory process will have to be based *explicitly* on prior analysis of those who leave: that is, of the structures and functions of the migratory groups *before and during* emigration, as an indispensable element in the explanation of the return itself. In this way it will be possible to *anticipate* the type and problems of readaptation of the emigrant to the society of origin in terms of observations made on him in the countries of immigration. In view of the profound disparity of the systems of standards and values of the emigrant and the host majority, an important basis of conflict and consequently of his functional capacity is missing: interaction and learning. Nearly parallel lives—yet they fail to meet: therefore there is no mutual understanding. Naturally there are groups among the emigrants who have absorbed more of these standards and values of the host society and, to some degree, they all bring a new and significant sophistication with them on their return. Nevertheless “the returning emigrant does not import a new system, but new details or particulars which run counter to the great sociological complex of the majority. The political experiences which have taken place during emigration cannot have left many traces on his sensitivity. He simplifies his aims in economic saving” (28). According to this proposition he dissolves in the ocean of his co-religionaries in the national economy.

G. Schiller seems to reach similar conclusions: “The sojourn abroad makes very little difference to the personal system of values: for example, in relation to what has been called ‘development-mindedness’. The first observation is in line with other observations and results of investigations... Some self-appreciations seem more optimistic: for example, when 20% out of a sample of 200 Spanish returned emigrants think they exercise a ‘significant’ influence on their environment, while 30% attribute a limited influence to themselves, the remaining 50% estimating theirs at zero. The reply of 83% of interviewees who claimed to have adapted easily to conditions of life in their own country may be interpreted in the same way” (29).

However, the mere fact of having been abroad and the mere experience of the migratory adventure must have influenced the returning emigrant himself: “Emigration produces transformation in individuals, more than by the penetration of a different culture, by the migratory experience... Although the impact produced on the emigrants by the concrete reality of Germany may be slight, we have seen that those who return to the heavy metal industry quite frequently show a feeling of admiration for Germany” (30).

**15.** Among the total number of returned emigrants it is analytically advisable to establish two sub-groups, according to the different degree of ruralism. It is reasonable to suppose that the less rural of the two will make a greater contribution to social change in the societies of origin, thanks to a greater influx of new techniques and attitudes. Primarily, a greater probability of conflict with the old system will be observed in this group. Consequently, investigation of the processes of readaptation will revolve around two complementary hypotheses, which can be formulated as follows:

*Hypothesis A:* The more industrial the structure of the group (of returning emigrants), the greater will be the probability of conflict in readaptation, and of social advance.

*Hypothesis B:* The more rural the structure of the group (of returning emigrants), the greater will be the probability of readaptation “*sui generis*”.

In the case of the emigrant who is better skilled in his occupational techniques, social workers have on various occasions indicated a better perception of social stratification, workers’ rights, etc., as well as the existence of a higher level of occupational and social aspirations. On the other hand, in the case of the emigrant who is less well prepared for the challenge of the industrial society, his return does not seem to entail any appreciable change in the system of values and behaviour. At the same time, we cannot speak of readaptation here, since he has never adapted to another social order. His readaptation to the society of origin is therefore “*sui generis*” and his contribution to its development is limited to the import of foreign currency.

In order to test the above hypotheses we must of course define concepts, such as those which correspond to “rural structure” and “industrial structure”, as well as “conflicting readaptation” and “readaptation *sui generis*”. To this effect, we shall at least establish the indices corresponding to the following factors:

1. Habits of consumption
2. Delinquency
3. Employment
4. Domicile
5. Savings and their goal
6. Political, religious and social attitudes
7. Duration of emigration.

By combining the data relating to the previous factors, we can establish an *index of ruralism*, to be used as a basis for classification of the returned emigrants in *three groups*:

G<sub>1</sub>: maximum ruralism (X<sub>1</sub>)

G<sub>2</sub>: medium ruralism (X<sub>2</sub>)

G<sub>3</sub>: minimum ruralism (X<sub>3</sub>): that is, industrialism.

In order to verify the hypotheses proposed above, we then proceed to establish the correlation between the variables *X* (ruralism), *Y* (readaptation), *Z* (social advance). The relations between these will be completed with reference to other factors within the framework of *multi-variable analysis*. At the same time, we shall have at our disposal another sample of non-emigrants, to fulfil the function of a *control group*.

Basically, it is the explanation of the following processes which is of interest: *Change of attitudes*: motives for emigration and return, transformation of the level of aspiration, change in religious and political attitudes, etc. *Social mobility*: change of status, level of qualifications, level of education, income, consumption, lifestyle, country/town and manual/non-manual mobility (intra-generation and inter-generation). The relevant analysis could also make use of the "inflow-outflow mobility" scheme of Thomas Fox and S.M. Miller (31).

*Family and social relationships*: changes in family situation, conflict, leisure time, fertility rate—aspects which, for instance, have not been studied in the European return emigration, although they have in America: "The fertility rate among returned emigrants is strikingly lower than those in Puerto Rico" (32).

*Occupational readaptation*: occupational and trade union relations, work satisfaction, alienation, etc. On the subject of awareness of the rigidity of the class divisions of society, Angels Pascual has made the following observation: in returned emigrants "an obvious relationship can be observed between the origin of the individuals and awareness of the rigidity and mobility of social divisions. Those of industrial origin show 37% awareness of rigidity; in those of agricultural origin it is reduced to 20%" (33).

As far as occupation is concerned, the returned emigrant, when he has absorbed some experience relevant to a qualification, seems to have prospects of success in societies constantly more in need of personnel suitable to the ever-growing mechanization. Thus in relation to a sample of returned emigrants and employees at Barreiros Diesel, the *Informe Jamarido* said that, although 91% lacked any qualification whatever before emigration, "on return, 29% were employed as skilled workers, 39% as labourers, 14% as representatives and 5% as foremen..." (34).

## 2.5. Towards a policy for returning emigrants

Since the migratory phenomenon is a bilateral matter concerning the country selling and the country buying labour, the policy for returned emigrants merits attention on both sides. It could operate on three fronts: society of emigration, society of immigration and the two together:

*From the society of emigration:*

**16.** Mention has already been made of the close correlation between the type of emigrant and his exploitation of his departure to a foreign and more industrialized labour market. The industrially more skilled emigrant will have a good chance of making better use of his emigration, not only because he is more capable of specialized work but also because he is more accessible to interaction and the absorption of new standards. Naturally, this does not mean encouraging the flight of the specialist. For the most part, the shortage of more or less skilled personnel in the Spanish group is a positive sign, since it indicates the *obvious* demand, relatively well rewarded, for technical assistance for the internal economy, growing constantly more dependent on the skilled worker and less on the labourer. However, the promotion of technical and social training courses is important (including a rudimentary skill in the language). Although such courses do exist—for instance that of the Spanish Institute of Emigration in Spain—the results do not seem very convincing. Thus these statistics show that the Spaniard is at an obvious disadvantage in relation to other migratory groups in Germany (35).

Similarly, the migratory groups should show a more urban composition. The straightforward countryman suffers more from emigration because he finds himself forced into extreme social isolation entailing depression, inhibition, repressed violence, etc. On this subject the foreign Press has made a good deal of the frequency of neurosis among emigrants. The demand is *that government emigration agencies should concern themselves explicitly with this subject, not only as regards the external factors—as in the case of the Spanish Institute of Emigration—but in conjunction with internal emigration*. Thus it would be advisable to give some preference to the urban emigrant, directing some of the agricultural groups which now go abroad to industrial posts,

almost always as labourers, within the country of origin. This might encourage the emigration of industrial workers, labourers, who would leave the position to the emigrant from the country.

At the International Employers' Seminar in Athens (18-21 October 1966), the Greek group suggested the following measures which constitute a policy recommendation for any country dealing with returned emigrants:

- a) Detailed information on jobs requiring skilled workers which have not been occupied for a definite period by workers available in Greece.
- b) On this basis, an offer of annual contracts to return emigrants or those who are in Europe...
- c) Dissemination of information on jobs offered...
- d) Reduced fares for return journeys,
- e) Organization, at departmental level, reception and reintegration of former emigrants...
- f) Establishment of a committee composed of ministerial representatives responsible for the application of the appropriate measures. Moreover, the Greek Government is to ask the bank to set up a savings/accommodation account at branches in Germany..." (36).

In order to qualify the emigrant—including the specialist level—the "Spanish houses" and similar centres of other Mediterranean countries will have to *broaden the basis of assistance offered*, to make them into something more than a refuge and meeting place for compatriots. To the language courses already given at some of these centres could be added other courses in occupational skills with a view to promotion both during emigration and on return.

*From the society of immigration:*

**17.** Just as the migratory policy of the countries of emigration has normally tended towards the exploitation of immediate goals—that is, acquiring an escape valve for unemployment problems, the importation of foreign currency, etc., so the policy of the receiving countries has been restricted to the obvious goal, that of getting hold of industrial labour to fill posts, including services, unoccupied by their own nationals. That is, posts on the lowest rung of the ladder of prestige have been those which were open to foreigners. Of course it is true that such countries have organized promotional and occupational training courses. However, these have not been sufficiently used by the foreigner, who owing to his rural conditioning, prefers the immediate benefit, that is, the overtime which brings him in more money for his savings. The so often betrayed principle of "equality of opportunity" which the host countries are wont to preach is maintained at a fairly theoretical level. Promotion of these ideas will have to bring with it *a system of immediate stimuli—occupational, financial, etc.* This is the only way of fulfilling the good will of organizations such as the German Department of Employment and Unemployment Insurance, which claims "to offer foreign workers the same opportunities of learning and technical improvement as the Germans".

With regard to the *establishment of branches of undertakings in the countries of emigration which would be basically concerned with potential or returned emigrants*, this measure may be advisable, although important factors in the general investment policy will have to be considered.

Finally, the policy of the country of immigration must not, of course, be guided solely by financial considerations. At the same time, *the emigrant arriving must be considered as a factor in the development of the country selling labour: that is, as a returning emigrant, who will go back better adapted to the industrial system.* This prospect may appear almost Utopian. However, without it, it would be difficult to give effective substance to the previous measures.

*From both societies jointly:*

**18.** Since emigration in general is a bilateral affair, as we have said, which affects two societies, the two should *join forces in order to organize the return of the emigrant more satisfactorily.* This principle could be applied to the steps already mentioned: for example, as regards more acceptable training for the emigrant who in general will be returning to his own society. Although, as has been pointed out, the basis of cooperation over aid and promotion will have to be broadened, this is a fact: "Both *Cáritas Alemana* and the *Obra Diacónica y Beneficiencia Obrera*, as well as the trade unions and other organizations have distributed the work of aid and assessment on behalf of the different nationalities. In this area there is cooperation with the different governments, so that, for instance, the *Agregaduría Laboral de España* has set up offices or information centres with the help of the Federal Office of Employment" (37).

Certain bases of cooperation also exist with regard to the occupational training of the emigrant, although he lacks sufficient stimulus to advance towards specialization.

### 3. CONCLUSIONS

19. Country/town relationships, and the flight from the land, are generally seen against an evolutionary background or the gradual and natural transition from the mechanical and rural to the urban and complex. It will be said that it all takes place without much conflict. It is forgotten that emigration in itself—like social action in general—is the expression of a conflict and the intention to resolve it. Moreover, conflict itself has its usefulness and it is inappropriate to reject it systematically.

From this aspect, the analysis of return emigration constitutes a work of practical utility which, at the same time, leads to interesting theoretical conclusions on the processes of interaction of greatly differentiated groups throughout the rural-urban progression. The same migratory policy must, moreover, include a type of scientific conclusion which is still missing at present because the limited existing analyses are more descriptive and ecological.

Naturally, the description of the phenomenon is indispensable. However, it is necessary to have a broader explanatory standard available and predominantly from the aspect of conflict. It is in fact reasonable to admit that a man emigrates not only to achieve something but also to free himself from something. Of course “emigration is neither a simple ‘fate’ which is suffered, nor the result of a free ‘project’. We can say that *structural pressure* exists on the local population which induces it to emigrate in given proportions. But this pressure... generates a ‘counter-pressure’, and thus leads to the result (‘synthesis’ if you like) of a transformation of the area and not only to emigration itself” (38). Analogously, the returning emigrant, despite the pressure he suffered during emigration and which impelled him to return to his country, initiates some dynamic process of interaction with the host majority. The analysis of this and of the factors which encourage it constitutes one of the major aspects of the phenomenon of return emigration.

From this aspect every returning emigrant is a potential factor in development, although, naturally, he will bring his quota of conflict on impact with the society he has formerly left. The analysis of this process thus constitutes a contribution to the better use of these new human resources and to the elaboration of a more satisfactory migratory policy. Such a study would automatically pre-suppose an observation of the differences which exist between planned and unplanned emigration.

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VII

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION  
AND THE WORLD DISTRIBUTION  
OF POPULATION

# THE RIGHT TO MIGRATION AND MIGRATION POLICIES (The Situation in the European Communities)

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## 1. The precise subject of the report

1. The subject of this report is the *right* to migration. Therefore the general problem of migration will be treated from a precise and limited angle: the legal aspect, *i.e.* freedom of migration and the legislative obstacles (statutes or regulations) that are in conflict with it. Moreover, the subject is further delineated and restricted by the deliberate choice of considering a particular case within this legal setting, that which exists in the European Communities. Migration between member-states, therefore, and not occupational migration within states. The accent will be on the migration of intellectual workers for a reason which will be given below.

2. It must thus be observed that the other aspects of migration—the economic, social, psychological and political problems — will only be mentioned insofar as these aspects are directly connected with the juridical formulation of the right to migration.

3. In order to avoid any misunderstanding it is perhaps as well to state again that the legislative or regulatory provisions adopted by states in the field of migration depend, of course, on a particular policy in that field. The size of the obstacles to this form of migration will vary in accordance with whether or not the state in question favours migration. Moreover, migration will be more widespread where the non-legal, psychological obstacles have been eliminated, and very often they can in turn be eliminated by new legislative provisions. All this is well known.

4. However, it is intended to restrict this report to consideration of the obstacles to migration existing at the time when the Treaty of Rome came into force and constituting discriminatory provisions based on nationality. These provisions cannot, on the one hand, be adopted afresh, since the entry into force of the Treaty, and, on the other hand, they must be progressively eliminated by means of binding Community legal measures.

5. Thus we are faced in this report with an existing political situation which we do not intend to examine as such. The obvious difficulty of such a precise viewpoint will be compensated in this case by the accuracy of the juridical situation adopted as the defined scope of the report.

## 2. Terminology

6. It seems necessary, in a report which must be examined in a world context, to define briefly a number of terms upon which the whole report is based.

7. The right to migration is expressed in the Treaty of Rome as *the free movement of persons*, workers, salaried employees, self-employed persons, members of the liberal professions or managers.

8. The concept of freedom of movement is interpreted in the Treaty by different terms depending on whether the persons are :

- employed workers: one then speaks of the free movement of workers or more simply migrant workers,
- self-employed workers: in this case there is either the right of establishment, when what is meant is the right to leave one member-state and go and establish oneself in another member-state in order to exercise an occupational activity there, or the provision of services, when what is meant is the right to exercise one's occupational activity while established in a member-state other than that to which the service is provided.

9. This latter term, *the freedom to supply services*, is important for the present study. In fact, contrary to what this expression signifies in the normal language of economics—*i.e.* a tertiary activity—the Treaty of Rome uses the term “provision of services” in a very special sense. As has just been seen, what characterises this concept is the fact that the provider of the service and the recipient are in different countries. The supplier does not leave his country of origin, or return to it when the service has been supplied. Thus it is more a question of mobility than of migration *stricto sensu*. However, this aspect of the matter must be stressed in a study dealing with migration since:

a) on the one hand, it constitutes an important phenomenon in the free movement of persons. In cases where only the subject of the service circulates are excepted, there is still the movement of a person, either of the supplier or of the beneficiary of the service, and this movement will be all the more frequent in the case of independent professional persons and university teachers.

b) on the other hand, it raises some of the problems posed by migration *stricto sensu*.

10. “Restriction” means the legal or administrative provision imposed by a member-state in its territory solely on foreigners, from which therefore nationals escape. It must therefore be observed that what is restrictive here must be discriminatory. A provision restricting freedom will not be a restriction within the meaning of the Treaty if it is applied without distinction to nationals and foreigners alike.

a) In order to achieve freedom of movement, one of the first conditions—and juridically the only one—is to eliminate these “restrictions”. The Treaty provided for their elimination within specified time-limits.

b) However, it will be realised that certain provisions in national legislation hamper mainly or exclusively foreigners, without really being discriminatory, but in fact they constitute just as large an obstacle. The main obstacles have been assimilated to a restriction and must be eliminated with them.

11. “Co-ordination” means the legal process whereby, by approximating divergent legal situations, minimum elements of equivalence are discerned in them, without unifying them or even harmonising them strictly speaking, thus ensuring their co-existence without discrimination.

One of the greatest difficulties in the Treaty and with regard to this subject will be to decide on the precise degree of co-ordination necessary to achieve freedom of movement; in fact, at the two extremes, such co-ordination may be almost non-existent if reliance is placed on the principle of the application of national law, or, on the contrary, it will be considerable if reliance is placed on a political will to approximate as much as possible the rules of the professions concerned.

### 3. A brief look at the political motivation of the free movement of persons

12. We said at the outset that our report would be of a strictly legal nature. Since the law is merely the reflection of a particular political situation, before going more deeply into the legal problems it is necessary to refer very briefly to the existing political facts upon which the legal problem is based.

13. The Treaty of Rome is an agreement which is predominantly but not exclusively of an economic nature. It contains important social provisions and cultural and political implications. In particular, Article 2 of the Treaty mentions as one of the tasks of the Community: “closer relations between the states belonging to it”.

14. Bearing this in mind, it will be acknowledged that the economic aspect plays the important part. Provision is made in the Treaty for freedom of movement mainly to meet the needs of the labour market in the widest sense: the best location of enterprises and the best utilisation of labour resources. Again it must be stressed that if that is the immediate objective, the free movement of persons assumes, in the process of integration, an importance that widely exceeds the economic point of view. The right of establishment in particular, and even more the freedom to provide services, entail contacts and exchanges that are particularly enriching for the Community.

15. Must such an approach not encourage a distinction in the free movement of persons—the phenomenon of migration—between unskilled workers and white-collar workers or self-employed people, especially university teachers? In the first case, if freedom of movement for all workers in fact enables better opportunities to be provided for employment, is it not necessary, however, to make sure that the human aspects of migration are not subordinated to the imperatives of production, particularly with regard to unskilled workers? Whereas in the case of white-collar workers, on the contrary, this human aspect does not pose such serious problems and therefore the accent may rightly be placed on contacts and exchanges. In other words, it may be asked whether, with regard to unskilled workers and migration, the best solution is to obviate it by doing everything possible to provide these workers with opportunities for employment in their own country.

And conversely, with regard to white-collar and independent workers, must they not be made to accept greater mobility in order to force them to share their technical knowledge with the whole of the Community?

**16.** That is to say that although there is a certain analogy between the free movement of capital and goods, on the one hand, and the free movement of persons, on the other hand, in the latter case—while there is still a problem of movement—there is a complete change of level, because human beings are involved. These facts must be reiterated when one realises that there is a temptation to bend the movement of persons according to the needs of production, or to an even greater extent when one might be tempted in the field of professional training—and I am thinking particularly of engineers—to model such training solely according to the needs of economic life.

**17.** In the Treaty of Rome the fundamental principle upon which the freedom of movement is based is to put the migrant on an equal footing with the national in everything that concerns the exercise of occupational activity. No one will underestimate the enormous importance of this principle. It completely overturns national legislation. For reasons that are certainly primarily economic, a policy is proclaimed and implemented: freedom of migration.

**18.** The consequences of this policy will not always be easy to keep in equilibrium; it will be necessary to take into account at the same time the insertion of the migrant worker into the national context and respect for his traditions. Sometimes, moreover, and quite paradoxically, the implementation of the principle of equality between nationals and migrants will put the nationals of the member-states in an inferior position in relation to the nationals of a non-member-state; in fact, the latter may find work more easily insofar as they are not protected by the rule of equality.

**19.** All this, which is complex but well known, must not cause the abandonment of the golden rule of the establishment of equal treatment which corresponds to an immense degree of progress in the relationship between nations. It is on the basis of this principle, firmly maintained, that solutions must be sought for the problems that it raises.

**20.** I shall not leave these brief remarks on the political aspect of our problem without reiterating that the juridical aspect that we have considered is indeed important but it is not essential. It is true that as long as the legal obstacles are not removed declarations regarding freedom of movement remain futile. However, this problem is not primarily legal. It is not even primarily political. It is above all fundamentally human. It must be tackled in a spirit profoundly attentive to human values. Only then can a policy be elaborated and finally embodied in law. Having said this let us return to the legal aspect which is our subject.

#### 4. The gradual elimination of obstacles

**21.** The legislative obstacles to migration, the restrictions, must be eliminated at a pace which, on the one hand, depends on the very completeness of this freedom and, on the other hand, on the periods for its achievement according to the activities concerned.

**22.** With regard to this completeness, it may be observed that the freedom of movement comprises the following stages:

- freedom to leave the country
- freedom to cross the frontier
- freedom to reside in the territory of a member-state
- freedom to exercise an occupational activity
- the right to the recognition of a national diploma.

#### 5. Freedom to leave the country

The Council's Directive of 25th February 1964 regarding Removal and Residence expressly provides that the member-states must give their nationals a document (passport or identity card) enabling them to fulfil the conditions for leaving their country.

#### 6. Freedom to cross the frontier

The same Council Directive provides for the simplification of the document to be furnished for crossing the frontier of another member-state. Visas are abolished; only identity cards (or passports) are retained.

## 7. Freedom to reside

It is not only on crossing the frontier that problems may arise. They arise even more often at the time when the migrant seeks to obtain residence in the host country, and even more when he wants to commence an occupational activity.

The Community legislation has provided for the progressive abolition of residence permits. Indeed in our field, residence is directly connected with the possibility of exercising an occupational activity, permanently (establishment) or temporarily (the provision of services), but a distinction must nevertheless be made between the two stages of freedom: the right to reside with abolition of residence permits and the right to exercise an activity with abolition of work permits.

**23.** That is why the directives relating to removal and residence concern, among the persons covered, the following categories:

- those who establish themselves or wish to do so
- those who wish to provide services
- those who wish to exercise an occupational activity permanently
- members of the family.

**24.** Since a residence permit is only required by foreigners, in the Community it becomes a restriction within the meaning defined above. It must be and is being abolished. It will be observed that this entails a considerable change of perspective in the legislation regarding foreigners as it exists in the various member-states.

**25.** Of course there is the important reservation contained in Article 56 of the Treaty: special provisions may be applied to foreigners for reasons of public policy, public safety or public health. These special provisions may consist of a stricter control; they may extend to refusal of the right to reside. Thus, for these reasons the restriction may be retained. On the other hand, the reasons for this restriction must be co-ordinated.

*a)* With regard to public health, the right of the member-states to restrict removal or residence is related to certain diseases, a list of which is annexed to the directive.

*b)* With regard to public policy and public safety, it has not been possible to give a Community definition to these concepts. It is easy to see the reasons for this. Here is a delicate sphere in which strict definitions do not always exist in each member-state. The governments have reserved a margin for discretionary action in this field. Nevertheless, the Community provisions have enabled these concepts to be circumscribed, on the one hand, from a negative point of view, and, on the other hand, from a positive point of view.

*c)* Negatively

- the concepts of public policy and public safety cannot be used to conceal a motive of economic protection;
- the reason for refusal cannot, except in the case of a subversive movement, relate to a category of persons but must be based on the personal conduct of the person concerned;
- a criminal conviction cannot automatically justify a refusal; the conviction must be of such a degree of importance that the concepts of public policy and public safety may reasonably be jeopardised.

*d)* Positively, the provisions ensure a certain degree of co-ordination between the procedures used by the member-states with regard to public safety. Such co-ordination represents considerable progress compared with the previous situation. In fact, real guarantees are given to the applicant; he must be properly informed of the reasons for the refusal to permit him to reside; this information must reach him within a specified period to enable him to make his arrangements; finally, an opinion must be issued by an authority separate from the administrative authorities normally having jurisdiction in this field.

*e)* Having said this, it will not be denied that since the concept of public safety is, as has already been said, difficult to define at the Community level, obstacles to the freedom of movement may subsist here as a result of strictly political considerations, such as the undesirability of a person's residence because of his political opinions.

## 8. Freedom to exercise an occupational activity

**26.** The freedom of movement is sought in the Treaty for the purposes of exercising an occupational activity. It has three different aspects:

- freedom of movement for employed workers,
- the right of establishment for self-employed workers,
- the provision of services by self-employed workers.

In all three cases there is indeed freedom of movement in order to exercise an occupational activity; what differs is the status of the worker (employed or not) and the nature of the self-employed activity (permanent or temporary).

**27.** Once again the subject is dominated by the rule that we have already met: equality of treatment between the migrant worker and the national in everything relating to their occupational activity. This latter point means that the equality is not absolute and that it is confined to matters that are necessary for occupational activity; for example, it does not include equality with regard to civil and political rights.

**28.** In fact, the Treaty provides for two exceptions to the freedom of movement:

- With regard to employment, it excludes employment in the public administration. It will sometimes be difficult to determine in relation to the nine member-states what is meant by employment in the public administration. For example, it is debated as to whether this applies to doctors working full-time in a public hospital (according to French legislation, for example, this is an activity assimilated to an office in the public administration, whereas that is not the case in all of the other member-states).

**29.** With regard to self-employed activity, the Treaty excepts from the right of establishment and the freedom to supply services activities involving “even occasionally, the exercise of official authority”. It should be observed that to be excluded from the right of establishment, the activity in question must be a genuine participation in official authority, as such exceeding ordinary rights. The fact that a worker contributes his technical knowledge in the preparation of a decision which remains within the prerogative of official authority does not make that activity come within the concept of “participation in the exercise of official authority”.

**30.** In order to achieve freedom of movement the “restrictions” that are an obstacle to it must be eliminated. These restrictions may be of various kinds: there is no room to enlarge upon them here. It will merely be observed that some of them may be of a general nature because they do not concern a particular activity but an entire field of activity taken as a whole. The elimination of this type of restriction—for example, the permit for foreign businessmen in France, or the work permit required for all foreign independent workers in Belgium—may pose a problem of control. In fact, although there is no doubt that these permits must be abolished as discriminatory, there remains the fact that states are anxious to obtain identification of nationals of other member-states working in their territory. Thus this identification may persist insofar as it constitutes a strictly automatic verification and is in no way a condition for entering, residing or working.

**31.** This concept of notification appears on two occasions in the Community instruments:

- in the Directive regarding Removal and Residence it is provided that a national of another member-state may be obliged to report his presence;
- in the directives or draft directives relating to the right of establishment applicable to professions organised into bodies or organisations governed by public law it is provided, with regard to the provision of services, that in the absence of registration in the body in the host country a beneficiary of the directive may be obliged to notify that body that he is providing services.

**32.** The abolition of restrictions is being achieved by means of Community legislation. These provisions relate, on the one hand, to employed workers in respect of all their occupational activities and, on the other hand, to self-employed workers in respect of the main activities in industry, commerce, crafts, banking, insurance and agriculture. There are some sectors where freedom of movement has not yet been achieved because of the complexity of the legislation in question, for example the pharmaceutical field.

**33.** It will also be observed that the liberal professions are not mentioned in the above list: engineers, architects, doctors, pharmacists, veterinary surgeons, lawyers, accountants, tax consultants, journalists and many others. In fact, freedom of movement has not yet been achieved in this sector of activity also because of the complexity of the legislation in question, to which is added, moreover, the difficult problem of the reciprocal recognition of qualifications, which is discussed below. The delay in this field is all the more regrettable since these are professions in which:

- on the one hand, the mobility could be greater, particularly in view of the more prevalent application to them of the concept of the provision of services, and
- on the other hand, the influence and therefore the contribution to European integration could be larger.

## 9. The reciprocal recognition of qualifications

**34.** For all the professions, access to which is subject to the possession of a "national" qualification, this requirement itself constitutes a very serious obstacle to the freedom of movement which can only be genuinely eliminated by measures for the reciprocal recognition of qualifications.

It should be observed, firstly, that the requirement of a qualification is not a restriction within the meaning of the Treaty since it is not in principle discriminatory. A foreigner may obtain a qualification. The restriction in this respect will arise after the acquisition of the qualification, when the holder is refused the right to exercise the activity. That is why a special chapter is devoted to this question.

**35.** This is not the place to debate the justice or injustice of the principle whereby a state subjects access to an activity to the possession of a qualification, or more generally, some form of training. What concerns us in the present study is the existence of this legal requirement. It should be observed, moreover, that although the system of qualifications has been the subject of criticism that is mostly well-founded, a reform in this sphere could only reasonably take the form of better control over the acquisition of knowledge. Such control, as long as it is not the subject of a decision taken within the framework of a common policy in the field of education, would always entail provisions for the reciprocal recognition of the methods of control in question.

**36.** The view has frequently been expressed that this problem of qualifications is overrated, that the member-states of the Community participate at the same level of culture and that their systems of training cannot therefore differ appreciably. It is added to the same effect that chemistry, physics, medicine, pharmacy, architecture, engineering and many other sciences cannot differ among the member-states of the Community to the extent that it is not possible to stick to a very simple principle in this connection: a person who is qualified to practise in his own country is considered competent throughout the Community.

**37.** However, this attitude, which seems to be commonsense itself, disregards a legal situation which must nonetheless be taken into account. In fact, even if the member-states of the Community participate at the same level of culture, it does not follow that the legislation in those states has imposed the same conditions with regard to training for access to a particular profession and practising it. Now with regard to the freedom of movement, what also plays a part, even if it is not the most important factor, is the degree of total effort that a student must undergo in his country of origin in order to enter the profession that he wishes to exercise in another member-state. The absence of equivalence of effort would quickly tell in favour of a movement of young persons towards the less demanding states. It cannot be denied that this phenomenon would eventually lead to a profound deterioration in standards of teaching.

**38.** Therefore the necessity to establish rules relating to the reciprocal recognition of qualifications cannot be evaded. This was understood perfectly well by the authors of the Treaty of Rome which does not compel the member-states to recognise their qualifications reciprocally but instructs the Council to adopt directives with a view to such recognition. That is to say that it is not automatic and provisions must be adopted in order to achieve it.

**39.** Having said this, and in the converse sense this time, reciprocal recognition of qualifications must not be confused with measures to obtain academic equivalence of qualifications. With regard to reciprocal recognition of qualifications which is sought to facilitate freedom of movement, what must be obtained is a certain equivalence in the training conditions taken overall—diploma, completion of training period, professional practice certificate—in order to provide the member-states with the necessary and adequate guarantees both with regard to the quality of training and the total effort that is demanded of the student.

**40.** Therefore it is not a question of comparing the teaching from the point of view of the details of programmes and methods but of adhering to certain standards laid down at the highest level possible, to which the member-states agree to subject their teaching.

**41.** As soon as one strays from this pragmatic view of things, one worries about the intrinsic quality of the programmes and methods; standards are sought that would ensure equal quality and one is rapidly led to the conclusion that a commission must be created to investigate the matter.

**42.** What is original and striking about the measures to be taken in this field in application of the Treaty is that the Council's provisions must contain in themselves the elements that are necessary and adequate for their application. There can be no question here, as is the case in this field with other international organisations, of taking decisions of a very general nature, which require implementation regulations before they can be put into force.

43. The Commission's proposals regarding the reciprocal recognition of qualifications are based on certain criteria which are fully or partially taken into account depending on the discipline in question: the length of training, total number of hours of teaching, a balance between theoretical and practical teaching, and finally, the practical training period and the essential conditions that it must fulfil. It is the sum of these various criteria that will enable the necessary level of quality for this type of decision to be achieved.

44. It should be observed that this subject of the reciprocal recognition of qualifications has a decisive bearing on the real possibilities of migration. However, the vast problem of teaching and its reform is only tackled incidentally by such decisions. One of the gravest errors that can be committed in this sphere is to claim that reciprocal recognition will resolve in itself the numerous problems relating to teaching in general.

45. Moreover, a careful distinction must be made between the free movement of persons for the purposes of exercising an occupational activity and the free movement of students in order to undertake or pursue studies. The latter objective undoubtedly comes within the scope of migration in general but in certain respects it is even more complex than the reciprocal recognition of qualifications for the purposes of the right of establishment. In fact, in the latter case, what is sought is the equivalence of the "final product" and this equivalence may be attained in particular through the effect of the various elements of practice and theory that are included in the whole training process; whereas for the free movement of students, at least when they are in the course of studying, it is a question of making the years of study correspond within a total amount, which is generally more complex.

46. One aspect of the migration of students which is easier to achieve, and moreover more desirable, relates to post-graduate students.

47. I merely mention this problem of the free movement of students, for it does not come directly within our subject as it has been defined: *the legal obstacles to the free movement of professional workers*. The problem of students relates more to the question of a common policy in the field of education, an even more important topic than that with which we have chosen to deal. However, it is necessary to refer to it to permit the initiation of other studies, for the wider legal framework constituted by a common education policy would enable other questions relating to migration to be tackled, in particular the difficult problem of *numerus clausus*. However, once again there can be no question of introducing provisions regarding *numerus clausus* within the limited legal framework covering the elimination of restrictions in order to facilitate the freedom of movement of professional workers. *Numerus clausus* could only be taken into account here insofar as it is discriminatory, *i.e.* based on nationality, which would mean treating this topic from a completely secondary angle.

## 10. Conclusions

48. We have voluntarily confined ourselves to a specific aspect of migration: the legal obstacles to freedom of movement for professional workers in the European Communities.

49. It must be hoped that this examination may be useful in the study of similar situations in other organisations of states and that it may also serve as a starting-point for studies with a wider legal context.

50. Keeping strictly to its legal context, the report has not, however, neglected treating very briefly the political and particularly the human aspects of the problem.

60. The progressive attainment of freedom of movement entails the elimination of legislative obstacles relating

- on the one hand, with regard to the right of residence, to the concepts of public policy, public safety and public health, and
- on the other hand, with regard to the right to practise, to discriminations based on nationality and the exceptions to freedom of movement based either on the concept of participation in the exercise of official authority or on the concept of an office in the public administration. The more specific problem of the reciprocal recognition of qualifications has been treated in greater detail because it conditions to a decisive extent the free movement of white-collar and independent workers, whose mobility seems most desirable.

61. This report will end with a remark that relates to migration policy but comes especially under the heading of consequences. In fact, it will be observed that there is a danger that freedom of movement may cause

migratory currents towards areas that are already favoured. Studies relating to occupational demography must therefore be undertaken simultaneously with the implementation of freedom of movement. Such studies must be intended to inform professional workers, and particularly the young, of the existence of areas with a surplus and those with a shortage. The results of these studies could encourage the governments to institute a policy of aid for the establishment of certain professions in particularly deprived areas. A policy of this kind, operating in a non-discriminatory manner, would be compatible with the principle laid down in the Treaty, of prohibiting aid that distorts the conditions for establishment.

# SPONTANEOUS MIGRATION, ASSISTED MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration  
Geneva, (Switzerland)

## I. INTRODUCTION

### (a) The concepts of spontaneous migration and planned and assisted migration

1. *Spontaneous migration*, broadly speaking, covers two types of movements. One is of persons who, for various reasons, decide to move across national borders without any regard to or contact with government controls or services. They make no attempt to obtain passports, visas, work permits or any other form of prescribed documentation, but just pick up their personal belongings and move. These, generally, are illegal migrants. The second group is that of persons also moving spontaneously, but complying with established governmental procedures for migration. They arrange and pay for their own transportation and secure employment through their own initiatives, either before movement or after arrival in the new country. In the first type of movement there is no government involvement prior to movement; in the second, government involvement is at a strict minimum, and no international assistance is provided.

2. *Planned and assisted migration*, on the other hand, covers those movements which are especially oriented, sponsored or facilitated in the application and implementation of particular programmes normally developed jointly by the immigration and emigration countries. Such movements are often undertaken in the context of written bilateral agreements between interested countries or multilateral agreements involving both national and international organizations.

3. Assisted migration may be either temporary or permanent, involving both national migrants and refugees. The criteria for admission to receiving countries may differ for these two categories, but otherwise they are accorded equal treatment and advantages under assisted migration programmes.

4. Some distinction should be made between what is termed "planned" and what is termed "assisted" migration, although, as they are so closely associated, reference to planned and assisted migration is characteristic of a well-defined and important type of movement in recent years.

5. Planned migration is that which is carefully promoted by governments for relevant demographic, social, economic or political reasons. Assisted migration is that which takes place with the encouragement and help of various public and private agencies and organizations, both national and international, not only in order to ensure successful implementation of planned migration programmes, but also to provide individual migrants and their families with the type of assistance that they so often require to accomplish the transition from one country or environment to another successfully and without undue hardship.

6. In movements planned and assisted by governments, international organizations, voluntary agencies and individual sponsors, the prospective migrant is usually provided with ample information regarding the intended place of destination and work prior to his departure, and considerable help is given as regards the reception, initial accommodation, placement in employment and other steps essential to adaptation. Transport assistance may or may not be given depending on the programme but it is also a generally recognized feature of assisted migration. So are other facilities available to immigrants in many countries, such as special language training courses, orientation and counselling, particularly on housing, social security benefits, schooling for children, etc. However, not all of these different forms of assistance are available in every case.

## (b) Brief historical review

7. Throughout the recorded history of mankind, almost every part of the world witnessed large flows of people moving on an international scale for innumerable reasons. It is not necessary to recall here the many migratory trends and flows which occurred at different historical periods, nor to show how widely the movements spread geographically.

8. In order to arrive at the origin of assisted migration as it is presently understood, some reference must be made to developments which took place, especially in Europe, in the nineteenth century. During that century and at the beginning of the twentieth century, high birth rates and declining mortality rates affected the demographic balance so strongly in Europe that migration on a larger scale than ever before began to take place. Economic depressions, and the corresponding periods of scarcity of employment contrasted with unexploited land and expanding employment opportunities overseas, caused millions to emigrate. The movements were spontaneous and almost completely unorganized. Certainly up to that time governments had given little thought to planning for or setting up machinery to assist migrants. The largest single flow was to the United States of America, with other strong migration currents moving towards Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Australia and to a lesser extent to African and Asian countries.

9. The First World War brought overseas migration almost to a halt. Although some movements took place in the two decades 1919-1939, there was a substantial reduction of the volume of migration in comparison to earlier decades. In general, many governments had not yet clearly formulated a precise migration policy nor given active support to the establishment of special migration programmes.

10. The world migration picture changed radically after the Second World War. Governments realized then that concerted international action was needed to find a solution to the problems posed by millions of displaced persons and unemployed or unsatisfactorily employed workers and to achieve a better population balance. Far more movements of workers and family groups took place in response to governmental initiatives in the field of planning and assisting migration. Industrialization, economic expansion, population building or general development were all strong motivations for governments to play a more active role in population transfers. Migrants were still free to choose, but by giving them more information and offering reasonable guarantees regarding salaries and living conditions, governments were able to influence to a greater extent the migrants' thinking regarding the prospects offered by migration to a particular country.

## II. SPONTANEOUS MIGRATION

### (a) The normal interaction of push and pull factors: chain reaction migration

11. Although the factors which have influenced the thinking of individual migrants, and their inter-relationship, are very diverse, in recent years the reasons for a very large proportion of the total migratory movements between countries of the same continent or from different continents, have been predominantly economic ones.

12. Particularly during the past two decades, millions of workers, in various regions of Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa, have been influenced by the "push" and "pull" factors operating in the economic field. Difficulties in finding employment, salaries inadequate for their personal needs, or lack of promotion prospects are "push" factors in the home country which turn workers' thoughts towards emigration. The "pull" factors in immigration countries are those which would meet these causes of dissatisfaction, and give the workers better opportunities for personal advancement and higher standards of living. They may include letters from relatives and friends giving favourable accounts of their experience in a new country. For professional people, there are attractive opportunities for research, educational development and quicker advancement; for others enticement may lie in the possibility of acquiring land and homes at less cost than in the country from which they originated. The news of successful and personally advantageous movements may be included in letters to relatives and friends and exert a strong stimulus on those receiving them. This type of chain reaction has been very noticeable in certain countries. Younger single migrants feel the pull of adventure, and may also have in mind the avoidance of military service.

13. In view of the overwhelming prevalence of unplanned and unco-ordinated migration up to the end of the Second World War, brief consideration should be given to the effects of such movements. Although, at first glance, migrants had complete liberty of choice regarding destination and, within certain limits, freedom

to seek the kind of employment they preferred or were fitted for, in fact they entered into a new situation full of risks; risks which are very much reduced when migration is planned, co-ordinated and assisted.

**14.** Although in the period of mass unplanned migration many major immigration countries had no restrictive legislation bearing on migrant flows, neither did they have any protective legislation covering the new arrivals. Many persons migrated because their prospective employers in another country paid part of their transport costs. Under this type of movement the migrant did have the guarantee of employment, but often only a very hazy concept of what he was going into, and what his future prospects might be. Governments were hardly involved in these movements. Because of the absence or inadequacy of labour legislation, in many cases migrant workers had to accept long hours of work or low rates of pay. Other migrants moved without even the guarantee of a job.

**15.** Migrants who were sponsored by future employers, and at least had the guarantee of a job, and those who went with no certainty of finding steady or well-paid employment, faced considerable risks. No specific legislation existed in most countries to guarantee them adequate housing, medical services, unemployment pay if they lost their job through sickness or economic recession, or any of the other social security provisions which are an integral part of modern legislation concerning planned and co-ordinated migration.

**16.** In recent decades individual governments and international organizations have taken steps to improve legislation and conditions applicable to international migration, therefore reducing the incidence of the risks just mentioned.

**17.** Even today large numbers of spontaneous, unplanned and unco-ordinated movements pose special problems for governments. The question of the mobility of the different types of migration is also an important matter. Spontaneous migrants who avoid following any official channels and who do not quickly find the kind of employment they seek are inclined to move around more, and often return home completely disillusioned, whereas most assisted migrants become more stable members of their new communities.

#### (b) Clandestine and illegal migration

**18.** In the last twenty years, regional migration in the form of uncontrolled movements across neighbouring frontiers has caused serious social and economic stresses in many countries and on occasion strained relations between good neighbours. This has been particularly noticeable in the Latin American continent. The problem has been most acute in Argentina and Venezuela, where hundreds of thousands of mainly rural workers and their families have moved in from neighbouring countries, attracted by more developed economies. They frequently start in rural employment over the border and then drift to congested urban areas, where many of them find only marginal employment. In view of the length of the frontiers and the nature of the terrain, it is impossible to set up controls at more than a few points. Once over the border, the migrants find themselves facing problems not only of security of employment, but of accommodation, medical services and many other personal needs.

**19.** Given the fluctuating and uncertain volume of the flow, governmental planning is necessarily very difficult. Whether in rural or urban areas, central and local governments are faced with serious problems, not only in providing adequate employment and avoiding exploitation of the migrants, but also regarding the provision of housing, health and other social services.

**20.** The governments directly concerned have made, particularly in the past few years, strenuous efforts to regulate and improve the situation. Bilateral agreements have been concluded between some governments, and the advice and support of specialized international organizations has been sought. In view of the many hundreds of thousands of persons involved in these movements, a rapid and complete solution of the problem is not possible, but constant consideration is being given to all possible measures to bring order into the situation, both by bilateral means and through multilateral agreements.

**21.** This type of spontaneous and often illegal migration has caused similar problems in Africa and Asia, although in many cases the motivations have been different. In both continents, economic reasons, political disturbances, or serious deterioration of climatic conditions, have caused larger numbers to cross frontiers in an effort to find better living and working conditions. According to a recent estimate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, there are about one million refugees in Africa. If one adds other migrants in Africa, who are not refugees, and without counting those who emigrate to Europe, the total figure for the whole continent is at least twice as high.

**22.** No exact figure is advanced for Asia because estimates vary considerably and a precise evaluation is extremely hazardous to make. Suffice it to say, however, that there are undoubtedly more than a million spontaneous foreign migrants in various Asian countries.

**23.** The scale of this migration is such in many developing countries that government facilities are not sufficient nor appropriately geared to provide needed assistance. This migration is also associated with the generalized exodus from rural areas to urban centres, a phenomenon witnessed in practically all parts of the world.

**24.** In some regions, there has been a drift back to rural areas, or when conditions return to normal, back across frontiers to the home country. Governments are, however, becoming increasingly involved in national and international planning in connexion with large-scale migration movements. Apart from giving urgent attention to the physical needs of the persons involved in spontaneous movements, there is a greater awareness of the need to set up placement facilities and other forms of employment counselling which will direct migrants to where they have the best chance of earning their living.

**25.** Some reference should be made here to another type of unplanned migration, which has become the centre of much attention and study. This type has come to be called the "brain drain". Graduates from universities and training institutes in developing countries have left their country and sought their fortunes elsewhere. They have been offered higher salaries than could be obtained at home, or the chance to engage in more advanced research work. In adhering to the belief in the free movement of people, their governments have not been able to stop these movements, nor have they been able to offer sufficient inducements to persuade their highly skilled nationals to stay. The loss, even if temporary, of these highly qualified persons hampers the national development effort.

**26.** Without going into the merits and demerits of the brain drain—a particularly complex subject—it should be mentioned here that to counteract the exodus of their professional and technical personnel, where such exodus has been really significant in numbers, several governments are planning or already providing official incentives and facilities for the return of many of these spontaneous migrants, and requesting international assistance and co-operation under multilateral assisted migration schemes, where applicable, for this type of return migration.

### (c) Free circulation of migrant labour - the European Economic Community

**27.** The regulation of the European Economic Community concerning the free circulation of migrant labour heralded a new development in the field of regional migration. As is widely known, under Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome, nationals of all member countries may move to the territory of any other member in a search for work or to take up prearranged employment.

**28.** A further regulation introduced in 1968 ensures freedom of movement as a basic right of EEC workers and their families. In order to improve his standard of living, obtain better working conditions or higher social status, a worker may seek whatever occupation for which his qualifications are recognized within the Community countries. Non-discrimination in this regard means that all Community workers enjoy equal employment opportunity, regardless of nationality.

**29.** The implications of such a regulation go far beyond the simple question of employment, and spread into the fields of family reunion, housing, schooling, language and vocational training, social security, trade union membership, and many other facets.

**30.** Within the Community, there is a considerable exchange of information on employment opportunities, both as regards volume and type of worker required. In the countries having the largest intake of migrant workers, close co-operation exists between government departments and individual enterprises or employers. The co-operation of sending governments is especially valuable in cases where medical or occupational tests are required before firm job offers can be made.

**31.** Through the exchange of information it is also possible to alert member governments regarding the unavailability of employment in specific regions or occupations. However, in spite of the efforts of EEC countries to regulate the flow of workers and assist those moving, there are still many migrant workers who do not utilize the machinery available. Large numbers go spontaneously to other member countries where they feel the kind of employment they are seeking is available. One country, Italy, estimates that up to 95 per cent of its migrant workers fail to utilize fully the official assistance available.

**32.** The present structure of the EEC facilitates this free circulation of labour, but such movements, taking place outside the channels set up between governments, create many problems, particularly in reception countries. It would seem that more intensive attention should be given to the strengthening of provisions in bilateral or multilateral agreements in order to provide migrant workers with suitable information and convince them that movement through official channels is more advantageous.

**33.** Although some spontaneous migration takes place from non-EEC countries, normally migrants are recruited officially for specific purposes. There is no doubt that, because of the changing economic situation, governments and employers are paying closer attention to the volume and type of workers engaged and retained. Such selectivity is likely to lead to more strict criteria for recruitment and to the repatriation of migrant workers from non-EEC countries who do not meet the precise needs of the economy. If the current problems regarding the availability of oil and other forms of energy are not resolved, at least in the short term, the whole situation in Europe regarding employment opportunities and labour mobility may undergo extensive changes.

### III. EFFECTS OF PLANNED AND ASSISTED MIGRATION

**34.** It is only comparatively recently that governments have taken positive action to channel and assist migration. The motivations for their interest are varied, but fall basically into two categories, one demographic and the other economic. In the first one are the governments which encourage emigration because of a high rate of population growth and those which favour immigration in order to build up their population density and growth rate. In the second category are the governments which feel that some part of their labour force is not likely to find steady employment within the country and therefore foster and assist emigration, as well as those, on the receiving end, which favour the immigration of foreign workers on a short— or long-term basis to meet the growing needs of an expanding economy.

**35.** However, more recently, particularly in Europe, bilateral or multilateral agreements between governments have tended to concentrate more on such questions as protection of migrant workers and equality of treatment in every respect. Some of these agreements also provide for the setting up of specific services to assist migrant labour in connexion with information, orientation, language training, accommodation, health and welfare. Depending on the source of the migrant labour, the services provided are necessarily different, but they all contain important advantages for the workers, and facilitate governmental efforts to regulate the flow of migrant manpower.

#### (a) Benefits for migrant workers and their families

**36.** The benefits of planned and assisted migration for the workers themselves, and for their families, are considerable. First and foremost, they usually find steady and more satisfying employment and, consequently, they are apt to receive higher wages, which enables them to save more and enjoy a better standard of living.

**37.** Another advantage is that assisted migrants are provided with information on the various employment opportunities open to them, often in different countries, taking into account their capabilities and personal inclinations. This information covers not only the vacancies, but also conditions of employment, wages and social security benefits which are so important in ensuring their successful adaptation in the receiving country. Where the family is to move as a unit, information is given regarding housing, schooling and general living conditions.

**38.** Many governments, in co-operation with intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations or agencies assisting migrants, have considered it helpful and prudent to set up an information counselling network, in order to ensure that sponsored migrants are well informed about conditions in the country to which they are going. It is recognized that incorrect or misleading information only leads to disappointment and then resentment, and it is in no one's interest to present a confused or wrong picture of what awaits new settlers.

**39.** Thus the EEC countries, for example, disseminate information on the availability or non-availability of employment in specific regions or types of occupation, with the intention of dissuading workers from entering those regions spontaneously. Similar arrangements are also in force among Scandinavian countries,

which practice a free labour market. Armed with appropriate information, workers may either temporarily give up the idea of changing jobs, or if they are out of work, seek it in other areas. The expense of wasted journeys is also avoided if workers know in advance which areas are unlikely to satisfy their desires for new employment.

**40.** Where intercontinental migration programmes are concerned, major advantages for assisted migrants derive from the help they receive as regards transport costs, initial reception and accommodation and placement in employment. In many instances board and lodging is provided at very reasonable rates, for a certain period of time.

**41.** Recent agreements between governments have covered such matters as sickness and accident benefits for migrant workers and their families, assistance in finding suitable housing, language training for adults and children as well as facilities for sending remittances to family members at home.

**42.** Nevertheless, many workers do move without going through official channels, and thus deprive themselves of important advantages in such areas as assistance regarding travel costs, job selection before movement, prior knowledge of labour conditions, better wages, accommodation and other matters.

#### (b) Effects in emigration countries

**43.** Governments favouring emigration do so not only for purely economic reasons, but also because of other factors which may be of a social and political nature. The benefits of planned and assisted migration for the emigration countries are generally not difficult to discern. The presence of any large number of unemployed or under-employed workers, especially when combined with a high birth rate and a limited absorptive capacity of the local economy, is a potential source of unrest, and emigration can usefully relieve the pressure, while at the same time contributing to a better national and regional demographic balance. Emigration may also proportionally reduce expenditure on social infrastructure.

**44.** A clear picture of the numbers, composition and distribution of the national labour force, taking into account the planned emigration of workers when applicable, also facilitates internal economic and social planning. In addition, through planned and assisted migration a country can provide or obtain better protection for their own workers abroad and ensure a continuous link with them.

**45.** From the opposite point of view, the large-scale unplanned movement of migrant workers can hamper or delay the planning of economic and social development projects.

#### (c) Effects in immigration countries

**46.** Receiving countries too are fully cognizant of the effects and advantages of planned immigration. Population building or a better distribution of population according to demographic density has been a motivation for some, like Argentina, Australia, Canada and France, to mention only a few, while others in a different formative stage realize that immigrant manpower can provide certain skills urgently needed for development purposes. As mentioned by Brinley Thomas: "If migration is a prerequisite of development, the absorption of unskilled national manpower is also governed by the rate of inflow of the complementary skilled grades. Even when a country is overpopulated, it still needs the migration of a nucleus of skilled and qualified foreign manpower to act as a link in the training of nationals". Perhaps the most important value of planned immigration of skilled and professional migrants to developing countries is that they train indigenous workers in new business processes and in industrial or agricultural techniques, and thus contribute to increasing national productivity and raising the living standards of the local population.

**47.** In the educational sector many immigration countries have strengthened the faculties of their universities and their technical training institutes or research centres by planning and assisting the immigration of professors and instructors.

**48.** In the more highly industrialized countries, particularly those in Western Europe, migrant manpower seems to fill in gaps in their own labour force where services and lower skills are involved. Many immigrant workers in the latter countries have taken over occupations unattractive to the local labour force, and the general effect on the economy has been beneficial. However, the situation presents many social problems which still have to be solved.

**49.** Within Europe, the effects of planned migration for the receiving countries include the advantage in establishing the type and conditions of migration best suited to their economic needs and social infrastructure. Planned immigration also enables them to limit more easily the total intake of migrants and to favour temporary over permanent migration.

**50.** Assisted labour migration, whether temporary or permanent, also presupposes some planning in connexion with placement in employment and accommodation, which is not only a definite advantage for the individual migrant but also for the receiving country.

**51.** The foregoing comments all tend to emphasize that immigration countries are generally taking more positive steps to correlate economic and social development needs with the recruitment, placement and adaptation of immigrant workers under planned or assisted migration programmes.

**52.** However, because of the heavy cost of the social infrastructure that has to be set up to cater for the needs of immigrants, several governments having large intakes of foreign workers are giving increasing attention to the quality and usefulness of the migrant workers, particularly in the context of planning and assisting their movement and resettlement. This is happening not only in European countries, but also in Australia, Canada and major immigration countries of Latin America.

**53.** Enough has been said on planned and assisted migration to show that distinct advantages accrue to all concerned. Many of the problems and the dissatisfaction that existed in the past and still exist in the field of unassisted and unco-ordinated migration have been eliminated or reduced when movements have been carried out within the framework of well-defined national and international policies, formulated through bilateral or multilateral arrangements, particularly where overseas migration is involved. However, the international efforts which have been made to date by no means cover all that could be done or needs to be done.

#### IV. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION—THE MULTILATERAL APPROACH

##### Efforts prior to the Second World War

**54.** Prior to the Second World War the multilateral approach to the problems of migration related almost wholly to refugees. The first League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was Fridtjof Nansen, appointed to that post in 1921. In 1938 the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR) was formed, but it had little time to accomplish much before the outbreak of war. It continued to study problems likely to arise after the cessation of hostilities, both for refugees and prisoners of war, and civilians in occupied territories. It was generally estimated that at the end of the war in 1945 there were 9 million displaced persons, mainly in Europe.

##### Post-war developments

**55.** Some 6 million of these persons were repatriated or otherwise assisted by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in 1945 and 1946. In the latter year the International Refugee Organization (IRO) was set up, and was particularly successful in organizing the transport of large numbers of refugees for resettlement overseas. It might be said that these efforts constituted the first occasion on which multilateral action was taken to correlate the problems of refugee resettlement and migration with manpower needs in overseas developing countries and immigration countries in general. Over one million displaced persons were assisted by the IRO to find new homes and the chance of steady employment, away from the chaos they had known before. Among individual countries overseas, Australia and Canada, for example, decided to accept a large share of these "surplus" Europeans. The Congress of the United States of America passed several special laws to facilitate refugee immigration in the years following the Second World War, and many other countries took similar action, inter alia, for humanitarian reasons.

**56.** In 1951 the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) were formed. The former had a mandate to give protection to persons who had fled from their native land because they feared persecution for political, racial or religious reasons; the High Commissioner was also required to seek permanent solutions to the problems of refugees, and to provide emergency aid.

## The role of ICEM

**57.** ICEM's mandate was different and somewhat wider. Refugees who had been forced to leave their country of origin or residence, and European nationals who felt that better opportunities for personal advancement existed abroad and who voluntarily made the decision to emigrate, were to be given information and assistance in movement and resettlement overseas. In addition to arranging transportation, the organization was called upon to provide a variety of migration services, such as assistance with documentation, professional pre-selection, pre-movement language or vocational training, reception and placement on arrival, adaptational training and various forms of integration assistance.

**58.** In the early years of its operations ICEM helped member governments to recruit and transport large numbers of migrants needed for population building and for the development of their expanding economies. Australia and Canada both had large intakes, while several countries of Latin America attracted migrants mainly from southern Europe. During more than twenty years of operations ICEM has moved over one million refugees and about a million national migrants. The largest streams have been to Australia (627,000), USA (347,000) and Canada (205,000), and as far as Latin America is concerned, to Argentina (120,000), Brazil (113,000) and Venezuela (74,000).

**59.** The rapid reconstruction of Europe and its economic recovery in the mid-fifties, has had important repercussions on ICEM's operations. Greater opportunities for employment and the increased mobility of manpower in Europe caused important changes in the character of the migrant flow, as fewer European workers were willing to consider overseas migration.

**60.** ICEM's overseas member governments, particularly those in Latin America, began to refine their migrant intake in the 1960s. Skills rather than numbers became the dominant criterion. Closer study was given to the link between economic development and migration, and consequently greater selectivity was exercised by governments in admitting migrants. At the request of specific governments, ICEM provided the necessary supporting technical facilities for the recruitment, selection, transport and placement in employment of very highly qualified or professional type of migrants. This became known as the "Selective Migration Programme", which was formally set up in 1964 and under which more than 12,000 skilled and highly skilled technicians and professional persons have migrated from developed to developing countries.

**61.** Matching the requirements of the immigration countries against the availability of skilled manpower in Europe has been and continues to be a difficult task. It is being successfully accomplished due to international solidarity, which allows for concerted action on a multilateral approach. European countries have shown a willingness to assist developing countries to find migrants with the specific skills they require, and have not hindered their nationals from moving, despite the loss of the investment they have made in educating and training them. The net result of this development concerning assisted overseas migration is that while there has been a quantitative reduction of the migration flow from Europe, there has been a striking upgrading in the quality of the migrants moved in recent years by intergovernmental arrangements and multilateral co-operation.

### Other intergovernmental and international efforts concerning the planned distribution of manpower

**62.** Some indication has just been given of how ICEM has modified and redirected its activities to accord with changing concepts and needs. However, many other international organizations are involved in different facets of the migration phenomenon. A brief listing of some recent programmes, humanitarian and others, will suffice to show the measure of international co-operation presently existing.

**63.** A recent example is the assistance ICEM provided in close collaboration with United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross in moving 4,600 stateless Asians from Africa to Europe within short notice, the majority of whom were then moved from Europe to other overseas countries of resettlement. Staff support and collaboration have also been extended to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees by ICEM, the ICRC and several non-governmental agencies in connexion with several programmes of an emergency nature, such as those involving the repatriation of children in Central Africa in 1970, the transport of people during the 1971 crisis in the Indian sub-continent, the present exchange of people between Pakistan and Bangladesh and the resettlement of refugees from Chile to asylum countries in all five continents.

**64.** In Latin America, member governments of the Organization of American States have called upon that Organization and ICEM to study and help solve some of the main problems of uncontrolled migration across national frontiers, while in Europe, several governments have sought ICEM's advice in dealing with technical problems arising from the sizeable intra-European movements of workers. Many aspects of these movements are also of concern to such organizations as the International Labour Organisation, the Council of Europe, the Commission of the European Communities and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.

**65.** The fact that substantial migration takes place from the African continent to Europe means that organizations such as the ILO and OECD, to mention only two, have had to view the effect of labour mobility in Europe in a wider context than a purely European one. Especially from North Africa, the worker flow to Europe has been considerable. The ILO has also devoted considerable attention to developments regarding worker migration among the countries of West Africa, while the Organization of African Unity has recently discussed in detail refugee problems on the African continent. Through its Bureau for the Placement and Education of African Refugees (BPEAR), the OUA "promotes the individual resettlement of African refugees with professional qualifications or a university education", and "collects and supplies information on educational, vocational training and employment opportunities in Africa". The carrying out of these programmes and activities cannot fail to have a beneficial effect on the overall manpower situation in Africa and in lessening some of the serious problems of uncontrolled migration.

**66.** Because of governmental attitudes and changing political structures in Asia, international organizations have not been so closely involved in the planned distribution of manpower in that continent. Migration between some countries occurs but only very infrequently on a planned or assisted basis. There have been a number of bilateral agreements between Canada, the USA and several countries of Asia, providing for the movement of persons from India, Pakistan, the Philippines and Hong Kong. Planned and assisted emigration from Japan and Korea especially to South America, which was reasonably high a decade ago, is now very much reduced. There are of course currents of spontaneous Asian migration going to many parts of the world.

**67.** Within the brief limits of this paper it is not possible to deal extensively with all the ways in which, in connexion with migration, international organizations are helping individual countries and furthering regional development plans. Suffice it to say that all organizations concerned, international, governmental and non-governmental, are becoming more and more aware that human capital is the key to economic growth and social progress, and that planned migration can play a leading role in promoting development in industry, agriculture, education, commerce and other sectors. This implies the realization that international co-operation in the field of migration is becoming increasingly desirable.

#### The present decade - needs and suggestions for increased international co-operation

**68.** The fact that migration has helped to solve problems of under employment, eased political tensions and played a vital role in economic and social development, makes the study of international population movements a matter of prime interest to social scientists, government planners and international experts. True international co-operation in this domain needs to be more actively pursued.

**69.** There are still, without doubt, localized problems which governments feel they can best deal with on a bilateral basis. Recent examples, of the many which could be given, are the bilateral migration agreements signed not long ago between such countries as France and Portugal, the Federal Republic of Germany and Turkey, or those between Australia and Yugoslavia, or the one which has just been concluded between Canada and China regarding a programme of family reunion. Regional agreements, regarding labour movements in the framework of economic and social integration efforts have an important place in this connexion, and one need only mention those already in force in the European Economic Community and those under consideration by the Andean Pact countries and similar ones being studied at sub-regional level in Africa. However, not all labour migration problems can be solved in a limited regional context, and there are wider implications and more extensive sources of aid available than can be found in a given region. The world-wide nature of international migration means that there are distinct advantages in discussing problems and planning solutions on a multilateral basis. However, co-operation between governments in this field is only possible if they appreciate each other's problems and requirements and share in the establishing and co-ordination of more far-sighted and far-reaching migration policies and programmes.

**70.** Of course sight should not be lost of the fact that, perhaps for many years to come, international organizations will be called upon to deal with emergency situations in various parts of the world. But what appears to be needed is a global concept and greater continuity in examining ways in which desirable population transfers might be encouraged and assisted internationally. It is here that international organizations have an important role to perform. They have been actively engaged in research on vast numbers of problems, generally at the request of governments, on national, regional or global situations and have developed many projects or put programmes in motion to help solve such problems, which involve the utilization of human resources and the transfer or movement of population in an organized fashion. However, much more needs to be done to help governments move away from purely national interests and to create common policies for the benefit of all. In this endeavour it is also considered necessary to draw more upon the experience of the appropriate national agencies and research institutes and of the international non-governmental organizations, which have for many years been co-operating in social and humanitarian international affairs.

## V. CONCLUSIONS

**71.** No one seriously doubts the fact that international migration will continue in the future, perhaps with variations in trends and flows, as well as changes in volume and duration, but in response to basically the same motivations as heretofore. Today's greatly improved travel facilities and communications between countries and continents have made geographical distance less of an obstacle to migration. Industrialization and technological development, by putting a premium on skills and accentuating the demands for manpower in many societies, have also spurred international migration within the last twenty years. This is true not only as regards mass emigration from developing to developed countries, but also in respect of the growing selective migration of technical and professional people from highly industrialized to less advanced countries where their talents are effectively contributing to economic and social development. Within regional or sub-regional systems of free movement of labour, attempts are being made to do away with major restrictions on labour immigration among countries aiming at a high degree of economic and social integration.

**72.** In view of this, the benefits and effects of planned and assisted migration need to be continuously kept in mind. As already shown, these are considerable, not only for migrants and their families, but also for countries of origin and receiving governments. There is no evidence to show that these benefits will diminish; indeed, all the signs point to the fact that, with increased intergovernmental and international planning and co-ordination, and above all, with a growing awareness among intending migrants that official assistance is of considerable value to them, it will be possible to achieve an ever smoother transition from one country to another, from one job to another. Appropriate machinery in the sending and receiving countries is necessary if migration policy is to be solidly linked to population growth targets and national development plans. Whatever the motives of individuals for migrating, or of governments for promoting and assisting migration, all parties will achieve their aims and arrive at more satisfactory results if they work as closely as possible together.

**73.** The multilateral approach to migration did not always exist. However, world events led governments to see the wisdom of greater co-operation and to appreciate that, while their problems could not be solved in isolation, they could be very much reduced by international planning and action. Out of the need to set up international organizations to deal with refugee situations has developed the wider vision to realize that most, if not all, persons desirous of migrating need adequate guidance and might benefit from some kind of assistance. Both regionally and globally, governments are involved in efforts now being made to achieve a more reasonable distribution of the world's population and, especially, a more rational utilization of human resources, leading to economic development and social progress.

**74.** Planned migration is certainly in harmony with some of the aims and targets of World Population Year. It requires increased co-ordination between governments, international organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, and many national agencies and demographic research institutes. More jointly planned programmes, including research and the exchange of practical experience in the migration field would greatly contribute to the fundamental aim of assisting individual migrant workers and their families.

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# SOCIAL ACTION ON BEHALF OF MIGRANT WORKERS

International Social Service

Geneva (Switzerland)

## INTRODUCTION

1. Migratory movements are not new but during the last few years their social repercussions have taken on international dimensions. It falls to other rapporteurs of the Seminar organised by the Committee for International Coordination of National Research in Demography (CICRED) to analyse overseas migration, to determine preliminary questions of methodology, to study the mechanics of migration, and its connections with economic development or its demographic implications and consequences. International Social Service has been asked to consider the *difficulties* encountered by the *human beings* concerned, to present an evaluation of the types of *social action* already undertaken and to suggest lines along which *research* could usefully be planned for the future.

2. International Social Service is a private, non-political and non-denominational organisation. Its essential aim is to come to the aid of individuals who, as a result of voluntary or forced emigration, are faced with personal or family difficulties requiring for their solution either concerted action in a number of countries, or action in the country in which they are resident. The second aim of I.S.S. is to study from an international point of view the conditions of migration and its repercussions on personal and family life and, on the basis of these studies, to make appropriate recommendations to the competent authorities. To fulfil these aims, I.S.S. in the fifty years of its existence has set up a specialised and professionally qualified network covering every continent.

3. One of the fundamental principles of the Service is that all Social Service work is centred on the individual. His behaviour, based on his cultural and social references, his education, his bonds with the other members of his family must be taken into account, as well as his desires, his motivations and his personal plans. Only if these factors receive due attention will social and economic development be satisfactory. The present study is based on our knowledge of individual situations and on information of a general nature obtained from various sources; it is inevitably limited.

4. The following topics will be studied successively:

- I. Description of problems arising and social action taken in the country of origin and in the host country.
- II. Suggestions for action, desirable from a *national* and *international* point of view.
- III. Fields in which research is required in the future.

## I. DESCRIPTION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION

5. Before embarking on a survey of the social consequences of migration, it is useful to give a brief account of the institutional framework: the *international agreements and recommendations* adopted in fact constitute a set of standards which, if effectively and generally implemented by all States, would ensure a substantially adequate measure of protection for migrants.

*Bilateral treaties (administrative procedures) aimed at:*

- assimilation of migrant to indigenous workers for the purposes of most social services and Social Security
- equal treatment and control of conditions of hiring workers
- conditions of work and remuneration
- opportunities for family settlement
- placement in employment and insurance against unemployment
- adaptation to living conditions
- methods of recruiting migrants: contracts of employment
- collaboration between Social Service departments.

*Multilateral treaties:* Various international bodies such as I.L.O., the U.N. and the Council of Europe, are engaged in the coordination and unification of treaties in this field. The aim of these agreements is to avoid conflict between different systems and to ensure some common standards.

- *I.L.O. Agreement 97 aims at promoting:*
  - an appropriate free service designed to assist migrant workers and, in particular, to provide them with accurate information;
  - facilities for departure, travel and reception of migrants;
  - equal treatment and the maintenance of established rights.
- *The Council of Europe* has adopted a European Social Security code and has incorporated in the European Social Charter a section on the right of migrant workers and their families to protection and assistance.
- In addition, these bodies are making *recommendations* to their member countries aimed at unifying and coordinating action undertaken by the various States. Examples: I.L.O. recommendation on the housing of workers; E.E.C. recommendation on Social Services for migrants.

#### A. Social action on behalf of migrants in the country of origin

6. *Measures taken in regard to information or aid prior to departure.* The means of providing the necessary information to enable workers going abroad to adapt, and to prevent them from being too severely uprooted vary depending on the country and the conditions of departure. In some countries, the only information is given by the recruiting organisations of the host country and there is no systematic preparation. In others, *organised* information is issued by the government and by private organizations. Booklets containing information on contracts of employment, living conditions, customs and administrative formalities, useful addresses and social provisions are distributed to future emigrants, as are elementary phrase-books. Various organisations help intending emigrants to reach a decision to leave based on full knowledge of the facts, and to implement this decision. Often, Social Service offices are attached to the emigration centres; assistance is given by private or denominational associations. A few countries have established a special Social Service department with suitably trained social workers. Occupational training programmes have been set up in some countries. In general, these are short, practical programmes. But in many countries there is no occupational training for emigrants.

#### 7. *Measures taken on behalf of the family remaining in the country of origin*

In some countries, the State provides financial assistance to families that need it. It is rare for special measures to be taken to protect the family if it is abandoned by the emigrant. Payments are generally made to the head of the family.

The right to family allowances varies in different countries of immigration: in some, the right is automatic for all the worker's children, regardless of the family's country of residence; in others, there are differences depending on the emigration agreements.

Methods and terms of payment vary according to country and nationality:

- Payment made direct to the head of the family along with his wages, generally at the same rate as for nationals of the country concerned,
- payment sent direct to the mother or the person bringing up the children,
- payment made to an institution empowered to accept such payment and responsible for passing it on to the family.

Workers owing maintenance may be required by law to fulfil their obligations but enforcement of such orders is rarely effective. In some countries, there is no provision for legal remedies and no organization to enforce recovery of any maintenance owed.

*The procedure for recovery of maintenance deriving from the U.N. Agreement on maintenance obligations is rarely effective because of the complexity of the procedure and the small number of countries that have ratified the agreement.*

It is rare for official measures to be taken on behalf of families abandoned by the head of the family working abroad. In some countries, private organizations endeavour to maintain contact between the emigrant and his family; travel at reduced rates is sometimes provided at certain times of year; sometimes the employer pays the cost of travel for a visit to the family when the worker renews his contract for the first time. Such arrangements are, however, limited.

#### **8. Measures taken to facilitate the return of emigrants**

Some governments have agreed measures for return migrants: credit facilities for building living or workshop accommodation; registration with employment agencies (but without special priority or insurance against unemployment). These measures represent a minimum of protection. In other countries, reception is organised for return migrants: and attempts are made to facilitate customs and exchange transactions, to give all the necessary information on lodging and employment. Return migrants can register for state housing. In general, there is no provision for the re-adaptation of children who have emigrated with their parents.

### **B. Social action on behalf of migrants in the host countries**

**9.** Before examining social policies, it is necessary to give some data on the problems specific to migration, the material and psychological repercussions of which are important for the head of the family, his wife and children. The new world that migrants discover when they first set foot in the host country will often bear little or no relation to their native land. Many of them have no resources and may even have incurred debts to finance their emigration. On top of these financial worries and this sense of alienation, they often experience disillusion and disappointment; emigration represented the hope for a better life, a decent wage, advancement in their occupation. They will find themselves faced with discriminatory measures and will have to accept harsh working and living conditions, under the permanent threat of expulsion. Their origin will provide an excuse for refusing them suitable accommodation, for offering them the hardest and least skilled jobs. As a result they will be more liable to illness, to accidents at work, to psychological disorders. Migrants are often subjected to *de facto* segregation which ultimately creates actual artificial ghettos and encourages racism.

**10.** If he is married, the worker very often leaves his family in his own country. Long separation from the family has results which are harmful in every way; the original family is often deserted in favour of a new one. Family resettlement is, in our opinion, an essential element in the worker's social well-being and adaptation to the host country. There are, however, many obstacles to this, due to administrative regulations and procedures. The national authorities have discretion to take direct or indirect measures, based on considerations such as the needs of the economy, the demographic situation, available accommodation, facilities for schooling and domestic political attitudes. Whether or not the family is allowed to enter may depend on the length of stay of the head, or on the worker's nationality or qualifications. Sometimes the spouse is only permitted to enter if there is a vacancy corresponding to his/her *qualifications*. In some countries there is no restriction on the entry of families apart from health inspection.

**11.** Once the family is reunited, there may be problems of adaptation if the husband and wife have been separated for a number of years. The wife is often lonely for she has no immediate contact with the husband's life, which is based on his work, through the necessity of completing certain formalities and organising his leisure. He has changed his way of life and even his attitudes, whereas the wife continues to live as she did in the country of origin, confined to her home and her family traditions. A cultural gap between husband and wife may cause misunderstandings and disappointments.

**12.** In relation to the *children*, certain difficulties have been noted. Having been absent from home for a long time, the father has difficulty in asserting his authority, particularly when the children attend school and become better educated and better adapted to the new language and way of life than their parents. It is not unusual for the children of migrants to suffer a worse crisis *during adolescence* than other children, because

of the difficulties of reconciling the values of their family and of the host country. They feel cut off both from their parents and from their surroundings. Although many migrants accept this lack of adjustment and judge their success in terms of the opportunities for advancement open to their children, there is certainly a risk of adjustment difficulties.

**13.** In the event of illness or accident, the difficulties of re-education and re-adaptation are increased by the migrant's status and his lack of knowledge of the language.

**14.** *Reception and information given to the migrant and his family on arrival.* In most countries, employers or employers' associations are responsible for the reception of workers who have contracts of employment and arrive in a party. In some countries, this reception is organized by the public authorities either through information offices or by giving financial aid to private committees or denominational bodies. These various organizations give information and advice designed to settle the emigrant into his new environment: rights and obligations, practical information (illustrated guides, phrase-books and leaflets of various kinds are distributed). They assist with administrative formalities, help to draft letters and fill in forms, provide translators and interpreters. Sometimes, they give financial aid or provide temporary accommodation.

**15.** *Accommodation.* In many countries, the housing crisis has not yet been solved, especially in the larger towns and this adds to the difficulties of aliens seeking accommodation. However, the migrant's work contract often makes it the responsibility of the employer to provide accommodation. Large firms provide hostels and smaller firms band together for the same purpose. But, all too often, foreign workers are still forced to rent unhealthy, overcrowded accommodation at exorbitant prices. Hampered by their ignorance of the language and by the conditions and formalities they have to fulfil, they are exploited, sometimes by their own countrymen. In their anxiety to save as much as possible, they are willing to make the maximum sacrifice of personal comfort. Regulations have been enacted against excessive rents, but they are often not observed. In some countries the regulation of hostel accommodation is subject to systematic control: this is an effective way of encouraging firms to house their employees in decent conditions. The public authorities of various countries have stepped in to alleviate the situation; either by providing subsidies for employers who find suitable accommodation for their foreign workers, or by financing accommodation for migrant workers.

**16.** As regards family accommodation, the situation is even more difficult. Some public or semi-public organizations have family housing programmes designed to get rid of slums and to re-house low-income families. Sometimes building firms reserve a certain percentage of flats for foreign families. However, migrants do not always enjoy the same rights to accommodation as do the nationals of the country concerned. One interesting project tried by a European firm deserves mention: this firm set up a "transit city" where families are housed free for the first four months after arrival. After that they pay a graded rent until they take up normal accommodation, when they may receive a loan to help with removing expenses. Migrants are sometimes able to obtain low-interest loans for home purchase on the same conditions as nationals of the country concerned, but in most cases these credit facilities are subject to certain restrictions: bilateral agreements, length of stay...

**17.** *Health protection.* Before examining the problems posed by health in the strict sense of the term, we must mention the problem of malnutrition caused partly by *change of diet*. Most countries are aware of the part played by food in the feeling of material well-being. Various steps have been taken with this in view:

- in many firms, the worker is given the opportunity to cook a meal in his own way at least once a day,
- food cooperatives are set up in factories, clubs, social centres and consulates to enable the worker to procure the foodstuffs he is accustomed to at relatively modest prices,
- cooks from the workers' country of origin are employed in factory canteens and hostels,
- small restaurants, partly subsidized, partly profit-making, have been established under foreign management.

**18.** *Prevention, detection and health education.* Health and welfare equipment is often inadequate and ill-adapted to meet the needs of the foreign population. Efforts have, however, been made: language guides are published specially for the use of the medical profession; interpreters from the welfare organizations are in attendance on doctors; some consulates or associations provide for consultations by doctors from the

country of origin. In many countries, information is given on the *prevention of accident and disease* in the form of lectures, slides, posters, literature, talks and radio broadcasts: educational programmes for immigrants are arranged by public or private organizations.

**19. Aid to the sick and disabled.** The various Social Security agreements mentioned briefly in our introduction represent an immense advance. However, they do not always provide satisfactory solutions in cases of chronic illness or accident. In some countries, there is no sickness benefit, or else illness or accidents may occur in circumstances for which the Social Security system cannot assume responsibility. Thus, we note the existence of special welfare funds designed to bear the cost of prolonged treatment for those unable to afford it or to provide temporary aid for workers who are not in receipt of sickness benefit or who are awaiting a pension.

**20. Organisation of life in the community.**

*Introduction to the language.* Large firms, legal authorities, labour exchanges, banks and social service organizations increasingly use interpreters and distribute guides or leaflets in two languages. Some countries attempt to give extra language training to staff in employment exchanges and organisations for aiding migrants. As regards language teaching, there are few free courses which workers can attend during working hours on full pay. In most cases, such teaching is confined to the rudimentary vocabulary required to ensure the worker's safety at work. Depending on the country, *language courses* are organised by: firms, professional organisations, trade unions, institutions of further education, social clubs or working men's clubs and are often government-financed. Experiments on methods of language teaching are under way in a number of countries and audiovisual teaching methods are increasingly being used.

**21. Integration of adults into the working environment.**

*Introduction to work:* In some firms where the work is particularly dangerous, there is a period of initiation at the beginning of the worker's stay; other firms have arranged a programme of graded work, so as to enable the worker to adapt in three stages (reception, change, adaptation); in others, the custom is to give the newcomer a "guardian", a worker from the same shop, who will give him the benefit of his advice for the first few weeks. Very often, employers have interpreters permanently on call in the place of work.

**22. Further training.** In principle, in all countries, promotion within firms is open to all workers without distinction of nationality. In practice, only a minority of foreign workers succeed in obtaining promotion. In several countries, however, further training courses for immigrants are organised by public and private organizations and trade unions.

**23. Participation in the life of the firm.** In some countries, foreign workers can be elected to trade union delegations or works' committees. In others, however, there is little or no representation of immigrants.

This state of affairs may have important consequences in respect of parity of treatment. Since foreigners cannot obtain a hearing in these decision-making bodies, the problems inherent in their position as immigrants are neglected or imperfectly understood.

**24. Female migrant workers (unaccompanied women).** A large number of foreign women, mainly under 35 years of age, emigrate to find employment; many are single, widowed or have been deserted by their husbands and some bring their children with them. Some firms, in keeping with the promises made by the recruiting agencies, have established centres for groups of young immigrant women under the wardenship of one of their countrywomen. In other countries, private associations manage hostels for women. The women living in these hostels are less confined than in accommodation supplied by firms, they are able to attend recreation centres which are open to young women of their own nationality or from the host country.

**25. Social welfare of mother and child.** The proportion of foreign mothers at work varies and depends on a number of factors: the number of vacancies for women—the need to add to "savings" in preparation for the return to the country of origin—the local system of family allowances (in certain countries, the allowance is reduced if the mother is working)—the need to have a work permit in order to obtain a residence permit.

*Care of the children.* When the mother of a family is working, she looks first of all to her family for help (grandparents, the eldest child); most mothers are obliged to use crèches, day-nurseries or nurses, but the number of places available is generally insufficient, so that in certain countries we see the development of crèches and day-nurseries reserved exclusively for foreign children and financed by the host country and the families.

*Interpreters or welfare workers from the country of origin:* These are sometimes employed in the health and welfare services of the host countries.

*Courses for women:* Some welfare centres have taken to organising courses for mothers in language, child care, home economics, the use of modern household equipment, prevention of disease.

## 26. *Education of the children*

*Integration into the education of the host country:* Children experience difficulties in adapting to school which may discourage them or cause disturbance to the native children. Often no special arrangements are made for these children. Some countries, on the other hand set up reception classes in which the children receive instruction in the language and are introduced to the curriculum; they are returned to the normal class appropriate to their age-group when they have made sufficient progress. In other schools, certain hours are set aside for instruction in the language. In many countries, research has been conducted and experiments undertaken with a view to building up a specialised body of teachers and adequate teaching material.

*Instruction in the language and culture of the country of origin:* In some countries, the country of origin and the host country have combined to finance additional courses in language and culture for foreign children, in order to maintain their knowledge of their own country and to make it easier for them to resume their studies should they return there.

*Apprenticeship:* In some countries, training takes place on the job. There may be vocational training institutions, but only a small proportion of foreign children are admitted to them and sometimes only on condition that they pay higher fees than the indigenous children.

Note: Children arriving after the age of 10 to 12 almost always suffer a handicap because of their ignorance of the language and sometimes also as a result of inadequate schooling in the country of origin.

## 27. *Leisure*

In the organisation of leisure, certain trends appear:

- district or community, cultural, sports and recreational associations; clubs organised by firms and hostels, open to all without distinction of nationality;
- leisure centres and meeting-places for foreigners open to some or all ethnic groups. In some countries, institutions of further education organise sight-seeing tours, films and lectures for foreign workers.
- They are run by private associations and financed by the host country or the countries of origin.

## 28. *Religious assistance*

The ministers and churches of the host country are, of course, available to migrants who wish to practise their religion, but here again language is an obstacle. Special glossaries have been prepared, but in most countries ministers have come from the country of origin. In some countries of immigration, these facilities are maintained by the State. Some Western countries provide facilities for Moslems to practise their religion (food is prepared separately in certain firms, hours of work arranged to allow the observance of Ramadan, and rooms are reserved for religious services in certain hostels).

## 29. *Relations with the native population*

Foreigners often prefer each other's company in the leisure centres organised for them, rather than attend the social and cultural amenities provided by firms or local communities. The frequent lack of understanding of the foreigner's position derives from a profound divergence of views—the immigrant expects to find everything he has been unable to obtain in his country of origin in the way of employment and security—the indigenous population regard him merely as an additional pair of hands and react defensively and with instinctive mistrust—a situation which in no way prevents coexistence based on mutual indifference. Private associations in some countries organise seminars to study the problems of foreign workers and their families, to which they invite participants from a broad cross-section of society as well as representatives of the migrants.

There has also been a great increase in the amount of information issued to the indigenous population on the subject of the migrants and their countries of origin, and care has been taken to improve the information supplied to groups most frequently in contact with foreigners: such as trade unions, medical services, various administrative departments, landlords, etc...

## 30. *The role of press, radio and television*

In most countries, especially in the large towns or where there is a large number of workers of a particular nationality, foreigners find newspapers or magazines from their own country. Special editions of

information bulletins are often issued in their language. In all countries, a number of periodicals are published for immigrants, sometimes at the expense of the host country and sometimes put together in the country of origin.

### 31. *Organisation of the Social Services*

Welfare work has taken its own particular form in every country. The sources of finance have often shaped the development of the Institutions and their work. In some countries, social welfare is mainly in the hands of private organisations, while in others the State plays an essential part. In addition, government policy, public opinion and the attitude towards immigrants affect the scope and bearing of the Social Services provided for these workers and their families. We find, on the one hand, countries in which *all the welfare services* are available to foreigners and which also have a number of associations catering specially for migrants. On the other hand, there are countries in which most of the welfare work is in the hands of *organisations dealing exclusively with immigrants*, sometimes specialising in particular nationalities. Most bodies work under the aegis of the public authorities or in collaboration with them; they sometimes have local branches. Depending on the country, there may be a committee to ensure coordination between the representatives of public and private organizations.

32. The Social Services provided by the *various firms* also play a part, which varies in different countries and sectors of industry. The *principal trade unions* have set up special sections for immigrant workers, where they can obtain legal advice. A number of *voluntary organisations*, denominational and non-denominational, help migrants in relation to the country of origin or other countries.

33. The *countries of origin*, for their part, try to place social workers: either in local social service departments, or in embassies or consular offices, or in services belonging to the country of origin, with branches in the host country.

34. *INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SERVICE* plays an extremely important part in this collaboration between different countries.

Through examination of particular cases, solutions can be found and put to the competent authorities. The studies carried out by I.S.S. for various inter-governmental bodies cover a variety of subjects: problems affecting migrant children, problems of maintenance allowances and adoption. I.S.S. is aware that the best way to international understanding lies in the collaboration of governments, organisations and individuals in different countries seeking effective solutions to particular problems. We quote a few examples of such collaboration:

- between the Ministry of Health of Australia and the private marriage guidance organisation in the Netherlands,
- between a private clinic for children in the United States and a government infant welfare department in Niger,
- between an institution for children in Hong Kong and the Belgian public welfare department.

## II. SUGGESTIONS FOR DESIRABLE ACTION

35. The situation of migrant workers, which often remains very difficult and precarious, calls for considerable efforts along precisely coordinated lines (1). In many matters of concern to these workers and to members of their families, the agreements and recommendations adopted by international bodies are instruments which embody the advances made in social rights and provide valid guarantees, but they have not been ratified everywhere and frequently only with reservations. They should be supplemented by international norms which would provide a useful guide to governments, employers' and workers' organisations and social service departments. As regards *the reception of foreign workers and their families and their adaptation to their new environment, the crucial problem is the abolition of the discriminatory measures and practices to which migrant workers are exposed in their conditions of life.*

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(1) In many countries of immigration, certain indigenous groups meet with social and economic problems which are comparable to those of the migrants. Programmes for migrants should be planned in the broader context of policies designed to alleviate poverty and to help sections of the population with special needs, whatever their nationality.

## Suggestions for desirable action in the countries of origin

### 36. *For the workers:*

- improve opportunities for obtaining information on living and working conditions in the countries of destination,
- increase provision of language courses and courses of initiation into the kind of work being undertaken,
- give information before departure on the conditions of family resettlement (possibilities, facilities, difficulties),
- assist workers and their families to complete emigration formalities and prepare for departure, provide them with the necessary help on the journey.

### 37. *For the members of the family:*

- speed up the application of the procedure governing enforcement of maintenance regulations,
- help them to safeguard their rights and interests in regard to Social Security and family allowances,
- provide them with moral and material support.

### 38. *For the return to the country of origin:*

- accommodation,
- workshop equipment,
- reintegration of children into the educational system.

39. *Organisation of welfare work:* This should be extended and refined. Thus, it would be advisable to devote the greatest efforts to the provision of information for social workers, ensuring that they are all aware of the problems connected with emigration, and giving them an adequate training to improve the quality of their work among migrant workers.

40. *Information:* Information on the situation of migrant workers should be distributed among the whole population, to encourage better understanding on the part of their fellow-countrymen during emigration and on their return.

## Suggestions for desirable action in the host country

41. No worker should be permitted to enter unless he has a contract containing precise guarantees regarding employment, length (of employment) and wages.

*Reception-guidance.* The initial formalities to be completed by the workers and their families on arrival should be simplified. A reception bureau, well-informed both on the status of the immigrant and on the facilities provided in the area, should give guidance: information, useful addresses. A record should be kept in each town or region of the opportunities for obtaining temporary lodging, emergency funds, information on welfare provisions, rights and obligations, etc., making maximum use of the media of press, radio and television. Public or private social services should everywhere be at the disposal of migrant workers to help them by direct personal contact to overcome the difficulties of adaptation and gradually to take full responsibility for themselves and their families. They should gradually lead them to become self supporting and responsible for their own interest and to take part in activities that concern them.

42. *Family resettlement.* In view of the problems raised by the separation of workers from their families, concrete measures should be taken to facilitate family resettlement. This should be authorised, whenever the worker desires it, as soon as his residence and employment can be regarded as sufficiently steady and permanent; the term "family" should include at least the worker's wife and his children under the age of 21.

43. *Accommodation.* The competent authorities should take the necessary steps to ensure that housing conditions conform to health and safety regulations, and should ensure that migrant workers enjoy the same legal protection as do the nationals of the country concerned in the matter of leases and rents (efforts to get rid of insanitary housing and to rehouse occupants are often made more difficult by the uncertain legal status of immigrants).

44. *Health protection.* Where there is a large foreign population, the hospital services should employ interpreters. In cases of repatriation due to illness, there should be advance coordination between the health and welfare authorities of the two countries. It is a matter of urgency for public, semi-public or

private organizations to make provision for cases of illness or accident occurring shortly after arrival, when the workers have not yet become eligible for social security benefits. Emergency aid should be obtainable without administrative difficulties. In considering these health problems, the point recently made by a specialist in the health of migrants should be borne in mind: "It is not possible to suggest medical remedies without a knowledge of the social, cultural and political problems raised by the health of migrants."

**45. Language problems.** The use of suitable teaching methods and the exchange between countries of the results of experiments, in language teaching, should be extended. Free courses on the language, life and institutions of the country should be made generally available. Attendance at such courses would not be compulsory, but should be encouraged.

**46. Social and occupational advancement:**

- the training and advanced training of migrant workers should be encouraged by giving them access, to the training facilities available to nationals of the host country after they have worked in the host country for a certain period,
- bearing in mind, the special interests of women, appropriate action should be taken to enable them to adapt more quickly to the new environment and to play an effective part in solving educational and other problems.

**47. Education of the children.** Provide for all children of migrant workers to have the same schooling or vocational training as do the children of the country concerned, supplemented by extra teaching at the time of their arrival designed to facilitate their integration into the normal school system. Migrant pupils should be eligible for scholarships and financial assistance provided for the children of the country concerned and for assistance to complete their studies. Staff teaching in areas where there is a large migrant population should be given additional training in the culture and way of life of the migrants' countries of origin, so that the cultural values of the migrants can be stressed during schooling. It is imperative that the school timetable be arranged to allow time for teaching in the mother tongue.

**48. Adaptation to the local environment.** The social services should use community work methods to help migrants to help themselves in realizing their aspirations in ways adapted to the local environment. In order to encourage understanding and goodwill, those members of the local population who are in frequent contact with migrant workers should be adequately informed, notably through the media of press, radio and television. These measures would inform the population of the country concerned of the real, economic, demographic or cultural interest of immigration and would help them to understand the behaviour, attitudes and reactions of the migrants.

**49. Organization and cooperation of the social services.** Genuine cooperation between all organizations and individuals dealing with the migrant population should be encouraged: specialised and multi-purpose social service departments, employers and trade unions, churches and representatives of the countries of origin; such cooperation makes for better knowledge of the migrants' needs and allows coordination of different measures. Exchanges between the staff of the social service departments of the countries of origin and the host countries, in the form of seminars, study trips and exchange of data, should be increased. The dissemination of information to the staff of government departments dealing with migrants should also be encouraged.

### III. FIELDS IN WHICH RESEARCH IS REQUIRED IN THE FUTURE

**50.** The survey of the social problems posed by migration and the description of the policies for social action which we have attempted to present show that methodical research is essential to obtaining better information about the situation as a whole before recommending future solutions. We propose a number of subjects for consideration:

*Study the underlying cultural motives for emigration* in countries where it is an old and continuing tradition.

*Trace the developments following an emigration agreement* concluded between two countries several years ago, studying the economic, demographic, psychological and social factors and analysing the consequences for the migrants, their families and the communities in the country of origin and the host country. In this connection, ask migrants (men, women, young people, etc.) for their opinion on social action, the resources placed at their disposal, the help they had sought in connection with information, promotion,

personal problems and the results that they had achieved investigate also (without any preconceived ideas) the migrants wants in regard to the oraganisation of their life in the local community (contact-introduction or integration).

*Prepare and try out methods of supplying information adapted to different mentalities—consider how to train those who, in turn, are to train the migrants and help them to accept new social norms without, however, rejecting their own (educational system—family planning, etc.).*

Note: Researches in ethnology and sociology enable us to understand the native cultures and particular values of various human societies. But there is no apparent connection between academic research and published work and the social policies dealing with the populations concerned. In this connection, coordinated studies undertaken either in two countries or in a number of countries would perhaps enable concrete suggestions to be put to intergovernmental or national organisations.

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## VIII

### TWO CASE STUDIES

# YUGOSLAVIA AS A COUNTRY OF EMIGRATION

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## The Development of external migration from Yugoslavia

1. Yugoslavia is by tradition a country of emigration. Emigration to countries overseas from the areas which were united after the First World War to form the Yugoslav community of peoples proceeded continuously from the mid-19th century up to the Second World War. It is estimated that on the eve of the Second World War about 1.5 million emigrants, who were either born in different parts of Yugoslavia or were descendants of Yugoslav emigrants, were living abroad (1). By origin, most of the pre-war emigrants came from the western parts of Yugoslavia, i.e. Croatia and Slovenia, and the main country of destination was the United States. In Argentina too, the host country of this Symposium, there are resident some 100,000 persons of Yugoslav origin (2).

2. Economic emigration from Yugoslavia was resumed after the Second World War (about 1954). Spontaneous and initially unauthorized emigration in the search for employment and higher earnings increased, especially in 1962. By that time, the Yugoslav political and state leadership had accepted employment abroad as a necessity under existing socio-economic conditions, and since 1964 the Yugoslav employment service has co-operated increasingly with foreign employers and foreign employment services in organizing the employment of Yugoslav workers abroad.

3. In contrast to pre-war emigrations to overseas countries, post-war migrations have chiefly been directed towards Europe—West Germany, Austria, France, Switzerland and Sweden—though overseas emigration was also resumed, especially to Australia and North America.

4. The number of migrants increased particularly after 1965. On the basis of statistical data collected in the countries of immigration it is estimated that there were 140,000 Yugoslav workers in European countries in 1965, and in the following year their number increased to 210,000 (1969—420,000; 1971—660,000) (3). In 1973, there were about 830,000 Yugoslav workers in European countries and about 160,000 new Yugoslav emigrants of working age in overseas countries who had left Yugoslavia after the war. When we compare the total number of 990,000 persons employed in European countries in the summer of 1973, plus the post-war Yugoslav emigrants in overseas countries, with the total population of Yugoslavia (in mid-1973 estimated total 20,994,000; *Yugoslav Statistical Yearbook* 1972), we obtain an external migration rate of 4.7. If we add the number of Yugoslav workers employed abroad in 1972 (990,000) to the total number of persons employed in Yugoslavia (4,210,000), it is seen that Yugoslav workers employed abroad account for 19.0 per cent of the total number of employed Yugoslavs (5,200,000). For every 100 workers employed in Yugoslavia, an average of 23.5 are employed abroad. These basic numerical indicators show that foreign migration plays an important role in Yugoslavia's economic and social life.

## Basic causes of post-war external migrations

5. In order to determine the highly complex causes of external migrations of Yugoslav workers since the war, it should first be noted that at the end of the Second World War Yugoslavia was one of the least developed countries of Europe. While Yugoslavia, with its special geo-political position between the interests and pressures of two military and political blocs and with its own policies of social and economic development, has not always found the optimum policies for rapid economic growth, it is undeniable that great progress has been achieved since the Second World War in setting this once backward agrarian country on the path of industrial development. Shortly before the Second World War, less than 6% of Yugoslavia's total

population was employed (Table I). In the last year of the war, employment decreased by one-half. The country's rapid economic development since the war has manifested itself in an almost continuous increase in the number of people employed and the rate of employment.

TABLE I : TRENDS IN THE TOTAL YUGOSLAV POPULATION AND IN THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EMPLOYEES IN 1939, 1948, 1953 AND 1961-1972\*

Year	Population in 1,000	Employed**		Rate***
		Number in 1,000	Chain index	
1	2	3	4	5
1939	15,996	920		5.8
1945	15,216	461		3.0
1948	15,772	1,517		9.5
1953	16,937	1,836		10.8
1961	18,549	3,242	109.1	17.4
1962	18,819	3,318	102.3	17.6
1963	19,029	3,390	102.2	17.8
1964	19,222	3,608	106.4	18.7
1965	19,434	3,662	101.5	18.8
1966	19,644	3,582	97.8	18.2
1967	19,840	3,561	99.4	17.9
1968	20,209	3,587	100.7	17.9
1969	20,209	3,706	103.3	18.3
1970	20,371	3,850	103.9	18.9
1971	20,505	4,034	104.8	19.7
1972	20,772	4,210	104.4	20.7

\* Source: Yugoslav Statistical Yearbooks and the publication "Yugoslavia 1945-1964 - A Statistical Survey". Federal Institute for Statistics, Belgrade 1965.

\*\* In Yugoslavia the concept «employed» applies to persons employed either in the public sector of the economy or with private employers.

\*\*\* Proportion (%) of the total population.

6. The process of post-war Yugoslavia's dynamic social and economic development is clearly observable in the gradual decrease in the ratio of the country's population employed in agriculture (Table II). Between 1948 and 1971 this ratio decreased from 67.2% to 36.4%. During the same period, the proportion of active farmers in the country's total working population decreased from 74.2% to 38.5%. In interpreting these figures it should be borne in mind that the diminution of the agricultural population over the past ten years has to a large extent been also due to employment abroad.

TABLE II : PROPORTION OF THE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IN THE TOTAL POPULATION, AND OF WORKING FARMERS IN THE WORKING POPULATION OF YUGOSLAVIA—ACCORDING TO POST-WAR CENSUSES.

Year	Agricultural population per cent of the total population	Working farmers per cent of the total population
1	2	3
1948	67.2	74.2
1953	64.3	68.3
1961	52.9	56.3
1971	36.4	38.5

7. However, despite the great decrease in the ratio of agricultural to total population, a very large proportion of Yugoslavia's population still derives its livelihood from farming and the ratio is one of the largest in Europe. This is particularly evident when we consider that only 39.6% of the country's total area is arable land (of Yugoslavia's total area of 255,804 sq.km only 101,250 sq.km is arable land). Thus there are 73.1 agricultural inhabitants per square kilometre of arable land, and only 2.6 hectares of arable land per active farmer. In 1961, i.e. before the number of Yugoslav workers going into employment abroad began to increase rapidly, there were as many as 90 inhabitants per square kilometre of arable land, with each active farmer cultivating an average of 2.2 hectares. The generally low rate of return on labour in agriculture should also be noted. In 1961, active farmers accounted for 56.3% of Yugoslavia's total population but earned only 23.2% of the country's total national income (4).

8. In trying to explain the causes of external migration from Yugoslavia one should keep in mind that despite an almost three fold increase in the rate of employment of the population between 1948 and 1972 (see Table I, column 5), this rate is still comparatively low (5). Another important fact is that over the last ten years, i.e. from 1963 to 1972, there has only been a comparatively small increase in the rate of employment (2.9 in all, i.e. from 17.8 to 20.7.) The desire among Yugoslavia's agricultural population to give up an exacting and increasingly less profitable agricultural activity is developing much faster than jobs are created in the non-agricultural sector.

9. Another characteristic of employment in Yugoslavia since the war has been the large fluctuations in the rate of increase of employment. Each period during which efforts were made to reform the country's economy was marked by stagnation in the employment of new workers. Especially important for contemporary external migration was the reform of 1965, which actually led to a decrease in the total number of employees in 1966 and 1967 (see Table I, column 3). At the same time, there was a great increase in the number of persons seeking employment while job opportunities decreased (Fig. 1).




Fig. 1. — Trends in the total number of employed (1), the number of persons seeking employment (2), and the number of vacant jobs registered (3) in 1960-1972 (1959 = 100).

10. The rate of increase in employment after 1965 did not provide work for even that part of the population which was reaching working age, despite the comparatively low current average employment rate (1965—18.8). The unemployed who had reached working age earlier but could not find work, and the growing need to provide jobs for under employed persons in agriculture, should also be considered.

11. In view of these conditions in Yugoslavia during the past ten years, and especially following the economic reform of 1965, it can easily be understood that many of those who could not find work in Yugoslavia were prepared to seek employment abroad. External migration of labour from Yugoslavia is mainly a form of the transition of an under-employed agricultural population to other sectors of the economy.

12. Additionally, people born during the period of greatest natural increase in the early post-war years reached working age or completed their schooling (6).

13. Another equally important cause of Yugoslav external migration derives from the difference between the levels of income in Yugoslavia and the more economically developed countries of western and central

Europe. Almost one-half of Yugoslav external migrants have been attracted to work abroad by the prospect of higher wages. While the average monthly earnings of employees in Yugoslavia amounted to about 80 U.S. dollars in 1969, the average monthly income of persons employed in West German industry was about 255 U.S. dollars, i.e. over three times the Yugoslav amount (7).

**14.** The attraction of employment abroad is not diminished by the fact that, due to the higher cost of living, the purchasing power of the currencies of the countries of immigration is considerably below the official exchange rate of the dinar. The migrant, during his stay abroad, tries to restrict his living expenses to a minimum and, on his return home, benefits from the higher value of the savings he brings home with him. Thus he is directly stimulated to take employment abroad (8). Moreover, when buying industrial goods in Yugoslavia with foreign currency, the migrant is entitled to a price reduction, and this is an additional method of increasing the value of his savings from work abroad (9).

**15.** When considering the reasons for the departure of workers who were employed or could find work in Yugoslavia, one must not overlook the fact that many of them had no real prospects in the foreseeable future of obtaining satisfactory housing whilst working at home. For a certain number of migrants an additional motive for taking employment abroad has been unfavourable promotion prospects in their particular jobs or the impossibility of fully applying their creative abilities, and sometimes bad personal relations in individual organizations. These reasons apply especially to persons with higher technical qualifications.

### Structure of migrants

**16.** The census taken in Yugoslavia on 31 March, 1971 recorded for the first time, "persons in temporary employment abroad". Although the census did not cover all Yugoslavs who live abroad by reason of employment, but only those "temporarily employed abroad"—and the assessment of temporariness was left to respondents in the census (i.e. family or neighbours)—these figures supply the best and most reliable information to date on the structural characteristics of Yugoslav migrants.

**17.** The 1971 Yugoslav census enumerated a total of 671,908 persons "in temporary employment abroad". Comparing this figure with the statistical data about Yugoslav workers collected in individual countries of immigration (which gave a total figure of 790,500), it may be seen that the Yugoslav census did not cover 15% of the workers who in the countries of immigration are returned as "foreign workers from Yugoslavia" (10). The difference in coverage was smaller in European countries (7.7%) than in overseas countries (47.7%) where it may be assumed with some justification that the stay of European workers is not of a temporary nature.

**18.** According to the results of the 1971 census, women account for 31.4% of the total number of Yugoslav migrants. This proportion is equal to the proportion of women in the total labour force in Yugoslavia (31.8%). Numerically the largest age group among migrants is the 20-24 year olds which accounts for one quarter of all migrants. As many as 83.3% of the migrants are below 40 years of age. On the average, women are much younger than men. 48.0% of the men and as many as 62.3% of the women migrants are below the age of 30. Comparison of the proportion of migrants in individual age groups with the corresponding proportion in Yugoslavia's total population shows that 11.1% of Yugoslavia's population in the age group 20-24, and 10.5% in the age group 25-29, are employed abroad.

**19.** Educational attainments of Yugoslav workers who take employment in foreign countries are superior to those of Yugoslavia's population as a whole. While the migrants contain a smaller proportion of persons who have completed university or secondary school (5.7%) than in the country's total population (8.1%), as many as 16.6% have completed training for skilled or highly-skilled workers, whereas in the total population such workers account for only 9.0%. Persons who have completed eight years elementary schooling are also represented disproportionately among external migrants (19.8%) than in the country's total population (14.6%). Fully 42.1% of all migrants have completed either eight-year elementary schooling, a vocational school, a grammar school or higher education, while in Yugoslavia's total population, such persons account for only 32.8%. As regards school education, it appears that Yugoslav migrants have a higher standard than migrants from other European countries of emigration.

**20.** Only some 10% of Yugoslav external migrants have changed their labour force status by taking employment abroad, i.e. have moved from being dependents to being gainfully employed, and about 40% of all Yugoslav migrants had work in Yugoslavia before taking employment abroad. We should also add those migrants who after completing schooling or on reaching working age did not even try to find employment

in Yugoslavia, but took their first post abroad, to those who had been employed in Yugoslavia. Although those migrants who went abroad mainly from private smallholdings may be regarded as having been under-employed, they still include many who, given the size of their small-holdings, could have earned a fairly good livelihood in the existing agro-technical and market conditions of their own country.

#### *Regional differences in the origin of migrants*

**21.** There are great and unexpected differences in regard to the proportion of external migrants from Yugoslavia's individual regions. The differences are unexpected because in Yugoslavia—in contrast to the situation prevailing in other countries of emigration<sup>2</sup>—the rate of external migration is generally higher in the more highly developed (western) parts of the country.

**22.** The differences in the intensity of external migration become especially evident when we compare the shares of the individual Yugoslav republics and autonomous provinces in the country's total population and among Yugoslav migrants employed in foreign countries (Table III). Bosnia/Herzegovina, Croatia and Macedonia have larger proportions of Yugoslav workers in employment abroad than would be expected on the basis of their respective proportions in the country's total population, while Montenegro, Slovenia and Serbia have smaller shares in the total number of Yugoslav workers abroad than in the country's total population. Even within the individual republics there are differences in the individual region's proportion of external migrants to their own total population (fig. 2).




Fig. 2. — Number of Yugoslav workers temporarily employed abroad in proportion to the number of inhabitants in individual communes (according to census of 31 March, 1971).

**23.** The data on the proportion of emigrants from individual republics and autonomous provinces of Yugoslavia among the total number of Yugoslav migrants who have taken employment abroad, in individual years show that the proportion of migrants from Croatia is diminishing while that of migrants from Bos-

TABLE III : POPULATION AND PERSONS EMPLOYED ABROAD BY INDIVIDUAL YUGOSLAV REPUBLICS AND AUTONOMOUS PROVINCES ON 31 MARCH, 1971.

Republics and Autonomous provinces	Population*			Employed abroad** %	Migration rate
	Number in 1,000	%	Number in 1,000		
1	2	3	4	5	6
Bosnia/Herzegovina	3,743	18.3	152,835	19.3	4.8
Montenegro	530	2.6	10,685	1.3	2.0
Croatia	4,423	21.6	268,340	34.0	6.1
Macedonia	1,647	8.0	71,810	9.1	4.4
Slovenia	1,725	8.4	56,150	7.1	3.3
Serbia	5,242	25.6	131,615	16.7	2.5
Voivodina	1,950	9.5	72,540	9.2	3.7
Kosovo	1,245	6.0	26,525	3.3	2.1
Yugoslavia TOTAL	20,505	100.0	790,500	100.0	3.9

\* Source: Preliminary results of the census of 31 March, 1971 Statistical Bulletin No. 662. Federal Institute for Statistics, Belgrade 1971.

\*\* Figures of the 1971 census, corrected according to the statistical records of the countries of immigration.

nia/Herzegovina, Serbia and Macedonia is increasing (fig. 3). Characteristically, migrants from Montenegro, which is the area least affected by external migrations of labour, continue to form a small proportion of the total number of migrants from Yugoslavia. These data provide an indicator for the current regional distribution of external migration in Yugoslavia, which increasingly affects the country's eastern and south-eastern parts, while the absolute number of migrants continues to grow both in the western and north-western parts of the country.




Fig. 3. — Percentage of migrants from individual Republics and Autonomous Regions in the total number of migrants by years (Source: Census of Yugoslavia, March 31st, 1971).

24. The reasons for the disproportions in the rate of external migrants differ greatly in different parts of Yugoslavia. First of all it should be noted that western Yugoslavia includes several traditional regions of emigration and that in the past it has had closer connections with most of Europe's countries of immigration

than did the eastern parts of the country. As a result, in western Yugoslavia the possibilities and advantages of employment abroad are more widely known, and information on these possibilities and advantages spreads much faster, than in the eastern regions. Empirical investigations have shown that the spontaneous process of external migration begins in urban settlements and first involves male workers with higher qualifications and in the more mature age groups. From urban settlements, the process spreads to rural communities affecting young, unskilled workers with a growing proportion of women (11).

25. One other important cause of the regional disproportions derives from the unequal economic development of the country over the past 7 to 8 years when external migration from Yugoslavia became especially intensive. During the period following the 1965 economic reform (see paras 10-13) stagnation in employment and decrease in the total number of employees were most marked in Croatia. This part of Yugoslavia did not regain the total number of employees it had in 1965 until 1971, and the rate of increase in the number of employees between 1965 and 1972 was lower in Croatia than in any other republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslav average 15.0, Croatia only 9.2).

### Countries of immigration

26. For a variety of reasons, a distinction between European and overseas countries of immigration appears justified. The social and legal position of migrants in European countries differs considerably from that of settlers in overseas countries. Migrants to European countries stay and work there for a temporary period only, although for many migrants this may prove an illusion. The official Yugoslav term "temporary employment abroad" also covers emigrants to countries overseas, although it is obvious that their stay in overseas countries does not have this temporary quality.

27. Of the total number of Yugoslav migrants who were in employment abroad at the end of 1973, 83.8% were in European, and 16.2% in overseas countries (Table IV). More than one-half of all Yugoslav migrants work in the Federal Republic of Germany, or 59.6% of all Yugoslav migrants employed in European countries. Other important European countries of immigration for Yugoslav workers are Austria, France, Sweden and Switzerland. The majority of post-war Yugoslav economic emigrants to overseas countries live in Australia, i.e. 47.5% of all persons who emigrated overseas.

TABLE IV: NUMBER OF YUGOSLAV WORKERS IN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES OF IMMIGRATION ON THE END OF 1973\*

Country of employment	Number	% of the total	% among the European countries	% among the overseas countries
1	2	3	4	5
Austria	197,000	19.9	23.8	
France	54,000	5.5	6.6	
F.R. of Germany	496,000	50.1	59.6	
Switzerland	28,000	2.8	3.4	
Sweden	25,000	2.5	3.0	
Benelux countries	14,000	1.4	1.7	
Other European countries	16,000	1.6	1.9	
European countries total	830,000	83.8	100.0	
Australia	76,000	7.7		47.5
Canada	39,000	4.0		24.4
United States	36,000	3.6		22.5
Other overseas countries	9,000	0.9		5.6
Overseas countries total	160,000	16.2		100.0
Grand total	990,000	100.0		

\* Estimates based on statistical records of countries of immigration collected by the Centre for Migration Studies, Institute of Geography, University of Zagreb.

28. There are considerable differences between different regions of Yugoslavia in respect of the destinations of migrants. This can best be seen by comparing the proportion of migrants from individual communes

Fig. 4 — Proportion of persons employed in West Germany in the total number of migrants




Fig. 5 — Proportion of persons employed in France in the total number of migrants




Fig. 4

employed in West Germany with the proportion of migrants employed in France (Fig. 4). An especially large proportion of Yugoslav migrants employed in West Germany come from Yugoslavia's western regions, which are characterized by a large number of migrants, but many also come from large regions which produce comparatively few migrants and have only recently joined in the process of external migration. The area from which Yugoslav migrants tend to go into employment in France, coincides roughly with the area of Serbia proper. The preference currently shown for particular countries of immigration by migrants from individual Yugoslav regions of emigration derives, no doubt, from the common traditions shared by migrants from individual regions.

### Some social and economic effects

**29.** Persons who take employment abroad are preponderantly young, more mobile and enterprising workers with comparatively good qualifications. Among those who want to take employment abroad, foreign employers and officials of foreign employment services select the ablest, while pronouncing about 30-40% as unfit for work in foreign economies. It should be remembered that most of those who would have liked to take employment abroad have worked and will continue to work in the Yugoslav economy which means that the selection of workers for jobs abroad leads directly to a deterioration in the quality of the labour force in Yugoslavia.

**30.** The return from employment abroad is in most cases a direct result of a second selection made by foreign employers which, from the point of view of the interests of Yugoslavia's economy, has just as unfavourable an effect as did the first. This time foreign employers make a new selection among those they originally selected themselves or who were selected for them by officials of their employment services, and send back to Yugoslavia those who do not meet their requirements. Even if such workers do find work when returning to Yugoslavia, it is understandable that their employment will lead to a further decline in the quality of the labour force.

**31.** On the one hand, workers with better qualifications who have left their work in Yugoslavia are replaced by workers who have poorer qualifications and no experience and whose productivity accordingly, is considerably lower, while on the other hand, the return of workers with lower abilities and their reabsorption into the economic life of Yugoslavia leads to further deterioration in the structure of the labour force. Research carried out in 115 enterprises in Central Dalmatia employing a total of 50,283 workers has shown that within six years (1967-1972) 3,181 workers left their respective organizations in order to take employment abroad, and that the total number of workers included only 406 persons who had returned from employment abroad (12). Moreover, the qualifications of the workers who left their respective enterprises in order to take employment abroad were found to be considerably higher than those of workers who had returned from work abroad and rejoined their respective enterprises. The adverse effects of migration abroad and return from employment abroad on the quality of the labour force can also be seen in the fact that the proportion of illiterates among employees in Croatia (the republic with the highest rate of external migration in Yugoslavia) increased from 4.5% in 1961 to 5.1% in 1965 and to 6.8% in 1970.

**32.** Since 1963, i.e. since separate records began to be kept of foreign currency remittances of workers employed abroad, the total value of these remittances has continued to increase: in 1963—15.5 million dollars, in 1966—64 million— in 1968— 122.3 million, in 1970, 440.6 million, and in 1972, 868.3 million dollars. This increase is partly due to the growing number of Yugoslav workers working abroad and the accumulation of savings resulting from longer periods of employment abroad, and partly also to the various measures introduced by Yugoslavia designed to attract the foreign currency savings of Yugoslav workers employed abroad.

**33.** The share of foreign currency remittances of workers and emigrants in Yugoslavia's total foreign currency earnings and earnings from invisible exports also continues to increase: while in 1963 the foreign currency remittances of workers and emigrants accounted for only 4.4% of the country's total foreign currency earnings and for 35.6% of the country's earnings from invisible exports, in 1972 these figures rose to 22.0% and as much as 61.4% respectively. As a rule, an exaggerated degree of importance tends to be attached to foreign currency remittances of workers and emigrants. This is due to a failure to consider that the bulk of this increase in foreign currency earnings returns to the countries of immigration to cover Yugoslavia's foreign trade gap, and that the country's international trade becomes more and more adjusted to a situation in which Yugoslavia increasingly pays for her imports with the export of man-power.

**34.** The remittances of Yugoslav workers abroad account for more than one-tenth of the personal expenditure of the Yugoslav population as a whole (13). Although Yugoslav migrant workers send home only a small portion of their savings, these still account for a large proportion of the expenditure of Yugoslavia's population as a whole, and their owners have much greater purchasing power than the rest of the country's population.

**35.** On the whole, migrants spend savings from their earnings abroad uneconomically, chiefly on short-term improvements to their own or their families' living standards and only rarely on productive economic activities which would ensure them better long-term living conditions and a more favourable social status.

**36.** Under current conditions, the bulk of savings from employment abroad is spent on the improvement of housing. Of the total number of migrants from Croatia who had accumulated savings and began to spend them before 1971, 69.1% spent their savings on the construction or reconstruction of houses or on the purchase of flats. While investment in new accommodation is undoubtedly necessary and useful, since it helps considerably in relieving the country's continuing shortage of housing, a large proportion of external migrants spend too much of their savings on the construction of houses the size of which greatly exceeds the migrants' current or foreseeable requirements. Investments in house construction are often made in remote villages and areas which have poor prospects of being included in the country's current economic development. Moreover, in the absence of urban development plans or general projects, these houses are often built on unsuitable, widely scattered sites which will make it very difficult and costly to provide them with basic communal services.

**37.** Investment of migrants' savings in economic activities, either in the social or private sector of the economy, has so far been almost negligible. Comparatively little has been invested in improving farm production. This is partly due to the ambition of many migrants from rural communities to ensure for themselves, by working abroad, a transition from rural areas to urban centres and to give up farming, and partly also to the increasingly low returns from agricultural work. Many peasant families who have bought tractors with money earned abroad have done so for reasons of social prestige or because of a desire to be independent of families possessing tractors, rather than because they regarded it as an economic proposition. As a result many farming regions now have a surplus of agricultural machinery.

**38.** Private investment in non-agricultural activities is possible chiefly in service trades such as various crafts, road haulage and catering. An investigation in a Central Dalmatian area, which is distinguished by a large number of external migrants, has shown that out of a total of 3,489 private owners of craft workshops and other establishments, 385 (or 11%) had been in employment abroad and had saved the money for starting their activities from their earnings abroad (14). Most of them (198) had bought lorries and were involved in road haulage, 105 possessed catering establishments, while in all other service trades only 82 owners were in employment abroad. The orientation of migrants who return from employment abroad to certain service trades, such as road haulage (including taxi driving) and catering, has resulted in a surplus of these services in certain regions. Despite the marked shortage of craft workshops, migrants are rarely prepared to invest or work in these activities.

**39.** As a rule, workers employed abroad express the greatest readiness to take employment in the social sector of Yugoslavia's economy after returning home if they can obtain work near their place of permanent residence where they have already secured or are securing suitable housing. To obtain such jobs, they are even willing to spend part of their savings from work abroad. However, few jobs have been created in this manner so far, —several hundred in all, but the comparatively few instances of investment of savings from work abroad in creating new jobs in the public sector of the economy have produced very favourable results and suggest that there are great potentialities in this.

**40.** The causes of the migrants' irrational economic behaviour in the investment of their savings in Yugoslavia are manifold. It is certain that the country's socio-economic system does not offer adequate scope to attract and utilize private capital in the development of economic activities and service trades. Changes in this respect have been very slow and not always adequate. The interpretation and implementation of relevant measures designed to direct private capital towards creating new jobs in both the public and private sectors of the economy differ from region to region while often being subject to changes. This creates a feeling of insecurity among the migrants. Besides, promoters of organized initiative that would attract the savings of migrants and ensure the most efficient use of the funds in productive investment are often lacking.

**41.** Although a large part of Yugoslavia's working population has found the possibility of a more productive employment abroad, it is obvious that, given the existing structure of external migrants, the current manner of obtaining and discontinuing work abroad, the current manner of investing savings, and the existing conditions

for the return and reintegration of migrants, —the employment of Yugoslav workers abroad is a highly adverse factor in Yugoslavia's economic development. It makes it more difficult to reduce the gap between Yugoslavia and the economically more highly developed countries which employ Yugoslav workers.

**42.** It is obvious that if the current total of almost one million migrants were working productively in the Yugoslav economy—despite lower productivity and the need for considerable investment to provide jobs for them, —this would ensure for Yugoslavia a much greater economic return than does the present situation, which consists of an influx of foreign currency remittances, income from taxation and customs duties on imported goods, and in a certain amount of stimulation of the building material and construction equipment industries.

**43.** External migration has many mainly adverse social consequences. Only about 10% of the migrants living abroad have their families living with them. The social and psychological effects on migrants' families whose individual members lead separate lives can be observed in an increasing rate of divorce, in neglect of the migrants' obligations to their children and invalid parents, in different forms of deviant behaviour, in mental disorders, etc. One-third of the migrants are women, most of whom are of the most suitable age for childbearing, and thus their stay abroad has an adverse effect on the biological reproduction of the population of emigration. Research has shown a very high degree of correlation between a high rate of external migration and a low birth rate in different parts of Yugoslavia.

**44.** Current external migration has caused major disturbances in all spheres of Yugoslavia's economic and social life. In a situation where so many workers live outside the country it is difficult and dangerous to try to re-establish a balance by means of hasty administrative measures. However, it is indisputable that several well considered measures could help gradually to improve the characteristics of external migration as a whole.

**45.** A law has already been adopted in Yugoslavia which, beginning in 1974, will make it difficult for workers in various categories, especially technicians needed in the country's economy, to take employment abroad. However, although it is difficult to introduce measures which would encourage workers to return home and take employment in Yugoslavia, it is encouraging that practically everybody in Yugoslavia has come to realize that only with these measures can a change in the current adverse economic effects of external migration be brought about. The need for encouraging the return of migrant workers and for ensuring that they are suitably accepted in the country's economic and social life has been accepted by almost all administrative and socio-political organizations in Yugoslavia for the past two years.

**46.** Although it is difficult to adopt such measures, because they require changes in Yugoslavia's socio-economic system or in the administration of the existing system (understandably, such changes are not and cannot be introduced for the sake of migrant workers alone), various measures have been adopted (e.g. tariff policies, banking and taxation policies, etc.) which are designed to speed up the return of workers from employment abroad. Many new measures are still necessary if the return from employment abroad is to be made possible and attractive for an increasing number of migrant workers, but it is equally important to gain and justify the migrants' confidence that the conditions under which they return from employment abroad and join in economic activity in the home country will not be affected by subsequent changes in the socio-economic system or its administration.

**47.** The return and reintegration of migrant workers should be included in the plans and concrete development programmes ranging from plans of individual enterprises and communal plans to plans and programme of regional development. Special support should be given to every individual or group initiative in Yugoslavia which will develop ways and means for including returning migrant workers in the country's productive industries.

**48.** In addition to ensuring favourable and stable conditions for the return of migrants and for their economic and social reintegration, returning migrants should be advised how best to invest their savings and how they can combine such investment with the most favourable utilization of their intellectual and physical abilities.

**49.** Only with an optimum reintegration can migrants play a part in the more rapid economic development of Yugoslavia and thus help in reducing the differences between the development levels of Yugoslavia and of the countries to which Yugoslav workers migrate. It may be expected that as a result of these measures the number of migrants will begin to decrease and the basic cause of Yugoslav external migration gradually disappear.

## NOTES

- (1) Enciklopedija Jugoslavije (*Yugoslav Encyclopaedia*), Vol. 4, Zagreb 1960, p. 602; Enciklopedija Leksikografskog zavoda Jugoslavije (*Encyclopaedia of the Yugoslav Lexicographic Institute*), Vol. 3, Zagreb 1958, p. 576.
- (2) According to the *Encyclopaedia of the Lexicographic Institute of Yugoslavia* (Vol. 1, Zagreb 1955, p. 215) about 170,000 Yugoslav emigrants lived in Argentina after the Second World War, while a 1972 report of the Yugoslav Embassy in Buenos Aires estimates that about 100,000 persons of Yugoslav descent live in Argentina.
- (3) Data and estimates by the Centre for Migration Studies of the Institute of Geography of Zagreb University. See: I. Baučić, "The Effect of Emigration from Yugoslavia and the Problem of Returning Emigrant Workers", European Demographic Monographs II, The Hague, 1972.
- (4) Source: Statistiki čgodišnjak Jugoslavije (*Yugoslav Statistical Yearbook*) 1969, p. 107.
- (5) In 1972 an average of only 20.7% of Yugoslavia's population were employed.
- (6) A. Wertheimer-Baletić, "Some Recent Tendencies in the Trends in the Economic Structure of the Population", Ekonomski preglad 1-2, Zagreb 1969, p. 55.
- (7) Source: for earnings in Yugoslavia—*Yugoslav Statistical Yearbook* 1970, p. 264; for earnings in Germany — *Handbook of Statistics for the Federal Republic of Germany* 1970, p. 164. The relation of the U.S. dollar and the West German mark to the dinar—according to the official rates of exchange of the National Bank of Yugoslavia in spring 1973 (1 U.S. dollar = 16,75 dinars, 1 DM = 5,69 dinars).
- (8) At the end of 1970 the purchasing power of the German mark was 31.5% higher in Yugoslavia than it was in Germany. After the 20% devaluation of the dinar in January 1971, the purchasing power of the mark in Yugoslavia exceeded that in the Federal Republic by 57.7%. Source: *Ekonomska politika* No. 984, Belgrade, 8, February, 1971.
- (9) Before 1973 the reduction on the price of goods purchased with foreign currencies was 10%; since then, different rebates have been applied to different goods (generally less than 10%).
- (10) For a more detailed interpretation of the results of the 1971 census see I. Baučić, "Yugoslav Workers Abroad According to the 1971 Yugoslav Census" (Summary in English, French and German), in *Radovi Instituta za geografiju Sveučilišta u Zagrebu*, Vol. 12, Migration of Workers, Vol. 4, Zagreb 1973.
- (11) I. Baučić, "Origin and Structure of Yugoslav Workers Employed in the German Federal Republic" (Summary in English, French and German), in *Radovi Instituta za geografiju Sveučilišta u Zagrebu*, Vol. 9, Migration of Workers, Vol. 1, Zagreb 1970, p. 41.
- (12) This public enquiry was carried out at the end of 1972 by the Centre for Migration Studies, Institute of Geography, Zagreb University, in the area under the jurisdiction of the Employment Bureau, Split.
- (13) B. Šefer: "Spending, Income and Living Standards", in *Aktuelni problemi ekonomske politike i privrednih kretanja Jugoslavije (Current Problems of Economic Policy and Economic Trends in Yugoslavia)*, Informator, Zagreb 1972, p. 10.
- (14) See note No. 12.

# IMMIGRATION, DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN ARGENTINA

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

1. The purpose of this document is to analyse two aspects of the relationship between external immigration and the process of social change in Argentina since the middle of the nineteenth century. The first section deals with an analysis of migration as a factor of change in the country's demographic structure; the second consists of an analysis of the relationship between international migration and industrial development\*.

The analysis of demographic change covers the various inter-censal periods from 1869 to 1970. The second section analyses two immigration stages, one going up to 1930, when immigration was primarily European and of very high volume, and the other, coinciding approximately with the 1960-1970 decade, when a numerically smaller volume of immigration occurred, predominantly from neighbouring countries.

The external immigration during the second half of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the present, was one of the principal factors in the process of social change and has affected practically all aspects of Argentinean society. Studies carried out to date have analysed certain aspects of immigration in the context of the process of social change, but this is still a largely unexplored field (1).

When the external immigration process began, Argentina was still in the early stages of its formation as a modern country (2). The number, characteristics and geographical location of the aliens turned immigration into the main factor in the growth, geographical redistribution and change in composition of the country's population, particularly in the central area (3).

In analysing immigration in conjunction with the development of manufacturing industry, we note that we have chosen the latter sector for the following reasons: i) the rise of Argentine industry and its growth up to the crisis of 1930 was primarily the work of immigrants; ii) the industrialization process which occurred during this period and subsequently, was intimately associated with changes in social structure, and particularly with the class structure, and iii) during the most recent stage of industrialization, the capacity of the industrial sector to create job opportunities has decreased in comparison with the immediately-preceding period.

The analysis of immigration in the last decade—predominantly from neighbouring countries—within the context of the industrialization process, and its comparison with the immigration before 1930, has been undertaken, despite the enormous difference in its quantitative impact, because this is a current process which may be expected to continue in the future, and because there are population movements whose characteristics are similar to and form part of the internal migratory process, which, as will be seen, has acquired considerable importance during the last three or four decades.

Finally, we would point out that no account has been taken in the analyses of the possible differential characteristics associated with the different social and cultural origins of the immigrants. The analyses are based on structural variables which, operating in the receiving country, have produced different conditions throughout the process of social change in Argentina.

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\* The two sections were prepared by Alfredo E. Lattes and Ruth Sautu, respectively.

## 2. IMMIGRATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE

2. Argentina is second among the nations which received the greatest amount of European immigration over the hundred-year period from approximately the middle of the nineteenth century to the fifties of the present century (4). If we relate the volume of immigration to the total size of the population receiving it, Argentina is in a unique position, since it has been the country in which the impact of European immigration was largest during this period.

Additionally, Argentina is currently one of the most urbanized countries in the world, with approximately 79 % of its population living in urban areas (5), and international migration, followed by internal migration were the main demographic factors in the process of urbanization.

These characteristics mark out Argentina as one of the most interesting cases in the field of research in both international and internal migration.

As has already been pointed out in the introduction, this part of the paper contains a demographic analysis of certain aspects of migratory movements in Argentina, in particular international migration. The analysis is fairly restricted. It only considers migration as one of the factors of population change.

It is usual to distinguish three characteristic aspects of this process. The changes which occur in a) the size, b) the geographical distribution and c) the structure of the populations. Migration may be considered as a factor of change, or in other words, how much growth it generated, how it affected geographical redistribution and what other changes it produced in the make-up of the population.

For a macro-demographic study of migrations, over a long period, censuses are the main source of information, although it is necessary to remember that censuses only provide instantaneous periods of a long and complex process of change. This observation is particularly true in the case of Argentina, since censuses have been taken less frequently there, than in other countries. Basically, we have analysed information from the first five national censuses which were carried out in 1869, 1895, 1914, 1947 and 1960. We have also included, though only partially, more recent information: that from the sample results of the 1970 national census, and additionally—in order to give a better view of the volume of immigration—information from the continuous entry and exit registers for persons coming into and leaving the country.

As far as aliens are concerned, the censuses show not only the numbers living in the country and its smaller political and administrative units, but also certain personal characteristics such as age, sex, country of origin, etc. As is known, this information makes it possible to estimate—with a fair degree of approximation—by using suitable techniques, the net migration for the various inter-censal periods, both for the country as a whole and for the various provinces. With this knowledge—and provided we also know the change in the total population—it is possible to show the net role of foreign migration in the growth, inter-provincial redistribution and changes in structure by sex, age and country of origin, within Argentina.

The first five censuses provide similar information for natives as for aliens, and it is thus possible to make estimates of the net migration of natives for the various provinces. In addition to the separate contribution made by internal and international migration, it is also useful to observe the individual characteristics of each type and their differences.


### 2.1 Brief description of the state of the population in 1869 in relation to migration

3. In about 1840, the total population resident in Argentina amounted to some 1,000,000 persons (6); the growth rate had been rising since the last few decades of the eighteenth century. In 1810, the First Governmental Junta proclaimed that aliens from countries with whom Argentina was not at war could be admitted to the country and enjoy the same rights as the remainder of its inhabitants. For many years, the Argentine authorities continued to support foreign migration, but the country—which was plagued by internal strife and civil wars—lacked political stability, and large-scale immigration did not begin until the second half of the nineteenth century. In the last few years of the 1850s, more than 5,000 aliens were arriving each year, whilst in the following decade the annual average amounted to some 15,000 persons.

As a result of these increases, the first national census of 1869 included over 210,000 aliens. The total population of the country at that time is estimated at approximately 1,900,000 (7), but, for the purposes of the analysis, we have used the figures actually given in the census (1,736,923). In accordance with this latter figure, in 1869, 12.1 % of the population were aliens. Certain characteristics of this group caused its influence to be proportionally greater than its numbers. They were much less dispersed geographically than the native population. Three provinces alone (Buenos Aires, Santa Fé and Entre Ríos) contained 80 % of the

total number of aliens. In turn, they were most densely concentrated in the urban areas, particularly the men, who made up 31 % of all urban males. Within the urban population, the particular case of the city of Buenos Aires must be mentioned, where aliens accounted for almost 50 % of the total population. As far as men were concerned, aliens greatly out-numbered the natives.

The structure by sex and age of the country's population in 1869 showed a high proportion of males among the aliens, with a masculinity index of 250, and a high concentration of young adults among them (see graph 1). In the economically active population, foreign males represented over 26 % of the total number of workers, this difference being caused mainly by the different age structures of the native and alien population. Likewise, among the aliens, a higher percentage were literate than among the natives. Taking those aged over 15 of both sexes the literacy figure for the former was 55.5 %, for the latter only 22.5 %. Among foreign males, the proportion of literates reached 60 %.



Graph. 1. — Structure by age, sex and origin, national censuses, Argentina, 1869-1970.

Source: Lattes and others — "The Population of Argentina", World population year 1974, C.I.C.R.E.D. series (in preparation).

As far as the country of origin of the aliens was concerned, whilst there were immigrants from almost every European nation and even some from Asia and Africa, the three Mediterranean countries—Italy, Spain and France—and the countries bordering Argentina—Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil and Uruguay—accounted for the major part, representing approximately 85 % of the total (see table 1).

The 1869 Census was the first source of information about internal migrations of the native-born, covering the whole country. The proportion of the native population found outside their province of birth, at the time of the census was 8.3 %. It should however, be pointed out that if the city of Buenos Aires is considered as a separate entity (8), this proportion rises to 14.4 %.

TABLE 1. NATIONALITIES OF THE PRINCIPAL FOREIGN GROUPS RESIDING IN ARGENTINA IN 1869

Nationality	Percentage of the total foreign population
Italians	33.6
Neighbouring countries <i>a</i>	19.8
Spaniards	16.1
French	15.3
British	5.1
Swiss	2.8
German	2.4
Other nationalities and unknown	4.9

*a.* Chileans, Bolivians, Paraguayans, Brazilians and Uruguayans.

*Source:* Primer Censo Nacional de Población (1869).

Men were predominant amongst the migrants. The masculinity index was 138. Young male adults also made up the majority of the internal migrants. The literacy level among them was lower than among the non-migrants in all age groups. The level of economic activity among men was higher among migrants, but among women the opposite was the case. This might indicate that in many cases the female migrants accompanied their husbands and took no part in the country's labour force.

The geographical distribution of the native migrant population was quite different from that of the non-migrants. The former were much more concentrated in certain provinces. For example, Buenos Aires (including the city of Buenos Aires), Santa Fé and Entre Ríos contained 58 % of the total number of native-born migrants and 33 % of the non-migrants. These were the provinces in which 87 % of the aliens were concentrated.


Finally, we must note that differentials between foreign and native migrants were studied from the point of view of the migrant population as a whole. Neither the native migrants nor the aliens constituted homogeneous groups in themselves. Both contained sub-groups, which were very different from one another. For example, if we analyse the characteristics of native migrants by different inter-provincial migratory currents, or of the foreign migrants by their country of origin, each of these groups will be very different in their composition. So far, then, we have shown that already by 1869, various aspects of the structure of the population were to a large extent, a direct consequence of migrations—both internal and international—which had taken place up to that time.

## 2.2 General view of international migration as a factor of population change between 1869 and 1970

4. Net migration of aliens was far from constant or stable throughout the many years between 1869 and 1960 (see graph 2). Because of this, its effect upon population growth in the country varied considerably at different periods. An observation of the long and unequal inter-censal periods—although inadequate for the purpose—enables us to form a general picture of the situation. Table 2 shows that international migration dominated total population growth during the first two inter-censal periods, and that it ceased to be the main growth factor during the three following periods.

It is very important to point out that we refer only to the *direct* contribution of migration to growth, i.e., to the consequence of the simple balance of entries and exits of aliens. No account is taken of the *indirect* contributions made by migration, to the actual growth and the structural demographic changes generated in the host population which, in their turn, affect general birth and mortality rates. As is well known, this effect last beyond the actual period when immigration takes place. Studies carried out for the total population and for the population of the city of Buenos Aires (Recchini de Lattes, 1965 and 1971) indicate that the estimate of direct contribution has to be significantly increased as a result of this indirect effect. For this reason, it is possible to affirm that the contribution of the net migration of aliens to total population growth in the country was even greater than the rates indicated in table 2.

The sex structure of the foreign population has always been different from that of the natives (table 3), with men always predominating, although to a decreasing extent. Indeed, the considerable drop in net foreign immigration—which occurred during the last few inter-censal periods—was accompanied by a considerable



Graph. 2. — Total population entries, exits and balance by 5-year periods, Argentina 1870-1959.

Source: Lattes and others "The Population of Argentina", World Population year 1974, C.I.C.R.E.D. series (in preparation).

TABLE 2. NET MIGRATION, NATURAL GROWTH AND TOTAL GROWTH FOR INTER-CENSAL PERIODS  
ABSOLUTE VALUES AND RATES. ARGENTINA 1869-1970

Periods	Absolute growth values in thousands			Average annual growth rates per thousand			
	Migra- tion	Natural	Total	Average Population	Migra- tion	Natural	Total
1869-1895	1,270	948	2,218	2,846	17	13	30
1895-1914	2,097	1,834	3,930	5,920	19	16	35
1914-1947	1,790	6,219	8,009	11,890	5	16	20
1947-1960	969	3,086	4,056	17,922	4	13	17
1960-1970	61	3,076	3,137	22,179	0	14	14

Sources: For the first four periods, refer to Lattes, A. *Migration as a factor of population change in Argentina*, CIS, ITDT, Buenos Aires, 1972. The figures for the 1960-1970 period are provisional ones supplied by the INDEC.

TABLE 3. MASCULINITY INDEX OF THE TOTAL, NATIVE AND FOREIGN POPULATION  
AT THE DATES OF THE NATIONAL CENSUSES. ARGENTINA, 1869-1970

Years	Total covered by census	Masculinity Index		
		Total	Natives	Foreigners
1869	1,736,923	104.9	93.6	249.6
1895	3,954,911	113.3	98.3	175.2
1914	7,885,237	117.6	100.9	171.0
1947	15,893,827	105.1	100.1	138.5
1960	20,013,793	103.1	99.8	129.2
1970	23,390,050	98.7	97.5	110.7

Sources: Recchini de Lattes Z. and Lattes A, *Migrations in Argentina*, Buenos Aires, 1969. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos, *Censo Nacional de Población, Familia y Vivienda*, 1970. Results obtained by sampling, Buenos Aires, 1973.

TABLE 4. DISTRIBUTION AND MASCULINITY INDEX BY MAIN GROUPS OF ORIGIN OF THE NET FOREIGN MIGRATION FOR THE INTER-CENSAL PERIODS. ARGENTINA, 1869-1970

Origin	1869-1895		1895-1914		1914-1947		1947-1960		1960-1970 * %
	%	Mascu- linity index	%	Mascu- linity index	%	Mascu- linity index	%	Mascu- linity index	
Italy	50.7	173.7	35.7	173.0	25.0	124.0	35.8	90.8	5.4
Spain	20.2	179.1	41.2	161.2	26.2	79.4	20.4	62.5	8.0
Rest of Europe	17.6	149.6	11.5	176.8	26.2	140.4	8.3	60.8	5.3
Neighbouring Countries	10.5	132.3	7.5	127.8	17.2	111.9	28.9	116.2	76.1
Rest of the World and unknown	1.0	207.2	4.1	405.0	5.4	140.6	5.6	102.3	5.2
Total net migration	100.0	165.6	100.0	169.4	100.0	112.6	100.0	88.2	100.0

\* For the 1960-1970 period, these are approximate percentages of the total immigration.  
Sources: Lattes, A., 1972 (*op. cit.*). INDEC, 1973 (*op. cit.*).

TABLE 5. PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGNERS TO TOTAL POPULATION AND BY SEX AT THE DATES OF THE NATIONAL CENSUSES. ARGENTINA, 1869-1970

Years	Percentage of foreigners		
	Total	Men	Women
1869	12.1	16.9	7.1
1895	25.4	30.3	19.8
1914	29.9	34.9	24.2
1947	15.3	17.4	13.2
1960	13.0	14.2	11.8
1970	9.5	10.0	8.9

Sources: Recchini de Lattes Z. and Lattes A, 1969 (*op. cit.*) INDEC, 1973 (*op. cit.*).

change in the sex structure (table 4). During the first two periods, the high rates of net immigration were accompanied by a large excess of males. During the third period, together with the sudden drop in the net rate of immigration, the proportion of men fell considerably, and continued falling during the fourth period, to a point when women became the majority. This has meant that the total population of the country has always been predominantly male, increasingly so up to 1914, and decreasingly so from that date. Table 5 shows how the proportion of aliens in the total population of the country has changed over the years.

We have already shown that in 1869 aliens enumerated in the census came from several different countries. Table 4 shows the make-up of net migration for each inter-censal period between 1869 and 1970, divided into five major place-of-origin categories. The first two correspond to the nationalities which have predominated among aliens in Argentina since the middle of the nineteenth century. Those grouped under the "rest of Europe" heading have in general belonged to one or two predominant nationalities in the various inter-censal periods, but these have not always been the same throughout.

Italians represented more than 50 % of the total net migration over the first period, and with Spaniards made up the dominant migratory nationalities. Together, they accounted for 71 % of the total. Among those from the rest of Europe, Russians, Austrians and Hungarians predominated during this period.

During the period from 1895 to 1914, the proportion of Italians fell, and Spaniards (41.2 %) became the main group. Nevertheless, added together, they represented an even greater proportion of the total net migration for the period (77 %). Among the other Europeans, Russians and Poles predominated. Syrians and Armenians also achieved some numerical importance within the "rest of the world" category.

During the period from 1914 to 1947, there were important changes in the distribution of net migration of aliens by origin. While the three main groups—Italians, Spaniards and the rest of Europe, in which Poles and Germans predominated,—made nearly equal contributions, there was a significant increase in the proportion of immigrants from countries neighbouring on Argentina.

In the period between the 1947 and 1960 censuses, Italians again became the predominant group, accounting for 57 % of net immigration. The considerable drop in the "rest of Europe" group and the further increase in the proportion of immigrants from neighbouring countries, were the other salient characteristics of net immigration during this period.

Between 1960 and 1970 there was a considerable reduction in the flow of immigrants, but migration from neighbouring countries remained constant, and even increased in the case of the Paraguayans. The immigration of Italians, Spaniards and other Europeans practically disappeared. Thus, during the decade immigration from neighbourly countries represented over 75 % of the total. These immigrants, by contrast with the Europeans of the earlier periods, did not initially settle in the Pampas areas, but mainly in the provinces bordering their countries of origin. Subsequently, they moved towards the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area, particularly the Paraguayans and Bolivians. It is very possible that the same factors which influenced the native population of these provinces move towards Buenos Aires operated in the case of this internal migration of aliens.

5. As a result of the changes which occurred in the net migration of foreigners during the various inter-censal periods, and in their composition by origin and sex, the alien population by nationalities was constantly changing. Table 6 shows the five nationalities which were of greatest relative importance in the total population of the country at each national census. Inter-provincial population redistribution is caused by the differences between the total growth rates of the various provinces. These differences are, in their turn, generated by the different effects of the growth components: migration and natural growth. At the provincial level, net migration includes both the migration of aliens and that of natives, as well as the internal and international migration of both groups. Thus, we may distinguish, as components of the total net migration, between the net migration of natives—which is essentially internal migration—and the net migration of aliens—which is a combination of internal and international migration.

TABLE 6. PREDOMINANT NATIONALITIES AMONG THE FOREIGNERS COVERED BY THE NATIONAL CENSUSES, ARGENTINA, 1869-1970

1869		1895		1914		1947		1960		1970	
Nationality	%*	Natonality	%*	Nationality	%*	Nationality	%*	Nationality	%*	Nationality	%*
Italians	4.1	Italians	12.5	Italians	11.9	Italians	4.9	Italians	4.4	Italians	2.7
Spaniards	2.0	Spaniards	5.0	Spaniards	10.7	Spaniards	4.7	Spaniards	3.6	Spaniards	2.2
French	1.9	French	2.4	Russians	1.2	Poles	0.7	Paraguayans	0.8	Paraguayans	0.9
Uruguayans	0.9	Uruguayans	1.2	French	1.0	Russians	0.6	Chileans	0.6	Chileans	0.6
Chileans	0.6	Brazilians	0.6	Turks	0.8	Uruguayans	0.5	Poles	0.5	Bolivians	0.4

\* % (of total population).  
 Sources: Information from the Censo Nacional de Población. For 1970, INDEC, 1973 (*op. cit.*).

Having estimated total net migration—and its components, the net migration of natives and of aliens—and the total net growth per province for the four inter-censal periods, we were able to obtain an indirect measurement of natural growth as the difference between the two figures. From the series for natural growth and net migration of natives and aliens, per province and for the four inter-censal periods, we were able to carry out the following analysis. We would point out that the purpose of this analysis is to indicate, in condensed form, the role played by these three demographic variables in the growth and redistribution of the population per province for the first four inter-censal periods. (Unfortunately, we still do not have the necessary information from the 1970 Census to be able to extend this analysis to the most recent inter-censal period).

Table 7 summarizes in proportions the importance of each of these variables. In the first two inter-censal periods, the migration of aliens—differing widely in different provinces—was the main factor. Subsequently, as the net volume of alien immigration began to fall off considerably, its effect upon this aspect of population change was greatly reduced. By contrast, the action of the net migration of natives, relatively low and stable during the first two periods, increased considerably during the third and even more during the fourth inter-censal period. In the third inter-censal period, the main factor was natural growth. This is explained, because during this period—in addition to the reduced effect of net alien immigration—there was a considerable fall in the birth rate in certain areas of the country, which contributed to an accentuation of the differences in natural growth between the various areas.

From a rapid analysis of the net rates of alien migration per province for the first four inter-censal periods, it is clearly seen that migration always produced population increases, although to very differing extents, with the exception of two provinces during the last inter-censal period. In this way, in provinces where total net migration was the main growth factor, this growth was due to the aliens. By contrast, the net migration of natives was the main demographic factor of population loss in the majority of the provinces.

In all cases, where total net migration resulted in a population decrease, the effect of native migration was preponderant.

The part played by net migration of natives has grown with the passing of time. During the first and second inter-censal periods, eleven provinces suffered population losses through the effect of this variable. In the third period, there were thirteen, and in the fourth, nineteen (out of a total of twenty-two). On the other hand, as a result of the overall reduction in the net migration of aliens after the first two inter-censal periods, its effect on population growth in the various provinces of the country decreased considerably. Consequently, in the last inter-censal period, there were for the first time two provinces which suffered population losses as a result of the net migration of aliens.

As has already been indicated, net migration of natives was a principal cause of population decline for the majority of the provinces, a role which grew in importance with each of the periods analysed. By contrast, in Buenos Aires, net migration of natives played an increasingly important part as a growth factor, becoming its most important component during the 1947-1960 period.

The level of the rate is not so high (7 per thousand) due to the city's large population. On the other hand, the volume of net migration into the city is high, accounting for 97.1% of total net migration of natives in the country during this inter-censal period.

At the beginning of this paper, we mentioned the very high proportion of the urban population within the country as a whole, and the fact that alien immigration played a major role in this process. In other words, the aliens settled mainly in the cities, particularly during the periods when immigration was highest, contributing not only to the rise in urban population size but also to the increase in the proportion of the population in towns. Table 8 clearly shows that the proportion of aliens in urban areas has always been higher than in the country as a whole. And this is most clearly shown in the urban population of Buenos Aires (initially in the city itself and subsequently in its Metropolitan Area).

TABLE 7. DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN INTER-PROVINCIAL POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION  
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ITS EFFECT  
FOR EACH INTER-CENSAL PERIOD, 1869-1960

Factors	1869-1895	1895-1914	1914-1947	1947-1960
Vegetative growth	14.6	14.6	43.9	32.9
Migration of foreigners	70.4	68.5	25.2	20.9
Migration of natives	15.0	16.9	30.9	46.2
Total factors	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Lattes, A. "Migrations in Argentina between the middle of the nineteenth century and 1960", *Desarrollo Económico*, Vol. 12, No. 48, page 849, 1973.

TABLE 8. PROPORTION OF FOREIGNERS IN THE TOTAL POPULATION, THE URBAN TOTAL AND BUENOS AIRES, 1869-1970

Year	Country	Urban (in percent.)	Buenos Aires
1869	12	22	40
1895	25	35	37
1914	30	37	49
1947	15	19	26
1960	13	15	22
1970	9	*	9

\* Information not available.  
Source: Recchini de Lattes, A. *Demographic aspects of urbanization in Argentina, 1869-1960*, 1973.

### 3. IMMIGRATION AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

6. In this section we shall analyse the relationship between external immigration and the process of industrialization in Argentina. Our purpose is twofold: (i) to point out the variables which have affected the creation and expansion of job opportunities, during the process of industrial development, and to indicate the type and characteristics of the manufacturing activities involved, and (ii) to analyse the types of work available, and the differing ways in which these were taken up by alien immigrants during each of the two periods analysed.

For the analysis, we have selected two periods which differ both in the national origin of the immigrants and in the stage of industrialization. In the first—1860 to 1930—, absolute majority of immigrants were Europeans; this period coincides with the first stage of Argentinean industrialization. The second—which extends from approximately 1960 to the present—is characterized by immigration from neighbouring countries; this is the stage of industrialization in which the dynamic industries have been developed (9).

### 3.1 The birth of Argentinean Industry

7. The first immigration wave occurred in Argentina during the period of great expansion of the agricultural and stockbreeding sector, which was directed towards the international market. It was, nevertheless, in this context that a manufacturing industry began to develop, which, several decades later—after the 1930 crisis—was able to replace agriculture and stockbreeding as the major dynamic growth sector.

The rise of Argentinean industry—during the final decades of the last century and the first decades of the present—was linked to the expansion of the agricultural and stockbreeding sector which, because of its emphasis on exports gave impetus to the growth of urban activities. Because Argentina was, throughout the period, a country with a chronic labour shortage, the need to promote alien immigration became a *sine qua non* for the achievement of economic growth. This need explains why local wage levels were higher than in the countries of origin of the immigrants. Thus, the existence of a large part of the population with an income above subsistence level provided a market for the consumption of manufactured goods. Briefly, the first stage of Argentinean industrial development was the result of the interaction of three factors which led to the formation of a consumer market: i) the high rate of development of the agricultural and stockbreeding sector; ii) the promotion of alien immigration because of the chronic labour shortage which characterized the Argentinean economy for several decades, and iii) the intensification of the process of urban concentration.

The long-term expansion of the agricultural and stockbreeding sector began in the third decade of the nineteenth century, and culminated with the 1930 crisis (10). Except for temporary periods of recession, the annual growth rate of production between 1860 and 1900 was 4%, and during the first few years of this century, 3.8% (11).

The growth of the agricultural and stockbreeding sector was accompanied by an expansion of the transport system, the development of an infrastructure and the growth of urban activities linked to the existence of the agricultural export sector itself. As Argentina was a country with a low population density, the labour required by this expanding economy had to be provided by foreign immigrants.

The existence of a chronic labour shortfall explains why in the Pampas region—where the major part of the agricultural, stockbreeding and urban development was concentrated—wage levels and employment levels were higher throughout the periods of expansion than in the countries of origin of the immigrants (12). Even when the wage differences between the countries of origin and Argentina disappeared after the first World War, real wages and internal employment levels continued to grow (13).

We have shown that a large proportion of the alien immigrants settled in the main towns. This concentration reinforced the urban structures which had existed since the colonial period, and which were directly dependent upon the existence of an agricultural exporting economy. These areas became a potential market for manufactured goods, in addition to the market already constituted by the agricultural areas.

The expansion of rural and urban job opportunities generated by the agricultural exporting economy, the urban concentration created by this same type of economy and the wage levels reinforced by the chronic deficit of labour, all favoured the formation of an effective consumer demand for manufactured goods. One part of this demand was directed towards locally-produced goods (14).

8. The industrial sector which developed between 1870 and 1930 showed a relatively high degree of diversification, a fact which will be appreciated when we consider that throughout this period, the whole economy revolved around an agricultural and stockbreeding industry directed towards foreign markets. In addition to the industries directly connected with the export trade—such as the refrigerating industry—companies were started in the food and drink sectors, subsidiary industries for the construction and maintenance of the infrastructure, textiles, clothing and leather, and the basis was laid for a chemical industry.

The data showing the structure of the industrial sector by activity groups during this period, come from the economic censuses of 1895 and 1914 (15). Between these two dates, the number of companies and the total number employed in industry doubled. The industries with the highest growth rates were textiles, drinks, foodstuffs, metals and building materials (table 9).

By 1914, the most highly developed industrial sectors were foodstuffs—including refrigeration—and drinks, and to a lesser extent the wood and metals sectors, plus three further sectors which, because of the types of goods which they produced, were more directly affected by the potential competition of imports clothing, textiles and leather. These three latter sectors together occupied 22% of the total personnel employed in industry.

While the manufacturing sector was relatively highly diversified during this period, this was achieved by a considerable dispersion of resources. If we use as an indication of the degree of concentration, the average investment per company in each branch of activity (see note, table 10), the data show that in 1914 the majority

TABLE 9. DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES, EMPLOYEES AND CAPITAL PER INDUSTRIAL SECTOR IN 1895 AND 1914 (IN PERCENTAGES)

Industrial Sector	Companies		Employees		Capital investment	
	1895	1914	1895	1914	1895	1914
Foodstuffs	18	28	26	28	34	35
Drinks	7	12	6	7	9	19
Tobacco	2	0	3	2	4	2
Textiles	1	5	2	3	1	2
Clothing	13	10	10	11	7	6
Timber	14	11	13	13	8	10
Paper and cardboard	—	0	—	1	—	1
Printing and publication	1	2	3	3	2	2
Chemical products	2	1	4	2	7	2
Petroleum derivatives	—	0	—	0	—	1
Rubber	—	0	—	0	—	0
Leather	15	8	11	8	8	5
Stone, glass and ceramics	6	4	6	6	4	3
Metals other than machinery	17	13	8	10	6	9
Vehicles and non-electrical machinery	2	3	4	3	5	2
Electrical machinery and equipment	—	1	—	1	—	1
Sundry	2	2	4	2	5	1

Cases where percentage 0 is given, are less than 0.5 percent.  
Sources: Censo Nacional of 1895 (T.3) and 1914 (T. VII).

TABLE 10. PROPORTION OF FOREIGN-OWNED BUSINESSES IN VARIOUS INDUSTRIAL SECTORS, CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO THE AVERAGE CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN THE BRANCH OF ACTIVITY TO WHICH THEY BELONGED IN 1895\*

Industrial Sectors	Totals		Businesses belonging to branches with an average capital investment (1895 pesos)					
			Up to 20,000		from 20,001 to 50,000		50,001 and over	
	Businesses	Foreign %	Businesses	Foreign %	Businesses	Foreign %	Businesses	Foreign %
Foodstuffs	4,228	81	3,006	88	957	60	265	68
Drinks	1,572	88	949	—	562	88	61	84
Tobacco	584	81	—	—	584	81	—	—
Textiles	128	63	—	—	128	63	—	—
Clothing	2,992	91	2,977	91	—	—	15	67
Timber	3,310	81	3,065	83	245	56	—	—
Paper and cardboard	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Printing and publishing	300	64	—	—	300	64	—	—
Chemical products	373	65	—	—	152	80	221	55
Petroleum derivatives	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Rubber	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Leather	3,524	84	3,270	85	254	74	—	—
Stones and others	1,372	48	1,345	48	—	—	27	89
Metals other than machinery	4,020	66	3,854	65	166	84	—	—
Vehicles and non-electrical machinery	517	86	341	85	154	87	22	91
Electrical machinery and equipment	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sundry	574	82	171	95	348	78	55	67
Total	23,494	78	18,978	79	3,850	73	666	66

Source: Censo nacional of 1895.

(\*) The average capital investment per business was calculated for each branch of activity. In each industrial sector, the businesses were included in the average capital column corresponding to the branch of activity to which they belonged. The gaps in the capital investment scale represent significant gaps between the sizes of the various businesses at the time.

of companies in all the industrial sectors, belonged to branches where there was very low concentration (table 11). It is interesting to note that twenty years earlier (table 10), the degree of concentration had been relatively greater. This enables us to infer that the process of industrial growth and diversification had consisted of the incorporation of new activities and the setting up of small production units. This inference, moreover, is backed up by the qualitative material available.

### 3.2 Immigrant entrepreneurs and workers in the industrial sector

9. The type and characteristics of industries which were begun during the first stage of industrialization, favoured the formation of a large middle class (16) and also provided greater job opportunities than did the agricultural and stockbreeding sector. Between 1869—the first national census—and 1914, the number of independent and wage-earning persons occupied in industry grew three and a half times; while in the agricultural and stockbreeding sector, the increase was only two and a half times (17).

In the growth of the manufacturing sector, alien immigrants occupied most of the managerial positions and supplied the major part of the labour used.

In 1895, 78% of the industrial companies belonged to foreigners. This proportion was the same in all industrial sectors, apart from building materials (stone and similar materials), where their representation was similar to that of the natives. If we take into account the average size of companies, the percentage of foreign ownership remains high in all branches, although somewhat lower in the more highly concentrated branches than in the less concentrated ones (table 10).

Twenty years later in 1914, when the industrial sector already accounted for 16% of the gross national product, the percentage of companies belonging to aliens was 68%. This percentage, nevertheless, underestimates the importance of immigrants in industry, because it does not include the sons of aliens (the same problem, although to a lesser degree, applies to the data from the previous census) (18).

Although the percentage of companies in the country as a whole owned by foreigners decreased between 1895 and 1914, in the latter year, three-quarters of companies in some industrial sectors—such as leather, clothing, mechanical engineering, wood and stone—were still in immigrant ownership. Only in textiles were foreigners in a minority (19) (table 11). These data and those of the 1895 Census show that a very high proportion of the managerial positions created by the rise of industry were occupied by aliens. They likewise indicate that these managerial positions were in small firms—to judge by the average size of the companies in each field—but covered a relatively wide spectrum of manufacturing activities.

The percentage of alien wage-earners was lower than that at managerial level. In 1895 and in 1914, the percentage of alien wage earners was 62% and 48% respectively (table 12) (20). There was no marked

TABLE 11. PROPORTION OF FOREIGN-OWNED BUSINESSES IN DIFFERENT SECTORS OF INDUSTRY, CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO THE AVERAGE CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN THE BRANCH OF ACTIVITY TO WHICH THEY BELONGED IN 1914\*

Industrial Sectors	Totals		Businesses belonging to branches with an average capital investment (1914 pesos)					
			Up to 20,000		from 20,001 to 50,000		50,001 and over	
	Businesses	Foreign %	Businesses	Foreign %	Businesses	Foreign %	Businesses	Foreign %
Foodstuffs	13,378	64	12,799	65	54	85	525	56
Drinks	5,601	58	5,572	58	—	—	29	86
Tobacco	234	63	179	63	—	—	55	66
Textiles	2,339	5	2,321	4	4	75	14	71
Clothing	4,684	84	4,541	84	119	82	24	75
Timber	5,193	74	4,391	78	309	68	493	44
Paper and cardboard	116	75	103	75	2	50	11	82
Printing and publishing	958	53	958	53	—	—	—	—
Chemical products	559	77	491	78	28	68	40	73
Petroleum derivatives	1	100	—	—	—	—	1	100
Rubber	15	73	15	73	—	—	—	—
Leather	3,657	81	3,468	81	189	82	—	—
Stones and others	2,088	76	1,842	77	246	66	—	—
Metals other than machinery	6,206	77	6,018	77	61	79	127	76
Vehicles and non-electrical machinery	1,317	76	1,270	76	—	—	47	64
Electrical Machinery and Equipment	388	77	363	77	35	71	—	—
Sundry	785	74	785	74	—	—	—	—
Total	47,519	68	45,106	68	1,047	74	1,366	56

Source: 1941 Censo Nacional, T. VII.

\* The average capital investment per business was calculated for each branch of activity. In each industrial sector, the businesses were included in the average capital column corresponding to the branch of activity to which they belonged. The gaps in the capital investment scale represent significant gaps between the sizes of the various businesses at the time.

TABLE 12. PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGNERS IN THE LABOUR FORCE ACCORDING TO VARIOUS INDUSTRIAL SECTORS IN 1895 AND 1914

Industrial Sectors	1895		1914	
	Total labour force	Foreigners %	Total labour force	Foreigners %
Foodstuffs	43,399	61	107,571	52
Drinks	9,107	50	26,993	39
Tobacco	5,751	58	7,121	43
Textiles	3,098	49	12,994	35
Clothing	16,892	65	39,841	55
Timber	21,079	59	51,587	35
Paper and cardboard	—	—	3,596	49
Printing and publishing	4,674	48	11,616	35
Chemical products	6,729	45	7,674	47
Petroleum derivatives	—	—	220	67
Rubber	—	—	154	56
Leather	18,813	69	28,937	54
Stone, Glass and Ceramics	10,734	65	23,695	51
Metals other than machinery	13,588	72	38,141	52
Vehicles and non-electrical machinery	6,802	70	9,961	46
Electrical machinery and equipment	—	—	3,263	46
Sundry	6,309	57	7,514	57
Total	167,056	62	380,888	48

*Source:* Censo Nacional of 1895 (T. 3) and 1914 (T. VII).

difference in this percentage between different industrial sectors, with the exception of clothing, leather, stoneworking and allied trades, and mechanical engineering, where the percentage of aliens was greater than in industry as a whole (21).

During the first stage of industrialization, the majority of the available job opportunities—management and wage-earning—were filled by aliens. Because of their numbers and their concentration in the most industrialized urban areas, the probability of their occupying such positions was high, although these variables on their own fail to explain the over-representation of the foreign population by comparison with the native population.

### 3.3 The development of the dynamic industries

10. In the first section, we stated that immigration from neighbouring countries had become numerically important only in the most recent decades, when migrants began to settle in the provinces bordering their respective countries of origin. Subsequently, available information has shown that some of these migrants have begun to move towards the Greater Buenos Aires area.

The provinces where immigrants from neighbouring countries originally settled in Argentina are not highly industrialized, and have been characterized for several decades by high rates of emigration of the native population. These internal migrations towards the more developed central area—similar to those of other provinces—began during the second stage of industrialization—1930/1950—(22) and have continued up to the present. For its part, the movement towards Greater Buenos Aires of immigrants from neighbouring countries has taken place during the last few years, a new stage in the process of development of the industrial-sector began in 1954/1958. The differences between the characteristics of this stage and the previous one explain the altered capacity of the industrial sector to generate job opportunities, and the probability that these will be filled by immigrants from neighbouring countries.

From 1930 onwards, industrialization has been of the so-called import-replacement type. Within this period, we may distinguish two stages with marked differences. These are the second and third stages of Argentinean industrialization (see footnote 9). Between 1930 and 1950, the major replacement effort came from industries producing final consumer goods; during the subsequent period, the dynamic industries producing intermediate goods and durable consumer goods accounted for the major growth in production in this sector (23). While the second-stage industries were labour-intensive, those of the more recent stage have been comparatively capital-intensive (24). Most of the growth in the manufacturing sector took place during the second stage, by the incorporation of more labour. By contrast, in the succeeding stage, technological change accounted for the growth in manufacturing output (25).

The replacement of light industries by dynamic ones are responsible for growth in the whole of the sector, and the decline of the former after 1959 had an adverse effect upon the capacity to absorb labour of the industrial sector as a whole. The difference in capacity is particularly noticeable during the second stage in the years of the Second World War and the immediate post-war period (26). Because of the nature of the expanding industries and the policy of full employment pursued by the Perón government—1946/1955—industry absorbed large contingents of migrants moving from the interior of the country to the towns—and particularly to Greater Buenos Aires. By contrast, during the succeeding period, although there may have been labour shortages in certain sections, labour supply exceeded demand in industry as a whole (27).

In addition to the differences already pointed out, and linked to them, the distribution of the national income in recent years has changed to the detriment of the wage earning sector (28). This has contributed to the decline in light industries producing final consumer goods and, consequently, has further reduced their demand for labour. This reduction has not been compensated by increased demand from the dynamic industries, which were growing at a higher rate and were comparatively more capital-intensive.

During the second stage of industrialization, growth in employment was one of the variables in the growth of the light industries, and of the sector as a whole: given income distribution patterns. We have no data which enable us to estimate the contribution which migrants—during this stage, predominantly internal migrants—made to the growth in demand for manufactured products. Nevertheless, this must have been sizeable, since the transfer of labour from lower-income sectors and occupations to the industrial sector—a process in which the migrants participated—was one of the factors which led to a more equitable distribution of national income and to the growth in the demand for manufactured goods. In other words, on moving from the less developed areas to the towns, the migrants not only provided labour for the manufacturing sector but also helped to enlarge the market for those industries, producing final consumer goods.

### 3.4 Positions not occupied by immigrants from neighbouring countries

**11.** Little information is available about the incorporation of immigrants from neighbouring countries into the Argentinean economy, and in particular into its industrial sector (29). We only have sketchy data to show the type of economic activity which they have engaged in, and their low participation in the manufacturing sector.

We have already stated that the major migrations from neighbouring countries have been Bolivian, Paraguayan and Chilean.

We have also stated that immigrants preferred to settle in the provinces bordering their respective countries of origin, and that only in recent years have certain movements towards the Greater Buenos Aires area been observed. The latter is the most highly developed area in Argentina, and the one, moreover, in which a very high proportion of manufacturing industry is concentrated. By contrast, although there are differences between them, provinces in which these immigrants had originally settled were relatively undeveloped, and had suffered from emigration of the native population.

The Bolivian population in Argentina best represents the settlement and mobility pattern in the two stages we have mentioned. Traditionally, Bolivian immigrants moved into provinces producing sugar-cane and tobacco, to take part in the harvest, and after the harvest returned to their country of origin. Thus, in other than exceptional years such as 1955, net migration up to 1959 was very low. After 1960, the rate of return decreased and the number of workers remaining in the country rose (30). The exact date when Bolivian immigrants began to move the Greater Buenos Aires area is not known, but we may put it at around 1966-67.

It was in these years that the crisis in the sugar industry became acute, and it is probable that the changes in population movement patterns were associated with the decline in this industry.

The industrial development programmes for the North-western region of Argentina have had neither the dimension nor the impact which were hoped for. The few industries which were set up in this area were not really labour-intensive, and, moreover, have tended to employ skilled labour, of which the Bolivian population has supplied only a small part.

Paraguayan immigrants have always had a lower return rate than Bolivians or Chileans. They have tended to settle in the North-eastern provinces of Argentina, but, as with the Bolivian population, in recent years have begun to move towards the Greater Buenos Aires area. This movement has probably been due to poor employment opportunities in the North-eastern provinces. All the area's activities—cattle-raising, tobacco,

mate, tea, tung, quebracho and cotton—are declining. The only industry with any prospects is forestry producing cellulose pulp in Misiones.

The third group of migrants from the neighbouring countries, the Chileans, have tended to settle in Patagonia and have not been attracted by the central areas to the same extent as the other two.

Patagonia, apart from its mining industry, is an extensive stock-breeding area with a low population density. Chilean immigrants make up a large part of the labour force—day-labourers and unskilled labour—not only on the farms (where they also provide casual labour), but also in the timber industry and the tertiary sector.

The recent movement of immigrants from neighbouring countries to the Greater Buenos Aires area is apparently due to the ability of their traditional settlement provinces in Argentina to create new jobs (and also, of course, to the factors which caused them originally to leave their countries). In Patagonia, where there is a shortage of native labour, Chilean immigrants show a lesser tendency to move towards the Greater Buenos Aires area.

Greater Buenos Aires, the biggest and most highly developed urban area in the country, has offered immigrants from neighbouring countries the opportunity of increasing the populations of the poorer neighbourhoods and adding to the growing contingent of unemployed and under-employed. Some of these immigrants have taken up work in the building industry, the sector which grew most rapidly between 1966 and 1970. The demand in this sector—largely satisfied by Paraguayans and Bolivians—together with the reasons leading them to leave the provinces in which they had traditionally settled, probably explains this movement towards Greater Buenos Aires.

The decline in the building industry over the last two years and the evolution of the manufacturing sector offer little hope of work for a high proportion of this additional labour. Unless measures are taken to create employment in the economy—and not under-employment—neither present nor future immigrants from neighbouring countries nor internal migrants will have much chance of improving their standard of living.

### 3.5 External immigration with differential opportunities

**12.** In the introduction, we stated that the purpose of this section was to point out the structural variables which had created different conditions for the participation of the immigrants in the manufacturing sector, during the two migratory processes studied.

European immigrants at the end of the last century and the beginning of the present one came into an Argentina which was expanding over a long period. Once this process had begun—generated in the agricultural export sector—it absorbed large numbers of European immigrants. Because of the characteristics of the agricultural exporting economy, the pre-existing urban structures were reinforced, again absorbing a high proportion of the immigrants. It was in this context that manufacturing industry developed.

The type and characteristics of the industries which grew during this stage of development gave managerial opportunities to individuals with limited capital resources. It was not too difficult to start a new industry on the basis of one's own individual work, because of the existence of a demand for locally manufactured goods and the type of technology which could be used to produce goods to satisfy this demand.

During this period of immigration, there were jobs available—at both management and worker level—a high proportion of which were taken up by aliens. The selection of the individuals—native and foreign—who actually took these jobs, was a function of individual social and psychological characteristics; but the availability of jobs depended upon the structural conditions of the time.

During the last few years, immigrants from neighbouring countries have come into Argentina at a time when there is little opportunity, either for them or for natives in a similar situation, to obtain managerial jobs in industry, even on a small scale. The technological complexity and the amount of capital needed act as a barrier to individuals who only have their own labour to offer.

Furthermore, the probability of these immigrants finding work even as wage-earners in industry is low. As we have stated, the stability of the industrial sector to absorb labour surpluses has decreased relatively to that of other sectors.

The difference in occupation between European immigrants and those from neighbouring countries thus lies in the different availability of opportunities at the time of their arrival. If work is available, it is individual variables which determine selection; but if it is scarce or non-existent because of contemporary socio-economic conditions, there is little scope for individual variables to operate. During the first period of immi-

gration, the new arrivals were numerous and came into the country at a time when the economic structure provided them with ample opportunities. The new arrivals of today—aliens or natives—are faced with a situation where there are no managerial opportunities available to them, and where they have to compete for wage-earning positions in a situation where labour supply exceeds the growth in demand which the industrial sector is capable of generating.

#### 4. FINAL OBSERVATIONS

13. We said at the beginning that alien immigration during the second half of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the present had been one of the central factors in the process of change, since it affected practically all sectors of Argentinean society.

In this document we have only analysed two aspects of the relationship between immigration and social change: population dynamics and industrialization. In both cases the results were important. We may summarize our conclusions, by stating that the rise of Argentinean industry was principally due to aliens and that immigration was the main factor in the explosion which occurred in population growth.

At present, external immigration has other characteristics. It is smaller in volume and originates mainly from neighbouring countries. It differs from that in the previous period both in its structure and because of the very different conditions which the country now offers to immigrants. We have taken no account in this work of its social and psychological characteristics, since, although these may play a part in individual selection, it is the structural variables associated with the process of economic development which provide the individual immigrants with the opportunity of taking up different types of jobs.

Immigration from neighbouring countries is a current phenomenon which will continue over the next few years. It is therefore necessary to examine it systematically; not only because of the interest which the process itself offers, but also in order to gain a better understanding of present-day Argentinean society and of its possible future course.

#### 5. NOTES

- (1) Gino Germani has dealt with this problem. In *Política y Sociedad en una época de transición* (Buenos Aires, Editorial Paidós, 1966, dapt. 7) he gives a general view of the role of immigration in the process of social change in Argentina.
- (2) The promotion of alien immigration was, indeed, part of the modernization plans of the political generation which led to the process of economic and social change.
- (3) This area—the Pampas zone—is not only the most populous but also the place where the country's economic and social activity has become increasingly concentrated.
- (4) Pre-1932 figures are given by B. Thomas, *International Migration and Economic Development*, Unesco, Italy, 1961; and figures for the last few decades are given by W. Borrie in *The cultural Integration of Immigrants*, Unesco, France, 1959.
- (5) Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos. *Censo de Población, Familias y Viviendas*, 1970 (Provisional results), Buenos Aires, 1973.
- (6) Author's estimates. Details will appear in a work to be published shortly.
- (7) In addition to the census total, this figure includes the indigenous population and an estimate of the number not covered by the census. See A. Lattes, *Evaluación y ajuste de los tres primeros censos nacionales de población*, Buenos Aires, Centro de Investigación Social, Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, Working Document No. 5, 1968.
- (8) The city of Buenos Aires is a political and administrative entity whose boundaries have been fixed since 1883.
- (9) We may distinguish three stages in Argentinean industrial development. The first, which corresponds to the initial rise of Argentinean industry, lasted from 1870 to 1930. The second began after the world crisis, when an import-replacement industrialization policy began to be implemented; this stage, when industries producing final consumer goods were developed, lasted until 1950. After a period of transition, the latest stage began in 1954/58, during which industries producing durable consumer goods, intermediate products and some kinds of capital goods were established.

- (10) The beginning of agricultural and stockbreeding development occurred around 1820-30. This process was the result of the frontier expansion and technological change, via the cross-breeding of cattle, the construction of artificial watering-stations and the enclosure of property.
- (11) C. F. Díaz Alejandro, *The Rural Sector in the Argentine Growth*, Buenos Aires, Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, Centro de Investigación Económica, Working Document No. 41, 1965, pp. 2/3.
- (12) The main attraction in the 80's was the possibility of acquiring ownership of land in the agricultural colonies. After the recovery, following the 1890 crisis, for various job categories, average local wage-levels were very close to those in England; the latter were double the average in Spain and Italy, the countries from which the immigrants came. Furthermore, the ratio between the cost of food in the Argentinean agricultural and stock-breeding zone and the wage-levels for various job categories—was 25%, compared with 33% in the U.S.A., 45% in England and 60% in Spain and Italy. V. Vázquez Presedo, "The Role of Italian Migration in the development of the Argentine", *Economie Internationale* 24, 3/4 1971, 606-626.
- (13) G. Di Tella and M. Zymelmen, *Las etapas del desarrollo económico argentino*, Buenos Aires, EUDEBA, 1967, pp. 342 and 369.
- (14) The channelling of part of the demand into locally manufactured goods is explained if one takes into account; i) the need to set up businesses directly dependent upon the export trade; ii) the existence of comparative advantages for the local production of certain manufactured products; and iii) the semi-protectionist character of the economic policies of the time, during which, despite the profession of free-trade, a number of partially protectionist measures were implemented. There was no specific protectionist policy, but fiscal requirements—particularly at the various times of crisis—satisfied by the income from the import and export trade, and the systematic use of devaluation, acted as a protective barrier for local industry. It should be remembered that the groups who were most favoured by this devaluation were the agricultural exporters, whose interests had a large bearing on the political decisions of the time.
- (15) The first national census—1869—does not include economic data. The next industrial censuses carried out after 1914 were those of the thirties.
- (16) The formation of a middle class, during this period, also occurred in the other sectors of activity.
- (17) R. Sautu, *Social Stratification and Economic Development in Argentina*, Master's Degree thesis, University of London, 1969 (unpublished).
- (18) The census includes under the "foreign ownership" category, businesses which were owned by foreign companies; even if these were excluded (they can be identified by other information), the percentages would be unchanged.
- (19) In the coastal zone (Federal Capital and the provinces of Buenos Aires and Santa Fé), the proportion of textile establishments belonging to aliens was over 80%. For the whole country, however, this percentage is significantly reduced because they include 1,500 businesses belonging to natives of the country in the province of Salta.
- (20) 1914 was a year of recession, when the rate of return of immigrants increased. For this reason, the census data probably under-estimate the proportion of aliens in the industrial labour-force.
- (21) An analysis of non-census data—mostly qualitative—shows that in several industries, immigrant managers tended to engage workers of their own nationality.
- (22) We refer to the numerically largest internal migrations, as there had already been movements of the native population towards the Pampas area since the previous century.
- (23) During the 1927-29—1948-50 period, foodstuffs and textiles accounted for 45% of the aggregate growth of the manufacturing sector, compared with 22% in the metallurgical industries (metals, vehicles, machinery, and electrical equipment and switchgear). In the 1948-50—1959-61 period, while the former accounted for 9% of the expansion of the sector, the latter's contribution was 57%. We have no further estimates of this type for subsequent years, but the relationship cannot have changed in view of the continuation of the process of structural change within the sector. C. F. Díaz Alejandro, "Stages in the Industrialization of Argentina", in M. Brodersohn (ed), *Estrategias de industrialización para la Argentina*, Buenos Aires, published by the Instituto Torcuato Di Tella.
- (24) During the period 1925-29 to 1948-50, the annual growth rate of employment in this sector was 3.1%, while the manufacturing output grew by 4.2% per annum. In the period from 1948-50 to 1959-61, the rates were respectively 1.8% and 3.7%. C.F. Díaz Alejandro, "Stages in the Industrialization of Argentina", above work, 333.

- (25) J. M. Katz, *Production functions, foreign capital and growth in the Argentine manufacturing sector, 1946-63*, Buenos Aires, Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, Centro de Investigación Económica, 1968.
- (16) From 1938 to 48, employment in the manufacturing and mining industries grew at an annual rate of over 6%. Out of a group of the thirty most industrialized countries in the world, excluding the Soviet Bloc, Argentina had the highest annual employment growth rate in these sectors. United Nations, *Patterns of Industrial Growth, 1938-1958*, New York, 1960, page 14; quoted by C.F. Díaz Alejandro in *Stages in the Industrialization of Argentina*, Buenos Aires, Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, Centro de Investigación Económica, 1966, 46.
- (27) An unpublished—and still unfinished—investigation carried out by the Di Tella Institute, shows that since 1951 industry, which was the fastest growing sector of activity, had a slow job-creation rate compared with other sectors. In the most recent period—1965-70—because of the slowdown in the rate of productivity increase and the moderate process of structural change, industry has generated comparatively more employment than in the years from 1959 to 1965. Nevertheless, despite this recent change, industrial employment has grown more slowly than total employment, which is why the sector's proportion of the total labour-force has fallen (Economic Research Centre).
- (28) The wage-earning sector improved its position in 1964-65, but without reaching the level of the pre-1955 period.
- (29) These data have been taken from official reports on the provinces in which the immigrants from neighbouring countries have settled. These reports only include scanty information on the subject. We also consulted social workers in the state-of-emergency towns of Greater Buenos Aires, and employees in the Municipal Housing Department of the city of Buenos Aires. We were unable, however, to obtain the reports on the work being carried out by the Development of Human Resources Sectorial Office of the former National Development Council, which are quoted by L.M. Marmora, in "A Historical and Structural survey of Population Movements in Latin America", (as applicable to the case of Argentina), and by M. Castells (ed), in *Imperialismo y Urbanización en América Latina*, Barcelona, Editorial Gustavo Gili S.A, 1973, 57-95.
- (30) R. Marcenaro Boutell, "Immigration from neighbouring countries", *Immigración IX*, 12, 1967, 5-16.

IX

CONCLUSIONS

# FINAL REPORT

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## GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. The primary aim of the present report is to indicate the research needs and priorities which emerged both from the conclusions of the various background papers and from the discussions at the various sessions of the Seminar.

The subject of the Seminar — international migration — requires by its very nature that a wide range of social, economic and political factors should be taken into account in addition to the demographic aspects of international migration. Indeed, the discussions often extended beyond purely demographic considerations to focus on the broader implications of international migration.

2. Although international migration has increased considerably during the past decade, it no longer retains its former importance as a factor in the redistribution of population throughout entire countries and continents. More or less rigid barriers for the control of international migration have been set up almost everywhere in order to regulate the flow of immigrants. In general, this means that countries have appropriate mechanisms for controlling the volume of immigration (much less so for emigration) by relaxing or tightening the regulations. Migration policies therefore play a key role in determining the pattern of international migration.

3. On the other hand, however, there are actual or potential forces at work which tend to create pressure for an increasing international redistribution of population. These result from differences in social and economic development among countries, the marked variations in rates of population growth and increasing facilities for travel. Despite strict regulations, mass illegal immigration is not a rare phenomenon in many developed and developing countries. These pressures are also influenced by political considerations related to the fact that political frontiers do not always reflect the cultural, linguistic, ethnic or religious factors which are the determinants of demographic cohesion.

4. Consequently, both the economic and the demographic disparities, on the one hand, and political pressure, on the other, are powerful factors, whether apparent or latent, in population redistribution. Development has given rise to growing geographic mobility, and this increase in mobility has led to the establishment of national regulations which have in some cases reduced effective mobility at the international level. Such a situation has to be recognized by the international community, and its implications must be taken into account in the World Plan of Action which is to be discussed at the forthcoming World Population Conference.

## THE MEASUREMENT OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

5. The session devoted to *the measurement of international migration* brought to light the deterioration in migration statistics during the past 50 years. There are two main reasons for this situation. The first is that increasing transport facilities and the large number of border-crossing points where no exit or entry formalities are required make it difficult to identify and measure adequately the flow of migrants in the mass of travellers. The second is that the classification of migrants has become diversified and at present covers a spectrum ranging from the permanent settler to the daily commuter.

6. In general, it was recognized that border-control statistics, although relatively accurate and the main source of information on international migration, could not be improved very much. On the other hand, it is obvious that border crossings provide the sole opportunity for measuring and controlling migrant flows. Therefore, in addition to any improvements which it might prove possible to make in the collection of data at crossing points and in the standardization of international statistics, it is highly desirable that sample

surveys should be undertaken to measure the flow of migrants across borders and, in addition, to determine the basic characteristics of the migrants.

7. In some instances, it should be possible to collate the migrants' entry and exit papers as a means of determining length of stay and nature of travel (tourism, business, work, etc.). Population registers, although a valuable source of information on internal migration, seem to be ill-suited for a study of international migration. They can only fulfil their purpose in countries having a very tightly knit administrative network, and are not an efficient tool for the improvement of migration statistics. Alien registration for administrative purposes (residence or working permits) is statistically useful in only a few countries.

8. It was generally agreed that only *censuses and surveys* could produce a decisive improvement in migration statistics. Priority should therefore be given to the improvement of census questionnaires—even though experience has demonstrated the limitations on the inclusion of questions in addition to those on place of birth and length of residence<sup>(1)</sup> and the improvement of cross-tabulations with other characteristics (demographic, economic, social, etc.). The projects currently under way in Latin America on the standardization of census questionnaires and tabulations should produce major advances in knowledge of the subject. Censuses should also make possible longitudinal sample surveys and, consequently, a deeper analysis of the migratory phenomenon.

9. *Sample surveys provide the only means of measuring migratory flows where censuses are not taken, or during the intervals between censuses.* However, the Seminar noted that little information on migration has as yet been collected by surveys, and that the limited amount of data gathered has represented a by-product rather than the main object of the surveys. Migration being a relatively rare event, the size of the sample has to be very large in order to give significant information. That is a serious obstacle to the use of sample surveys. Follow-up surveys also give information on migratory flows, provided appropriate techniques are used for eliminating the consistent bias due to the omission of whole families arriving or departing between two surveys (in this connexion, area samples are advisable). Finally, it should be noted that a substantial proportion of international migration is illegal; consequently, regardless of the means used for measuring migration, the higher the penalty for illegal movement, the poorer will be the results. High priority must therefore be given to any methods by which the level of illegal migration can be estimated without prejudice to the migrants' human rights.

10. The methodology used in the study of migration is outdated only in appearance, and this is due to the poor quality of the data. The Seminar clearly indicated that more sophisticated methods would be used as soon as reliable basic data became available. To achieve that result, the length of stay of migrants in each geographical area should be known so that cohort migration histories might be established according to areas of destination.

## DETERMINANTS AND MECHANISMS OF MIGRATION

### Models

11. The session devoted to the *determinants and mechanisms of migration* gave rise to controversial debate and showed that in this field much research remains to be done. Three main subjects dominated the discussion: the relevance of internal migration models for representing international migration; the economic and non-economic factors in international migration; and the determinants of the brain drain.

It was generally felt that internal migration models could not, without major adaptations, be applied to the study of international migration. Two main reasons were given. The first (and more general) derived from the notion that the political factor is an important exogenous variable which is unpredictable as regards both its significance and its influence. The second is that the weakness of the data on migration and the lack of uniformity of such data at the international level provide a poor basis for model building. In other words, although there exists a body of research workers highly skilled in model building, the resulting models are of little use owing to the poor quality of the data. Agreement in this field is not unanimous. It was observed that although political constraints on migration are very strong, it is also true that migration takes place mainly for economic reasons (in the broadest sense). As the political frame of reference sometimes remains unchanged over a period of time, it can be logically incorporated in the model with other relevant variables. International migration is often an extension of internal migration; in that respect, the data could be improved. Research could make advances in this field, particularly if efforts were concentrated on countries which exchange manpower within integrated political and economic systems.

(1) In this connexion, the usefulness of questions on the year of entry into a country was emphasized.

## Economic and non-economic factors

**12.** A discussion along similar lines took place when the participants focused their attention on economic and non-economic factors in international migration. The view was expressed that current economic theories on the determinants of emigration are only variants of those proposed in the past, in which individual decisions to emigrate were explained by means of unrealistic assumptions, such as that individual free migration is determined by the economic self-interest of the migrant, which coincides with the general interest. In other words, the macro-economic approach cannot explain the complex mechanism, largely of a psycho-social nature, involved in the decision to emigrate. Further research on individual decisions to emigrate, which should take into account the need to study individual behaviour on a comparative basis, was strongly recommended.

The separation of the economic from the political factors of migration was considered to be without heuristic value in providing guidance for research purposes. Research must take into account a complex set of historical factors, careful consideration being given to the level of resources, the degree of industrialization, the conditions of agriculture (with special reference to the system of land-ownership) and the relationship between geographical differences and stages of socio-economic development. Attention should also be given to the political factors, such as the nature of the system (capitalist, socialist or mixed), planning policy, measures to assist less developed areas of a country, the general political situation, etc. In the opinion of some, only a comprehensive approach of this kind, taking into account economic, political and demographic factors, can lead to a satisfactory interpretation of migratory movements.

**13.** Research priorities cannot be easily defined in view of the complexity of the matter, but there was obvious dissatisfaction with an approach limited to only one aspect of the problem of migration and with the weakness of current empirical research.

Nevertheless, the following topics can be regarded as having priority:

- (i) Analysis of policies, and of their determinants, in the field of international migration.
- (ii) Empirical research, on a cross-cultural and comparative basis, into the determinants of the decision to migrate.
- (iii) A more thorough study of the structure (political, economic, demographic, etc.) of the sending country as the preliminary basis for any micro-sociological or macro-sociological interpretation.
- (iv) A better appraisal of the comparative population growth of sending and receiving countries and the impact of this on the volume of migration.

## Brain drain

**14.** At the same session there was a broad exchange of views on the determinants of the brain drain or, more precisely, the international migration of highly qualified professional and technical workers. The various speakers agreed that the problem is a pressing one for sending developing countries. There was also agreement that migration of highly skilled people from Asia, Latin America and Africa was an important problem, although the assessment of the phenomenon is a subject of dispute.

Research priorities in this field seem to be as follows:

- (i) A study of the importance of the problem. It would appear to be relatively easy to carry out such a study on the basis of the university records of the sending and receiving countries, especially in view of the relatively small number of people involved. An analysis of motivations could be carried out on the basis of international comparisons in which income differentials, the length of residence abroad, ties with the country of origin and future expectations would be taken into account. Attention should also be given to the state of advancement of research in the various countries. That should make it possible to assess the impact—both positive and negative—of this particular type of migration on both the sending and receiving countries.
- (ii) A better assessment of the needs of the developing countries in terms of highly trained personnel, with a view to a more effective planning of higher education and the training of skilled workers. This would include long-term projections of the demand for skilled personnel and a study of measures to relieve over-supply in one country and a shortage in another by a reallocation of resources through migration between developing countries.
- (iii) A study of the various kinds of compensatory measures which receiving countries should take on behalf of the sending countries, and in particular the easing by many receiving countries of selection policies which tend to favour the immigration of skilled people and to prevent the immigration of the

unskilled. This is probably a crucial factor, which falls in the more general field of migration policies. A study of the most suitable means by which sending countries could encourage the return of their highly skilled emigrants is another worth while line of research.

## INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

**15.** The relationship between *international migration and the process of economic growth* was dealt with at another session, where the discussion centred on three main topics: migration, the labour market and the theory of economic growth; migration and economic development; and migration and the theory of international trade. The discussion focused, in particular, on the effects of migration on growth, both in the sending and in the receiving countries, and on the possibilities of substitution between export of capital and import of labour.

The historical role played by immigration in the economic development of many areas of the world was widely recognized. It was also the general opinion that, although immigration is by no means irreplaceable, nevertheless, it has represented a very effective and rapid means of utilizing the growing accumulation of capital in the developed countries. In some cases, immigration has even speeded up the process of capital accumulation and slowed down the process of reduction in salary differentials, inasmuch as it has kept the general level of salaries at a low level, with high profits for the employers.

Although it is not possible here to summarize the reasoning behind the economic theory involved, which is adequately dealt with in the background papers, it is evident that immigration has accelerated the process of growth in many developed countries. This is true not only of free migration movements but also of migration for political reasons, as the cases of the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel and Taiwan seem to suggest.

**16.** It was also observed that the comparatively more developed areas are the ones which have determined the intensity of international migration both because of their deficit of domestic manpower supply and because they retain the power of controlling the size and the structure of the flow of immigration. There are forces, however, which might in future bring about a change in the attitude of the receiving countries. The latter are more and more tending to recognize the need for stabilizing their population around modest levels of growth and in some cases are even tending to a stationary state. Whether or not these objectives are attainable is still a matter of conjecture, but the crucial question is whether the developed countries will be able to accept social and economic implications of a stationary population or indeed of a stationary labour force. These implications are numerous and are being widely discussed by sociologists and economists; they include: possibly higher salaries and a higher cost of labour in general; a higher rate of inflation; changes in consumption patterns and in life styles; and a shift of investment towards capital-intensive sectors. If the developed countries do accept these implications, then it might well be that, in the long run, the flow of international migration to those countries will be substantially reduced.

If, however, population growth becomes negative and remains so for a long period, the developed countries will be forced once more to accept immigration in order to avoid a deterioration of their economic standards. It is also possible that the implications of a stationary situation might be partially or wholly unacceptable and that immigration might therefore continue in future. In either case, the developed countries must deal with immigration—as some of them have already done—in a long-term perspective, fully considering not only the benefits they derive from it but also the burden of the total social and economic cost which it entails.

**17.** Within this hypothetical framework, the discussion brought to light several controversial points. The opinion held by some that export of capital might be a perfectly appropriate substitute for import of labour was not shared by the majority. Even on a theoretical basis, it was questioned whether such a substitution would be at all feasible for some areas of the economy, such as the building industry or a large part of the tertiary sector.

Many observed also that, even admitting that a country might be able completely or partly to replace foreign labour with transfers of capital, it is very likely that the capital would go to where investment was the most profitable and not necessarily to the developing countries. Moreover, although from a purely economic point of view foreign investment might have the same effect on development as emigration of nationals, political considerations might carry great weight and make foreign investment undesirable for developing

countries. Negotiations on the conditions governing the investment of foreign capital might, however, provide an adequate solution to the problems encountered by various countries. On the whole, the developing countries certainly cannot restrict the outflow of emigrants while waiting for future foreign investment. This demonstrates once again that the direction and intensity of international migration are determined in large measure by the policies of the industrial countries.

**18.** The seminar devoted considerable attention to the micro-economic aspects of the problem which are neglected in the macro-economic approach. It was observed that temporary, repeated migration from less developed areas does not serve the long-term interests of the migrants. Migrants from these areas often leave with the hope of some day returning to their country of origin; accordingly, they try to increase their earnings to the maximum by working overtime; they neglect their social and occupational advancement; and they do not have the opportunity of benefiting from normal contact with the receiving society.

Upon their return to their country of origin, they can seldom employ whatever skills they have acquired. This type of migration serves only the short-term interests of the migrant, but the receiving countries themselves also have an interest in obtaining highly mobile manpower, at a low cost in terms of infrastructure, which is relatively easy to send back to the home country in case of an economic recession.

**19.** Temporary and repetitive migration is only one case in the complex typology of international migration, which includes commuter migrants, seasonal workers and semi-permanent or permanent settlers, with all combinations of social, occupational and demographic characteristics. In some cases migration is carried out by legal means; in others it is illegal. Broad generalizations are difficult to make and perhaps ought not to be made, given the insufficiency of knowledge on the subject; but, in each case, it is necessary to know under what conditions emigration can contribute to the long-term aspirations of the migrants and serve their social, economic and occupational advancement.

**20.** It is not easy to single out research priorities having demographic relevance. However, since an analysis of the economic implications of migration is essential for a proper interpretation of its demographic character, the research priorities are as follows:

- (i) Comparative study of demographic, economic and migration policies. Contradictions between the three types of policies have to be brought to light, particularly as regards the implications of a stationary or quasi-stationary labour force, the acceptability of these implications and the resulting attitudes with respect to migration.
- (ii) To what extent can trade and the transfer of capital between developed and developing countries partly or entirely replace migration between the two types of country? This point can become very relevant in cases where economic and demographic pressures mount due to the large disparity in rates of population growth and in social and economic levels between the countries.
- (iii) Analysis of the effects of emigration on the social and economic development of the country of origin. As the situation in the sending country can vary greatly, according to its stage of development, its population density, the intensity of the migration, the characteristics of the migrants and so on, generalizations are, again, out of place. Policy-makers need, however, to know under what conditions emigration can contribute to economic and social development or, on the other hand, impede development in the sending society. Comprehensive national studies would be very useful, and a variety of subjects ought to be explored, such as the use of the emigrants' remittances, the impact of returning migrants, the types of demographic structure which cannot tolerate the departure of further migrants without dislocation of the community of origin, etc.
- (iv) Long-term projections of manpower supply and demand in countries at different levels of development within the same geographical area, with a view to evaluating the extent of the pressure for a redistribution of manpower.

## DEMOGRAPHIC IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

**21.** The session on *demographic implications of international migration* was based on two background papers dealing with the effects of emigration on the age-sex structure of sending and receiving countries and, hence, on their potential fertility.

The first of the two papers examined the possibility of emigration as a population policy alternative to fertility reduction; the other evaluated the medium- and long-term effects of emigration on the age-sex structure of a sending population, given two different patterns of emigration and one assumption about fertility and mortality.

At least three conclusions can be drawn from these papers and the discussion. First, the efficacy of emigration as a substitute for fertility reduction is limited by several factors: emigration must be massive to affect significantly the rate of growth; if the maximum fertility-reducing effect of emigration is to be achieved, migrants must be women in the youngest child-bearing age groups (15 to 19 and 20 to 24); and no long-term change in fertility can be expected if the women who migrate have passed the child-bearing age. Second, emigration can significantly modify the age-sex structure of the population if the movement of people is massive and especially if it is from specific age and sex groups. Third, while emigration leads to a reduction in the rate of growth, it brings about a less advantageous age structure—from the economic and social point of view—than would have occurred without emigration.

22. The authors of the papers, the participants in the discussion and the delegates made many suggestions for research, mainly in the following two general categories:

- (a) The direct relationship between international migration and other demographic variables.
- (b) The relationship between international migration and social and economic changes; changes which in turn affect other demographic variables.

The principal suggestions for future research are summarized below.

- (a) *Direct relationship between international migration and other demographic variables*
  - (i) What is the effect of migration on nuptiality (especially the rate of celibacy and the age of marriage) in the sending region and in the receiving region?
  - (ii) What is the effect of migration on the fertility of migrants? If there is an effect, how long does it take to be felt?
  - (iii) What is the relationship between internal and international migration?
  - (iv) Differential behaviour of migrants: in what way is migration "selective"? If migrants have lower fertility (biologically and/or psycho-sociologically), or if a greater proportion of migrants than non-migrants are unmarried, or if migrants have a higher fertility than the population of a receiving area, how is the rate of natural increase in sending and receiving areas affected?
  - (v) What is the result if the effect of migration on the age-sex structure is calculated in terms of person-years lived away from the sending region, rather than in terms of net migration?
  - (vi) What would be the result if rates different from the conventional rates were used to measure emigration? For example, what would be the result if emigration were calculated in terms of female migrants of child-bearing age, using as the denominator all females of child-bearing age?
- (b) *Relationship between international migration and social and economic changes; changes which in turn affect other demographic variables*
  - (i) The "feed-back" effect of migration: how is migration related to social and economic change, which are themselves related to changes in fertility and mortality patterns? Does migration contribute to social and economic change and thus to fertility change? Does migration bring about changes in fertility; or is "modernization" the cause both of migration and of fertility change? How does the age-sex structure of sending and receiving countries affect the level of effective demand, thus bringing about economic change and, by extension, fertility change?
  - (ii) What is the "demonstration effect" of return migration? Is fertility in the sending areas changed?
  - (iii) How does migration affect the social and economic status of women and thus their fertility?
  - (iv) How does the rural/urban residence pattern of migrants affect their fertility?
  - (v) How does migration affect economic, occupational and social mobility (inter- and intra-generational) and thus fertility?

## MIGRATION AND SOCIETY

23. One session was devoted to the problem of *migration and society*. Three topics were dealt with: migration and ethnic relations; migration and social change; and return migration. As the three subjects are in fact closely interrelated, it is not possible to deal with them separately.

In the case of the receiving societies, a knowledge of the mechanisms and determinants of adjustment, integration and assimilation are essential for any assessment and evaluation of the process of social change.

These mechanisms are determined, on the one hand, by the attitude of the receiving society and its institutional and social structure and, on the other hand, by the demographic, cultural, ethnic and other characteristics of the immigration. In practice, some receiving societies may require the total assimilation of the immigrants, while others will require functional integration or adjustment. It was recognized that the solution cannot be a uniform one. The question is not how to find a prescription valid for all cases, but rather, how to determine the conditions in which immigration will best serve the interests of the migrants and of the receiving society.

**24.** A number of points were raised in this connexion. First, some thought that it is unrealistic to assume that the receiving society will accept the true integration of immigrants who are not disposed to accommodate themselves to cultural change. Second, the changing character of international migration also makes the complete assimilation of migrants difficult. Third, the attitude of the receiving society may be tolerant towards immigrants who want to assimilate and intolerant towards those who want to retain all or part of their cultural identity. Fourth, the policy of the receiving country can play a useful role in facilitating relations between the immigrants and the receiving society; however, this policy must be developed with the participation of the migrants' community. Fifth, some of the tensions resulting from immigration are inherent in the system of norms and values of the receiving society; an effort should therefore be made to determine to what extent the system ought to be changed. Sixth, it is important to determine the structural characteristics of immigration (number of migrants, age, sex, marital status and family structure, type of settlement, etc.), which offer the best chances of fulfilling the expectations of the migrants and of the receiving society.

All these points could be the subject of priority research.

**25.** Social changes brought about by emigration and by the return of migrants to their country of origin are of the utmost importance. Unfortunately, our knowledge is still scant in this area, particularly as concerns the determinants and consequences of return migration. The background papers and the reports of the discussants present a very clear picture of the problems and of the research needed to deal with them. Emigration, particularly when the migrant continues to maintain close ties with the country of origin, may introduce new models of behaviour and may change life styles, consumption patterns and even political preferences. Many thought that the social impact of emigration on the country of origin is by far more important than the economic impact.

However, the quality of this impact probably is a function of the quality of the migrant's experience in the receiving country. In this sense, any study of the consequences of migration on the sending country must be made in close co-ordination with a study of the migrant's experience in the receiving country. Although for evident technical reasons research in this field is extremely rare and difficult, it must be regarded as a priority task if an objective value judgement of migration is to be made.

While the quality of migration statistics is generally poor, the statistics on return migration are especially meagre and unreliable. Return migration can play a significant role in bringing about changes in the country of origin in terms of new educational, occupational and financial resources. How much the society of the sending country can gain from the migrant's experience in the receiving country is not clearly known and depends very much on the existence of an effective policy. Returning migrants may have acquired education, skills and money, but if employment and investment opportunities are lacking, they may be forced to utilize those acquired benefits in low-productivity types of activity (for instance, certain areas of the primary and tertiary sectors).

**26.** Priority research is needed on virtually the entire process of return migration. Five main points may be mentioned here:

First, attention must be given to the establishment of techniques suitable for measuring and describing the flow and characteristics of return migration. Only on this basis can a typology of return migration be attempted.

Second, the external and personal motivations of return must be investigated; this is important not only in itself but also in order to evaluate the migration policies of both the sending and the receiving countries.

Third, more must be learnt about the volume and the use of the remittances and savings of the migrants. It is obvious that in some countries these funds are used mainly for the acquisition of consumer goods or of land and property, but the situation can differ greatly from one country to another.

Fourth, the problem of the economic and social reintegration of the migrant must be dealt with, and this will be possible only on the basis of a systematic understanding of the preceding points.

Fifth, the policy of the country of origin concerning return migration must be carefully studied and evaluated in relation to its policy of emigration in order that the many existing contradictions and inconsistencies can be identified and corrected.

## THE RIGHT TO MIGRATE

**27.** One session was devoted to the problems of *the world distribution of population viewed from the standpoint of migration*. Three topics were discussed: the right to migrate; the juridical patterns of migration; and the social problems raised by migration. The last mentioned topic clearly has implications extending far beyond the theme of labour migration which was the main subject of the seminar. That is why very important questions such as those concerning refugees and related problems (citizenship, expulsion, etc.) were considered only in passing.

With regard to the right to migrate, the example of the European Common Market was given considerable attention. It was clear from the discussion that freedom of movement requires not only the right to enter and to leave, but also a variety of measures permitting the true integration of migrants into the economic life of the receiving country. One example of such measures is the equivalence of certificates of competence of skilled workers. It was suggested that studies should be undertaken to identify the various types of obstacles legislative or regulatory to freedom of movement.

The example of the Common Market, where departure conditions are particularly favourable, clearly shows that genuine freedom of movement is difficult to achieve. The Common Market can, however, be taken as a reference point for analysing the problem in other regional groupings of countries. This suggestion could perhaps be taken into account in the World Population Plan of Action.

Discussion also focused on the juridical patterns of migration and on the problems resulting from the considerable increase in illegal migration. Speakers from various countries emphasized the universal character of the problem. Although the international aspects of migration are dealt with by several organizations, including the Population Division of the United Nations, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Labour Organisation, the Economic Commission for Europe and various non governmental organizations, unfortunately no international organization is responsible for monitoring, organizing and studying migration at the international level. The Deputy Director of ICEM mentioned the possibility of transforming his organization with the aim of adapting it to new migratory currents and emphasized the important role which research could then play. The participants suggested that subject should be considered in the context of the World Population Plan of Action.

**28.** Social policies on behalf of migrants were examined with great attention. Various aspects of the living conditions of migrants were considered.

Suggestions for research were presented. In addition to those proposed in the preceding paragraphs, these are:

- (i) Provision of specific training for experts on migration.
- (ii) Study of the legal problems arising from occupational migration.
- (iii) Demographic analysis of occupational migration.

## PROPOSALS FOR RESEARCH SUGGESTED BY THE SEMINAR ON DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH IN RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

The Seminar proposed the following list of the items on which it feels that research should be undertaken. (The numbers appearing after each research proposal refer to the paragraphs of the final report. To ascertain the exact content of the proposals and subjects, reference should be made to the text of the report):

### 1. Collection of data on international migration

- 1.1 Use of sample surveys to measure the flow of migrants across frontiers and to record certain basic characteristics of these migrants (6);
- 1.2 Link-up of entry and exit documents (7);
- 1.3 Improvement of census questionnaires with a view to studying international migration (8);
- 1.4 Longitudinal sample surveys of migrants, based on censuses (8);
- 1.5 Assessment of irregular migration, in respect of the right to migrate (9);
- 1.6 Collection of data on the length of stay of migrants, so that migratory histories can be established by cohort (10).

### 2. Establishment of methods and techniques of analysis

- 2.1 Perfecting of patterns for the representation of international migration, particularly in the context of countries with integrated political and economic systems (11);
- 2.2 Invention of techniques suitable for measuring and describing the volume and characteristics of return migrations (26);
- 2.3 Analysis of international migration by standards other than the traditional ones.

### 3. Research into the factors determining international migration

- 3.1 Research, at individual level, into the decision to emigrate (12);
- 3.2 Comparative research into the factors determining the decision to emigrate in different cultural systems (13);
- 3.3 Study of the structure (political, economic, demographic, etc.) of the countries of departure and its influence on international migration (13);
- 3.4 Better evaluation of the comparative growth in population in the countries of departure and arrival and of its impact on the volume of migration (13);
- 3.5 Study of the external and personal reasons for return migration (26).

### 4. Research into the "brain drain" (14)

- 4.1 Evaluation of the extent of the "brain drain";
- 4.2 Study of the legal problems raised by migration of skilled personnel;
- 4.3 Demographic analysis of migration of skilled personnel;
- 4.4 Study of compensating measures to lessen the effects of the brain drain;
- 4.5 Deeper study of the needs of the developing countries for skilled personnel.

### 5. Research into the economic and social implications of international migration

- 5.1 Study of the limits to the replacement of the flow of men by the flow of goods and investments between the developed and the developing countries (20 ii);
- 5.2 Assessment of the pressures in favour of a redistribution of manpower based on long-term forecasts of labour requirements and availability in countries with different levels of economic development (20 iv);
- 5.3 Analysis of the positive or negative effects of emigration on the social and economic development of the country of origin (20 iii);
- 5.4 Analysis of the social consequences in the country of departure, in connection with the experience gained by emigrants from that country in the host countries (20 iii);

- 5.5 Analysis of the relations between international migration, changes in demographic behaviour (fertility, mortality) and socio-economic changes, particularly those affecting the status of women, the distribution of the population between urban and rural areas, job mobility, social mobility (within a single generation, between generations), etc. Special attention should be given to the part played by return migrants in showing the way (22 b);
  - 5.6 Study of the amount and the use made of cash transfers, and more generally of the savings of return migrants (26);
  - 5.7 Study of the economic and social reintegration of the return migrant (26).
- 6. Research into the specific relations between international migration and other demographic variables (22)**
- 6.1 Study of the effects of international migration on the marriage rate (age on marriage, frequency of permanent celibacy...) in the populations of the countries of departure and arrival;
  - 6.2 Study of the possible long-term effects of international migration on the fertility of migrants and of the length of time these effects take to appear;
  - 6.3 Comparative study of the effects on fertility of internal and international migration;
  - 6.4 Study of the differential behaviour of migrants in regard to fertility and of the factors of this behaviour. Analysis of the possible long-term consequences of this phenomenon for the natural growth rate of populations in the countries of departure and arrival;
  - 6.5 Analysis of the effects of international migration on structure by age and sex, employing the concept of the number of years lived.
- 7. Research into the reception of migrants**
- 7.1 Analysis of the differential aspects of tolerance in the host society (towards migrants who assimilate and those who do not assimilate) (24);
  - 7.2 Relation between the evolving character of international migration and the assimilation of migrants (23);
  - 7.3 Study of the system of norms and values of the host country and of the possibilities of modifying it to facilitate the integration of migrants (24);
  - 7.4 Determination of the volume and structure of immigration (age, sex, matrimonial status, type of household...), in order to give both migrants and host society every possible chance of satisfaction (24).
- 8. Research into policies regarding international migration**
- 8.1 Comparative study of demographic, economic and migratory policies and, more particularly, of possible conflicts between them (20);
  - 8.2 Study of the policies of each country regarding emigration, on the one hand, and return migration on the other, and in particular of possible conflicts between them (26);
  - 8.3 Identification of the various kinds of obstacles to the free circulation of migrants, taking for example the European Economic Community as a point of departure (27);
  - 8.4 Thorough study of the interrelations and implications linking the following three phenomena: economic development, the growth of geographical mobility, and the promulgation by the various States of increasingly restrictive regulations designed to reduce this mobility (27).
- 9. Proposals for actions**
- 9.1 To organise a real training for experts in international migration (28);
  - 9.2 To transform the I.C.E.M. into a truly intergovernmental organisation responsible for supervising, organising and studying migratory movements (27).

It is suggested to the Member Centres of Cicred to select from these lists for concentration of their research efforts.



## ANNEXES

## ANNEX 1

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Dirección Nacional de Migraciones  
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Dirección Nacional de Políticas  
Ministerio de Bienestar Social  
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Dirección General, Ministerio de Cultura y Educación  
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Instituto de Derecho Publico, Universidad de Belgrano  
BUENOS AIRES

Faculty of Law, University of  
BUENOS AIRES

División Encuestas Sociales, Caja de Subsidios  
Familiars para Empleados de Comercio (C.A.S.F.E.C.)  
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#### **V - C.I.C.R.E.D. STAFF**

**Jean BOURGEOIS-PICHAT**  
**Elisabeth GARLOT**  
**Liliane LE LAY**  
**Jean TRILLAT**

## ANNEX 2

## PROGRAM OF THE SEMINAR

Date		Time Schedule	Chairman	Discussant	Panel Participants
Tuesday 5th March 1974	<p><b>OPENING SITTING</b></p> <p>Opening Ceremony</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>— Julio H.G. Olivera (Secretario de Estado de Ciencia y Tecnologia)</li> </ul> <p>International Organizations' Concern for International Migration:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>— G. Maselli (I.C.E.M.)</li> <li>— O. Cabello (U.N. Population Division)</li> </ul> <p>Presentation of the Seminar:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>— J. Bourgeois-Pichat (Chairman of C.I.C.R.E.D.)</li> <li>— G. Tapinos (Co-director)</li> <li>— Z. Recchini de Lattes (Director)</li> </ul>	10.30-12.30			
	<p><b>PANEL ON TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION BASED ON REGIONAL PAPERS PREPARED BY:</b></p> <p>U.N. Population Division: World Trends I.C.E.M.: Transcontinental Migration J.P. Pilliard (O.E.C.D.): Europe Economic Commission for Africa: Africa W.T.S. Gould: Africa J. Morales Vergara: (CELADE) Latin America R. Marcenaro Boutell: Argentina Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: Asia J. Harewood: Caribbean</p>	14-30-18.00	G. Calot	H. Wander	E. Adams P. B. Desai W.T.S. Gould M. Husain R. Marcenaro Boutell G. Maselli J. Morales Vergara G. Rochcau

Date	Topic of the Discussion	Time Schedule	Chairman	Discussant	Authors of Background Paper	Rapporteur
Wednesday 6th March	THE MEASUREMENT OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION	09.00-12.30	E. Cerisola	A. Speare	H. Schubnell K. S. Gnanasekaran M. Picouet J. Vaugelade* A. Quesnel D. Courgeau	K.S. Gnanasekaran W. T. S. Gould
	DETERMINANTS AND MECHANISMS OF MIGRATION  The relevance of internal migration models for international migration Economic and non-economic factors in the dynamics of international migration The determinants of brain drain	14.30-18.00	C. Benazzou	G. W. Roberts  E. Sonnino	A. Speare  R. T. Appleyard P. Visaria	
Thursday 7th March	INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH Migration, the labour market and the theory of economic growth Migration and economic development Migration and the theory of international trade	09.00-12.30	H. Wander	A. Ghosh  H. Y. Lee  D. Friedlander	A. Marshall  P. Singer W. Travis F. Bourguignon G. Gallais-Hamonno*	N. M. Castro M. V. Raman
	DEMOGRAPHIC IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION Effects on age structure and fertility of different migration models Migration and population control	14.30-18.00	J. de Jesus Goico Castro	N. Federici P. B. Desai	A. Santini R. Ginsberg	J. Gregory
Friday 8th March	MIGRATION AND SOCIETY Migration, ethnic relations and race relations Migration and social change Return migration	09.00-12.30	D. Friedlander	A. Oubouzar J. Harewood* I. Baucic	A. H. Richmond A. Bouhdiba S. Del Campo J.A. Garmendia*	S. S. Hassan
	INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND THE WORLD DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION Migration policies and the right to migrate Free migration, assisted migration and international co-operation Migration and social policy	14.30-18.00	N. Federici	E. P. Hutchinson  S. C. Fan G. Rochcau	J.-P. de Crayencour  I.C.E.M. International Social Service	A. Gomez-Aguirre E. Sonnino
Monday 11th March	INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION (PRESENT STATE OF KNOWLEDGE AND RESEARCH) 1. Two case studies: a) One sending country (Yugoslavia) b) One receiving country (Argentina) 2. Trends in on-going research	09.00-12.30	R.T. Appleyard		I. Baucic A. Lattes R. Sautu G. Tapinos	M. Livi Bacci
	PRIORITY IN RESEARCH: DEFINITION OF A PROGRAMME	14.30-18.00	J. Bourgeois-Pichat			

\* Not present at the seminar



## PUBLICATIONS OF CICRED

- A bi-annual *Bulletin* in three languages (English, French and Spanish).
- A *Directory of Demographic Research Centres* (1974) (bilingual English and French).
- A *Repertory of Research Projects in Priority Areas of Demographic Study* (1974) (bilingual English and French).
- A Report on the *Seminar on Demographic Research in Relation to Population Growth Targets*, Series S. n° 1., in three languages (English, French and Spanish).
- National *Monographs on Population Trends* :

*AFRICA* - Algeria\*; Egypt\*; Ghana; Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania; Liberia\*; Morocco\*; Nigeria; Togo; Tunisia\*; Zambia.

*LATIN AMERICA* - Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Cuba; Guatemala; Mexico; Panama; Paraguay; Peru\*; Venezuela.

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\* *Already printed.*

