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THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION ON RECEIVING
COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF
THE NETHERLANDS

This series of monographs, essays and selected articles on population sets out to disseminate results of demographic research with special emphasis on the Low Countries. It is aimed at an international audience interested or involved in the study of population. NIDI CBGS Publications contain analyses of past, present and future demographic trends as well as their determinants and consequences. The character of the series is interdisciplinary, comprising both formal demographic analyses and studies in social, historical, and applied demography. Manuscripts are selected on the basis of their scientific scope or significance for policy.



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THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS



Netherlands
Interdisciplinary
Demographic
Institute

Social and Cultural Planning Office



CICRED Committee for International Cooperation
in National Research in Demography



IOM International Organization for Migration

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PREFACE

This report has been prepared within the framework of a series of national monographs on the impact of international migration on receiving countries, initiated jointly by the Committee for International Cooperation in National Research in Demography (CICRED) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The project was launched in 1988 and extended over several years; ultimately, reports were prepared for twelve countries. Based on these reports, a comparative study will be published separately, compiled by the coordinator of the project, Leszek A. Kosinski, in co-operation with Léon Tabah, Chairman of CICRED, and Jean-Pierre Gonnot of the United Nations Population Division.

Particularly during the last decade a host of data and studies on international migration and immigrant populations in the Netherlands have become available. By far the majority of these studies are in Dutch; since Hans van Amersfoort's study (1982) on "Immigration and the formation of minority groups: the Dutch experience, 1945-1975", and the 1979-report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy, "Ethnic Minorities", no state of the art studies have been published on this topic in a foreign language. The authors estimate that such a more up to date publication will meet an audience and may facilitate international comparative studies in this field.

The report combines both the demographic and the socio-economic, cultural and political impacts of migration on Dutch society. Part I, dealing with the demographic impact of immigration, is based on work carried out for the Working Group on the Demographic Aspects of Immigrant Populations, an international working group initiated by NIDI under the auspices of the European Association for Population Studies (EAPS).

We thank IOM and CICRED for their stimulating initiative. Furthermore, we thank the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics which made material available as much as we have asked and NCBS could supply. Thanks also to NIDI, The Hague, the Department of Social Methodology of the Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, and the Social and Cultural Planning Office, Rijswijk, for providing time of the authors, facilities, and funds for publication.

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INTRODUCTION

Although it is only gradually and grudgingly being admitted by the Dutch government, the Netherlands has in fact been an immigration country for most of the years since the Second World War. Until quite recently, the rates of immigration have been lower than in most other West European countries, but in the last few years the Dutch rates have overtaken those of several other countries. As a result, the immigrant population has grown significantly and continuously over the years. The number of foreign-born inhabitants and their immediate descendants is estimated at 2.2 million in 1990 (15 percent of the total population). However, this figure is not a very meaningful one because it includes many Dutchmen, in either the legal or the ethnic sense or both, who have simply returned to their home country. This is partly compensated for by the fact that as many as 600,000 Dutchmen live abroad at any given moment, and in the first two decades after the Second World War the Netherlands supplied great numbers of emigrants to countries like Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.

From the viewpoint of an external observer, both the factual information and the terminology relating to the immigration process and to the immigrant populations are often confusing. In this study we deal with concepts like immigration, emigration, immigrant population, foreign (or alien or non-Dutch) population, population of foreign descent, and ethnic minorities, all of which stand in a rather complicated relationship to each other. Though the fact of immigration lies somewhere at the bottom of all these concepts they are by no means identical. The terms migration, immigrants, and emigrants refer to movements and to people taking part in those movements. For instance, any person crossing into the Netherlands and residing there for a fixed minimum period of time is considered an immigrant. Immigrants may or may not be Dutch citizens. As a result of immigration over the years the Netherlands harboured approximately 642,000 aliens in 1990, though not all of these have gone through the process of immigration themselves. Many aliens acquired their Dutch nationality at birth, while another substantial group of these immigrants already held Dutch citizenship on arrival, including considerable numbers coming from former colonies, like Surinam (Dutch Guyana).

Certain groups among both the Dutch and non-Dutch immigrants are distinguished by ethnic and sometimes racial characteristics setting them apart from

the native Dutch population. These characteristics, which are not restricted to the first generation of immigrants but extend to their Dutch-born descendants as well, cannot be considered neutral factors, but seem to have taken on a negative social connotation. Hence the concept of 'ethnic minorities' made its way into Dutch society at the beginning of the 1980s. By ethnic minorities are meant groups which differ from the majority population in the following respects:

- a. their social position is homogeneously low
- b. their ethno-cultural position is perceived as markedly different
- c. their numerical position prohibits the exertion of power and influence
- d. these three conditions extend across generations.

According to this definition, it would be premature to decide exactly which groups in Dutch society can be considered ethnic minorities. It would be more accurate to speak of groups who run a risk of becoming minorities or of a process of minority formation, as is done in Part II of this study.

However, the concept of ethnic minorities was adopted by the policymakers, who converted the theoretical notion as defined above into a practical policy definition by singling out and enumerating those groups most closely corresponding to the definition: Turks, Moroccans, South Europeans, Surinamese, Antilleans, Moluccans, and refugees and asylum seekers from Eastern Europe and the Third World. These groups have become the object of an 'ethnic minority policy'. When the term ethnic minority is used in this report, unless otherwise stated, it is in the official, rather than in the theoretical sense. It follows that members of ethnic minority groups need not be immigrants themselves; neither are they necessarily aliens. Of the estimated 800,000 members of ethnic minorities (according to the policy definition) in 1990, almost half hold Dutch citizenship, and close to a quarter were born in the Netherlands. These are complex matters of definition, and therefore a glossary of terms and concepts has been added (see Appendix 2). In addition, the most important groups of foreign descent, including the official ethnic minorities, are listed in Tables 2.1. and 2.2.

The issue of migration, and its impact on Dutch society, can be approached from different angles. In this study, the dominant perspective employed is related to the concept of the ethnic minority. Those immigrant groups singled out by the policymakers as a target for minority policy have been highlighted, sometimes at the expense of other groups which took part in the migration process. However, in Part I, "Immigration and immigrant populations in the Netherlands", the scope is wider, and is intended to cover migratory movements in general and the participants in those movements. For example, the substantial immigration of repatriates from Indonesia, who are not considered to constitute a minority, is taken into consideration. Likewise, the Chinese and several groups from Western Europe and other western countries are dealt with

here: they are of foreign descent, but none of them forms a minority in the official sense. In this first part of the study, attention is paid not only to immigration, but to emigration as well. However, even at this point the discussion focuses to a certain extent on those groups who have, by means of their immigration, become official minorities. The fact that they attract the lion's share of public attention is reflected in the availability of statistical information. Chapter 1 deals with the migration histories of the various groups. Chapter 2, "International migration: current trends and patterns", is devoted to migratory flows, and the size and demographic structure of the present immigrant population. The legal criterion of citizenship remains crucial in the delimitation of categories. The immediate demographic consequences of immigration in terms of nuptiality, fertility, mortality, changes of nationality, and population distribution are treated in Chapter 3, "The demographic impact of immigration".

In Part II of the study, "The position of immigrants and ethnic minorities in Dutch society", the scope narrows gradually towards ethnic minorities, and demography gives way to sociological description and analysis. It is here that the concept of ethnic minority is properly introduced, and that the social position of selected immigrant groups in Dutch society becomes a central theme. In Chapter 4 an analytical model is presented, which acts as a framework for discussing developments in terms of minority formation, and the analytical concept of 'minority' has been used as an organizing principle for the other chapters in Part II. The development of the social position of the ethnic minorities is depicted in Chapter 5. Indicators are taken from the domains of 1) labour, income, and social security, 2) education, and 3) housing. In Chapter 6 the notion of the 'ethno-cultural position' is introduced. The discussion is directed towards questions such as how these immigrant groups are seen and defined by the receiving society, how they define their own position in that society, and how relations between these groups and the receiving society have developed over the course of time. In Chapter 7, the conclusions of the two preceding chapters are brought together and related to the analytical concept developed in Chapter 4.

Part III concerns the impact of migration on the receiving country. Immigration has affected many aspects of life in the Netherlands, including the demographic, economic, cultural and the political. The main conclusions drawn from the analysis in the preceding chapters are summarized, and a cautious attempt is made to forecast future developments and their consequences.

PART I

IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT
POPULATIONS
IN THE NETHERLANDS

1. INTRODUCTION: THE NETHERLANDS AS AN IMMIGRATION COUNTRY


International migration and the development of the population of foreign descent in the Netherlands since World War II has been determined both by political processes, some of which were related to decolonization, and by economic developments, operating in varying degrees over the years.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, about 9,000 displaced persons remained in the Netherlands, including the survivors of a group of pre-war refugees from Germany and Austria, and Polish members of the liberation armies (Verwey-Jonker, 1971: 234). In 1947 the total population of foreign nationality in the Netherlands numbered 104,000 (1.1 percent of the total population), mainly of European origin.

The period of post-war economic reconstruction was geared towards the development of a strong, export-oriented industrial base. However, during its initial years, labour supply still exceeded demand, and public opinion felt that the country was overpopulated. Therefore, an active emigration policy was conducted. Between 1946 and 1972, 481,000 Dutch citizens emigrated under the auspices of the 'Directorate for Emigration', mainly to Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand (Penninx, 1979, 1984b). Immigration, on the other hand, was officially discouraged, but this does not mean that it was non-existent. The general trend in post-war immigration has been one of increase, though with considerable short-term fluctuations (Figure 1.1). Since the beginning of the 1960s, and with the sole exception of the 1967 depression, net migration has been positive.

Directly after the war, immigration increased sharply due to delayed repatriation from the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia of people who had been interned by the Japanese during the war. At least 44,000 repatriates are estimated to have arrived in this first migration stream, though statistics are unreliable due to incomplete registration (Ellemers and Vaillant, 1985).

Figure 1.1. *International migration, the Netherlands, 1945-1991*



Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

Repatriation and immigration¹ from the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia increased again at the end of the 1940s, as a consequence of the decolonization process (independence of Indonesia in December 1949). Estimates of the number of persons --predominantly civil servants and military personnel (see also below)--involved in this second migration stream, which lasted from 1949 to 1951, vary between 68,000 and 90,000. The third migration stream (1952-1957) consisted mainly of persons of mixed Indo-European descent from the socio-economically lower levels of Indonesian society, whose position had deteriorated after independence. Furthermore, in this period, a number of people who had not yet been able to repatriate due to financial reasons, or who had not wanted to leave their jobs before, now decided to return to the Netherlands. Part of this migration was related to the continuing tension between Indonesia and the Netherlands, a consequence of the fact that the Netherlands was not yet willing to relinquish sovereignty of New Guinea to the Indonesian government. About 71,000 persons arrived during 1958-1963, mainly people who left Indonesia

¹ Many of the migrants involved were born in the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia, and had never set foot in the Netherlands before. Therefore they were not actually 'repatriates', though the latter term is often used to indicate all decolonization migration from the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia.

as a consequence of this political conflict. In December 1957, all Dutch citizens were told to leave Indonesia, and between then and September 1958 around 35,000 repatriated. In 1960, diplomatic relations broke down, and military hostilities between the two countries caused around 12,000 people to leave New Guinea for the Netherlands between 1960 and 1963. In addition, a number of previously Dutch citizens who regretted to have opted for Indonesian citizenship at the time of independence decided to repatriate after all. From 1964 onwards, annual migration is below 5,000, and after 1968 below 1,000 (Ellemers and Vaillant, 1985).

In total, the number of repatriates and immigrants arriving in the Netherlands between 1946 and 1962 is estimated at about 300,000. At first the government did not actually encourage repatriation from Indonesia to the Netherlands, but tried to find other destinations (such as New Guinea and the United States); however, most repatriates opted for the Netherlands (Entzinger, 1984). The majority was of mixed Indonesian-Dutch descent and was entitled to settle in the Netherlands on the grounds of their citizenship. For the most part, they held government and business jobs at the middle and upper levels in colonial society, and were well-educated and strongly oriented towards the Netherlands. Other conditions were favourable for their reception too: they encountered an expanding economy and labour market, as well as support and an active policy from both public authorities and private organizations (Penninx, 1984b).

Part of the migrants arriving in 1951 were military personnel: Moluccan soldiers in the former colonial armed forces and their families, 12,500 in all. Both they and the Dutch government regarded their stay as temporary in that they intended to return to a Free Republic of the Moluccans, which however never came into existence. Conditions for adjustment to Dutch society were unfavourable, to say the least: there was a strong intention to return on the part of the Moluccans, a government policy intended to keep the group intact with a view to return migration, discharge from the army, a low level of education, and a lack of knowledge of the Dutch language. The desired return never materialized, but only in 1978, after a series of armed occupations and train-hijackings by disillusioned Moluccan youths, were policy objectives changed explicitly (Entzinger, 1984; Penninx, 1979, 1984b).

By the mid-1950s, the post-war reconstruction efforts had already begun to lead to sectoral labour shortages, and Italian workers were recruited for jobs in mining and industry, initially on a small scale. After the economic slump of 1958, the economy continued to grow and, even though the domestic labour force increased rapidly (compared to other West European countries), labour shortages became more pronounced. The system of 'temporary guest-work' was regarded as an acceptable solution to what were considered temporary shortages on the labour market. Industrial employers initiated recruitment in a number of Mediterranean countries; in addition, spontaneous immigration from these countries occurred. The government followed these developments by regulating recruitment procedures through bilateral agreements concluded between 1960

and 1970 with Italy, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Greece, Morocco, Yugoslavia, and Tunisia, successively. However, about half the foreign workers obtained employment without going through the official recruitment channels. By the beginning of 1967, there were 74,000 persons from these recruitment countries living in the Netherlands, amounting to 35 percent of all foreigners.

Labour recruitment came to a virtual standstill after the 1973 oil crisis. Nevertheless, immigration continued to increase all through the 1970s, most notably among Turks and Moroccans. This migration took the form of family reunion, and more recently marriage migration, which --apart from asylum-- have become practically the only means for legal admission. By January 1990, the number of residents from the former recruitment countries had increased to 401,000 persons², or 63 percent of all foreigners. Among them, Turks and Moroccans constitute by far the largest groups: 53 percent of all foreigners, up from only 13 percent in 1966.

Despite widespread family reunion in the 1970s, the idea that labour migration was temporary remained firm until as late as the end of the 1970s, and therefore policy measures were limited to facilitating reception. It was not until the process of family reunion was well under way, and the duration of residence of the migrant workers increased, that the realization grew that the originally temporary presence of migrants had in fact become permanent, and that policy shifts were necessary. This need for a change in policy was strengthened by the negative consequences of the deteriorating labour market, and by a process of stigmatization of 'foreigners', reinforced by the fact that recruitment as well as family reunion had been predominantly of unskilled and semi-skilled people from rural areas, with relatively poor education (Penninx, 1979, 1984b).

The decolonization process of the Dutch West Indies started several decades later than that of the East Indies. In 1954, all residents of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles had received Dutch citizenship and the right to live and work in the Netherlands; and this was thus a quite different situation from that which applied to residents of the Dutch East Indies. Surinam became independent in 1975, while the Netherlands Antilles still remain a member of the Kingdom (with a separate status for Aruba). Until the mid-1960s, immigration from Surinam was small; emigration levels from the Netherlands to Surinam were only slightly lower. As was the case before World War II, most Surinamese migrants were students. Gradually, immigration (predominantly of people of --mixed-- African descent) increased, and its character became more labour-oriented. It reached a peak in 1974-1975, just before independence, when 55,000 immigrants born in Surinam arrived in the Netherlands, amongst them relatively large numbers of Hindustanis, Javanese (many from rural areas rather than from Paramaribo or other towns, as had been the case before), and

² If Cape Verdians, who were Portuguese citizens until independence in 1974, are included, this figure increases slightly, to 404,000.

Chinese (Muus *et al.*, 1983). At the moment of independence, there were about 140,000 Surinamese in the Netherlands, one-third of the potential population of Surinam (Entzinger, 1984). A second immigration peak (36,000 persons) occurred in 1979-1980, prior to the expiry of the transitional agreement on the settlement and residence of mutual subjects. Since 1980, Surinamese nationals require a visa to enter the Netherlands. Contrary to the trend in immigration, emigration remained fairly stable throughout the period. The Surinamese have the advantage of knowing the Dutch language; they are a very heterogeneous group in terms of ethnicity and education, though among the more recent migrants those with low educational levels are strongly represented. At the peak of the immigration, in the middle and late 1970s, the economic situation was unfavourable, however, and the attitude of the native population had become more negative. Policy measures were comparable to those established for the Indonesian repatriates, though with less social acceptance by the resident population. Attitudes about the permanence of migration were quite different from the Indonesian case: both the Dutch and the Surinamese governments continuously stressed the alternative of return migration, and return in the not-too-distant future was also in the minds of many Surinamese migrants (Entzinger, 1984). However, in the second half of the 1970s the idea of permanent residence of the Surinamese took hold with the government too, as it did with respect to the Moluccans, giving rise to an assimilationist policy with pluralist aspects (Entzinger, 1984).

Using a rather broad definition, the population of Surinamese origin in the Netherlands is estimated at 244,000 in January 1990³ (compared to about 390,000 in Surinam) (Harmsen *et al.*, 1991; United Nations, 1992). A large

³ This estimate is based on a register count for 1 January 1990 of the population according to nationality, country of birth, and country of birth of the parents. The number of 244,000 is arrived at by adding those with Surinamese citizenship (15,000) to 143,000 Dutch citizens born in Surinam (including 9,000 with parents who were both born in the Netherlands), and to 86,000 persons born outside Surinam of parent(s) born in Surinam. Until 1990, estimates of the Surinamese population were made by applying migration and mortality data by country of birth, and data on births by country of birth of the mother, on the base population of the 1971 census. By this method the Surinamese population in the Netherlands was estimated at 215,000 in 1990. Applying approximately the same definition to the register count data, a not-so-widely diverging number of 219,000 would be arrived at. The difference between the two definitions is mainly due to the fact that, in the older definition, 18,000 Dutch citizens born in the Netherlands of a father born in Surinam and a mother born in another country, as well as 7,000 Dutch citizens born in a third country from parent(s) born in Surinam, are excluded.

Table 1.1. Population of the Netherlands by nationality, 1946-1991^a

Year	Total	Dutch	Foreign													
			Total	EC	Turkey	Other Europe	Morocco	Other Africa	North Amer.	M.+S. Amer.	Asia	Oceania	Other ^b + Unknown	Stateless		
1947 ^c	9,729,371	9,625,499	103,872	61,884	32	12,496				115	970	130	1,373	42		26,830
1960 ^c	11,461,964	11,344,357	117,607	60,600	100	10,976					2,800		5,700	200	21,870	15,361
1962	11,721,416	11,588,716	132,700	62,000	200	8,800					4,500		8,800		33,700	14,700
1963	11,889,962	11,742,262	147,700	70,500	300	8,900					5,600		10,700		35,700	16,000
1964	12,041,970	11,886,470	155,500	79,800	1,200	10,100	300				7,600		11,900	800	29,300	14,500
1965	12,212,269	12,049,433	162,836	84,400	4,300	9,900	1,700				7,900		12,000	900	28,936	12,800
1966	12,377,194	12,191,723	185,471	94,622	8,744	14,276	5,848			1,230	8,871	798	17,030	1,270	20,562	12,220
1967	12,535,307	12,322,339	212,968	104,299	14,464	14,918	14,273			1,472	9,775	944	18,752	1,535	20,546	11,990
1968	12,661,095	12,458,896	202,199	99,714	12,324	14,026	12,587			1,514	8,964	925	18,200	1,493	20,916	11,536
1968 ^d	12,798,346	12,594,318	204,028	100,299	13,526	13,772	12,770			1,562	9,162	1,008	17,825	1,580	21,080	11,344
1970	12,957,621	12,957,621														
1971	13,119,430	13,119,430														
1971 ^e	13,269,563	13,014,808	254,755	131,880	30,345	19,345	21,625			1,705	8,860	970	14,135	1,775		24,115
1973	13,387,623	13,083,264	304,359	138,445	46,018	23,686	27,901			2,519	11,189	1,305	19,805	2,445	21,998	9,048
1974	13,514,508	13,194,181	320,327	141,889	53,529	23,844	29,637			2,917	11,406	1,401	20,925	2,423	23,488	8,868
1975	13,623,880	13,282,842	341,038	146,265	62,587	24,559	33,156			3,015	11,943	1,556	22,072	2,539	24,788	8,558
1976	13,733,578	13,383,113	350,465	154,812	76,473	24,933	42,201			3,492	12,129	2,232	24,503	2,375		7,315
1977	13,814,495	13,438,188	376,307	159,202	84,817	24,985	48,222			4,195	12,794	4,791	27,696	2,778		6,827
1978	13,897,874	13,498,079	399,795	162,992	94,105	24,927	54,708			4,967	12,831	7,194	29,164	2,795		6,112
1979	13,985,526	13,555,505	430,021	165,798	105,227	25,475	62,929			6,036	12,944	11,380	31,635	2,973		5,624

Absolute numbers

1980	14,091,014	13,617,592	473,422	167,700	119,624	25,868	71,760	7,327	13,036	23,922	36,131	3,048	5,006
1981	14,208,586	13,687,730	520,856	171,076	138,527	26,613	83,359	8,794	13,100	30,888	40,689	3,095	4,815
1982	14,285,829	13,748,258	537,571	172,317	147,970	26,623	93,077	9,451	13,024	23,813	43,607	3,107	4,582
1983	14,339,551	13,793,089	546,462	175,367	154,201	25,552	101,511	11,236	11,644	17,270	40,949	2,197	6,535
1984	14,394,589	13,842,230	552,359	173,894	155,280	24,872	106,435	11,992	12,010	16,633	42,789	2,222	6,232
1985	14,453,833	13,895,123	558,710	172,641	155,579	24,695	111,329	12,821	12,606	15,748	45,310	2,241	5,740
1986	14,527,430	13,976,897	552,533	161,533	156,395	23,991	116,358	12,074	12,785	15,642	46,267	2,302	5,186
1987	14,615,125	14,047,112	568,013	159,697	160,637	24,360	122,746	13,890	12,796	18,313	48,247	2,431	4,896
1988	14,714,948	14,123,101	591,847	156,901	167,325	25,178	130,094	19,295	12,944	21,417	51,493	2,622	4,578
1989	14,805,240	14,181,571	623,669	159,795	176,547	26,861	139,212	22,563	13,500	23,875	54,110	2,841	4,365
1990	14,892,574	14,250,656	641,918	162,688	191,455	27,544	147,975	22,672	12,693	21,836	46,920	1,997	6,138
1991	15,010,445	14,318,016	692,429	168,440	203,519	30,691	156,880	29,345	13,812	28,341	52,956	2,405	6,040
In %													
1947 ^c	100	98.9	1.1	59.6	0.0	12.0	0.1	0.1	0.9	0.1	1.3	0.0	25.8
1960 ^c	100	99.0	1.0	51.5	0.1	9.3	0.2	2.4	2.4	0.1	4.8	0.2	18.6
1962	100	98.9	1.1	46.7	0.2	6.6	0.2	3.4	3.4	0.4	5.6	0.2	25.4
1963	100	98.8	1.2	47.7	0.2	6.0	0.2	3.8	3.8	0.4	7.2	0.2	24.2
1964	100	98.7	1.3	51.3	0.8	6.5	0.2	4.9	4.9	0.5	7.7	0.5	18.8
1965	100	98.7	1.3	51.8	2.6	6.1	1.0	4.9	4.9	0.4	7.4	0.6	17.8
1966	100	98.5	1.5	51.0	4.7	7.7	3.2	0.7	4.8	0.4	9.2	0.7	11.1
1967	100	98.3	1.7	49.0	6.8	7.0	6.7	0.7	4.6	0.4	8.8	0.7	9.6
1968	100	98.4	1.6	49.3	6.1	6.9	6.2	0.7	4.4	0.5	9.0	0.7	10.3
1968 ^d	100	98.4	1.6	49.2	6.6	6.8	6.3	0.8	4.5	0.5	8.7	0.8	10.3
1970	100												
1971	100												
1971 ^e	100	98.1	1.9	51.8	11.9	7.6	8.5	0.7	3.5	0.4	5.5	0.7	9.5
1973	100	97.7	2.3	45.5	15.1	7.8	9.2	0.8	3.7	0.4	6.5	0.8	3.0
1974	100	97.6	2.4	44.3	16.7	7.4	9.3	0.9	3.6	0.4	6.5	0.8	7.2
1975	100	97.5	2.5	42.9	18.4	7.2	9.7	0.9	3.5	0.5	6.5	0.7	7.3
1976	100	97.4	2.6	44.2	21.8	7.1	12.0	1.0	3.5	0.6	7.0	0.7	2.1
1977	100	97.3	2.7	42.3	22.5	6.6	12.8	1.1	3.4	1.3	7.4	0.7	1.8
1978	100	97.1	2.9	40.8	23.5	6.2	13.7	1.2	3.2	1.8	7.3	0.7	1.5

majority of the Surinamese have Dutch nationality, which explains why they figure so low in Table 1.1.

Migration from the Netherlands Antilles is of a different nature. Traditionally, the Antilles have been oriented more to the Americas. Student migration to the Netherlands started only in the 1950s, and labour immigration (through recruitment) did not begin to increase until the 1960s, but the numbers are relatively small. In the 1970s, more women and economically non-active people began to take part in the migration process (Muus *et al.*, 1983). The Antilleans in the Netherlands seem to be a rather heterogeneous group. Return migration is relatively high; all possess Dutch citizenship. Recent estimates based on the population register count (as of January 1990) put the number of residents of Antillean origin at 84,000 persons⁴ (the population of the Antilles and Aruba is estimated at 290,000; Harmsen *et al.*, 1991; United Nations, 1992).

While repatriates from the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia, migrants from Surinam and the Antilles, and labour migrants and their families from Mediterranean countries represent the main waves of immigration since the end of World War II, immigration from other European countries continued, and the size of the foreign population of European origin in the Netherlands increased steadily. However, in a relative sense it became less and less important. By the beginning of 1990 there were around 163,000 foreigners holding the citizenship of an EC member state living in the Netherlands, of whom 29 percent were from former recruitment countries, and 28,000 from non-EC European countries excluding Turkey.

⁴ The estimate for the population of Antillean descent is based on the 1990 register count (cf. footnote 3). Practically all those living in the Netherlands who were born in the Netherlands Antilles, or whose parents were born there, have Dutch citizenship. There are 56,000 Dutch citizens who were born in the Netherlands Antilles (including 11,000 Dutch citizens who were born in the Netherlands Antilles but of parents who were both born in the Netherlands), and 28,000 persons born outside the Netherlands Antilles of a parent or parents born there. Until 1990 estimates of the Antillean population in the Netherlands were made by applying migration and mortality data on the base population of the 1971 census. By this method the population of Antillean descent in the Netherlands was estimated at 71,000 on 1 January 1990. Applying approximately the same definition to the register count data, the same number is arrived at. The difference between the two definitions is mainly due to the fact that in the older definition 10,500 Dutch citizens born in the Netherlands of a father born in the Netherlands Antilles and a mother born in another country, as well as 2,500 Dutch citizens born in a third country of a parent or parents born in the Netherlands Antilles, are excluded.

The Chinese population, which had dwindled on the eve of the war, started to grow again in the early 1960s, when Chinese-Indonesian restaurants became popular. Recruitment of new personnel for these restaurants caused a strong chain-migration from the People's Republic, Hongkong, and to a lesser extent from Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Macao. The growth continued until the restaurant sector became saturated in the early 1980s. The Chinese originating from these countries currently number about 41,000 (Voets, 1989). In addition, there are ethnic Chinese among the repatriates from Indonesia, among the Surinamese immigrants, and among the group of refugees from Vietnam, estimated at about 13,500 by Benton and Vermeulen (1987).

Apart from politically motivated migration in the post-war years related to decolonization, refugees arrived from Hungary (1956), Portugal (1960s), and Czechoslovakia (1968), followed in the 1970s and 1980s by Ugandans, Chileans, Uruguayans and Argentineans, Ethiopians and Eritreans, Vietnamese and Cambodians, Surinamese, Iranians, Turkish Christians, Poles and others. Recent arrivals come from Sri Lanka and a number of African countries; most of these have only the status of asylum seeker and many are refused admission as refugees.

The number of refugees admitted between 1945 and 1969 is estimated at 13,000, of whom about half had re-emigrated by 1969 (Verwey-Jonker, 1973). The number of refugees admitted since 1970 is probably about 15,000. In addition, the number of asylum seekers from developing countries has increased steeply since the early 1980s: from 1,200 in 1982 to 13,500 in 1987 (Department of Justice). In November 1987, a stricter reception policy caused a temporary decline, but in 1989 the number of asylum seekers was back at the 1987 level and it has since increased to 21,600 in 1991.

For the so-called 'invited' refugees, fairly extensive reception and assistance programmes exist. These do not apply to 'individual' refugees and asylum seekers, though in practice many of them have received comparable treatment, with one important exception: asylum seekers are not allowed to work.

In all, in January 1990 there were 642,000 foreign citizens living in the Netherlands, or 4.3 percent of the total population (Table 1.1). If we add the group of Dutch citizens who were born in the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia, Surinam or the Netherlands Antilles, and those with both parents born in any of these countries (499,000), the population of first or second generation foreign descent in the Netherlands may be roughly estimated at 1,141,000 (7.7 percent). If we broaden the definition of foreign descent further to include Dutch citizens born outside the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia, Surinam, or the Netherlands Antilles, but with one parent born in one of these countries (275,000 people), 9.5 percent of the population has first or second generation foreign roots (1,416,000). Were we to include all those who either have a foreign nationality, and/or are born abroad, and/or have one or two parents who are born abroad, the population of first or generation foreign descent living in the Netherlands would number 2,232,000, or about 15 percent of the total population (Prins, 1991a).

2. INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: CURRENT TRENDS AND PATTERNS

2.1 | Size and composition of the immigrant population

2.1.1. *Size*

In Chapter 1 an overview was presented of the development of the immigrant population and their descendants in the Netherlands since the end of the Second World War. In the following chapters the focus will be on more recent developments, that is, those since the 1960s.

In the period 1960-1970 the population with foreign nationality approximately doubled from 117,000 in 1960 to an estimated 235,000 in 1970¹. In the following decade the foreign population doubled again, to reach 473,000 by the beginning of 1980 (Table 1.1). The growth in the past decade (1980-1990) is smaller, both relatively (36 percent) and absolutely (169,000 persons). By January 1991, 692,000 foreigners were living in the Netherlands (4.6 percent of the total population).

The increase can largely be ascribed to the growth in the number of persons with Turkish or Moroccan nationality, from only 6,000 in 1965, to 360,000 in 1990. Heavy immigration of family members, low levels of return migration and relatively high fertility levels are all factors responsible for this increase. In addition, few Turks and Moroccans applied for naturalization. Currently the Turks and Moroccans form 53 percent of the foreign population in the Netherlands. The overall growth in the population from the other recruitment countries has been much more moderate: the population with Italian, Greek, Spanish, Portuguese, Yugoslavian or Tunisian nationality has increased from 29,000 in 1965 to 77,000 in 1975, then decreased again (due largely to significant return

¹ No data are available for the period between mid-1968 and the census of February 1971. The estimate is based on interpolation.

migration, naturalization and the indirect consequences of mixed marriages) to 63,000 in 1991 (66,000 if Cape Verdians are included). Together they now form about 9 percent of the foreign population (compared with 18 percent in 1965).

The number of inhabitants from the seven Northern EC countries² also increased continuously until 1985, when a change in the law on Dutch citizenship caused a sudden 'decline' (see Section 3.4). Currently the group numbers 121,000 people, or 17 percent of all foreigners. Within this group the largest numerical increase was among the British (partly British born in Hong Kong; see Voets, 1989), but those from the five other countries increased as well. The Germans (44,000), British (39,000) and Belgians (24,000) together make up 88 percent of the Northern EC citizens in the Netherlands.

The population from other European countries (i.e. excluding the EC, Turkey and Yugoslavia), North America, and Oceania has increased gradually and only slowly: from 26,000 in 1965 to 33,000 in 1991; this resulted in a proportional decline from 16 to 5 percent of the foreign population. Within this group, particularly the number of Poles and Rumanians has recently increased through the arrival of asylum seekers.

Both the size and the composition of the remaining group of foreigners, coming from Asia, Africa (excluding Morocco and Tunisia), and from Middle and South America (excluding Surinam), has changed considerably. In 1965 the group numbered about 32,000. Amongst them there were 20,000 Moluccans, while most of the others also came from other countries in Asia (e.g. Indonesia, China). By 1991, their number had risen to 89,000 (including 2,600 Cape Verdians), and more Asian countries were represented (e.g. India, Pakistan, Vietnam), while refugees and asylum seekers have arrived from Latin America and Africa as well. The sudden decline in the size of this group in the previous year (1990) was due mainly to a large number of naturalizations (see Section 3.4) and so-called administrative corrections following a population register count for 1 January 1990 (see Appendix 1). Currently, they constitute 13 percent of the foreign population, and their share is gradually increasing. Stateless persons or those with unknown nationality decreased, from about seven percent in the mid-1960s to below one percent currently.

In addition to these population groups of foreign descent, which can be described fairly well in terms of a single nationality, there are several groups—some of them sizeable— which consist mainly or completely of people with Dutch citizenship (such as the Surinamese, Antilleans, and the earlier group of repatriates from the former Dutch East Indies), or which are made up of different nationalities (Moluccans, Chinese, refugees and asylum seekers). Statistical information on the estimated size of these groups is presented in Table 2.1.

² Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg and United Kingdom.

Table 2.1. Estimated size of principal ethnic groups ^a not identifiable on the basis of nationality alone, the Netherlands, 1960-1991 (in thousands)

Year (Jan. 1)	Surinamese	Antil- leans	Moluccans	Chinese	Refugees	Asylum seekers
1960		19,4				
1965		21,2				
1970	38,1 ^b	18,2 ^b	25,9			
1975	79,2	23,9	29,0	7,2		
1980	145,7		35,2	14,6		
1981	164,6	40,0	35,6	15,6	5,5	2,5
1982	168,6	42,3		16,1		
1983	171,4	43,7		17,3		
1984	176,7	44,9		16,7		
1985	181,4	46,2		17,0		
1986	188,2	50,2		15,4	14,7	8,4
1987	195,0	55,2	35-40	14,5		
1988	203,0	60,8		13,6		
1989	208,8	66,3		13,2		
1990	219,0	71,0				
1991	229,0	76,0				

^a *Surinamese and Antilleans*: Persons born in Surinam/the Netherlands Antilles plus live-born children of women born in these countries.

Moluccans: original group of immigrants, with corrections for fertility under the assumption that the Moluccan CBR equals the Dutch CBR. No corrections were made for mortality and emigration.

Chinese: those with the nationality of the People's Republic of China or Singapore, plus estimates of the British born in Hongkong.

Refugees and asylum seekers: only those who have arrived since 1977 from developing countries. Estimates, with corrections for fertility, mortality and migration.

^b 1971.

Sources: *Surinamese, Antilleans*: Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

Moluccans: 1960: Statistisch Zakboek; 1965-1981: Ministerie van CRM; 1987: Veenman, 1990, and Muus, 1988.

Chinese: Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics; Voets and Schoorl, 1988; Voets, 1989.

Refugees and Asylum seekers: Gooszen, 1988.

Naturalization and the growth of a second generation influence the size of population groups of foreign descent to different degrees. Data on the size and composition of a number of population groups of foreign descent in terms of nationality, country of birth and parents' country of birth collected by the Central Bureau of Statistics from the municipal population registers, are available for 1990. In addition, for 1989 these data are available for a number of population groups on a sample basis (see Voets, 1989)³.

Until the 1990 count based on the population registers, estimates of the population of Indonesian or mixed Dutch-Indonesian descent varied widely (see e.g. Ellemers and Vaillant, 1985). Based on the criteria of nationality, country of birth and parents' country of birth, a maximum estimate of about 473,000 may be arrived at (Harmsen and Van der Heijdt, 1991). Amongst these are 8,000 persons with Indonesian nationality (most of whom were also born in Indonesia, as were their parents). The vast majority (461,000 or 97 percent) of those of Indonesian descent, however, are Dutch citizens. In all, 188,000 or 40 percent belong to the first generation (born in Indonesia). In this latter group, one in four (48,000) had parents who were both born in the Netherlands; therefore, these people are likely to have belonged to the so-called group of 'totoks' (persons of native Dutch descent). A much larger group was born in the Netherlands and has either two parents born in Indonesia (66,000 or 14 percent), or one parent born there (204,000 or 43 percent). The remaining small group of three percent belongs to even more mobile families: persons born in a third country but who have one or both parents who were born in Indonesia (15,000). This composition very clearly illustrates the older history of the group's immigration (about 57 percent belongs to the second generation), as well as the large degree of mixed parentage (53 percent have only one Indonesian-born parent).

The Surinamese population in the Netherlands increased nearly fourfold between 1971 and 1980; the period of heaviest immigration occurred during 1974-1975 and 1979-1980. In the decade since then, the increase has only been 48 percent, due to further immigration and natural increase. Using the same criteria as those for the population of Indonesian descent, the number of Surinamese is estimated at 244,000 (Harmsen *et al.*, 1991). Only 15,000 (have Surinamese nationality (and most of them were born in Surinam of two Surinam-born parents). As in the group of Indonesian origin, the vast majority (229,000 or 94 percent) are Dutch citizens. The first generation (born in Surinam) is relatively larger than among the Indonesians: 64 percent of the population of Surinamese descent belong to that generation, compared with only 40 percent of the Indonesian group. Within this group of first-generation Surinamese in the Netherlands, 6 percent (9,000) had parents who were both

³ The sample contains information on 398,000 persons in 16 municipalities (see Voets, 1989).

born in the Netherlands. One third (33 percent) belong to the second generation, but contrary to the case of the Indonesian group, the number with two Surinam-born parents (46,000) is larger than that of mixed parentage (34,000). The remaining 'mobile' group of people born in a third country of Surinamese parentage makes up 3 percent (7,000); in almost two out of every three cases this third country are the Netherlands Antilles.

The population of Antillean descent increased steadily but at a slower pace overall: it doubled in the 1970s and again in the 1980s. Among the Antillean population, the first generation (56,000 or 66 percent) is still larger than among the Surinamese. The second generation, however, consists mainly of persons of mixed parentage (21,000 or 25 percent). Only five percent of those born in the Netherlands of Antillean origin have both parents born in the Antilles. The relatively small size of the Antillean population in the Netherlands, combined with their socio-economic composition (a relatively high proportion of students) and high return migration probably accounts for this specific generational composition.

Because naturalization and mixed marriage are still rather rare among the Moroccans and especially the Turks, the number of them who have Dutch nationality is small: 11 and 7 percent respectively. Irrespective of nationality, in both the population of Turkish and that of Moroccan descent 68 percent belong to the first generation, reflecting again their recent migration history. Mixed parentage among the second generation too is limited: of the majority of those of Turkish or Moroccan origin born in the Netherlands, both parents were born in Turkey (92 percent) or in Morocco (89 percent) (Prins, 1991b). The Chinese (defined as British citizens born in Hong Kong or citizens of the People's Republic or of Singapore) are estimated at around 16,000. If persons of Chinese origin with Dutch citizenship were included, the population of Chinese descent would increase to an estimated 37,000-46,000 (Voets, 1989; see also Table 2.2). More than half of the Chinese in the Netherlands are Dutch citizens, and many of the others possess nationalities other than those of the People's Republic or Taiwan. For instance, 16 percent have British nationality. As far as country of birth is concerned, there is equal diversity among the Chinese: 32 percent were born in the People's Republic, 30 percent in the Netherlands and 29 percent in Hong Kong.

Among the population groups that originated from recruitment countries other than Turkey and Morocco, it is estimated that 35 percent have Dutch nationality. This group is characterized by a considerable rate of mixed marriage and naturalization: in the period 1975-1986 194,000 persons from these countries obtained Dutch citizenship (Noordam, 1989).

Finally, Gooszen has made an estimate of the number of refugees and asylum seekers residing in the Netherlands. This is an under-estimation in so far as only persons from developing countries (but excluding Surinam) who have arrived since 1977, are included (Gooszen, 1988). She arrived at a count of about 15,000 refugees and 8,400 asylum seekers in 1986. However, in the years

Table 2.2. Estimated^a size of selected population groups of foreign descent^b, the Netherlands, January 1, 1989/1990 (in thousands)

	1-1-1990 (CBS)		1-1-1989 (Voets) ^{bc}	% with Dutch nation.	% born in the Netherlands
	Low ^a	High ^b			
Indonésians	425	473		97	57
Surinamese	235	244		94	133
Antilleans	73	84		100	30
Turks	205	207		7	31
Moroccans	167	169		11	30
Other recruitment countries ^d			94	35	29
Chinese ^e			41	55	29
East Europeans ^f			24	80	31
Selected Third World ^g			65	34	14

^a Those with respective nationality or born in respective country and those with one or both parents born in respective country, but excluding those born in respective country of both parents born in the Netherlands.

^b Those with respective nationality or born in respective country and those with one or both parents born in respective country.

^c Medium variant. Confidence intervals vary by group from zero to 8,000. The confidence interval of the total estimated population amounts to $\pm 18,000$.

^d Greece, Italy, Portugal and Cape Verde, Spain, Tunisia and Yugoslavia.

^e Malaysia, Macao, People's Republic of China, Taiwan and Singapore.

^f Hungary, Poland and Rumania.

^g Only those countries where most of the refugees and asylum seekers have come from since 1977.

Source: Voets, 1989 (Other recruitment countries, Chinese, East Europeans, selected Third World); Harmsen and Van der Heijdt, 1991 (Indonésians); Harmsen *et al.*, 1991 (Surinamese, Antilleans); Prins, 1991b (Turks, Moroccans).

1986-1991 77,700 new requests for asylum were received. In addition, about 3,000 refugees invited by the Dutch government to resettle in the Netherlands have arrived during the period 1986-1990 (Muus, 1991) (see also Section 2.2).

No data are available on the composition of the refugee population by nationality or country of origin. Some information can be derived from the composition by nationality at the time of settlement in their first residence (invited refugees), or at the time they have been granted asylum (individual refugees, that is, former asylum seekers) in the period 1976-1986. The majority of the invited refugees had Vietnamese nationality. A small proportion had Latin American nationalities or were Iranians (4 percent each). The differentiation among individual refugees is greater. The Turks were, with 42 percent, the biggest group (both Kurds and Syrian-Orthodox), followed by the Iranians (15 percent), Ethiopians (14 percent) and Surinamese (10 percent) (Gooszen, 1988).

2.1.2. Composition

New waves of immigration tend to be very skewed in terms of their age and sex distributions (see also Section 2.2), as they consist mainly of workers (as in the case of labour migrants from the Mediterranean countries) or students (as was originally the case among Surinamese and Antilleans); this is reflected in the age and sex composition of these immigrant populations. As family reunification gets under way, or when migration becomes more common among other layers of society, the age and sex distributions of the population groups concerned shift to a more balanced structure. This process is illustrated by Figure 2.1, for the period 1976-1989. The over-representation of men, especially in young adult age groups (about 20-40 years), has become less dominant; and in the younger age groups there is no difference in sex composition. The proportion aged 60 years and over is still very small, except among the populations from the Northern EC, and from the category 'other Europe (excluding Turkey and EC), North America and Oceania'. This is partly due to the short history of immigration, partly to return migration among the elderly, and partly to naturalization. The broad base of the Turkish and Moroccan pyramids indicates a relatively high fertility level (see Section 3.2). The sharp decrease in the youngest age groups of most population groups between 1976 and 1989 is due to a change in the law on citizenship, rather than to a 'real' change in population size (see Section 3.4). As expected, in the group of asylum seekers men are still over-represented: 69 percent of all asylum seekers staying in the Netherlands in 1986 were men, and 41 percent were men in the age group 20-34 years.

Among the resident refugee population, who have lived in the Netherlands longer than the group of asylum seekers, only 55 percent are men, and only 26 percent are 20-34 year old men (Gooszen, 1988). Considering again the population of foreign descent according to nationality, country of birth and parents' country of birth (Voets, 1989), the majority of the children aged 0-9 years were born in the Netherlands (78 percent, see Figure 2.2). This percentage decreases to 45 for the age group 10-14 years, 21 percent for the age group 15-19, and 9 percent for 20-24 year olds.

Figure 2.1. *Composition of the foreign population in the Netherlands by age, sex, and country of nationality (2.1a-f and 2.1i) or by country of origin (2.1g-h); January 1, 1976 and 1989*

Figure 2.1a. *Total with foreign nationality*




Figure 2.1b. *Northern EC nationalities (Belgium, Denmark, F.R. Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, United Kingdom)*




Figure 2.1c. Southern EC nationalities (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain)




Figure 2.1d. Turkish nationality




Figure 2.1e. Moroccan nationality




Figure 2.1f. Other European (excluding Turkey and EC), North American, Oceanian nationalities




Figure 2.1g. Surinamese (according to country of birth and mother's country of birth)




Figure 2.1h. Antilleans (according to country of birth and mother's country of birth)





Figure 2.1i. African (excluding Moroccan), Middle and South American (excluding Surinamese), and Asian nationalities




Source: (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

Overall, 61 percent of those aged 0-19 years were born in the Netherlands. This general picture applies more or less to the Turkish and Moroccan as well as to the Surinamese population groups, albeit that the proportion born in the Netherlands among the Turks and Moroccans in the age group 15-24 years is somewhat smaller. Among the East Europeans, and to a lesser extent the population groups from the recruitment countries excluding Turkey and Morocco, the second generation is also relatively well represented in the age groups of 25 years and older.

Some information is available on family and household composition and on household size, based on data from the population registers regarding the population of foreign descent (Table 2.3; Voets, 1989), and based on survey data from the National Housing Survey (WBO) among the major ethnic minority groups (Tables 2.4a/b). Unfortunately, due to different sampling procedures (individuals versus households), the data in these tables are not directly comparable.

Among the Turks and Moroccans there are relatively few single persons, and these are often men whose families have remained in the country of origin. The relatively high proportion of children living at home (Table 2.3), of couples with children (Table 2.4a), and of large households (Table 2.4b) reflect a

Figure 2.2. Composition of a selected population group of foreign descent^a by age, sex, and country of birth, January 1, 1989



^a Population of foreign descent defined according to nationality, country of birth, and parents' country of birth. Nationalities/countries included are Surinam, the Netherlands Antilles, the recruitment countries and the countries listed in footnotes e-g in Table 2.2.

Source: Voets, 1989.

family-oriented way of life, relatively high fertility levels, and a young age structure in these two recent immigrant groups. The Antilleans are characterized by a large proportion of single persons (41 percent), which may be partly explained by the relatively high proportion of students among this group, and by the fact that unmarried cohabitation is quite common. The proportion of Antilleans actually living alone seems to be somewhat lower (Table 2.4a). A large proportion of the Surinamese and the Antilleans is single parent (14 percent and 13 percent respectively; Table 2.3). This is even more apparent from the household data: 33 percent of the Surinamese and 18 percent of the Antillean households are single-parent households (Table 2.4a).

Among the Dutch there are relatively many couples without children present (Table 2.4a). This reflects both the comparatively high levels of childlessness among the younger couples and the ageing population structure.

On the other hand, all minority groups with the exception of the East Europeans have relatively few families or households without any children present. The East European population group consists primarily of former refugees who have now reached middle or old age. In many cases, their children have left home.

Table 2.3. Composition of a selected population group of foreign descent^a by position in the family and ethnic group, January 1, 1989

Ethnic group	Head of family			Wife	Children	Single living at home	Total (=100%)
	with wife	with wife & children	with children				
Turks	4	18	3	21	45	10	100
Moroccans	2	15	2	16	54	11	100
Oth. recruit ^b	5	15	5	17	36	22	100
Surinamese	2	7	14	9	41	27	100
Antilleans	2	5	13	6	34	41	100
Chinese ^c	4	17	3	21	43	13	100
East Europeans ^d	11	15	6	15	27	27	100
Oth. countries ^e	4	11	4	13	37	32	100
Total (N=382,506)	3	12	7	14	43	20	100

Notes: see Table 2.2.

Source: Voets, 1989.

Table 2.4a. Household composition of selected population groups of foreign descent^a

Household Composition	Turks	Moroccans	Surinamese	Antilleans	Dutch
Living alone					
male	7	14	12	13	10
female	0	2	12	22	16
Couple	10	4	8	6	22
Couple with children	71	74	29	28	40
Single parent	6	3	33	18	7
Other	7	2	6	8	5
Total (=100%)	566	303	621	106	44,600

^a Turks, Moroccans and Dutch by nationality; Surinamese and Antilleans by country of birth.

Source: WBO-1985/1986 (CBS). In: Ankersmit *et al.*, 1988.

Moreover, the children of those children (the third generation) are not included in the database of Table 2.3. The same applies to non-Dutch partners, which is again most apparent in the group of East Europeans, indicating a relatively high degree of inter-marriage (26 percent are married men with a wife present, but only 15 percent of the total are classified as wives).

Household size is comparatively large among the Turks and Moroccans: 22 and 41 percent of their households respectively consist of six or more persons, while this is the case in only seven percent of the Surinamese, two percent of the Dutch, and practically none of the Antillean households (Table 2.4b). On the other hand, one- and two-person households are less common among the Turks and Moroccans (19 and 23 percent respectively) than among the other three groups (45-57 percent). This is partly related to the youthful age structure of the immigrant population, partly to the conditions of migration (there are still a number of Turkish and Moroccan men not reunified with their families), and partly to differences in the social structure of family life (single parenting among the Caribbean groups, late marriage and postponement of children among the Dutch, relatively high fertility among the Turks and Moroccans).

Table 2.4b. Household size of selected population groups of foreign descent^a

No. of persons in household	Turks	Moroccans	Surinamese	Antilleans	Dutch
1	7	17	24	35	27
2	12	6	21	22	30
3	16	12	20	17	15
4	24	11	17	17	19
5	18	13	12	6	6
6	11	12	4	0	2
7	7	12	2	0	0
8+	4	17	1	0	0
Total (=100%)	566	303	621	106	44,600

^a Turks, Moroccans and Dutch by nationality; Surinamese and Antilleans by country of birth.

Source: WBO-1985/1986 (CBS). In: Ankersmit *et al.*, 1988.

2.1.3. *Geographical distribution*

In this section the geographical distribution of the foreign population over the country is described, based on data arranged by municipality. For a discussion of the local distribution we refer to Section 5.4.3.

The geographical distribution of the foreign population is generally more concentrated than that of the population as a whole, but there are considerable differences according to group. The proportion of foreigners (i.e. only those with a foreign nationality) varies widely between municipalities: the larger cities in particular have large foreign population groups relative to their total populations; the same applies to a number of smaller industrial and former mining towns in the eastern and southern parts of the country, and to municipalities on the southern and eastern borders. For instance, while 13 percent of the total population live in the four largest cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht), 38 percent of the foreign population live there; similarly, 38 percent of the total population live in the urbanized provinces of North and South Holland (in which the first three of the cities mentioned above are located), but 55 percent of the foreign population live in these two provinces.

The spatial pattern of the groups from Mediterranean countries is in line with that of the industries in the 1960s and 1970s, for which these migrants were recruited. The concentration of these groups is still greatest in the large cities in the western part of the country, and in the industrial cities of the east (Twente, in the province of Overijssel) and south (especially the province of North Brabant). Spontaneous immigration was centred on the same locations; and family reunion brought about little change in the spatial pattern. In 1990, almost half the Moroccans in the Netherlands (49 percent) lived in the four large cities; among the Turks the concentration is less: 37 percent, which represents hardly any change from the mid-1980s. Suburbanization among these groups is far less common than among the native Dutch. For instance, in Almere, a satellite town of Amsterdam, the Moroccans are well represented, but both Turks and Moroccans are under-represented in Zoetermeer, a satellite of The Hague.

The migration to the Netherlands of the Surinamese and Antilleans has a longer tradition than that of the employees from Mediterranean countries and has been more heterogeneous. It comprised not only manual workers, but also white-collar workers and students. Organized recruitment did not precede the settlement of Surinamese and Antilleans to any significant extent; these groups opted to settle primarily in the three large cities. The newcomers followed in the footsteps of those already settled (known as chain migration). As will be described later on (Section 5.4.1), this spontaneous concentration process was more or less halted by a national dispersal policy. The result is that the Surinamese and Antilleans have become large-city populations more than the groups from Mediterranean countries, while outside these cities they are dispersed across the country more than the 'Mediterranean' groups. An estimated 59

percent of Surinamese live in the four large cities (25 percent in Amsterdam alone), and 32 percent of the Antilleans.

Refugees and asylum seekers are urban groups too. However, few data are available on this extremely heterogeneous population. It is also particularly subject to change. In the mid-1980s probably nearly half the refugees and asylum seekers lived in the Randstad conurbation⁴. Because these groups are subject to a state settlement policy (cf. Section 5.4.2), their concentration in the large cities is less pronounced than that of the Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans (Gooszen, 1988).

For the earlier group of Moluccans, too, state housing policy determined their spatial distribution over the country. The government placed the Moluccans in existing communal barracks outside the western conurbation. The later construction of special Moluccan residential areas did not alter this pattern. These areas form the only concentration in the Netherlands which could be termed ghettos. They are not, however, the result of a spontaneous process but of a well considered policy.

2.2 | Immigration

2.2.1. Policies

Policies regarding admission to the Netherlands deal with the foreign population only. For Dutch citizens no restrictions on immigration exist. Because inhabitants of the Netherlands Antilles are Dutch citizens, they are free to settle in the Netherlands. The same applied to the inhabitants of Surinam before it became a sovereign state in November 1975. Surrounding Surinamese independence, transitory regulations were in force between that date and November 1980, when Surinamese citizens became subject to visa regulations.

For foreign citizens, Dutch immigration policy is one of restricted immigration. This implies that residence permits are in principle only issued in accordance with international treaties (that is, the EC treaty with regard to the free movement of labour, and the Geneva Convention of 1951 with regard to refugees and asylum procedures), and for humanitarian reasons (mainly family reunion). Otherwise, residence permits are given only for short-term purposes (e.g. for study), or if the interest of the Netherlands is at stake.

To foreigners who come to live in the Netherlands for the first time, a temporary residence permit may be issued --taking into account the principle of restricted immigration-- conditional on a specific purpose, such as study, work, asylum, family reunion, etc. A change of purpose can be applied for later on. A temporary permit is generally valid for a period of one year and may be

⁴ The Randstad conurbation comprises most of the provinces of North Holland, South Holland, and Utrecht, and includes the four largest cities.

renewed annually; it may be withdrawn or its renewal may be refused in accordance with any special provisions made in an individual permit, or if the person concerned has insufficient personal income or has violated the Law on Foreign Employees. In addition, the foreigner should not have infringed seriously upon national order or security.

A permanent residence permit will be issued to a foreigner who is at least 18 years old and who has resided in the Netherlands for at least five years with a temporary permit. A permanent permit can be refused only if there is no reasonable guarantee that the foreigner will have sufficient personal income, or if he or she has infringed seriously upon national order or security. A permanent permit can only be withdrawn if fraud has been committed in obtaining the permit or in case of serious criminal offence or threat to national security.

The temporary permit initially issued on the condition of family reunion, that is, to foreigners belonging to the immediate family (partner and/or dependent children) of a Dutch citizen or to that of a foreigner with a permanent residence permit, is changed into a 'dependent permanent permit' after one year. This means that the condition of residence with the family member who is the holder of the main permit remains. Children lose this permit automatically upon reaching the age of 18, but may then apply for another type of permit: either a non-dependent permanent permit of their own, if they have resided in the Netherlands for at least five years, or otherwise an non-dependent temporary permit. In the latter case, the requirement of employment is waived for children aged 15-18 who were born in the Netherlands, and for children aged 15 years or older who arrived in the context of family reunion at least a year previously (Handboek Minderheden, 1984-). Due to high youth unemployment, the actual legal position of young migrants who arrived on family reunion permits in their mid- to late teens is rather weak (see e.g. Brassé *et al.*, 1983).

Generally, foreigners and their employers will need a work permit if the temporary residence permit is issued for the purpose of work⁵. In general, after a period of three years of employment, a work permit is no longer needed. Foreigners with a permanent residence permit, as well as their wives or husbands and their children under the age of 18, are exempted from the work permit requirement (Handboek Minderheden, 1984-).

Most women from the former recruitment countries (the majority being Turkish and Moroccan women) have immigrated on dependent residence permits, issued

⁵ EC citizens as well as foreigners holding a permanent residence permit, refugees, the wives/husbands and minor children of the latter two groups, as well as a number of other categories, are exempted from the Law on Foreign Employees which regulates the requirements for obtaining work permits.

conditionally for reunion with their husband or because of their marriage to a Turkish or Moroccan man living in the Netherlands⁶. Rules for family reunion with the holder of a permanent residence permit are less stringent than those for reunion with the holder of a temporary permit; in the latter case, permission for family reunion is dependent on certain requirements regarding the income of the holder of the temporary permit. Unemployment—if involuntary—of the holder of a permanent residence permit forms no ground for refusing family reunion. Furthermore, there are no waiting periods for family reunion, neither with regard to the duration of residence of the person with whom the reunion takes place, nor with regard to the duration of the marriage. However, a person admitted on a family reunion permit can obtain a non-dependent permit only through becoming employed her- or himself. In the event of divorce a person on a dependent permit risks deportation unless she or he was married for at least three years, of which one year as a resident in the Netherlands. If the divorce takes place after these conditions have been fulfilled, the person concerned receives a temporary non-dependent permit which may be renewed annually for five years, on the condition that she or he has a job, and is likely to continue to have a job in the coming year. Only for women (or men) who have to look after young children is the requirement for paid employment temporarily lifted; and they are eligible for welfare benefits according to the rules that apply to other single unemployed parents. After five years of the temporary non-dependent residence permit, a permanent non-dependent permit is issued, if the requirements described above have been met. Only serious violation of the law may then lead to deportation (Handboek Minderheden, 1984-). In most cases, the dependent residence permits are issued to women; but increasingly, young men receive such permits as well, if they marry the daughter of a migrant.

To conclude, there are no restrictions on employment for holders of dependent (family reunion) residence permits, and in this respect there are no differences between dependent and non-dependent permits. However, the regulations concerning admission and residence tend to make women dependent on men because, in practice, women hold the conditional permits issued for family reunion (recently, however, the reverse case of men marrying migrants' daughters is becoming more frequent as well). Especially in the period shortly after migration, when people have to adapt to new situations, perhaps after several years of separation, conflict may arise between partners, but divorce may have the additional consequence of deportation. Furthermore, for young people it may be difficult to qualify for family reunion, because their income may be too low, and because of housing problems.


⁶ A cohabitational relationship is also accepted. In the case of polygamous marriages, only one wife is permitted legal residence in the Netherlands.

Apart from those who immigrate for family reunion or marriage, an increasing number of people apply for admission through asylum procedures. Annually, a small number of refugees is formally invited to the Netherlands by the Dutch government, but the number of asylum seekers arriving independently is much larger than the number of invited refugees. Both invited refugees and asylum seekers are initially, and in principle only for a short period, housed in central reception centres, after which they receive housing through a municipal housing reservation system. The steep increase in the number of asylum seekers has jammed the system, and periods of stay in reception centres have extended into months rather than weeks. Before November 1987 asylum seekers were entitled to welfare benefits much like the other residents of the Netherlands, but in that month a new regulation went into force, restricting reception of asylum seekers to so-called 'bed-bath-bread' facilities. This led to a temporary decline in the number of asylum seekers. Asylum seekers are not allowed to work, in order to prevent integration before the decision on asylum is made, and in order to prevent the increase of unemployment among other residents of the country. The chance of asylum seekers receiving a formal refugee status or a residence permit for humanitarian reasons is relatively small. Procedures may last for a period of several years, though efforts are made to reduce the length of the procedures considerably. After a final refusal of asylum, asylum seekers may be deported, though this policy is generally not considered effective. In addition, a number of asylum seekers who do not qualify individually for the formal status of refugee are nevertheless not subject to deportation, due to the political situation in their countries of origin.

2.2.2. Size and composition

Immigration over the past three decades has gradually increased, from an average of 58,000 each year during the first half of the 1960s to an annual average of 91,000 in the period 1985-1989, and an average of 119,000 in the two years 1990-1991 (Figure 2.3). This increase is due to the immigration of foreign nationals, which more than doubled over the period, from on average 23,000 a year in 1960-1964 to an annual average of 57,000 in the period 1985-1989, and of 83,000 in 1990-1991. In comparison, immigration of Dutch citizens has been relatively stable, with peaks only in 1962 (independence of New Guinea) and 1973-1975 (independence of Surinam). The immigration trend of foreigners has generally followed economic booms and recessions (1967, 1973, early 1980s), or post-decolonization developments (1979-1980). The 1975 'immigration' peak of foreigners, however, is a statistical disturbance due to the entry into the population registers of a number of foreigners after a large scale regularization of illegal residents, who for the most part had been already living in the country for several years.

Figure 2.3. Immigration by nationality, the Netherlands, 1960-1991



Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

Roughly, immigration since 1960 can be subdivided into four main groups:

1. labour migration from the Mediterranean area (1960s), followed by family reunion (1970s and early 1980s), and by marriage migration for the benefit of the children of migrant workers (1980s);
2. immigration from Surinam (peaking in 1974-1975 and 1979-1980) and from the Netherlands Antilles;
3. immigration of EC nationals;
4. immigration from other countries, including:
 - a. Chinese immigration, mainly for work in the restaurant sector;
 - b. immigration from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, dominated by refugees and asylum seekers. The number of refugees and asylum seekers was small until the mid-1980s, and then increased rapidly, first from Asian and African countries, and very recently from Eastern Europe as well.
 - c. immigration from other countries: North America, Oceania (mainly Australia and New Zealand), and from European countries other than the EC, the former recruitment countries (Turkey and Yugoslavia) and Eastern Europe.

Figure 2.4a presents migration data for the eight countries with which the Netherlands have concluded bilateral labour migration agreements in the 1960s. Four of these are now also members of the European Community (Italy, 1958; Greece, 1981; Spain and Portugal, 1986⁷). With the exception of 1967 and 1983-1984, immigration from the former recruitment countries has always considerably exceeded emigration, but there are sizeable differences by country. Until 1973 the majority of the labour migrants from the Mediterranean area came from Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece; since then, recruitment has stopped and immigration from these countries has continuously decreased; in most years since 1973 emigration has exceeded immigration, especially among the Spanish migrants (Figure 2.4b). On the other hand, return migration among the relatively small groups of Turkish and Moroccan labourers who had arrived in the 1960s and early 1970s has been very small (Figures 2.4c/d); for Turks and Moroccans family reunion in the Netherlands rather than family reunion in the country of origin has been the preferred option. These differential 'preferences' are at least partly explained by differences in economic development in the Mediterranean countries: economic growth has progressed much more rapidly in Southern Europe than in North Africa and Turkey.

The movement of persons (of any nationality) between Surinam and the Netherlands has been strongly dominated by the decolonization process (Figure 2.4e). Up to 1975, the year of independence, immigration was not limited by regulations; it gradually increased, reaching a peak in 1975, when almost 40,000 people arrived in the Netherlands. Emigration increased only slightly in the next year, and generally has been very low. Immigration increased again sharply in 1979 and 1980, just prior to the expiry of the transitional agreement on the residence and settlement of mutual subjects — and the institution of a visa requirement.

Political developments in Surinam since have not encouraged return migration, and annually about 5,000 people immigrate, a number of them seeking asylum. Immigration from the Netherlands Antilles has been stable, with a slight and recent tendency to increase (Figure 2.4f). As all Antilleans have Dutch nationality, they are free to move to the Netherlands. However, orientation towards the Americas and the absence of an immediate 'threat' of independence has kept migration levels low.

The seven Northern EC countries supply a gradually increasing flow of migrants to the Netherlands; but emigration has been increasing too, resulting in a reasonably stable net migration balance of no more than several thousand persons a year (Figure 2.4g). Most Northern EC migrants originate from the Netherlands' neighbours: Great Britain (among them a number from Hong Kong), the Federal Republic of Germany, and Belgium.

⁷ There are transitional periods regarding the free circulation of employees: seven years in the case of Greece, Spain, and Portugal.

Figure 2.4. International migration by nationality (2.4a-d, 2.4g-i) or country of origin/destination (2.4e-f), the Netherlands, 1960-1991

Figure 2.4a. Eight recruitment countries




Figure 2.4b. Southern EC (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain)






Figure 2.4c. Turkey*Figure 2.4d. Morocco*

Figure 2.4e. Surinam (country of origin/destination)




Figure 2.4f. Netherlands Antilles (country of origin/destination)




Figure 2.4g. Northern EC (Belgium, Denmark, F.R. Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, United Kingdom)




Figure 2.4h. Europe (excluding EC and Turkey), North America, Oceania





Figure 2.4i. *Africa (excluding Morocco), Middle and South America (excluding Surinam), Asia*



The migration pattern of people originating from the remainder of Europe (including East European countries), North America, and Oceania is characterized by stable immigration, stable emigration and a low net migration balance (Figure 2.4h). Because for some of the demographic events there are no separately available data on East European countries, they have been grouped here with Europe as a whole. During most of the past decade immigration from East European countries could be counted in the tens or at most the hundreds. Since 1989, when political and economic situations began to change quickly, first the number of Polish migrants followed by the Rumanians, the Bulgarians, and recently the Yugoslavians began to increase. Data on asylum seekers and figures from the population registers differ to some extent, probably partly due to the fact that asylum seekers in reception centres are often not immediately entered into the population registers.

The largest recent increases in immigration come from Africa, Asia, and Middle and South America, mainly consisting of refugees and asylum seekers (Figure 2.4i). In 1972 no more than 4,600 immigrants came from these countries (excluding Morocco, Tunisia and Surinam); in 1991 23,600 arrived. Amongst them were 12,000 Asians (especially Indians, Pakistanis, Indonesians, and Chinese), 8,900 Africans (many from Somalia, Ethiopia, Ghana and Egypt), and 2,700 Latin Americans.

The dip in the immigration from these countries is explained by a stricter reception policy for asylum seekers, influencing their housing facilities and welfare benefits. This policy change, introduced in November 1987, resulted in a temporary decline of the number of asylum seekers in the following

months. Refugees and asylum seekers are not directly traceable in the immigration statistics, though developments can be deduced from figures like those presented above. The Department of Justice registers the number of requests for asylum, the number of requests granted and the number of refugees invited (according to a quota system). The number of invited refugees is relatively small; the annual quota is currently set at 500, excluding family reunion and excluding special categories — such as the Vietnamese boat people. With the exception of 1979-1981, when respectively 2,218, 2,086 and 1,151 refugees were invited, the number arriving approximately equalled the level of the quota (Muus, 1987). In the period 1986-1990, 3,043 invited refugees were admitted (Muus, 1991). The number of requests for asylum has increased sharply: there were only 386 such requests in 1975, 993 in 1979, 1,214 in 1982, 5,865 in 1986, 13,460 in 1987, 7,486 in 1988, 13,898 in 1989, and 21,615 in 1991. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 give an indication of the wave-like character of asylum migration, responding to political unrest in different parts of the world. The overall percentage of individual asylum requests granted has decreased. In 1982, 63 percent of individual requests were granted, while in 1986 it did not exceed 30 percent (Aalberts, 1987). These percentages need to be interpreted cautiously, however, as the asylum procedure may take several years, and therefore the number of requests granted in any particular year does not relate to the group of requests first made in that year (which explains why the percentage granted may occasionally rise above 100 percent; see Table 2.5). Furthermore, the percentage of requests granted in any period tends to be lower among recent arrivals because they have not yet had the opportunity to complete their legal procedures, which may take several years. It is not clear how many of those whose requests have been refused actually leave the country (see also Section 2.3). Refusal does not necessarily imply deportation, either because those who are denied the formal status of refugee originate from countries to which deportation is not effected due to the general political situation there, or because those refused disappear into 'illegal' residence or leave 'voluntarily'. The developments outlined above have led to a fundamental change in the composition of the migrant stream by origin: generally, in the 1960s immigration was predominantly from the EC countries; they gave way to Turks and Moroccans in the 1970s, and to migrants from developing countries (Asians and Africans) in the 1980s. Current expectations are for a further increase in the latter group, as well as for an increase in the number of migrants from Eastern Europe.

New waves of immigration tend to be dominated by young, unaccompanied men, as is illustrated both by the case of 1960s labour migration from Mediterranean countries, and by the recent refugee migration from developing countries (Tables 2.7-2.9). In 1965, 83 to practically 100 percent of immigration from the Mediterranean area was male. Among all foreign immigrants in that year, three out of four were men, a similar proportion were men aged 20-39 years, and 61 percent were men immigrating alone, without family members. As the migration process 'matures', family reunion becomes more prominent in the total of immigration, as can be shown to have happened among the Turkish and

Table 2.5. Numbers of requests for asylum and percentage granted, 1982-1986, by nationality^a

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	'82-'86	Percent granted
Afghanistan	22	32	34	135	452	675	12.6
Bangladesh	10	0	13	61	214	298	2.0
Chile	23	38	29	26	41	157	94.9
Ethiopia	73	107	136	154	352	822	106.3
Ghana	19	34	23	36	142	254	9.1
Hungary	38	35	24	21	22	140	47.1
India	20	24	53	60	389	546	0.4
Indonesia	20	26	0	38	38	122	130.3
Iran	37	89	341	510	549	1,526	37.3
Iraq	86	24	20	21	19	170	82.4
Lebanon	16	31	37	60	177	321	7.8
Pakistan	192	97	53	98	216	656	8.2
Poland	273	175	209	359	151	1,167	44.1
Rumania	83	59	61	30	51	284	14.8
Somalia	0	0	15	20	76	111	11.7
Sri Lanka	0	41	553	2,090	132	2,816	6.5
Surinam	34	608	306	533	807	2,288	19.4
Syria	14	0	74	113	141	342	9.9
Turkey	99	422	459	1,031	1,380	3,391	50.9
South Africa	12	0	10	36	45	103	54.4
Zaire	0	13	0	34	181	228	0.0
Total	1,071	1,855	2,450	5,466	5,575	16,417	31.5

^a Only those nationalities for which the total number of requests was at least 100.

Source: Aalberts, 1987.

Moroccan population groups. So, by 1985, only 51 percent of the new immigrants from Turkey, 47 percent of those from Morocco, and 60 percent of those from the Southern EC countries were men. No more than a quarter of the foreign immigrants were men travelling alone, and the percentage of men in the age group 20-39 years among all foreign immigrants had declined to 37. The immigration pattern from the Northern EC, the other 'northern' countries, and from Surinam and the Antilles is much more like the Dutch pattern, in terms of their approximately equal representation of men and women among new immigrants. Women even constitute a small majority among the immigrants from 'other Northern countries', Surinam, and the Antilles. For the latter two groups this is partly related to the Caribbean family system, where women often live alone or as single parents. Among the former group, marriage migration may explain the dominance of women.

Table 2.6. Recent developments in the number of asylum seekers, 1987-1991, by nationality

Country	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Total	13,460	7,486	13,898	21,208	21,615
of which:					
Bangladesh	832	214	106	117	66
P.R. China			120	643	1,311
Ethiopia	543	682	885	1,017	816
Ghana	2,515	920	812	715	465
India	1,537	489	261	303	318
Iran	545	641	716	1,724	1,726
Iraq	53	173	361	439	684
Lebanon	408	239	1,107	1,196	213
Nigeria	167	131	417	901	740
Poland	200	461	892	1,185	548
Rumania	64	155	444	2,202	1,662
Somalia	213	395	2,382	1,690	1,710
Soviet Union				224	1,013
Sri Lanka	393	404	884	3,010	1,821
Surinam	1,265	302	166	286	197
Turkey	1,358	381	485	797	914
Yugoslavia	65	121	504	580	2,733
Zaire	1,356	448	680	196	297

Source: Department of Justice.

The shift from economic to social migration can be deduced from data on the profession of new immigrants. In general, the proportion of labourers declined steadily from the mid-1960s, while the proportion of non-workers compensated for this. The few women from Mediterranean countries who migrated in the 1960s and early 1970s were relatively often migrating for work rather than just for family reunion.

Immigrants with Dutch or Northern EC nationalities, as well as immigrants from Surinam and the Antilles, are more likely to be white-collar than blue-collar workers, contrary to those from the Mediterranean countries. But in recent years the proportion of white-collar employees and people in the managerial and free professions among the latter group of immigrants has begun to increase. Furthermore, the orientation of Surinamese and Antillean immigration has shifted from white to blue-collar jobs, as immigration has become less elite and has begun to comprise all layers of society.

Table 2.7. Percentage male among immigrants, by nationality/origin, 1960-1990

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990
Total	52.5	65.6	61.0	54.1	52.1	52.9	55.7
Dutch	50.3	52.1	50.7	49.9	50.2	51.3	50.8
Foreign	57.9	74.7	68.7	59.6	52.9	54.0	57.8
Of which:							
EC-North ^a	52.3	52.5	52.4	53.8	57.0	53.7	54.8
EC-South		83.1	78.7	52.1	61.4	60.5	63.8
Turkey		96.2	77.5	63.1	50.5	51.2	63.6
Morocco		99.6	91.0	73.0	49.9	47.1	62.3
Other 'North' ^b				50.8	51.4	49.7	50.8
Other 'South' ^c				64.4	58.4	62.5	60.7
Surinamese	51.5	51.1	49.3	49.5	48.7	46.8	46.0
Antilleans	51.5	59.5	52.7	49.1	46.3	48.2	46.4

^a 1960-1970: excluding Ireland and Luxembourg.

^b Europe excluding EC and Turkey; North America; Oceania.

^c Africa excluding Morocco; Middle and South America excluding Surinam; Asia.

Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

2.3 | Emigration

2.3.1. Policies

Emigration policy is currently limited to two basic measures: a general return migration policy, as well as a return migration policy directed at older people. The general policy provides financial assistance to people returning to their country of origin. This assistance is limited to a contribution to the costs of moving and a benefit to cover the costs of living during the first months after return migration. The same nationalities are covered by this policy as those whose members may apply under the terms of the return migration policy for older people. This latter policy was instituted on 15 November 1985. Under the new regulation, return migrants are entitled to a monthly benefit payment until they reach their 65th birthday (at which date the payment of regular retirement benefits will take over). The measure is intended for a limited group of older people, namely those who have no realistic chances of finding work any more, and who would prefer to spend the rest of their lives in their country of birth rather than in the Netherlands, but who are prevented from doing so because of financial reasons. This is translated into the following conditions:

Table 2.8. Family composition^a at the time of immigration, 1960-1988

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1988
Dutch							
Not migrating alone							
Household heads							
Men	13.3	12.3	12.3	10.8	12.6	12.4	10.6
Women	5.0	4.2	4.4	6.5	5.4	5.5	5.7
Wives	13.1	12.2	12.2	10.3	12.3	11.9	9.8
Children	29.9	25.7	27.0	31.6	23.5	23.0	22.0
Migrating alone							
Men	21.9	26.7	25.0	23.3	25.8	27.3	29.3
Women	16.8	18.9	19.0	17.5	20.4	19.9	22.9
Foreign							
Not migrating alone							
Household heads							
Men	10.8	6.2	5.9	6.0	4.4	5.7	4.7
Women	2.4	1.9	3.2	6.3	8.3	6.0	5.8
Wives	10.1	5.8	5.4	5.7	4.1	5.5	4.5
Children	22.5	14.2	14.2	22.6	29.5	21.0	18.2
Migrating alone							
Men	35.6	61.3	55.5	41.8	32.8	37.5	40.7
Women	18.5	10.6	15.9	17.6	21.0	24.3	26.1

^a If women immigrate together with their husband they are classified as wives. If children immigrate together with one or both parents they are listed as children. If women immigrate together with one or more children, they are listed as female heads of households. This classification is thus quite independent of marital status.

Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

1. Age group 55-64 years; in November 1987 extended to 50-64 years. From age 65, the formal retirement age, one is entitled to a pension, the payment of which is dependent on accrued entitlements, rather than on country of residence.
2. Unemployment or disability benefits during the last six months.
3. Legal residence in the Netherlands for at least five years.
4. Marriage partners residing in the Netherlands are required to remigrate with the person applying for return migration under this regulation.

Table 2.9. Age distribution of immigrants, by nationality, 1960-1990

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990
Dutch men							
0-19	35.2	32.2	34.8	42.9	30.5	31.3	30.2
20-29	21.0	28.3	28.1	23.5	25.1	22.7	24.5
30-39	22.0	18.7	17.8	15.2	22.5	21.4	19.8
40-49	12.7	11.6	10.6	8.7	10.7	11.9	12.9
50+	9.1	9.2	8.7	9.8	11.1	12.7	12.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Dutch women							
0-19	35.4	34.3	37.1	43.5	31.9	32.9	32.0
20-29	23.6	28.7	29.3	24.0	28.6	24.9	25.1
30-39	20.9	17.3	16.4	14.0	21.4	21.0	19.3
40-49	11.0	10.5	8.8	8.6	8.0	9.5	11.1
50+	9.0	9.2	8.4	9.8	10.1	11.8	12.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Foreign men							
0-19	28.0	13.4	14.5	29.6	44.8	31.0	24.9
20-29	41.8	44.7	44.6	40.9	32.2	36.9	40.9
30-39	16.6	31.5	33.9	20.5	14.3	20.3	23.7
40-49	6.8	7.6	5.0	6.5	5.5	7.7	7.0
50+	6.8	2.7	1.9	2.5	3.1	4.1	3.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Foreign women							
0-19	35.7	34.2	32.6	41.6	46.2	38.2	32.8
20-29	28.7	34.9	40.3	33.1	28.9	33.2	35.6
30-39	16.1	15.9	16.3	15.3	13.1	16.5	19.2
40-49	8.1	7.5	5.8	5.7	7.0	7.1	7.3
50+	11.5	7.5	5.0	4.3	4.7	5.0	5.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

5. Finally, the measure is only applicable to nationals of a limited number of countries: Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, Yugoslavia, and the Cape Verde Islands, that is the non-EC recruitment countries (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 1986).

2.3.2. Size and composition


While the trend in immigration has been upwards in the long run, with large short-term fluctuations, emigration has been much more stable over the past 30 years. Total emigration lies at around 50,000-60,000 persons in most years, with small peaks during years of economic depression. More Dutch than foreign nationals emigrate: emigration levels are around 30,000-40,000 and 20,000-25,000, respectively (Figure 2.5). The net migration (Figure 2.6) of the Dutch has mainly been slightly negative, with the now familiar exception of the years preceding the independence of Surinam (1975). Thus, the net migration trend of foreigners is largely responsible for the total migration balance of the Netherlands.

General trends in emigration by nationality have been described in Section 2.2 (see Figure 2.4). As was observed in the case of immigration, emigration has gradually become more equally distributed across men and women, and again the most equitable distribution is to be found among the Surinamese and Antilleans (Table 2.10). Furthermore, while immigration was often of men travelling alone, who were joined by their families several years later, families are more likely to emigrate together (Table 2.11).

Obviously, the distribution of emigration by different characteristics is strongly influenced by the composition of the resident population. Therefore, it is preferable to relate the emigration statistics to the resident population when possible. Age-gender-specific emigration rates have been calculated for different population groups by nationality or destination, for 1988 (Figure 2.7). The probability of emigration amongst the native population is low, at 4.6 per thousand at most (men aged 25-29 years). The age pattern of the foreigners shows characteristic peaks for young adults (25-39: rates between 43 and 55 per thousand), together with a secondary peak for their young children (32-38 per thousand), and a retirement peak at age 50 and older (especially the age group 55-59 years, at 63 per thousand). Among the women --often married to men a few years older-- these peaks are not quite so pronounced.


A breakdown by the major nationality groups shows considerable differences, both in the probability of emigration and in the age pattern of emigration. Nationals from Northern EC countries show the highest tendency to emigrate, while Surinamese and, at most ages, Moroccans and Turks show the lowest. The age-specific pattern with the two 'young family' peaks is that of the northern EC citizens, predominantly men who only came to the Netherlands for a limited number of years as white-collar employees, together with their families. Young Turkish children are also relatively likely to emigrate, possibly for the purpose of getting an education in Turkey, where they may stay with grandparents or other relatives while their parents remain in the Netherlands.

Figure 2.5. Emigration by nationality, the Netherlands, 1960-1991



Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

Figure 2.6. Net migration by nationality, the Netherlands, 1960-1991



Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

Table 2.10. Percentage of males among emigrants, by nationality/destination, 1960-1990

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990
Total	53.3	57.6	54.7	54.3	54.1	53.2	53.4
Dutch	52.9	50.0	49.3	50.4	51.8	52.2	52.2
Foreign	55.6	73.0	65.8	60.1	57.5	54.4	55.5
Of which:							
EC-North ^a	52.0	56.2	56.2	55.6	59.2	55.7	54.2
EC-South		88.9	78.9	72.0	59.9	57.6	59.8
Turkey		96.8	88.9	59.8	52.5	49.7	56.6
Morocco		99.6	93.5	72.0	55.5	52.5	58.8
Other 'North' ^b				52.2	52.6	52.0	52.1
Other 'South' ^c				60.1	64.0	60.8	58.6
Surinamese	51.5	51.6	49.0	51.1	53.5	51.3	53.8
Antilleans	55.4	54.1	56.2	50.1	48.5	48.2	47.0

^a 1960-1970: excluding Ireland and Luxembourg.

^b Europe excluding EC and Turkey; North America; Oceania.

^c Africa excluding Morocco; Middle and South America excluding Surinam; Asia.

Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

Among both the Turks and the Moroccans the emigration rates surge upwards from age 55 and older (the rates at ages 65 and older are fairly unreliable, however, due to the small numbers involved). The same can be observed among the Turkish and Moroccan women, though at a lower level. This high emigration rate of older people is caused by the return migration policy instituted in November 1985 (see Section 2.3.1).

Up until now, Turkish nationals in particular have applied for return migration under this regulation; Figure 2.8 illustrates the effect on their emigration rates. Emigration among 55-59 year old Turkish men increased from about 50 per thousand in the period 1981-1985 to 223 per thousand in 1986; among 60-64 year olds the emigration rate went up from about 100 to 265 per thousand. Obviously a 'catch up' effect also plays a role here: in the following years, the rates in both age groups went down considerably: to 107 and 44 per thousand (age group 55-59 years, 1988 and 1990) and to 68 and 49 per thousand (age group 60-64 years) respectively. Extension of the return migration policy in 1987 to 50-54 year old men had a comparable effect. The impact in terms of absolute numbers is fairly small, simply because the target groups are small

Table 2.11. Family composition^a at the time of emigration, by nationality, 1960-1988

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1988
Dutch							
Not migrating alone							
Household heads							
Men	14.3	12.5	13.2	14.9	15.4	13.2	12.8
Women	2.8	4.0	3.8	3.8	3.4	3.9	3.5
Wives	14.2	12.4	13.1	15.0	15.5	13.0	12.0
Children	31.3	25.2	24.1	24.2	23.2	19.7	20.0
Migrating alone							
Men	22.5	24.5	24.0	23.2	24.5	29.1	29.4
Women	15.0	21.4	21.9	18.9	18.1	21.1	22.1
Foreign							
Not migrating alone							
Household heads							
Men	12.2	10.2	12.3	12.3	13.1	12.4	14.1
Women	2.2	1.1	1.7	3.7	3.9	4.5	3.4
Wives	10.9	9.0	10.9	11.5	12.1	12.0	14.0
Children	18.4	13.4	19.7	22.6	24.3	25.2	20.5
Migrating alone							
Men	34.0	56.0	43.5	36.2	32.1	29.5	30.7
Women	22.3	10.3	11.9	13.7	14.5	16.6	17.3

^a If women emigrate together with their husband they are classified as wives. If children emigrate together with one or both parents they are listed as children. If women emigrate together with one or more children, they are listed as female heads of households. This classification is thus quite independent of marital status.

Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

(for instance, in January 1990 the total number of Turkish men aged 50-64 years living in the Netherlands was only 8,800).

An indication of the extent to which original cohorts of immigrants eventually emigrate is provided in Figure 2.9 for all foreigners, and for those of Turkish nationality. Of all foreigners who immigrated in 1970, about half had left the country again within ten years. Among later cohorts return has been slower: of the 1976 cohort about 40 percent left within ten years. Of those who emigrate many do so within only two years of arrival, but the trend is declining

Figure 2.7. Age-sex specific emigration rates by nationality (2.7a-d) or country of birth (2.7e-f), 1988

Figure 2.7a. Dutch and foreign men




Figure 2.7b. Dutch and foreign women




Figure 2.7c. Turkish, Moroccan, Northern EC and Southern EC; men




Figure 2.7d. Turkish, Moroccan, Northern EC and Southern EC; women







Figure 2.7e. Men born in Surinam or the Netherlands Antilles*Figure 2.7f. Women born in Surinam or the Netherlands Antilles*

Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

Figure 2.8. Age-specific emigration rates of men with Turkish nationality, the Netherlands, 1982-1990



Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

(31 percent of the 1970 cohort, 20 percent of the 1985 cohort). Emigration of Turks is both slower (no more than 9-13 percent leave within two years) and at a lower level (no more than 25-30 percent have left within ten years); furthermore, the pattern of decline among successive cohorts is less clear.

Finally, the issue of the emigration of asylum seekers whose request for asylum has been turned down was briefly mentioned in Section 2.2. Asylum procedures may take several years to be completed: some asylum seekers leave before their procedure has ended; others change their address within the country without reporting it to the authorities. Many of those who do actually leave the country do not report their departure to the population register officials either.

This failure to report is not confined to asylum seekers alone. Under-reporting of emigration turns up eventually in the population registers' accounting system, and is then reported and treated as 'administrative corrections'. In Figure 2.10 the general trend in these administrative corrections is presented for the total population of foreigners. The recent increase in the number of asylum seekers explains the recent increase in administrative corrections. The curious disruptions in 1982 and 1989 were due to register counts for 1 January 1983 and 1990 respectively; the errors found were applied to the preceding year.

Figure 2.9. Cumulative emigration of immigration cohorts, by nationality and duration of residence, the Netherlands

Figure 2.9a. All foreigners




Figure 2.9b. Turkish nationals




Figure 2.9c. Moroccan nationals






Figure 2.9d. Other foreign nationals



Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

Figure 2.10. Net administrative corrections by nationality, the Netherlands, 1977-1988



Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

3. THE DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION

3.1 | Nuptiality

Little is known about the marriage behaviour of immigrant populations in the Netherlands, although some studies do report on the age at marriage (Schoorl, 1984), on the status of women in the migrant family (see e.g. Van den Berg-Eldering, 1978; Gemeente Utrecht, 1984; Priester and Brouwer, 1982; Risvanoglu-Bilgin *et al.*, 1986; De Vries, 1987; Schoorl, 1990), or on the incidence of mixed marriage (see e.g. Gooskens, 1979; Shadid, 1979; Brassé and Van Schelven, 1980; Schoorl, 1982; Lindo, 1988; Veenman, 1989).

In addition to stock data from surveys, flow-type information is available from the marriage registration system. Problems with the interpretation of these data are related to the following issues (cf. e.g. Price and Zubrzycki, 1962):

1. The statistical definition of the sub-populations does not normally permit the delineation of homogeneous marriage markets. For example, the Chinese marriage market is wider than one specific nationality group and wider than one country of birth; the Surinamese marriage market is split up into several sub-markets according to ethnic-religious differentiation (Creole, Hindustani, etc.). Furthermore, a host of social and psychological characteristics other than 'ethnicity' play a role in the functioning of a marriage market.
2. Most countries have data pertaining only to the number of marriages contracted within the country. Biases occur when one or both partners return to the country of origin for the marriage ceremony, and/or when the marriage is contracted at an embassy or consular representation.
3. The size and age-sex composition of a specific population group influences the opportunities for marriage within the group, irrespective of the preferences for in- or outmarriage (cf. Gray, 1987, 1989; McCaa, 1989).

The Dutch marriage registration system partially solves the problem of marriages contracted 'abroad' (including those contracted at embassies or consular.

offices): marriage data are available for all residents registered in the population registers (see also Appendix 1). In 1991, those contracted 'abroad' form about four percent of all marriages, and even 22 percent of all marriages in which at least one of the partners has a foreign nationality. However, while marriages contracted in the Netherlands according to Dutch civil procedure are reported monthly to the Central Bureau of Statistics, marriages contracted 'abroad' are reported to the CBS only if they are reported to the registrar within one year of the marriage. This causes a fairly substantial gap between the municipal data and those at the national level with regard to marriage-related statistics, especially where marriages between two foreigners are concerned (the marriages most likely to be contracted 'abroad'). For example, it was found that the proportion married among the Turkish women in the Netherlands aged 20-24 years was 64 percent on January 1, 1981 according to calculations based on the marriage statistics; however, a corrected figure based on a register count for January 1, 1983 puts the 1981 figure at approximately 81 percent. There were comparable underestimations for Moroccan women and for the other important marriage-age groups (15-19 and 25-29) (Schoorl, 1984). Therefore, the data presented below (Tables 3.1-3.4) should be interpreted with caution, as they are likely to over-estimate the occurrence of intermarriage.

Even so, Table 3.1 shows that, obviously, the vast majority of marriages are between two Dutch partners, but that there was a decline from about 96 percent in the 1960s to 87 percent in 1991. When corrected to include marriages between residents contracted 'abroad': 84 percent of all marriages in 1991 were between two Dutch nationals. This trend obviously reflects the increase in the foreign population as well as the change in their composition from a population dominated by married workers to a population in which many of the children of immigrants have reached marriageable ages (see Section 2.1).

Looking in more detail into the marriage behaviour of different population groups, it appears that in 1988 3.5 percent of all marriages are with or between partners born in Surinam, the Netherlands Antilles or Aruba (Table 3.2). Furthermore, while on average 52 percent of the marriages involving foreign men are with Dutch women, this percentage varies from 92 among men with Surinamese nationality to only 16 among Turkish men (Table 3.3). The relatively high percentages of British and Pakistani men marrying women of another (foreign) nationality is related to the absence of similarity between marriage markets based on nationality, and those influenced by ethno-cultural factors.

The differences between population groups in the incidence of mixed marriage observed in the aggregated data in Table 3.3 are confirmed by survey-based studies. This is most evident in the low incidence of mixed marriage among Turks and Moroccans (groups characterized by a recent migration history and a relatively wide cultural and religious 'distance' from the Dutch population), and its frequent occurrence among West and South European migrants (Shadid, 1979; Brassé and Van Schelven, 1980; Schoorl, 1982; Lindo, 1988).

Table 3.1. Marriages in which at least one of the partners resides in the Netherlands, by nationality group of both partners (marriages contracted in the Netherlands or 'abroad'^a), 1965-1991

Year		Dutch husband and		Foreign husband and		Total (= 100%)
		Dutch wife	foreign wife	Dutch wife	foreign wife	
1965	in Neth.	95.6	1.2	3.0	0.3	108,517
1970	in Neth.	96.0	1.2	2.5	0.3	123,631
1975	in Neth.	95.0	1.8	2.7	0.5	100,081
1980	in Neth.	92.1	3.4	3.7	0.9	90,182
1985	in Neth.	92.9	2.9	3.5	0.8	82,747
1986	in Neth.	92.8	3.0	3.4	0.7	86,927
1986	'abroad'	3.8	21.4	6.5	68.3	2,657
1986	total	90.2	3.6	3.5	2.8	89,584
1988	in Neth	91.1	3.5	4.5	1.0	87,402
1988	'abroad'	5.3	19.5	7.0	68.2	4,581
1988	'total'	86.8	4.3	4.6	4.3	91,983
1990	in Neth.	88.5	4.6	6.0	0.9	95,130
1990	'abroad'	7.2	19.1	9.1	64.5	4,810
1990	total	84.6	5.3	6.1	4.0	99,940
1991	in Neth	86.9	5.1	6.8	1.2	87,402
1991	'abroad'	8.5	19.1	9.5	62.8	4,581
1991	'total'	83.8	5.6	6.9	3.7	91,983

^a Marriages contracted 'abroad' (but involving at least one person registered with a population register in the Netherlands) include both marriages contracted outside the Netherlands, and marriages contracted at an embassy or consular representation in the Netherlands.

Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

Table 3.2. Marriages in which at least one of the partners resides in the Netherlands, by country of birth of both partners (marriages contracted in the Netherlands or 'abroad')

Year	Nh Nw	Nh Sw	Nh Aw	Sh Nw	Ah Nw	Sh Aw	Ah Sw	Sh Sw	Ah Aw	Total (100%)
1986	97.0	0.6	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.0	1.4	0.1	89,584
1987	97.1	0.6	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.1	90,039
1988	96.5	0.8	0.3	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.1	91,983

A: Netherlands Antilles and Aruba

h: husband

N: Netherlands or other countries

w: wife

S: Surinam

Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

Moroccan women and Turkish men and women marry young, relative to the total population of the Netherlands (Table 3.4). By the age of 25, 76 percent of Turkish men in the Netherlands have already married, compared to just 22 percent of 25-year-old Dutch men. Over 95 percent of Turkish and Moroccan women aged 30 are ever-married, while this is so for only 73 percent of Dutch women of that age; the figure is even lower for 30-year-old EC women: 69 percent. The current distribution by marital status is not only a function of the nuptiality pattern in the Netherlands and in the countries of origin, but also of immigration policy. Since about 1973, immigration has in fact only been possible for non-EC foreigners in the context of family reunion (unmarried dependent children and married partners), or asylum. In the early days of family reunion, therefore, almost all adult Turkish and Moroccan women (as well as women from other non-EC recruitment countries) were married.

Furthermore, in the past decade and a half the second generation has grown up and they tend to marry later than the previous generation. This delay in marriage is probably partly due to social processes of assimilation and modernization, and partly to the difficulties experienced by young people in meeting the legal requirements (of sufficient income and suitable housing) for family reunion with their newly married partners (Schoorl, 1984, 1989).

Finally, no statistical data are available on cohabitation and on divorce. It is thought that divorce among Turkish and Moroccan couples is increasing, though the percentages are still very small. Again, this is a function of immigration policy --only married partners are admitted-- as well as a consequence of the disruptive influence of the migration process. In a sample of Turkish and

Table 3.3. Marriages in which at least one of the partners resides in the Netherlands (marriages contracted in the Netherlands or 'abroad'), by nationality of both partners, 1988

Nationality of groom	Total (100%)	Nationality of bride		
		Dutch nationality	Same as groom	Other nationality
Total	91,983	91.4	3.9	4.7
Dutch	83,799	95.3	-	4.7
Foreign	8,184	51.6	43.9	4.6
Belgium	219	81.7	11.9	6.4
FRG	285	80.7	14.4	4.9
UK	433	72.1	15.7	12.2
Italy	151	80.8	13.2	6.0
Spain	118	58.5	33.1	8.5
Yugoslavia	166	51.8	45.2	3.0
Turkey	2,205	15.9	83.2	0.9
Morocco	1,402	22.9	75.4	1.7
Egypt	264	87.5	4.2	8.3
Ghana	337	89.6	4.2	6.2
USA	232	84.5	8.2	7.3
Surinam	435	91.7	6.2	2.1
Indonesia	83	70.0	26.5	3.6
India	172	87.2	5.8	7.0
Pakistan	190	68.9	18.9	12.1
P.R. China	62	33.9	64.5	1.6

Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

Moroccan ever-married women aged 15-49 years (1984), only one and three percent respectively were found to be divorced (Schoorl, 1989). Another study from the same time found that one percent of the Turkish heads of household (aged 18 and older) and three percent of the Moroccan ones were divorced, while among both groups one percent were widowed (CBS, LSO 1984).

Table 3.4. Percentage ever-married at age 20, 25, 30, and 35 years, by sex and nationality, January 1, 1991

Age	Dutch		Foreign		EC		Turks		Moroccans	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
20	0.6	4.2	15.3	46.6	1.6	12.3	31.9	66.9	4.0	48.9
25	21.8	43.0	46.5	69.1	20.8	44.6	76.3	90.3	45.6	84.3
30	58.5	73.2	63.8	82.0	48.4	69.2	90.0	96.6	77.8	95.0
35	77.5	86.0	75.7	87.2	67.5	80.7	94.0	98.4	87.3	98.5

Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

3.2 | Fertility

Relatively extensive information about the fertility of foreigners is available in the Netherlands, both from registration sources and from surveys of the major immigrant/minority groups. With the increase in family reunion, the number of foreign births has increased as well (Tables 3.5 and 3.6). Until 1985 a child received its father's nationality at birth, irrespective of the nationality of its mother; only if the father was unknown, the child received its mother's nationality. Children born since January 1, 1985 receive the Dutch nationality if at least one of the parents has Dutch nationality. Therefore, a clear break in the number of foreign births in 1985 is apparent, relative to the previous year (Table 3.5; this is also reflected in the age structure of the foreign population: see Figure 2.1 in Section 2.1).

The percentage of foreign births slowly increased from five percent in the mid-1970s to eight percent in 1981; it currently stands at about seven percent. The impact of foreign births on the birth rate is limited: the crude birth rate in 1990 was 13.2 per thousand of the total population, and only slightly lower per thousand of the population of Dutch nationality, at 12.9 per thousand (and 20.2 per thousand among the population with foreign nationality).

If the births of infants with Dutch nationality to mothers born in Surinam or the Netherlands Antilles are included, the percentage of 'non-native' births is currently around 9.7 percent. This is higher than the share of the non-native population in the total population of the Netherlands, partially due to the young age structure of the non-native population, and partly due to the relatively high fertility of some of the foreign women. The number of births of infants with a Northern EC nationality was fairly stable in the decade prior to 1985.

Table 3.5. Number of births by nationality, 1976-1991

	Total ^a	Dutch	Foreign ^b						
			Total	EC-N ^c	EC-S ^d	Turks	Moroc- cans	Other North ^e	Other South ^f
Absolute numbers									
1976	177,090	168,297	8,793	1,604	1,262	2,551	1,606	817	774
1977	173,296	163,119	10,177	1,737	1,187	3,297	2,032	734	1,037
1978	175,550	164,481	11,069	1,755	1,022	3,676	2,371	817	1,307
1979	174,979	162,865	12,114	1,817	907	4,076	2,806	749	1,675
1980	181,294	167,717	13,577	1,790	986	4,697	3,126	779	2,123
1981	179,691	165,224	14,467	1,862	912	5,146	3,475	709	2,287
1982	172,071	158,747	13,324	1,799	725	4,466	3,709	630	1,942
1983	170,246	156,980	13,266	1,683	707	4,479	3,812		
1984	174,436	161,421	13,015	1,662	624	4,318	3,955		
1985	178,136	167,240	10,896	1,016	330	4,096	3,916		
1986	184,513	173,748	10,765	828	264	4,206	3,980	322	1,109
1987	186,667	175,143	11,524	650	226	4,753	4,293	298	1,282
1988	186,647	173,888	12,261	625	213	5,327	4,508	316	1,213
1989	188,979	175,532	12,901	542	250	5,788	4,747	274	1,241
1990	197,965	183,900	13,485	569	246	6,019	4,788	356	1,421
1991	198,665	185,023	13,642	657	237	6,051	4,631	398	1,582
In %									
1976	100	95.0	5.0	18.2	14.4	29.0	18.3	9.3	8.8
1977	100	94.1	5.9	17.1	11.7	32.4	20.0	7.2	10.2
1978	100	93.7	6.3	15.9	9.2	33.2	21.4	7.4	11.8
1979	100	93.1	6.9	15.0	7.5	33.6	23.2	6.2	13.8
1980	100	92.5	7.5	13.2	7.3	34.6	23.0	5.7	15.6
1981	100	91.9	8.1	12.9	6.3	35.6	24.0	4.9	15.8
1982	100	92.3	7.7	13.5	5.4	33.5	27.8	4.7	14.6
1983	100	92.2	7.8	12.7	5.3	33.8	28.7		
1984	100	92.5	7.5	12.8	4.8	33.2	30.4		
1985	100	93.9	6.1	9.3	3.0	37.6	35.9		
1986	100	94.2	5.8	7.7	2.5	39.1	37.0	3.0	10.3
1987	100	93.8	6.2	5.6	2.0	41.2	37.3	2.6	11.1
1988	100	93.2	6.6	5.1	1.7	43.4	36.8	2.6	9.9
1989	100	92.9	6.8	4.2	1.9	44.9	36.8	2.1	9.6
1990	100	92.9	6.8	4.2	1.8	44.6	35.5	2.6	10.5
1991	100	93.1	6.9	4.8	1.7	44.4	34.0	2.9	11.6

^a Including children born alive who died before birth registration.

^b Including stateless and unknown.

^c Belgium, Denmark, F.R. Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, United Kingdom.

^d Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain.

^e Europe excluding EC and Turkey; North America; Oceania.

^f Africa excluding Morocco; Asia; Middle and South America.

Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

Table 3.6. Live births by mother's country of birth and nationality, 1977-1990

Year	Total births	Country of birth of the mother					
		Surinam			Netherlands Antilles		
		Total	%	Of which: % w. Dutch citizenship	Total	%	Of which: % w. Dutch citizenship
1977	173,296	2,065	1.2	94.8			
1978	175,550	2,216	1.3	92.6			
1979	174,979	2,499	1.4	87.6			
1980	181,294	3,274	1.8	84.6			
1981	178,569	3,407	1.9	83.9			
1982	172,071	3,462	2.0	90.4			
1983	170,246	3,559	2.1	91.3	743	0.4	97.2
1984	174,436	3,886	2.2	93.2	740	0.4	98.1
1985	178,136	4,164	2.3	97.4	824	0.5	99.2
1986	184,513	4,197	2.3	97.5	941	0.5	99.8
1987	186,667	4,083	2.2	96.8	1,012	0.5	99.4
1988	186,647	4,290	2.3	96.1	1,101	0.6	99.5
1989	188,979	4,109	2.2	95.9	1,195	0.6	99.5
1990	197,965	4,295	2.2	96.1	1,360	0.7	99.5

Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

However, the legal change by which infants born to Dutch mothers receive Dutch nationality has influenced this group considerably, reducing the number of births by 50 percent, indicating the importance of mixed marriage in this population group. The same applies to the Southern EC births, but their number was already declining in the 1970s, probably a function of the decrease in the number of women of procreative age in the Netherlands with Southern EC nationalities. The 1985 legal change has influenced the number of births of infants assigned the nationalities of the category 'other North' (Europe excluding EC and Turkey; North America and Oceania) as well, and to a lesser extent this also seems to apply to those from the group of 'other South' (Africa excluding Morocco; Asia, and Middle and South America), though there is a data gap for the years 1983 to 1985 inclusive.

Turkish and Moroccan births are far less influenced by this phenomenon, though the existence of a slight dip in 1985 is partly obscured by the overall increase in the number of births in this group. The increase itself can be

attributed to the fact that the children and daughters of the original labour migrants are now reaching procreative age.

In 1990, there were 19,000 'non-native' births (those of infants with a foreign nationality, as well as those to Dutch mothers born in Surinam or the Netherlands Antilles). Of these, 57 percent were Turkish or Moroccan, 30 percent were of Surinamese or Antillean descent, 7 percent had nationalities of 'other South', with the remaining 6 percent belonging to EC or 'other North' nationalities (Tables 3.5 and 3.6).

Research focuses on the issue of the adaptation of fertility behaviour among immigrant population groups towards that of the total population. The issue of high immigrant fertility has a strong policy component, and at times an emotional one. For instance, the geographical concentration of foreign families, especially the relatively large ones of Turkish and Moroccan origin, in poor inner-city neighbourhoods, strengthened by the out-migration of native Dutch families from these areas has resulted in the emergence of 'black' schools.

The majority of foreign births is to Turkish and Moroccan mothers. In 1990, one in twenty births in the Netherlands belonged to either of these two groups. Turkish and Moroccan women have relatively high fertility: the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for Moroccan women was 5.5 in 1990 and that for Turkish women was 3.1. The TFR for the total female population of the Netherlands is 1.6 (Table 3.7; Figure 3.1). Fertility among the other groups is at least as low as among the total population; only among women born in Surinam is the TFR somewhat higher, at 1.9 in 1990.

The relatively high fertility of some foreign groups has only marginal influence on the TFR for the total population: while for all foreign women the rate was 2.26 in 1990, it was 1.59 for the Dutch, and only slightly higher (1.62) for the total population.

The interpretation of these period rates is fraught with difficulty. In the first place, before 1985, foreign births to Dutch mothers were included in the rates for foreigners but the mothers were not¹, resulting in artificially high rates. This was a problem more serious among population groups characterized by a strong tendency towards mixed marriage, like those from EC countries and North America, and those with Surinamese nationality. This explains the 1985 dip in the rates for many of the countries in Table 3.7. A second problem is related to the fact that the rates are likely to be influenced by the degree of immigration relative to the size of the resident population. The process of immigration is strongly connected with marriage; furthermore, immigration may disrupt the process of family formation. Therefore high proportions of newly arrived women in the total group of women of procreative age are likely to raise the total fertility rate. Finally, the rate suffers from the usual interpretative


¹ Dutch births to foreign mothers are included neither in the pre- nor in the post-1985 rates, but the mothers are.

Table 3.7. Total fertility rates^a per thousand women by nationality/country of birth, 1976-1990

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Total	1642	1589	1592	1568	1600	1559	1496	1470	1493	1511	1553	1561	1551	1560	1623
Nationality															
Dutch										1477	1525	1528	1517	1524	1590
Foreign										2428	2271	2367	2327	2304	2256
Turkey	4580	5058	4968	4796	4759	4592	3726	3527	3305	3044	2915	3071	3204	3170	3076
Morocco	8017	8083	7368	7228	6960	6658	6278	5948	5853	5475	5205	5225	5105	4965	4690
Belgium	1012	1111	1031	1092	1107	1204	967	994	1060	522	525	302	306	240	265
FRG	2492	2156	1934	1809	1760	1565	1591	1369	1303	836	501	353	316	330	315
UK	2603	2480	2327	2332	2128	2259	2122	1978	1935	1197	993	869	792	615	567
Italy	5872	5369	4253	4301	4655	4648	3307	3510	3123	1050	810	505	506	437	465
Spain	2819	2909	2686	2423	2584	2320	1932	1834	1650	1074	765	640	573	676	600
Yugoslavia	2301	2192	2642	2426	2514	2421	1998	1925	1798	1593	1496	1211	1549	1358	1355
Country of birth															
Surinam		1694	1733	1753	1949	1860	1842	1849	1945	2024	1986	1882	1940	1849	1887
Neth. Antilles								1357	1331	1463	1544	1545	1548	1613	1784

^a Based on age-specific rates by mother's age at occurrence (nationality) or mother's age at 31 December (country of birth).
Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

Figure 3.1. Total fertility rates by nationality, 1976-1988 ^a



^a Before 1985, a foreign 'head of the family' resulted in a foreign child; thereafter both parents needed to be foreign.

Source: Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

problems in times when the level and/or the timing of fertility is changing. Though these data-problems demand caution in the interpretation of the rates, it is beyond doubt that the fertility level of Turkish and especially Moroccan women is rather high. This is brought about by higher fertility in all age groups (Table 3.8). Furthermore, there seem to be indications of a decline in the fertility level of women belonging to these two ethnic groups. As far as Turkish women are concerned, the decline has occurred in all age groups: in an absolute sense the decrease was strongest among women under 30 years of age, but viewed relatively it was strongest among those aged 30 or older. Among Moroccan women the decline in age-specific fertility rates is mainly due to the behaviour of younger women (15-29 years). The age distribution of Moroccan immigrant fertility remains less concentrated than that of Turkish immigrants. To a large extent the decline in TFRs among Turkish and Moroccan women can be attributed to a decrease in the percentage of women married at younger ages. This decrease in turn is probably related to the following phenomena:

1. Legal requirements for family reunion resulted in a disproportionately high share of married women in the original adult female immigrant population. This imbalance decreases as their daughters grow up.

*Table 3.8. Age-specific fertility rates per thousand women by nationality/
country of birth, 1976-1990^a*

	Year	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49
Turkey	1976	109.8	279.2	218.6	138.7	96.1	54.5	19.2
	1977	132.8	396.7	237.9	179.4	93.7	46.2	15.0
	1978	158.1	289.1	229.6	159.9	97.0	40.6	19.2
	1979	146.9	302.8	220.8	142.8	92.9	42.2	10.9
	1980	130.5	299.6	224.6	149.8	92.8	37.4	17.0
	1981	131.1	289.2	227.5	143.9	77.5	39.1	10.1
	1982	95.8	239.9	189.4	118.9	68.3	25.4	7.3
	1983	90.6	236.5	180.1	113.2	60.0	18.7	6.3
	1984	81.8	216.9	171.8	110.7	54.5	20.3	4.9
	1985	74.3	191.1	175.3	98.5	47.0	18.1	4.5
	1986	76.7	195.1	152.0	93.4	48.6	13.2	3.8
	1987	91.0	204.9	160.1	97.1	43.4	14.2	3.6
	1988	98.2	213.9	165.4	100.5	47.4	13.2	2.3
	1989	100.4	216.9	161.3	98.8	41.3	11.8	3.6
1990	102.8	195.9	162.0	100.3	40.6	11.5	2.1	
Morocco	1976	172.0	397.1	354.2	291.3	218.8	127.8	42.2
	1977	168.1	351.3	384.6	286.2	244.7	117.1	64.7
	1978	137.0	355.1	348.9	277.8	209.0	108.7	37.2
	1979	118.7	342.9	352.8	274.8	195.3	113.5	47.8
	1980	96.5	310.9	318.7	288.0	194.2	121.2	62.4
	1981	75.5	309.0	298.8	275.4	199.2	123.3	50.3
	1982	74.2	287.3	298.3	269.6	189.5	96.5	40.3
	1983	69.8	270.7	287.5	249.1	179.7	92.7	40.0
	1984	64.5	255.8	269.8	257.6	196.4	93.5	32.9
	1985	73.2	223.9	267.0	219.7	183.4	86.4	41.5
	1986	63.8	221.1	253.0	201.1	161.0	93.2	47.9
	1987	63.1	213.9	256.7	209.2	172.7	96.1	33.2
	1988	59.2	215.5	248.1	192.8	170.7	91.9	42.9
	1989	54.5	218.4	251.0	188.6	153.5	87.3	39.7
1990	47.4	203.4	232.6	362.8	134.1	79.1	48.9	
Surinam	1977	34.1	102.4	109.5	61.6	24.3		3.4
	1978	28.3	103.7	112.5	65.1	25.4		5.7
	1979	30.3	96.2	114.6	68.8	31.4		4.7
	1980	33.6	118.5	122.2	72.9	33.0		4.9
	1981	28.3	110.4	119.8	74.4	32.3		3.4
	1982	26.3	105.0	122.4	77.0	27.6		5.0
	1983	26.9	106.9	117.8	75.3	32.9		5.0
	1984	27.9	112.7	125.3	84.1	29.1		5.0
	1985	26.3	122.0	124.8	90.5	34.1		3.5
	1986	22.7	116.0	127.3	86.0	36.2		4.5
	1987	21.6	105.2	119.1	86.1	35.7		4.3
1988	22.1	102.9	125.7	87.3	40.0		4.9	

^a Based on age-specific rates by nationality and mother's age at occurrence (Turkey, Morocco) or by mother's country of birth and mother's age at 31 December (Surinam).

Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

2. For young people it is difficult to meet the legal requirements regarding immigration permits for non-resident marriage partners, especially if they are unemployed or earn the minimum youth wage.
3. Social processes of 'assimilation' and 'modernization' may be expressed in longer education for girls, a greater command over the timing of marriage and the choice of partners by young people (Schoorl, 1984).

More reliable information on fertility behaviour comes from survey data. In the Netherlands, every three or four years a fertility survey (Onderzoek Gezinsvorming — OG) is held among women in the main reproductive age groups, but the sample is too small to include sufficient non-native women, while furthermore the interviews are held only in the Dutch language. One small-scale fertility survey has been held among women of Turkish or Moroccan nationality (Immigrant Fertility Survey, IFS: NIDI, 1984); and another set of single-round surveys has been held among Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, and Antillean heads of household (Leefsituatie-onderzoeken — LSO: CBS, 1985b, 1986a, 1986b, 1987, 1988a). While these household surveys were primarily concerned with socio-economic issues, a number of questions about fertility were also included.

The decline in fertility levels among the Turkish and Moroccan immigrant groups which was inferred from the trend in period rates is also apparent from retrospective cumulative data for birth cohorts, especially among women aged 30 years or older (Table 3.9). For instance, Turkish immigrant women born in the years 1935-1939, 1940-1944, and 1945-1949, had, by the time they were 35-39 years old, given birth to an average of respectively 4.5 children (in 1974), 4.0 children (in 1979), and 3.5 children (in 1984). Successive birth cohorts of Moroccan immigrant women showed an even faster decline: from 6.4 to 5.9, to 4.1 children at ages 35-39 years in the respective birth cohorts. Some survey data on the number of surviving children are presented in Table 3.10. The LSO-data are not completely comparable due to the fact that the information is based on the number of children of the head of household/reference person, usually a man (his data are related to his current wife). Again, the relatively high fertility of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants is apparent from the data in Table 3.10. On the other hand, immigrant fertility is lower than fertility in the countries of origin, and the difference becomes more marked at higher ages, up to ages 35-39. An exception is formed by Moroccan women in their forties: women in Morocco have borne more children than immigrant women but they have also lost more children. The currently observed lower fertility among the Turkish and Moroccan immigrant women relative to that of women in the countries of origin is partly a function of differences in their distribution according to a number of characteristics (e.g. region of origin, level of education). Whereas before a couple's migration there is little evidence of fertility differences between women in the countries of

Table 3.9. Number of children ever born to Turkish and Moroccan women in the Netherlands, by birth cohort and current age of woman

Age	Birth cohort						
	1935-39	1940-44	1945-49	1950-54	1955-59	1960-64	1965-69
<i>Turkish women</i>							
15-19	0,2	0,4	0,3	0,2	0,3	0,3	(1,0)
20-24	1,0	1,4	1,2	1,4	1,3	1,7	
25-29	2,6	2,5	2,2	2,5	2,4		
30-34	3,6	3,6	3,0	3,3			
35-39	4,5	4,0	3,5				
40-44	4,9	4,4					
45-49	5,1						
<i>Moroccan women</i>							
15-19	0,9	0,2	0,4	0,3	0,3	0,2	(0,4)
20-24	1,1	1,9	1,0	1,4	1,2	1,6	
25-29	3,2	3,9	2,5	2,9	2,6		
30-34	5,2	5,2	3,4	3,9			
35-39	6,4	5,9	4,1				
40-44	6,8	6,3					
45-49	7,4						

() Fewer than 10 observations.

Source: IFS, 1984; Schoorl, 1989.

origin and women about to migrate, the process of family formation starts to be disrupted when the husband moves abroad, often followed only some years later by his wife (Schoorl, 1989).

Obviously, the disruptive process does not influence all women equally: the current group of adult immigrant women consists of a small --and declining-- group who were married before their husband's migration, a sizeable group who married men already living in the Netherlands, and a small (outgrowing) group who grew up in the Netherlands. Thus, the post-migration share of the fertility of immigrant women is becoming more important relative to the pre-

Table 3.10. Number of surviving children by nationality, country of residence and age of mother

Age	Turkish nationality			Moroccan nationality			Neth. OG/SIN 1982
	Netherlands		Turkey	Netherlands		Morocco	
	IFS	LSO	WFS	IFS	LSO	WFS	
	1984	1984	1983	1984	1984	1980	
15-19	0.8	1.1	0.6	0.4	2.1	0.7	0.2
20-24	1.6	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	0.5
25-29	2.3	2.2	2.5	2.5	2.9	2.8	1.1
30-34	3.1	3.2	3.4	3.8	3.8	4.2	1.8
35-39	3.5	3.7	4.0	4.0	4.7	5.1	2.0
40-44	3.8	4.0	4.2	6.3	5.3	5.7	..
45-49	4.5	4.3	4.4	6.8	6.3	5.5	..
Total	2.7	3.3	3.0	3.9	4.0	3.8	..
Standard ^a	2.9	2.8	3.0	3.7	3.7	3.8	..

^a Standard is the combined population of Turkish and Moroccan women in the Netherlands.

Sources: Schoorl, 1990; Hacettepe, 1981; Enquête Nationale, 1984; CBS, LSO 1984.

arrival portion in the aggregate figures. Currently, 43 percent of married Turkish women under the age of 50 arrived in the Netherlands either during childhood or at the start of their marriage; among Moroccan women this percentage is still quite low (26 percent). When analyzed, for age and marriage duration, it appears that this group has fewer children than the primary migrants², and also has a lower expected family size (Table 3.11).

Multiple classification analyses have been carried out by Van Hoorn (1987, 1988), Van Praag (in: Schoorl, 1989), and Schoorl (1989) on the influence of a limited number of variables on the fertility level of the largest immigrant population groups in the Netherlands: Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, and Antilleans, based on IFS and LSO data. The results indicate that the more

² That is, those women who spent part of their married life in the country of origin.

Table 3.11. Average expected family size by duration of marriage, nationality and type of 'family reunion'

Duration marriage	Turkish nationality		Moroccan nationality	
	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
0- 4	2.5	2.4	2.8	3.3
5- 9	3.5	2.6	3.6	2.8
10-14	3.5	2.9	4.1	3.3
15-19	3.2	*	4.7	*
20+	4.3	-	6.3	-

* Insufficient data

Primary: Those who spent part of their married life in the country of origin.

Secondary: Those who migrated during childhood or at marriage.

Source: Schoorl, IFS, 1984.

advanced a woman's education and the longer the duration of her residence in the Netherlands, the lower the number of her children ever born. Other factors, like region of origin, knowledge of the Dutch language, and ties with the country of origin (e.g. home ownership) are less important especially for Turks and Moroccans. Among the Surinamese and Antilleans, education and duration of residence are also important, further correlations exist with religion, the woman's participation in the labour force and --among the Surinamese-- the region of origin.

The decline in fertility among Turkish and Moroccan immigrant women is partly due to a decrease in desired or expected family size (observed especially among the better educated who spent most of their married life in the Netherlands, and who live in the Netherlands for many years). To reach fertility goals, the vast majority of immigrant women use contraception, and in that respect they differ greatly from the women in the countries of origin (Table 3.12). No more than half the 30-34 year old women in Turkey, and only a quarter of those in Morocco, use contraception, while 80 percent of the immigrant women do. More recent data from surveys in Turkey and Morocco indicate an increase in contraceptive use in those countries, but there remains a considerable difference between migrant and non-migrant women in this respect (Hacettepe University, 1987; Enquête Nationale, 1989).

Table 3.12. Percentage of all married women currently using contraception, by age group, country, and nationality

Age	Turkish women		Moroccan women		
	Neth. 1984	Turkey 1978	Neth. 1984	Morocco 1980	Neth. 1982
15-19	80	15	40	9	81
20-24	75	32	52	15	78
25-29	81	41	70	19	76
30-34	81	51	85	23	77
35-39	78	45	73	20	76
40-44	60	37	68	20	65
45-49	45	20	45	10	57

Sources: Schoorl, 1989; Hacettepe, 1981; Enquête Nationale, 1984; CBS, 1984.

There is little difference between the percentages of Dutch and Turkish women in the Netherlands who use contraception; only among the younger Moroccan immigrant women do relatively few use contraception, due to the fact that many of them either are pregnant or want to become so.

Table 3.13 provides some data on the type of contraceptive methods used. The pill is the method employed by most women in the Netherlands; after the age of 30 sterilization is more frequently resorted to by Dutch women. Of the women in Turkey who use contraception in the age groups 35-39 and 40-44, only 5 and 3 percent respectively are sterilized; the percentages among the immigrants in those age groups are 21 and 28 percent (among the Dutch: 43 percent). As one would expect, the duration of marriage, the present number of children, and the intention to delay the next pregnancy all influence the use of contraception. Furthermore, women from rural areas are less likely to use it, but factors related to migration (like duration of residence in the Netherlands, age at immigration) are not important in this respect. The only exception is formed by women who were already in their forties when they migrated; they are no longer likely to start to use contraception.

Apparently, women were motivated before their departure from Turkey or Morocco to use contraception, but were hampered in doing so by the lack of

Table 3.13. Contraceptive methods used by women 15-44 years of age who are currently using contraception

Women 15-44	Pill	IUD	Sterili- zation	Other (= 100%)	Total	% using contra- ception
Turkish migrants	61	16	11	11	100	75
Turkey	18	8	2	73	100	40
Moroccan migrants	85	5	8	2	100	70
Morocco	72	8	3	17	100	20
Netherlands	39	11	29	21	100	78

Sources: Schoorl, 1989; Hacettepe, 1981; Enquête Nationale, 1984; CBS, LSO 1984.

accessible and available methods. For induced abortions performed in clinics, registration data are available, currently covering about 88 percent of all induced abortions. These registrations are by ethnic group (country of birth). In 1988 there were 15,700 abortions, compared to 14,600 in 1983 and 15,400 in 1982). Of these, the majority were native Dutch women (60 percent), 9.4 percent were Surinamese women, 3.3 percent Antillean, 4.0 percent Turkish, and 1.5 percent Moroccan women. Women from other countries accounted for 11.6 percent of the abortions in 1988, while for 10.5 percent the country of birth was unknown. Abortion occurs relatively frequently among Surinamese and Antillean women, and relatively little among the native Dutch and the Moroccan women (Table 3.14).

For Turkish women, abortion is a method to prevent having a fourth or fifth child rather than to prevent having the first one, as among the Surinamese and Antilleans (Sieval, 1985; Ketting and Leseman, 1986; Rademakers, 1988 and 1990; Schoorl, 1989). This is also illustrated by the distribution of abortions according to the number of children a woman has: of all native Dutch abortion clients in 1988, 61 percent had no children. The percentages for the Antilleans, Moroccans and Surinamese were 45, 38, and 34 respectively, while among the Turkish clients only 14 percent had no children (43 percent had 1 or 2, and 43 percent had 3 or more).

Repeat abortions were most frequent among the Surinamese and Antilleans, of whom 42 and 33 percent respectively had experienced at least one previous abortion; and least frequent among the native Dutch (14 percent) (Rademakers, 1990).

Table 3.14. Estimated number of induced abortions per 1000 women 15-44 years of age; and per 100 known pregnancies (including spontaneous abortion)

	Per 1000 women 15-44				Per 100 pregnancies			
	1982	1984	1986	1988	1982	1984	1985	1988
Native Dutch	4.9	4.5	4.3	3.6	8.9	8.2	7.4	7.0
Surinamese	43.2	30.0	30.1	30.2	37.7	30.1	29.6	30.6
Antilleans	19.4	26.6	25.6	31.5	27.0	33.9	35.4	37.7
Turks	21.5	15.7	17.0	18.1	14.1	11.6	13.1	13.0
Moroccans	9.7	8.6	10.9	11.0	4.4	4.1	5.7	6.4

Source: Ketting and Leseman, 1986; Rademakers, 1988 and 1990.

Thus, Surinamese and Antillean abortion clients tend to be young, single women without a permanent partner, and usually without children. Their contraceptive pattern tends to be less effective, and abortions may occur more than once, depending on the woman's circumstances (Lamur *et al.*, 1990). Moroccan abortion clients too are relatively young, contrary to Turkish women who are older and often have a completed family when they come for abortion (Rademakers, 1990).

Finally, fertility outside marriage is a rare phenomenon in the Turkish and Moroccan communities in the Netherlands (Table 3.15, Figure 3.2). In 1985/86 no more than 1.3 percent of all Moroccan births and 4.0 percent of Turkish births in the Netherlands were non-marital (Tas, 1988). By comparison, the non-marital percentage was 8.7 of births with Dutch nationality and, perhaps rather surprisingly, 13.2 of those with an EC nationality was non-marital. Among the latter, the Italians (27 percent) scored high, followed by the Germans, Danish and Irish (20 percent), and the Belgians, French and Portuguese (15 percent). In the category 'other foreign nationalities', the Surinamese contribute most to the relatively high percentage of non-marital births (60 percent). The frequency of non-marital fertility among Caribbean mothers is even better illustrated by the data in Table 3.16: in 1987 about half of the children born to Caribbean mothers were born outside marriage. Compared to the first half of the 1980s there has been an increase in the percentage of non-

Table 3.15. Non-marital live births by age of mother ^a and nationality

	< 25 years		25-34 years		35 + years		Total	
	abs.	% ^b	abs.	% ^b	abs.	% ^b	abs.	% ^b
1980/1984								
Netherlands	4,586	10.8	4,432	4.0	684	7.5	9,683	6.0
Alien countries	348	6.4	232	3.5	31	2.1	611	4.5
of which:								
EC-countries ^c	76	11.5	79	4.7	12	5.6	187	6.6
Turkey	77	3.0	15	0.9	4	0.8	96	2.1
Morocco	15	1.2	9	0.5	0	0.1	24	0.7
Other alien countries	179	19.3	130	8.1	15	7.3	324	11.8
Total	4,914	10.3	4,665	4.0	715	8.7	10,294	5.9
1985/1988								
Netherlands	5,912	16,1	7,664	6.3	1,324	10.9	14,900	8,7
Alien countries	312	7,0	238	4.7	44	3.4	593	5,5
of which:								
EC-countries ^c	56	21,9	92	10.9	14	11.1	162	13,2
Turkey	119	4,9	39	2.8	7	2.3	165	4,0
Morocco	31	2,3	18	0.9	4	0.8	52	1,3
Other alien countries	107	26,0	90	9,4	19	12,4	215	14,2
Total	8,224	15,1	7,902	6,2	1,368	10,1	15,493	8,5

^a Age at occurrence.


^b As a percentage of all births to mothers of the same age.

^c 11 EC countries (excluding the Netherlands).

Source: Tas, 1988.

marital births, especially among those with EC nationalities. This is related to the change in the law on Dutch nationality, assigning Dutch nationality to all infants born to parents of whom at least one has Dutch nationality. The effect has been to reduce the total number of births of EC nationals, thereby causing the proportion of non-marital births to increase (Tas, 1988).

Figure 3.2. *Non-marital live births, as a percentage of the number of live births by nationality, 1980-1986*^a



^a Before 1985, a foreign 'head of the family' resulted in a foreign child; thereafter, both parents had needed to be foreign.

^b 11 EC countries (excluding the Netherlands)

Source: Based on Tas, 1988.

Table 3.16. *Non-marital births by mother's country of birth, 1977-1988*

Year	Total	Surinam	Year	Total	Surinam	Antilles
1977	2.7	36.7	1983	7.0	41.4	40.8
1978	3.1	39.0	1984	7.7	42.9	47.2
1979	3.4	36.8	1985	8.3	44.9	43.4
1980	4.1	38.7	1986	8.8	46.2	47.4
1981	4.8	36.6	1987	9.3	49.9	50.6
1982	5.9	38.8	1988	10.2	47.3	52.3

Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

3.3 | Mortality

Most of the immigrant populations in the Netherlands have a young age structure, because immigration has been relatively recent. Furthermore, the size of these populations is relatively small. Therefore, the number of deaths observed is small, about 1,600 per year among all foreigners, one percent of all deaths in the country (Table 3.17). The 'older' populations from the Northern EC countries contribute the largest share to the total number of foreign deaths, at around 40 percent. The influence of the foreign population on the death rate is small: the crude death rate was 8.6 per thousand for the total population in 1990, compared to 8.9 for the population of Dutch nationality, and 2.5 for the foreign population.

On the basis of these limited data not much research has been done. There are several theories regarding mortality among labour migrants (from developing countries). On the one hand it is hypothesized that their mortality risk is higher than that of the native population in the host country because they originate from countries with relatively high mortality, and because they usually have heavy and dangerous jobs and a low socio-economic position. Another assumption postulates that the selectivity of migration depresses migrant mortality: they are young, often having to undergo a health check on recruitment, and they may return when ill. This seems most valid at early stages of the migration process; for family reunion this type of selectivity does not apply.

For a few nationalities it is possible to calculate age-specific mortality rates. They are presented as indirectly standardized rates in Table 3.18. There seems to be little difference between the nationality groups. The Moroccan, the EC and the 'other' men have slightly lower mortality than the Dutch, which would be in tune with the second hypothesis; Turkish men and Turkish and Moroccan women have slightly higher mortality rates — and this would be in line with the first hypothesis of higher mortality in the country of origin and low socio-economic position. The latter seems also confirmed by a study on perinatal mortality among several ethnic minority groups in the municipality of Amsterdam in 1985 (Doornbos and Nordbeck, 1985).

In 1985 for the country as a whole, mortality among Turkish and Moroccan 0-year-olds was below the national level, but in previous years it had equalled or exceeded the national figure (Sterfte onder Turkse en Marokkaanse personen in Nederland, 1983). The data for Amsterdam indicate Turkish and Moroccan rates for infant mortality and mortality among 1-3 year olds in the early 1980s which were higher than average; among the Surinamese, perinatal and infant mortality was not significantly higher than among the total Amsterdam population.

Perinatal mortality among children born at home (rather than in the hospital) among the immigrant groups (Mediterranean, Caribbean, and Asian countries) was found to be substantially higher than among the Dutch born at home, which

Table 3.17. Number of deaths by nationality, 1976-1990

	1976		1980		1985		1986		1988		1990	
	abs.	%										
Total ^a	114,454	100.0	114,279	100.0	122,704	100.0	125,307	100.0	124,163	100.0	128,824	100.0
Dutch	113,373	99.1	112,919	98.8	121,196	98.8	123,817	98.8	122,195	98.2	126,603	98.3
Foreign	1,081	0.9	1,360	1.2	1,508	1.2	1,490	1.2	1,470	1.2	1,641	1.3
Total foreign		100.0		100.0		100.0		100.0		100.0		100.0
EC-North	459	42.5	564	41.5	631	41.8	626	42.0	529	36.0	620	37.8
EC-South	98	9.1	75	5.5	107	7.1	104	7.0	118	8.0	129	7.9
Turkey	132	12.2	203	14.9	225	14.9	263	17.7	279	19.0	288	17.6
Morocco	61	5.6	112	8.2	138	9.2	131	8.8	171	11.6	184	11.2
Other 'North' ^b	94	8.7	114	13.7	297	19.7	130	8.7	144	9.8	146	8.9
Other 'South' ^c	113	10.5	186	13.7			167	11.2	177	12.0	210	12.8
Stateless	124	11.5	106	7.8	110	7.3	69	4.6	52	3.5	64	3.9
Country of birth												
Surinam					474		459		542		542	
Antilles					63		80		105		105	

^a Including deaths of children born alive who died before birth registration.

^b Other European, North American, Oceanian.

^c Other African, Asian, Middle and South American.

Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

Table 3.18. Mortality by sex and nationality (per thousand of the population), 1987 and 1990

	Not-standardized			Indirectly standardized per sex by age (on December 31)		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
1987						
Turkey	2.1	1.1	1.6	10.9	8.9	10.3
Morocco	1.7	1.1	1.4	8.1	9.9	8.8
11 EC-countries	4.1	3.8	4.0	7.6	6.1	6.9
Other alien countries	3.4	2.3	2.9	7.2	6.8	7.1
Netherlands	9.3	7.9	8.6	9.0	7.8	8.4
Total	9.0	7.8	8.4	9.0	7.8	8.4
1990						
Turkey	1.9	1.1	1.6	10.3	9.0	9.9
Morocco	1.6	1.0	1.3	7.6	8.8	8.1
11 EC-countries	4.7	4.4	4.6	8.8	9.1	9.0
Other alien countries	3.3	2.3	2.8	8.2	8.8	8.5
Netherlands	9.3	8.5	8.9	9.0	8.2	8.6
Total	9.0	8.2	8.6	9.0	8.2	8.6

Source: Van der Erf and Tas, 1989.

is related to a lack of pre- and postnatal care, and of professional maternity care (Doornbos and Nordbeck, 1985). The study also showed an under-registration of 14 percent perinatal mortality.

3.4 | Changes of nationality

3.4.1. Naturalization policies

According to current legislation on nationality, a person may acquire the Dutch nationality at birth, or through adoption or naturalization. The child of a mother and/or father who were residing in the Netherlands or the Netherlands Antilles at the time of its birth, and who were themselves born to a parent residing in the Netherlands or the Netherlands Antilles, receives Dutch nationality at birth. In other words, children belonging to the third immigrant generation, become

Dutch citizens automatically. Foreigners born in the Netherlands or the Netherlands Antilles (the second generation) who have resided there since birth can simply opt for Dutch citizenship between the ages of 18 and 25. In general, all other foreigners can apply for naturalization, for which the following conditions apply: the applicant must be of age; there should be no 'objections' to his/her residence in the Netherlands or the Netherlands Antilles; the applicant should have resided there continuously during the last five years; and he or she should be considered 'integrated' into the society (in practice interpreted as having a 'fair' command of the Dutch language and a 'reasonable knowledge' of the society). For those who have had Dutch nationality before, and for partners (by marriage or other 'permanent' relationship) of Dutch citizens, waiting periods of zero and three years respectively apply. Children under 18 are naturalized together with the adult applicant.

In addition to the situation described above there have been several important legal changes since the 1960s:

1. Before 1964 Dutch women who married a foreigner lost their Dutch nationality. This rule was abolished in 1964, and at the same time those women who had lost their Dutch nationality due to a marriage contracted before 1964 received the right to opt back for Dutch nationality. Foreign women who marry a Dutch man do not automatically receive Dutch citizenship any more. Furthermore, wives are no longer naturalized together with their husbands; they need to apply independently.
2. On January 1, 1985 a new law on Dutch nationality took effect. The most important changes to the situation which pertained before that date are:
 - a. Children born of a mother who has Dutch nationality receive the Dutch nationality at birth (article 3). Previously children received their father's nationality, irrespective of the nationality of the mother³.
 - b. Foreign children born before January 1, 1985 can receive Dutch nationality if their mother is Dutch and if they are not married and younger than 18 years. If these children wanted to receive Dutch nationality, they needed to apply before January 1, 1988 (transitional agreement, article 27).

At the time when Surinam became independent (November 25, 1975), a special agreement on the settlement and residence of mutual subjects was drawn up, with a transitional period of five years. During that period changes from the one to the other nationality were easily obtained. Since 1980 the normal natural-

³ If the mother is not married and the father does not 'recognize' the child legally, the child receives its mother's nationality. This was the case both before and after the 1985 law.


ization procedure has applied (Brinkman, 1985; Tas 1987; Handleiding, etc., 1975).

3.4.2. Size and composition

The trend in changes of nationality influences the size and development of the population by nationality. This trend is dependent both on individual or group inclinations towards naturalization, and on legal changes concerning eligibility for Dutch nationality (paragraph 3.4.1).

In recent decades the number of naturalizations has increased significantly, but not in relation to the total foreign resident population (Figure 3.3). Naturalization is usually within the range of 15-40 per thousand resident foreigners; the period 1985-1987 forms the most notable exception, with an average of 56 naturalizations per thousand foreign residents. In the 1960s and 1970s naturalization concerned mainly Indonesians, Germans, stateless persons, and to a lesser extent also Hungarians and Chinese; and Surinamese in the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s (Table 3.19). The period 1985-1987 was characterized by the temporary effects of the transitional agreement on the nationality of the children of Dutch mothers; the number of naturalizations among most population groups increased substantially. For instance, naturalization increased nine fold among nationals of the Southern EC countries (from 600 in 1984 to 5,500 in 1985). The backlog of requests made in 1988 was dealt

Figure 3.3. Naturalizations, total and per thousand of the resident population with foreign nationality, 1960-1991



Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

Table 3.19. Number of naturalizations by previous nationality, 1946-1991^a

	'60-64	'65-69	'70-74	'75-79	'80-84	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Total	20,592	28,370	21,555	35,264	61,954	41,991	24,071	27,551	9,791	28,730	12,794	29,112
Belgium	393	442	425	652	847	1,256	568	709	115	249	96	139
FRG	1,626	1,665	1,425	3,254	3,923	5,590	2,429	2,615	276	672	194	378
France	147	165	207	442	439	877	703	902	54	96	30	46
U.K.	348	698	974	2,093	3,179	3,610	2,201	2,673	913	1,884	621	902
Greece	26	74	238	422	240	575	392	271	37	85	37	59
Italy	116	492	556	1,452	1,579	2,510	1,088	1,743	90	153	48	92
Portugal	52	127	419	1,185	802	727	378	404	146	224	119	143
Spain	17	123	447	758	685	1,736	819	1,068	53	103	36	60
Poland	402	406	210	321	376	300	115	147	194	528	143	351
Turkey		28	296	509	1,036	2,297	1,504	1,427	825	3,277	1,952	6,105
Morocco			133	240	559	1,692	1,519	1,469	1,198	6,827	3,026	7,298
Indonesia	12,041	12,550	4,045	3,767	2,039	1,137	483	459	234	460	190	385
Surinam	-	-	-	3,709	31,744	4,319	1,692	1,819	900	3,574	1,638	4,009
China	679	1,220	1,455	1,360	1,696	1,178	822	758	561	1,584	557	1,130
India					249 ^b	669	376	351	264	345	225	366
Pakistan					969 ^b	1,193	684	571	303	692	343	394
Stateless	1,280	4,626	5,937	7,999	4,984	1,265	709	431	444	510	271	361

^a Naturalizations 'zelfstandig en mede bij wet' and 'zelfstandig en mede krachtens wet', 'by Royal Decree', by option and by adoption. For the years 1960-1976 naturalizations of persons who re-acquired Dutch citizenship are included in the total but not in the data by nationality.

^b 1981-1984.

Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

with by the Department of Justice in 1989, resulting in a very high number of naturalizations in that year; in fact, this number was surpassed only by the 42,000 naturalizations of 1985 (Tas, 1990). Equally, requests delayed in 1990 were processed in 1991 (Tas, 1991).

There are substantial differences in the tendency towards naturalization by nationality (Table 3.20). At one extreme, few Turks and Moroccans have changed their nationality; before 1985 only one per thousand acquired Dutch citizenship each year, and even during the transitional period of the new law (1985-1987) their rate of naturalization did not reach over 15 per thousand. Only since 1989 did Turkish and Moroccan naturalizations show a significant increase: on average in the three year period 1989-1991 annually 3,800 Turks (19 per thousand) and 5,700 Moroccans (49 per thousand) acquired Dutch citizenship; or, roughly, a rate of 20 per thousand Turks and 40 per thousand Moroccans. On the other hand, much larger portions of the Indonesian, Surinamese and Chinese population groups have opted for Dutch nationality. In 1960, more than one third of the Indonesians became Dutch citizens; over one fifth of the Chinese in 1965 and again in 1989⁴; almost half of the Surinamese in 1980 and almost a quarter in 1989. With regard to Indonesians and Surinamese who are citizens of former colonies, the explanation may be sought partly in the more liberal regulations for naturalization for those who have 'special ties' with the Netherlands. Groenendijk (1987b) advances several explanations for the surprisingly strong tendency of the Chinese to change nationality: escape from the political and/or socio-economic situation in China, attraction of retaining the Chinese nationality after naturalization (possible until 1980), uncertainty about the future of Hong Kong, the limited rights associated with the British Hong Kong passport, and the restrictive policies of the Dutch government towards further recruitment of Chinese.

Otherwise, little research has been done on naturalization. A study of Polish, Slovenian and Italian migrants in the southeastern Netherlands showed that about half of the first generation kept their original nationality, but only 14 percent of the second and four percent of the third generation did so (Brassé and Van Schelven, 1980)⁵.

The 1985 law has resulted in a significant increase in the naturalization rates among all nationalities. The increase is partly temporary, however, because most of it is due to Article 27 of the law which specifies the three year transitional period: in 1985, 1986 and 1987, respectively 54, 41 and 54 percent of all naturalizations were due to Article 27.

⁴ The fairly high rate for British citizens is partly due to the strong naturalization tendency among persons born in Hong Kong: for example, in 1985 1,385 persons from Hong Kong received Dutch nationality (Voets and Schoorl, 1988).

⁵ The third generation generally receives Dutch nationality at birth.

Table 3.20. Naturalizations by previous nationality per thousand of the population of respective nationality at the beginning of the year, 1960-1991

	1960 ^a	1965	1971 ^a	1975	1980	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Total	25.3	36.6	16.5	18.0	32.1	75.2	43.1	48.5	16.5	46.1	19.9	42.0
Belgium	5.5	5.3	4.0	6.6	6.0	53.2	24.9	30.9	5.0	10.8	4.1	5.9
FRG	9.9	14.7	6.5	13.1	20.1	124.7	59.3	64.8	7.0	16.7	4.6	8.5
France	16.8	14.4	12.0	13.7	11.2	125.1	100.9	125.1	7.2	11.9	3.6	5.1
U.K.	16.1	22.2	15.6	21.0	13.3	88.7	57.2	70.3	24.6	50.4	16.6	23.1
Greece	7.5	2.6	16.0	20.4	12.1	142.2	103.8	71.0	9.4	19.8	8.3	12.1
Italy	8.5	2.8	4.4	12.3	16.0	123.8	61.0	102.5	5.7	9.6	2.9	5.4
Portugal	190.0	25.0	14.1	14.5	32.2	92.4	50.6	53.6	18.8	27.9	14.8	17.3
Spain	60.0	0.1	2.8	5.0	6.0	83.9	43.0	58.7	3.0	5.9	2.1	3.5
Poland	87.0		35.6		44.9	149.4	52.9	62.7	71.9	166.7	44.9	86.6
Turkey			2.3	1.7	1.0	14.8	9.6	8.9	4.9	18.6	10.2	30.0
Morocco			0.6	1.5	1.6	15.2	13.1	12.0	9.2	49.0	20.4	46.5
Indonesia	378.6	240.7	122.8	83.7	47.1	123.9	55.6	51.6	25.5	48.5	23.9	45.2
Surinam	-	-	-	-	493.4	440.6	176.9	156.3	63.5	224.8	112.1	207.2
China	108.7	226.5	138.8	149.6	42.4	134.6	97.5	91.2	68.7	192.5	90.4	172.7
India						286.9	172.9	136.0	73.7	96.4	77.9	116.1
Pakistan						241.1	168.1	140.9	71.4	158.5	99.2	102.2
Stateless	17.9	117.5	49.6	197.1	252.7	220.4	136.7	88.0	97.0	116.8	44.2	59.8

^a Population on 31 May.
Source (basic data): Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

3.5 | Population change

Since 1961 immigration to the Netherlands has exceeded emigration every year. Had there been no international migration during the period 1960-1987, the Netherlands would have had 14.1 million inhabitants on January 1, 1988, including adjustments for the indirect effects on births and deaths. In reality, however, the country had 14.7 million inhabitants on that date (De Beer and Noordam, 1988).

In order to meet the increasing demand for up-to-date demographic forecasts, in 1984 the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics started to revise the national population forecasts annually. In the 1984-based forecast (as well as in earlier ones) it was expected that the Netherlands would continue to conduct a restrictive immigration policy. Furthermore, it was assumed that changing political relations between the Netherlands and other countries (such as the Netherlands Antilles) would have a negligible effect on immigration, if any. Mainly due to the decreasing number of foreign immigrants, net immigration was expected to decline further. For the year 1990 net immigration was assumed to lie between -5,000 and +10,000. For the years after 1990 reliability margins were decreased to 5,000 because neither a continuously high level of net immigration nor a continuation of net emigration were considered likely (Table 3.21)⁶.

In the population forecasts based in 1985, 1986 and 1987, net immigration was set at successively higher levels, but it was not until 1987 that the assumption that the Netherlands would continue to be an immigration country was incorporated in the national population forecasts.

The major difference between the national population forecasts from 1987 onwards compared to the 1986-based one is the higher number of immigrants both in the short and the long terms. According to the middle variant of the 1987 population forecast of the Central Bureau of Statistics (and the 1988 one as well), net migration would decline to 28,000 persons in 1990, after which it was assumed that it would remain constant⁷. The 1989-based projection assumes a somewhat lower level of net immigration: 25,000 in 1990 declining to 20,000 in 1995; but in the 1990- and 1991-based projections net immigration was revised upwardly again. These assumptions result in the expectation of a higher population growth within the next few decades. A relatively high standard of living, the stable political environment, and the favourable geographical position

⁶ In the national forecasts assumptions are made about future levels of both immigration and emigration. These figures are distributed proportionally by age and sex.

⁷ Besides emigration, net administrative corrections are set to minus 8,000. These net administrative corrections consist for the most part of non-registered emigration.

Table 3.21. Expected natural growth (NG) and net immigration (NI), according to successive national population forecasts, middle variant (in thousands)

Year	Base year of projection															
	1984		1985		1986		1987		1988		1989		1990		1991	
	NG	NI	NG	NI	NG	NI	NG	NI	NG	NI	NG	NI	NG	NI	NG	NI
1984	55	8														
1985	54	7	56													
1986	52	6	55	19	60	31										
1987	51	5	54	15	64	30	66	44								
1988	51	4	53	12	66	27	64	41	64	36						
1989	50	3	53	8	68	25	65	35	64	31	62	25				
1990	50	3	52	5	68	22	66	28	64	28	61	25	68	48		
1995	44	3	46	5	61	15	64	28	64	28	60	20	67	25	72	43
2000	20	3	21	5	53	15	45	28	49	28	50	20	53	25	64	25
2005	-12	3	-11	3	6	8	14	28	18	28	21	20	23	25	39	25
2010	-33	3	-33	-	-14	-	-7	28	-3	28	-2	20	-1	25	15	25
2020	-59	3	-69	-	-33	-	-22	28	-21	28	-22	20	-19	25	-4	25
Estimated total population size in:																
1990	14,725		14,777		14,876		14,897		14,894		14,892		14,893		14,893	
2000	15,147		15,213		15,588		15,718		15,717		15,696		15,860		16,019	
2010	15,075		15,148		15,749		16,103		16,143		16,142		16,377		16,688	
2020	14,618		14,687		15,519		16,160		16,218		16,217		16,517		16,979	
2035	13,361		13,394		14,599		15,777		15,880		15,877		16,287		17,040	

Sources: CBS, 1985a, 1986c/d, 1988b, 1989, 1990, 1991a/b.

of the country, as well as the socio-economic developments and considerable population growth in a number of developing countries, were considered to be the main push and pull factors influencing current and future migration (CBS, 1988b).

These new immigration assumptions led to the expectation of a delay in the predicted eventual decrease in the size of the total population; in the middle variant of the 1987 forecast the population is expected to start to decline only around the year 2019, by which time there would be 16.2 million inhabitants; but in the 1991 projection the peak population size is expected not before 2030, with 17.1 million people.

De Beer and Noordam (1988), using the 1987 projection as a basis, calculated that if there were no immigration from 1988 onwards, the peak size of the total population would be reached as soon as 2006, at the lower level of 15.5 million people. The size of the total population in the Netherlands in the year 2050 would be 15 percent greater under the 1987 immigration assumptions than it would have been if brought about by natural growth alone. In 2050 the total population was expected to number 14.7 million inhabitants, instead of 12.5 million in the absence of migration.

The trends in migration not only have an effect on the size of the population, but also on its age structure. Due to the direct and indirect effects of international migration over the period 1960-1987, the population of the Netherlands on January 1, 1988 was slightly younger than it would have been in a situation of natural growth only. Half the population is younger than 32.8 years, whereas this would have been 33.4 years without migration. Furthermore, without migration 12.9 percent of the total population would have been 65 or older, while the actual percentage is 12.5. Similarly, without migration the proportion of young people (those under 25) would have been correspondingly lower: 34.7 percent, as opposed to 35.3 percent in reality.

As a consequence of the migration assumptions of the 1987 forecast, the population would be slightly less old in the year 2000: 13.5 percent in the age group 65 or older, instead of 13.8 percent should there be zero net migration. Assuming continued net immigration (28,000 per year) over a longer period, say until 2050, the effect is more pronounced: 21.5 percent of the population would be in the age group 65 or older, rather than 23.5 percent (De Beer and Noordam, 1988). It can therefore be concluded that immigration has reduced and will continue to reduce the ageing of the Dutch population. However, the effect of immigration on the age structure is limited, and continuous immigration at levels higher than those experienced by the Netherlands in the past would be required for any substantial effects. A change in the age-specific patterns of migration could enhance an effect on the population's age structure. However, as soon as immigration declines or is halted, the effect on the age structure disappears rapidly, as the immigrants age with the general population and the indirect effects to be expected from higher immigrant fertility can likewise be assumed to be of a temporary nature (see Section 3.2).

Setting projection levels for future immigration and emigration is a difficult task. Large fluctuations in immigration, as well as its unpredictable character, have made frequent revisions necessary. This applies to the national population projections, but even more so to projections of specific foreign population groups. Therefore, such sub-group projections are usually only made for the short-term. In 1980, 1982, and 1984, the Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP) made projections of the population with Turkish or Moroccan nationality in the Netherlands (Kool *et al.*, 1980; Van Praag and Kool, 1982; SCP, 1984). In the first three projections the levels of net migration were successively adjusted downward in accordance with observed declines in immigration, and an increase of emigration (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3). However, since the last projection, immigration has increased again considerably, causing the results of the 1984 projection to be too low in relation to unfolding reality (see Table 3.22) (Berkien and Schoorl, 1988). Considering total population size only, the outcomes of the projection of 1982 are --in retrospect-- more plausible: the total numbers of Turks and Moroccans living in the Netherlands on January 1, 1990 (191,000 and 148,000 respectively) were within the margins of the projection. However, with regard to the individual components of the 1982 projection, the differences between projection and observed trends are greater. The turn of events in migration development (1983/84) was not foreseen in the 1982 projection, resulting in a probable underestimation of total net migration in the period 1982-1989. A comparison of the observed age structure with the age structure projected for January 1, 1986 (projection 1982, low variant) shows that in particular the 0-19 year old Turks were overestimated (by 10 percent, or nearly 8,000 persons).

In the more recent population projections of the Turks and Moroccans (base years 1987, 1989 and 1990; see Berkien and Schoorl, 1988; Nusselder *et al.*, 1990; Nusselder and Schoorl, 1991), it was expected that immigration, after an initial limited further increase or a relative stability, would then decrease slightly until the middle of the 1990s⁸, influenced by an hypothesized gradual decrease in family reunion and possibly in the number of asylum requests. The assumption that family reunion will gradually decrease is based on two considerations. Firstly, the increase of the Turkish and Moroccan population in the Netherlands provides an increasing group of potential marriage candidates of the same 'ethnic' group within the Netherlands. Secondly, it is expected that an increasing number of Turks and Moroccans who are born in the Netherlands, will marry 'native' Dutch partners (Berkien and Schoorl, 1988).

⁸ Migration assumptions for both the next national population forecast and the next specific nationality-group projection are regularly discussed by those involved in making the projections and forecasts, as well as by external experts, in an effort to increase reliability and consistency.

Table 3.22. Total number of Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands on January 1, 1990, according to successive projections (low and high variants)

Base year of projection	Turks		Moroccans	
	Low	High	Low	High
1980	217,000	234,000	173,000	183,000
1982	165,000	196,000	119,000	149,000
1984	162,000		113,000	
1987	179,000	183,000	144,000	147,000
1989	186,000	187,000	149,000	150,000
Observed 1990	191,000		148,000	

Source: Kool *et al.*, 1980; Van Praag and Kool, 1982; Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 1984 (projections of 1980, 1982 and 1984); Berkien and Schoorl, 1988; Nusselder *et al.*, 1990.

According to the 1990 projections, the number of immigrants is assumed to remain constant from 1993 onwards, at a level of 8,000-11,500 Moroccans and 11,000-15,000 Turks a year. The flow of immigrants will provide an important new group of Turks and Moroccans, mainly consisting of marriage partners of compatriots residing in the Netherlands. During the projection period of ten years (1990-2000), 113,000-147,000 new Turkish and 83,000-112,000 Moroccan immigrants could be involved: these assumptions are significantly higher than those in the 1987-based projection. However, a number of these immigrants will be 're-immigrants', and a small proportion will return to their country of origin quite soon after settlement.

With regard to emigration, it is assumed that the slightly declining age- and sex-specific emigration rates for ages up to 50 years observed in the recent past will continue to decline in the near future, on the grounds that those belonging to the second generation and who are brought up in the Netherlands, as well as the elderly whose children will remain living in the Netherlands, will be less likely to opt for return migration. Despite the fact that the inclination to emigrate is assumed to decrease, the absolute number of emigrants will actually

rise in the long term as well, due to the growing size of the Turkish and Moroccan population.

Based on recent trends in fertility and on data on expected family size among Turkish and Moroccan women (cf. Section 3.2), it is assumed that fertility will decline fairly rapidly, after an initial period of stability due to continued high immigration. But despite the expected decline, the number of births will continue to increase in the near future, as a direct result of youthful age structure of the Turkish and Moroccan immigrant populations. In terms of total fertility rates, the average number of children by the end of the century may be in the region of 2.5 to 2.8 per Turkish woman, and 3.6 to 4.1 per Moroccan woman. During the entire projection period the total number of live-born children is estimated at 71,000-82,000 Turks and 55,000-64,000 Moroccans.

The total size of the Turkish population in the Netherlands is estimated to reach 293,000-338,000 by 1 January 2000, an increase of 53-76 percent in ten years. In comparison: during the previous decade (1980-1990), the population increased by 60 percent (from 120,000 to 192,000).

The Moroccan population grew more rapidly. In 1990 there were more than twice as many Moroccans in the Netherlands as in 1980 (148,000 and 72,000 respectively). In the next decade the relative increase is expected to be slower, of the order of 39 to 63 percent to a total of 205,000-242,000. The expected deceleration of the population growth compared with the years 1980-1990 is mainly a result of the projected decrease in net migration, and of the increased level of naturalization among the Moroccan population group.

Both the 1987 and the 1989 projections underestimated the resident Turkish population on January 1, 1990. This was largely due to a high number of positive administrative corrections following the population register count for January 1, 1990.

So far only two projections of the Surinamese and Antillean population groups have been made, in 1981 by Kool and Van Praag (1982) and in 1989 by Voets (1991). These projections suffer from the lack of reliable population data to be used as input in a projection. Recent estimates of the population per January 1, 1990 have been made by the Central Bureau of Statistics, however (see Section 2.1).

Apart from these projections for the largest groups of foreign descent, projections have recently been made for the EC population and for the group of foreigners with nationalities other than Turkish, Moroccan or EC (Nusselder *et al.*, 1990; Nusselder and Schoorl, 1991). The results of the most recent of these projections are presented in Table 3.23. The foreign population holding the nationality of one of the EC countries is expected to increase moderately, from 163,000 in 1990 to 179,000-201,000 ten years later (10-23 percent). Only a moderate increase is projected, following the conclusions of Penninx and Muus (1988), which on the basis of a classification of types of immigrants,

Table 3.23. Total population with an EC nationality or another foreign nationality (excluding Turks and Moroccans) in the Netherlands on January 1, 1990, 1995 and 2000, according to a projection covering the period 1990-2000 (low and high variants)

Year	EC		'Other' foreign	
	Low	High	Low	High
1990 (base)	163,000		140,000	
1995	173,000	184,000	190,000	223,000
2000	179,000	201,000	211,000	266,000

Source: Nusselder and Schoorl, 1991.

maintained that internal EC migration is unlikely to undergo significant change in the near future. The uncertain factor is formed by the immigrants from developing countries and Eastern Europe. Obviously, the uncertainty arises from doubts about the future of migration for this group. With a number of reservations (see Nusselder and Schoorl, 1991), a larger increase is expected for this remaining group of foreigners (excluding Turks, Moroccans and EC nationals): a growth of 50-90 percent has been estimated.

As for national population forecasts, the demand for projections of the foreign or minority population groups has been increasing too, mainly for policy purposes. Current interests revolve around the second generation (characterized by an un-favourable socio-economic position), the direct and indirect role of immigration in the process of ageing in the population, the influence of the changes in the EC per 1993, on future levels and directions of migration streams both within the EC and between the EC and other countries, and the role of asylum seekers in future migration.

As regards the latter two issues, many of the policy measures related to the abolition of internal EC borders have not yet been decided. Callovi (1988; in Van de Kaa, 1989) distinguishes three groups of opinions: the first envisages that there will be no need for future immigration, and that therefore restrictive immigration policies will apply. This is based on a socio-economic picture of continued high unemployment and deregulation of social labour systems, of a restrictive treatment of requests for asylum, strict controls on the presence of

illegal residents, all combining to make EC countries less attractive for new immigrants. Callovi's second group argues that the absence of pull factors by itself will not be sufficient, and that a strict common migration policy has to be established prior to 1993.

Thirdly, a future increase in the demand for labour is thought possible, and this should --in so far as this development has consequences for migration-- be channelled through joint EC agreements with third countries, containing provisions for limited and controlled migration. Arguments in favour of the third idea are to be found in the political and economic necessity of joint EC policies, and the negative consequences of population growth in Europe, but also in the international obligations with respect to family reunion and asylum, the proximity of areas with high population pressure (Maghreb), and developments in Eastern Europe.

PART II

THE POSITION OF IMMIGRANTS
AND ETHNIC MINORITIES
IN DUTCH SOCIETY

4. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

4.1 | Introduction¹

In the preceding chapters it has become apparent that, since World War II, substantial groups of immigrants have settled more or less permanently in the Netherlands. These immigrants arrived in different periods; furthermore, the reasons for their migration to the Netherlands and the motivations of the newcomers have varied considerably. They were not only heterogeneous in terms of their origin and history, but also in terms of characteristics which are to be regarded as relevant for the process of integration: their knowledge of Dutch society, culture and language, their level of education, their cultural and religious background, and other such factors.

This background and history of immigration and the characteristics of individual immigrants are of great importance for the study of the development of the position of immigrants and immigrant groups in a new society. But at the same time students of the process of integration and absorption have noted that these processes are also to a large extent determined by the receiving society, its policies and reactions.

In this second part it is the intention to outline the development of the position of immigrants and their descendants in Dutch society during the last three decades, taking into account both sides of the equation. In view of the multitude of data and the heterogeneous and unbalanced nature of the research material available, a reliable analytical framework is required, to enable us to identify the main lines of development, and to determine the

¹ This chapter is based on R. Penninx's doctoral dissertation, "Minderheidsvorming en emancipatie; balans van kennisverwerving ten aanzien van immigranten en woonwagengewoners in Nederland 1967-1987" (The formation of minority groups and emancipation; a survey of social-scientific research relating to immigrants and caravan-dwellers in the Netherlands, 1967-1987), Samsom, Alphen aan den Rijn 1988.

direction in which an immigrant group is moving: towards a minority status, or towards the situation of an emancipated group. This chapter will present a framework of this kind. Before doing so, there will be an examination of the sources from which it will be drawn: social-scientific research on immigrants.

4.2 | The development of social-scientific research on immigrants

The attitude of Dutch society towards immigrants and its definition of the problem over a period of time has had great consequences for scientific research. In chapter 1 it was stressed that the question of immigrants in the post-war period was defined in a very special way. In view of the 'over-population' of the Netherlands, post-war Dutch policies stimulated emigration of Dutch families to countries like Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, and the USA. Immigration was seen as undesirable. The immigration flows which actually occurred were separated out and defined as 'return migration of Dutch citizens' (Dutch and Eurasians from the former Dutch Indies) or 'temporary migrants' (Moluccans, and 'guest workers'). This denial of reality led to a growing discrepancy between official policy and the facts of growing (semi-)permanent settlement of immigrant groups in the 1970s. The assumed temporary nature of the stay proved to be a fiction in the case of most migrants, and widespread family reunification made permanent settlement the most probable scenario for most of them (Penninx, 1979).

A new definition of the problem, and a fresh policy in this area, was formulated only in 1980, when a general ethnic minorities policy was announced². The notions that most migrants have settled permanently, that they should be entitled to the same rights as other residents in the Netherlands, that a continuously low position of these immigrants in the stratification of Dutch society should be avoided, and that they should have the right to develop their own cultural identity and socio-cultural environment, became the foundation of these new policies. Particularly those groups which were, in the eyes of politicians and policy makers, in danger of developing a permanently marginal position in Dutch society, became the target of these policies. From 1980 onwards a more or less

² In the reaction of the government to the Report on Ethnic Minorities by the Scientific Council for Government Policy of 1980 (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 1980), the main features of this new policy were outlined. These policies were further developed in the Draft Minorities Bill (1981) and finalized in the Minorities Bill (1983). For an extensive description of these policies see Entzinger (1984).

comprehensive set of measures and instruments was developed, particularly in the fields of education, housing and social services.

The definition of the issue of immigrant groups, and the changes it has undergone, have had consequences for scientific research in this field, which in turn has affected what we know empirically and theoretically about immigrants and their descendants. In terms of numbers of projects, research relating to immigrants was scarce in the 1950s and 1960s, when the issue was not seen as a problem. It expanded in the seventies, when discrepancies between ideology and reality became evident, and reached its peak in the eighties, as a consequence of the redefinition of the problem in politics³. The present number of current research projects is well in excess of 200, covering very diverse and detailed topics. A bibliography of research publications of the last five years amounts to some thousand titles⁴.

Apart from sheer numbers, it is noticeable that the central government has financed most of the research projects in this field throughout the entire post-war period. However, the motivation and attitudes of the funding agencies changed significantly over this period. Before 1980, the attitude of the authorities is best described as benevolent and passive: initiatives taken by individual researchers were positively received and subsequently subsidized, as long as they did not interfere with policy — to the extent that policy existed. After the government had formulated and implemented a general minorities policy in 1980, it not only financed more research projects than ever before, but also undertook the programming of policy-oriented research and made special funds available. This meant direct control by governmental agencies over the content and scope of research projects. Financing from other sources like universities and special funds has been limited, an indirect consequence of the relatively generous funding policies of the central government.

In recent years the dominance of government programming and funding has led to an intertwining of minorities policy and research policy in this field or, more precisely, a dependence of research on the development of minorities policy. It transpires that both the content and significance of research alter in the four phases of what may be termed the policy cycle. In the first and second phases of that cycle, in which the problem is defined and a policy is formulated, research can be quite influential, as was evident in minorities policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In these initial phases

³ For a detailed analysis see Penninx (1988b).

⁴ A bibliography of scientific publications in English on immigrants in the Netherlands was published by the Advisory Commission for Research on Ethnic Minorities (September 1989). It includes 212 titles. The bibliography can be ordered from: LISWO, Wassenaarseweg 52, 2333 AK Leiden.

politicians and policy makers used the conceptualization and definitions provided by researchers to come to grips with the new phenomenon and to outline this new policy. The influence of social scientists, however, decreased as soon as the policy entered the third and fourth phases of implementation and administrative routine. In these later phases political interest declined, and policy makers built up their own organizations, instruments, procedures and budgets, which has made them one of the most influential interest groups in the field of minorities policy. They have and use the means to programme research projects according to their direct (often momentary and organization-related) policy problems and questions. Two general conclusions can be drawn concerning the content and quality of social-scientific research, particularly for the period since 1980. The first is that the recent expansionist growth of research projects, in combination with the fact that the majority of these initiatives are policy-oriented and funded by government agencies, has led to a high level of specialization and diversification. An overview of the whole field and of the main lines of development is lacking and, as a consequence, accumulation and systematic extension of knowledge are non-existent. The second conclusion is that the same combination of rapid growth and policy orientation forms an unfavourable environment for the formation and use of theories and theoretical models. Few such attempts have been made recently. For our purposes of analysing the development of the position of immigrants in Dutch society, however, a theoretically based analytical model is indispensable.

4.3 | An analytical framework: concepts and definitions

4.3.1. *The social versus the ethno-cultural position*

The central concept to be employed is that of 'the position of immigrants in (Dutch) society'. This position has two aspects. The first is called the *social position*, defined as the position of a minority group as a whole in the social stratification of society. Indicators for this position can be found in such domains as a) labour, income, and social security, b) education, and c) housing.

The importance of the first domain is evident: having a paid job or not, the type and level of work, the level of income derived from work or from other sources all directly affect the status of a person in society and his or her place in the social stratification. The position of an individual in this domain is also crucial because it determines to a great extent the position in other domains which are strongly influenced by consumption and purchasing power.

The second domain, that of education, is of great importance, because the level of education attained by an individual determines the chances and possibilities on the labour market and in a more general sense the level of

income. In that sense education is a primordial factor in the causal chain that determines the social position. Furthermore, the level of education also affects opportunities for participation in other spheres of life and in society in general.

The third domain is that of housing. The position of an individual in this domain can be viewed as a result of his consumer behaviour. In that sense the position of an individual in this domain is a yardstick for his prosperity. At the same time, however, that position affects his future and that of his children: living in a certain quarter may reduce the chances of receiving adequate education, for example, and living in crowded, inadequate housing may have a negative influence on school attainment.

The interaction of the different domains of the social position can be illustrated by a slightly adapted model designed by Van Praag (1984) (Figure 4.1).

Following this conceptual model, the social position can be measured with the help of more or less objective indicators in these domains.


The second aspect of the position of immigrants is the *ethno-cultural* one, defined as the extent to which a group is regarded primarily as a different group by the majority of society, and/or the extent to which the group defines itself primarily as such. The ethno-cultural aspect relates to the process of social classification or categorization of individuals primarily as members of a group which is perceived as different from one's own group.

Identification with and loyalty to an ethno-cultural group is always relative. Membership of such a group might be regarded as relevant in only a limited number of situations in daily life, or it may be regarded as an aspect that pervades all spheres of life (or should do so). The ethno-cultural position is thus to be found somewhere on a continuum between two poles: on the one hand there is the extreme where people regard themselves (or are perceived by others) only incidentally as members of a specific ethno-cultural group (for example when migrants with a common origin gather once in a while in a folkloristic, recreational reunion); at the other extreme there is the situation that migrants have all their primary relations and social contacts (nuclear and extended family, acquaintances, neighbours), and almost all their secondary social contacts (school, work, religious institutions, leisure time, organizations, etc.) within their own group, and share a group culture and loyalty.

It is essential to realise that classification of persons as members of a certain group, which is perceived as different, is at the basis of the ethno-cultural position. Real or perceived differences in culture, norms, and values are often mentioned by people when asked for reasons for their classification or identification.

Physical or racial characteristics may also play a role, implicitly or explicitly. It is also important to realise that the ethno-cultural position is determined by the perceptions of both the immigrants themselves and members

Figure 4.1. A model to explain the social position



of the receiving society. When studying the ethno-cultural position of a given group, therefore, we shall examine not only the extent to which immigrants and their descendants perceive themselves as different, organize themselves separately and build their own institutions; we shall also study the way the receiving society, its members, organizations and institutions define and treat the newcomers. In fact, these two strands influence and reinforce each other.

It must be emphasized that the social and ethno-cultural positions, although analytically distinguished, constantly influence each other. We shall return to this in the next section.

4.3.2. Minority-group formation versus emancipation

A second crucial concept is that of 'minority'. For analytical purposes it is convenient to introduce a specific concept which differs from that generally used in common language and in policy documents in the Netherlands⁵. In the definition used here, a group is a minority group if a) its social position

⁵ The concept of minority is not specified in policy documents. Dutch minorities policy has *not* been an immigrants policy (many immigrants such as EC-nationals, migrants from Third World countries, and also the large category of Chinese are excluded), but a policy aimed at particularly deprived groups with a separate culture, which are supposed to be different, and which on the basis of these two characteristics are *in danger of* marginalization and stigmatization. The main target groups have been: workers from Mediterranean countries and their families, Surinamese and Antillean immigrants, Moluccans, refugees, gypsies, and caravan dwellers.

is homogeneously low; b) its ethno-cultural position is perceived as markedly different; c) its numerical size prohibits the exertion of power and influence; and d) these three conditions continue to exist over generations (cf. Van Amersfoort, 1982).

A minority, thus defined, is a sociological concept, not merely a quantitative one. It may result from immigration, but immigration does not automatically lead to it⁶. Furthermore, minority-group formation is defined as the process which leads to a minority position. If the process is reversed and moves in the opposite direction, it is called emancipation.

This specification of the concept permits us to reformulate and specify the central questions in the second part of this book, and these questions are: has minority-group formation taken place in the Netherlands during the last decades? Which groups have been involved in this process? What are the factors determining the process of minority formation?

The analytical distinction between the social and ethno-cultural aspects of the position of immigrants and their descendants was drawn in Section 4.3.1; in studying the way in which the two aspects influence each other, two directions can in principle be distinguished:

- a. The homogeneously and permanently low social position of immigrants and their descendants may lead to or reinforce negative images and perceptions among dominant groups and in the receiving society at large, possibly culminating in the stigmatization of immigrant groups and the accentuation of their different and inferior character. Among the immigrants themselves it may lead to strong in-group feelings, the explicit development of a strong and specific ethnic identity and group formation, factors which in turn may hinder or even block integration and social mobility in the new society.
- b. Theoretically this process may also develop in the opposite direction. If certain groups of immigrants and their descendants are regarded from the beginning as essentially different and not belonging to the receiving society, such views and their concomitant negative attitudes and stigmatization may lead to a situation in which these immigrants are denied any possibility of upward social mobility through systematic (and perhaps institutionalized) discrimination. In this situation the social position of these immigrant groups will stay permanently low (or will become so, if that was not the case at the moment of their arrival). In exceptional cases this process may also be (partly or completely) the

⁶ A minority position may also be the result of cultural differentiation and group formation among non-immigrants, like caravan dwellers in the Netherlands (Penninx, 1988a). The present discussion, however, will not include this type of group.


result of the attitude of the immigrants themselves, particularly if they do not share essential norms and values relating to the desirability of a good social position in the receiving society. Figure 4.2 illustrates these two processes.

4.3.3. *Acquired versus allocated positions*

In order to explore the determining factors of minority-group formation, two aspects are distinguished in the process of attaining a position in a society. Seen from the perspective of the individual, the first aspect stresses the importance of personal characteristics, efforts and choices in acquiring a position in society. In this approach the individual is viewed as a protagonist, who constantly makes choices and takes decisions, alone or as part of a network of individuals or a (small) group. In this scenario these decisions are assumed to have a (potential) influence on his or her position in society. This aspect may be termed 'position acquisition'.

The second aspect stresses that, on the macro-level, structural factors in society delineate and limit the scope of action of individuals, and pave pre-structured paths for individuals in society. These structural factors limit the choices of individuals and may even allocate a certain position to an individual or group, leaving no choice at all. In this approach individuals are regarded as carriers of certain characteristics, which force them as it were to act in a certain way. This aspect may be called 'position allocation'.

Figure 4.2. *Interplay between the social and ethno-cultural positions*



Acquisition and allocation should be regarded as two complementary concepts to be studied together and in relation to each other. It is furthermore assumed that the social as well as the ethno-cultural position can be analysed in terms of acquisition and allocation, on the assumption that these are two different aspects of the same process. If we apply the concept of 'position allocation' to the development of the social position, for example, the question will be posed of whether immi-grants and their descendants have systematically less rights and choices than natives, and are treated differently with negative results in the domains of the labour market, education, and housing. If that is the case, this can be called negative position allocation. But a low social position may also be the consequence of the fact that immigrants do not take advantage of the equal opportunities that the receiving society offers: in that case, it is negative position acquisition. In the same vein, these concepts can be used to analyse the mechanisms behind the development of the ethno-cultural position.

In principle, position allocation and acquisition may be positive as well as negative. If, for example, the authorities keep a certain portion of important goods like jobs, educational opportunities, or housing outside the general distribution system, and allocate these specifically to immigrants, this would amount to positive position allocation. For the process of minority-group formation, however, negative allocation is much more important. Because politics and governmental authorities are capable of considerable influence on these processes of position allocation, we shall pay special attention to their role.


4.3.4. Levels of analysis and a heuristic model

Finally, the question has to be answered of how these concepts can be made operational. Where can we find relevant data, relating to such comprehensive entities as the receiving society on the one hand, and immigrant groups on the other, to make an analysis in terms of the concepts outlined in the previous sections? Three different levels of fact-finding and analysis can be distinguished: a) the institutional level, b) the organizational level, and c) the individual level.

An institution is defined here as a commonly accepted, structured pattern of behaviour. Such patterns of doing things are followed within a socio-cultural context according to a certain ideology. Politics, health care, commercial enterprise or education are examples of such institutions, sets of institutions or institutional practices. The effects of institutions become visible in the acts of organizations and individuals. The different levels are therefore related, but for the purpose of ordering the available material and analysing it, it is convenient to keep the levels separate.

The analytical instrument that we have developed can be summarized in the following heuristic model (Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3. A heuristic model for studying the position of immigrants



5. THE SOCIAL POSITION OF IMMIGRANTS

5.1 | Introduction

Labour and income, education and housing are taken as the most important indicators of the social position of immigrant groups. The development of the social position of minorities in the Netherlands during recent decades can thus be outlined by analysing the development of the position of immigrants in these three areas. This is done briefly in this chapter, comparing whenever possible their position with that of the native Dutch population, or with relevant categories of it.

5.2 | Labour, income and social security

5.2.1. *Unemployment, employment and sources of income*

The present situation of immigrants on the labour market can be described in general terms with the aid of data from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. That Ministry makes detailed data available relating to the unemployment of immigrants, compared to total unemployment in the Netherlands. These figures are based on the registration of people seeking work by the Employment Exchanges (Gewestelijke Arbeidsbureaus). Technically these data are disputable, because this form of registration is not entirely consistent, particularly for non-alien immigrant groups like the Surinamese, Antilleans and Moluccans¹.

¹ This registration contains data of registered unemployed people relating to sex, age, level of education, duration of unemployment and the kind of job wanted. Aliens and people from Mediterranean countries (if they are aliens) can be traced by the criterion of nationality. First-generation immigrants of Surinamese and Antillean origin can in principle be identified by 'country of birth', but in fact a severe under-registration exists, because country of birth is not always noted down

Nevertheless a number of preliminary conclusions can be drawn (see Tables 5.1-5.5):

1. The unemployment of workers from Mediterranean countries, Surinamese and Antilleans, but also of Moluccans and refugees (see Table 5.1) has risen significantly since 1980. This rise of unemployment for these groups continued even after total unemployment in the Netherlands began to decrease at the beginning of 1984. The share of aliens and ethnic groups in total unemployment steadily increased in the period 1980-1988 from 7.9 percent to 11.5 percent.
2. The unemployment of Turks and Moroccans is about three times higher than that of the total salaried labour force in the Netherlands, while that of Surinamese and Antillean immigrants is about twice as high as the total level (see Table 5.2).
3. Those of alien and ethnic origin seeking work have a significantly lower level of education compared to the Dutch unemployed. This difference is largest in the case of Moroccans and Turks (see Table 5.4).
4. The duration of unemployment for alien and ethnic unemployed is significantly longer than for all those seeking work; the Antilleans and the category of 'other aliens' form an exception to this rule (see Table 5.5). The higher long-term unemployment among aliens and ethnic groups can to a certain extent be explained by their low level of education: unemployment among those with a low level of education is much higher than the total level of unemployment, while aliens and ethnic minorities are strongly overrepresented among those with a low level of education.
5. Unemployment among youngsters under 25 years of age is higher than in other age brackets, as is shown in Table 5.3.

(according to the Employment Exchanges themselves; see also Kroonenburg en Reubsaet, 1983). As far as Moluccans are concerned, a provisional form of registration has existed since 1983: Employment Exchanges make estimates of registered unemployed Moluccans in municipalities with Moluccan residential areas (Muus, 1984: 75). A second problem with these unemployment figures is that they cannot be related to a salaried working population within the same dataset. At the same time, other sources for calculating the total working population (the Labour Force Survey) are not very reliable in regard to (specific) immigrant groups. The calculation of a percentage of unemployment of specific immigrant groups is then necessarily matter of rough estimates. For the latest estimates of the total working population, based on the newly introduced permanent 'Survey of the Working Population', see Ankersmit *et al.*, 1990: 45-46. In that publication, estimates are made for the larger alien nationality groups and for the Surinamese and Antilleans.

Table 5.1. Registered unemployment in the Netherlands by nationality: June 1980 - June 1989^a

Date: end of ...	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	Total (Dutch and alien)	Dutch of Surinamese origin	Dutch of Antillean origin	Aliens	Aliens from Mediterranean countries ^b	Turks	Moroccans	Other nationalities	Column 4 as % of total employment
June 1980	221,758	6,893	1,863	17,574	11,135	5,545	3,074	6,439	7.9
Dec. 1980	322,353	8,418	2,483	26,243	16,700	8,913	4,675	9,543	8.1
June 1981	360,068	8,962	2,521	31,433	20,230	10,631	6,141	11,203	8.7
Dec. 1981	473,620	10,059	2,833	37,584	24,307	12,572	7,576	13,277	7.9
June 1982	521,592	10,748	2,844	41,649	27,574	14,325	8,501	14,074	8.0
Dec. 1982	644,191	11,295	2,777	47,093	31,721	16,648	9,492	15,372	7.3
June 1983 ^c	792,733	13,737	3,158	59,167	40,737	21,156	12,257	18,430	7.5
Dec. 1983	855,601	13,964	3,129	64,149	43,632	22,333	13,418	20,517	7.5
June 1984	815,910	14,746	3,202	64,716	44,564	22,702	13,942	20,152	7.9
Dec. 1984	796,475	14,817	3,147	64,096	44,188	22,526	14,122	19,908	8.1
June 1985	737,938	15,655	3,360	66,966	45,096	23,141	14,606	21,870	9.1
Dec. 1985	749,519	16,717	3,849	68,918	47,071	24,393	15,492	21,847	9.2
June 1986	687,200	16,752	4,052	68,087	46,771	24,352	15,607	21,316	9.9
Dec. 1986	705,380	17,237	4,460	71,242	48,593	25,511	16,253	22,649	10.1
June 1987	657,911	17,516	4,609	72,540	49,150	25,948	16,617	23,390	11.0
Dec. 1987	696,980	17,805	5,051	75,571	51,830	27,094	17,764	23,741	10.8
June 1988	673,910	18,581	5,575	77,425	53,509	27,965	18,674	23,916	11.5
Dec. 1988	689,906	18,545	6,017	77,421	55,517	28,885	19,303	21,904	11.2
June 1989	651,095	18,701	6,346	77,316	54,921	28,774	19,713	22,395	11.9

^a After January 1, 1989 these figures no longer represent the official number of unemployed; from that date the data source has been called 'Bemiddelingsbestand Zonder Baan' (BZB) ('Mediation File of Unemployed').

^b Greece, Yugoslavia, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, and Italy.

^c June 1983: a new series started as of January 1, 1983; new definitions were used.

Source: Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics, and Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment.

Table 5.2. Registered unemployment according to sex, in absolute numbers and in percentages of the working population by ethnic group 1987-1988^a

	Absolute figures (x1000)			As percentage of the working population per group		
	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total
Native Dutch ^b	375.5	219.4	594.8	12	16	13
Surinamese ^c	13.0	6.7	19.7	27	25	27
Antilleans ^c	3.2	1.9	5.1	21	27	23
Turks ^b	18.6	7.6	26.2	40	58	44
Moroccans ^b	13.5	3.3	16.8	41	49	42
North Mediterraneanans ^{bd}	3.6	1.2	4.8	18	21	18
Other non-EC aliens ^b (i.a. refugees)	14.0	4.2	18.2	35	38	36

^a Unemployment figures from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment; working population from Central Bureau of Statistics.

^b Unemployment as of mid-1987 related to data on the working population as of March 31, 1987.

^c As of January 1, 1988. For Surinamese and Antilleans it is assumed that participation in the labour market according to sex and age does not differ from that of the total population of the Netherlands.

^d Italians, Greeks, Portuguese, and Spaniards.

Source: Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (taken from the report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy, 1989: 105).

All the data presented up to now have been based on the criterion of registration as unemployed with the Employment Exchanges. This registration, however, is far from perfect. Let us therefore look at alternative sources, particularly surveys among immigrant groups, which may confirm or reject the trends

Table 5.3. Unemployment of certain immigrant groups according to age, in 1986, in percentages (unemployment registration data)

Age	Total	Turks	Moroccans	Surinamese	Antilleans
15-24 years	26	45	47	31	20
25-44 years	14	36	35	27	20
45-64 years	9	39	36	25	25
Total	16	40	38	28	20

Source: Arbeidsmarktrapportage 1988, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, The Hague, 1988: 29.

Table 5.4. Registered unemployment of certain immigrant groups according to level of education, January 1, 1989, in percentages (unemployment registration data)

	Native	Antilleans	Surinamese	Moroccans	Turks	Moluccans
Primary education at most	17	21	27	73	68	7
Secondary education not completed	17	27	24	13	13	22
Secondary: lower and medium levels ^a	35	40	38	11	15	56
Secondary: upper levels ^b	19	9	8	2	3	12
Higher education ^c	12	3	3	1	1	3
Total (abs. = 100%)	577,809	6,004	20,851	19,280	28,829	2,125

^a Lower technical education and general secondary of middle level (MAVO and LBO).

^b Middle level of vocational education, general secondary education of higher level and preparatory scientific education (HAVO, VWO, and MBO).

^c Higher vocational and university education (HBO and University).

Source: Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (taken from the report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy, 1989: 107).

Table 5.5. Unemployment of certain immigrant groups according to the duration of registration, January 1, 1987, as percentages of the total number of unemployed per group (unemployment registration data)

	Months of registration				Total (abs. = 100%)
	<6	6-12	12-24	>24	
Native Dutch	37	13	17	33	577,300
Surinamese	29	13	18	40	20,851
Antilleans	37	17	19	27	6,004
Moluccans	21	13	18	49	2,125
Turks	29	15	20	37	28,829
Moroccans	27	13	19	41	19,280
North Mediterraneans ^a	33	13	17	37	4,709
Other non-EC aliens (i.a. refugees)	31	14	20	36	14,652

^a Italians, Greeks, Portuguese, and Spaniards.

Source: Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (taken from the report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy, 1989: 106).

outlined so far. A short review of the major studies carried out since the end of the seventies will serve this purpose².

² In 1979 a survey among Surinamese was conducted (Reubsaet *et al.*, 1982). The Central Bureau of Statistics has carried out two Quality of Life Surveys: one among Turkish and Moroccan heads of households in 1984 (CBS, 1985b and 1986a), one among Surinamese and Antillean persons of 18 years and older in 1985 (CBS, 1986b and 1988a). The Housing Need Survey of 1981 (Serail, 1984) also provides some general data on the labour and sources of income of the largest immigrant groups. Data for all other groups have to be derived from special research projects relating to these groups. For the Moluccans the studies of Veenman (1984 and 1985) from a major source. A special study on refugees has recently been made by Gooszen (1988).

As far as the *workers from Mediterranean* countries are concerned, in the survey carried out by Shadid in 1977/78 among Moroccan workers in the Netherlands an unemployment rate of 10.4 percent was revealed. According to his data, unemployment of long duration was still rare at that time: 3.6 percent of his sample had been unemployed for a total of more than 12 months since their arrival in the Netherlands (Shadid, 1979: 173/4).

De Vries (1981) also pointed out that unemployment of young aliens and members of ethnic groups was in general of short duration at the end of the 1970s, particularly among males. Significantly more women experienced longer periods of unemployment: 30 to 40 percent longer than 6 months, as against 15 percent among males (De Vries, 1981: 243).

Data from the survey carried out by Brassé *et al.* at the end of 1981 among young Turks and Moroccans show, however, that this trend was reversed at the beginning of the 1980s: unemployment of long duration increased rapidly among these young Turks and Moroccans, and at a greater speed than among native youngsters. A total unemployment rate of 35 percent was established for the young Turks and Moroccans in the age group 16-24 years of age. This figure was --at that time, in 1981-- twice as high as that for Dutch youngsters in the same age group: a drastic deterioration, when compared to data from earlier surveys (Brassé *et al.*, 1983).

The Housing Need Survey of 1981 confirmed that, at that time, unemployment among youngsters was significantly higher than the rate of total unemployment. This was also the case for the various alien and immigrant groups. In that survey a total unemployment rate of 15.2 percent was revealed for Turks and Moroccans, twice as high as that for the total population (Van Praag, 1984: 73).

The Quality of Life Survey held among Turkish and Moroccan households in 1984 is the most recent survey for these groups. Because it was carried out among heads of households, the data cannot be compared directly with other data. They may be compared, however, with data concerning Dutch heads of households as collected in 1983 (see Table 5.6). It transpires that only 49 percent of the Moroccan heads of households in the age group of 18-64 had paid jobs as their main activity, 36 percent of them were unemployed, 10 percent had social insurance incomes in the form of disability or widows' pensions. Turks showed somewhat better figures, but also in their case the difference when compared with Dutch heads of households is significant (CBS, 1985b and 1986a). Surveys relating to the labour-market position of the *Surinamese* are few in number. In 1979 a representative survey was carried out among persons born in Surinam (Reubsaet *et al.*, 1982): in that survey an unemployment rate of 25 percent was found, while the total unemployment rate in the Netherlands amounted to 5.5 percent at that time. Women (30 percent) and young Surinamese were relatively more often unemployed. Two years later the Housing Need Survey arrived at a comparable figure for unemployment of Surinamese and Antilleans combined (Van Praag, 1984).

Table 5.6. The principal daily activity of Turkish, Moroccan and Dutch heads of households, in percentages

	Moroccans 1984	Turks 1984	Dutch 1983
Salaried work, 15 hours a week or more	49	56	73
Unemployed	36	32	5
Social insurance: WAO, AAW	10	10	8
Other	5	2	13
Total (abs. = 100%)	1057	1313	1622

Source: CBS, Quality of Life Survey of Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands 1984, part 2, The Hague, 1986.

The Quality of Life Survey of Surinamese and Antilleans, carried out in 1985, showed that 40 percent of the members of these ethnic groups, aged 18 years and older, had to rely on social insurance payments as their main source of income. The part of these groups that earned an income from paid labour only just exceeded this, at 40 percent (CBS, 1986b and 1988a; see also Table 5.7). Veenman (1990: 5) found for Surinamese and Antilleans an unemployment percentage of 33 in 10 municipalities in 1988.

As regards the *Antilleans* only one special survey was conducted, in four cities in 1983 (Reubsaet and Kropman, 1985): the unemployment rate turned out to be 43 percent³. Veenman's survey in 1988 in 10 municipalities put it at 34 percent (Veenman, 1990: 5).

The unemployment of *Moluccans* was surveyed in 1983 in 17 municipalities in which Moluccan special residential quarters existed (Veenman, 1984 and 1985). In this survey an unemployment rate of 45 percent (of the labour force) was calculated. If the criteria used by the Employment Exchanges were to be applied, that percentage would come drop 38 percent⁴.

³ Since the survey was not carried out with a national representative sample, the conclusions are technically only valid for the municipalities in which the research was carried out. The same holds true for Veenman's survey of 1988.

⁴ See foregoing note.

Table 5.7. The principal source of income of Surinamese and Antilleans in 1985, and of native Dutch in 1983, in percentages

	Surinamese 1985	Antilleans 1985	Dutch 1983
Work	43	41	48
Social Insurance	40	40	19
Other	17	19	34

Source: CBS, Quality of Life Survey of Surinamese and Antilleans 1986, part I, 16, The Hague, 1986.

The level of unemployment is therefore higher for Surinamese, Antilleans and Moluccans in surveys than indicated in the official unemployment statistics based on registration at Labour Exchanges. The unemployment rates given in Table 5.8 must be regarded as reflecting reality more reliably than the ones in Table 5.2. It is furthermore remarkable that the level of unemployment of the various immigrant groups should not differ very much, while the duration of employment and the level of education show quite some variation.

A recently published survey, held among Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans in 1988 in ten municipalities, confirms these two theses. In this survey, unemployment of these respective groups was found to be 37, 40, 33 and 34 percent (Veenman, 1990: 5). Long-term unemployment among these groups proved to be much higher than among native Dutch unemployed, except for the Antilleans (Veenman, 1990: 5).

5.2.2. The position of those in employment

Two sources exist from which general data on the employment of members of immigrant groups and their position within firms can be derived. The first is the Labour Force Survey, which was held once every two years (until 1988). The Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics makes estimates of the total alien labour force based on these data, combined with administrative data on the total alien population.

The second is a recent survey of a sample of employers, carried out by the Loon-Technische Dienst (salaries section) of the Ministry of Social Affairs and

Table 5.8. Unemployment of immigrant groups on January 1, 1987; absolute number of registered unemployed, and estimates of unemployment rates based on surveys

	Absolute numbers	As percentage of the dependent work force: estimates
Native Dutch	605,940	14
Surinamese	18,960	45
Antilleans	4,430	43
Moluccans	6,100	45
Turks	24,970	40
Moroccans	16,400	40
Other aliens (i.a. refugees)	12,510	50

Source: Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (in: Ministry of Interior, *Notitie over de bestrijding van de werkloosheid onder etnische minderheden*, 1987: 4-5).

Employment (1988)⁵. The general picture given below is based on these two sources.

Tables 5.9 and 5.10 show that the total employment of aliens from Mediterranean countries, and particularly that of Turks and Moroccans, decreased continuously from 1983 to 1987. This seems to correspond with the increasing unemployment, which was demonstrated in the preceding section. Remarkably, total alien employment increased from 1985 to 1987. An increase of more than 20,000 workers from EC countries accounts for this rise. This seems to confirm the thesis put forward by Penninx (1986), which suggests that migration within zones of free circulation is particularly sensitive to economic fluctuations:

⁵ The survey of the LTD of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment does not include firms in the sectors of agriculture, horticulture, and mining, and also excludes governmental, provincial, and municipal employers, and public utility firms (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 1988: 5). Furthermore, the report confines itself to 'ethnic minorities' in the official policy definition. Aliens from EC countries, for example, are not included.

Table 5.9. Estimates ^a of foreign workers in the Netherlands, on March 31, 1983-1987 (including trans-frontier workers, but excluding the self-employed, their collaborating family members, and the unemployed) (in thousands)

	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987		
					Total	M	F
Total	173,7	168,8	165,8	169,0	175,7	134,8	40,9
E.C. countries ^b	65,7	64,9	65,2	80,0	86,1	60,9	25,2
- F.R.G.	15,4	15,9	16,3	17,1	18,7	13,1	5,6
- France	2,4	2,2	2,5	2,8	3,1	2,1	1,1
- Belgium	22,0	21,2	21,3	22,5	24,6	15,7	8,8
- Luxembourg	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,1	0,1
- U.K.	15,3	15,0	14,9	15,4	16,5	12,0	4,5
- Ireland	0,9	0,9	0,9	1,2	1,5	1,0	0,5
- Denmark	0,4	0,4	0,4	0,5	0,5	0,3	0,3
- Greece	1,6	1,6	1,6	1,6	1,7	1,4	0,4
- Italy	7,7	7,3	7,2	7,5	7,9	6,6	1,3
- Portugal	-	-	-	3,2	3,4	2,5	0,9
- Spain	-	-	-	8,0	8,1	6,1	2,0
9 Mediterranean countries ^c	90,5	88,0	85,9	84,3	83,7	68,9	14,8
- Portugal	3,3	3,1	3,2	3,2	3,4	2,5	0,9
- Spain	8,9	8,2	7,8	8,0	8,1	6,1	2,0
- Turkey	36,4	35,8	35,2	34,2	33,6	28,1	5,5
- Yugoslavia	5,7	5,0	4,9	4,9	4,9	3,6	1,3
- Algeria	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,0
- Morocco	25,8	25,4	24,9	23,8	23,2	19,7	3,4
- Tunisia	0,9	0,9	0,8	0,8	0,7	0,7	0,1

^a CBS estimates have been adjusted recently, as have those for some previous years.

^b from 1986 Portugal and Spain are included.

^c including Greece and Italy.

Source: CBS, Buitenlandse werknemers per 31 maart 1983/1984/1985/1986/1987.

Table 5.10. Estimates of employed foreign workers in the Netherlands on March 1, 1983, 1985 and 1987 (including trans-frontier workers, but excluding the self-employed, their collaborating family members, and the unemployed) according to fields of economic activity and selected (groups of) nationalities (in thousands)

Sector	Year	Total	EC	Mediterranean countries		
				Total	Turkey	Morocco
1. Agric./ Fishing	1983	2,6	0,3	2,0	1,0	1,0
	1985	2,2	0,4	1,7	0,5	1,2
	1987	2,4	0,5	2,2	0,6	1,4
2. Mining/ Industry Public Serv.	1983	85,9	28,5	55,2	24,5	14,8
	1985	79,6	26,3	50,9	22,4	15,1
	1987	74,6	37,1	42,7	18,6	10,5
3. Building	1983	7,1	3,3	4,1	1,3	1,1
	1985	6,6	3,0	3,5	1,2	0,7
	1987	9,3	4,4	4,8	1,6	1,5
4. Trade/ Repair Services	1983	23,2	9,6	8,8	2,3	3,4
	1985	22,2	10,2	8,6	2,6	2,9
	1987	23,4	11,2	10,5	3,0	4,7
5. Transp./ Communi- cation	1983	9,7	3,2	5,4	2,5	1,4
	1985	9,6	3,1	4,6	2,3	0,7
	1987	14,0	6,6	6,0	2,1	0,6
6. Banking/ Insur- ance	1983	9,8	6,2	1,5	0,4	0,1
	1985	10,3	7,0	1,9	0,6	0,3
	1987	14,4	9,2	3,3	1,3	0,0
7. Other Services	1983	35,3	14,6	13,5	4,4	3,9
	1985	35,3	15,1	14,8	5,7	4,0
	1987	37,7	17,0	14,3	6,2	4,6
Total	1983	173,7	65,7	90,5	36,4	25,8
	1985	165,8	65,2	85,9	35,3	25,0
	1987	175,7	86,1	83,7	33,6	23,2

Source: CBS, Buitenlandse werknemers in Nederland 1979-1987, Table 7.

economic upswings like the one which began in 1984 lead to a more intensive traffic of (skilled) workers within the EC. The period of stagnation up to 1984 had stabilized the number of EC workers in the Netherlands.

Workers from Mediterranean countries, and again particularly Turks and Moroccans, are most often employed in the sectors of industry, mining and public services (see Table 5.10). This concentration, however, decreased in the period 1983-1987. These workers, to the extent they can find employment at all, more and more frequently enter into other fields of economic activity, particularly commerce and 'other services' (which include cleaning services)⁶. The distribution of EC citizens over the various fields of economic activity is much more balanced, except for the fact that they do not appear in the agricultural sector.

The differences between workers from Mediterranean countries and those from EC countries are clearly illustrated if we look at their professions in Table 5.11. EC workers are strongly represented in the categories 'scientists, specialists and artists', 'managers', and 'administrative and commercial professions'. 'Mediterranean' workers, and particularly Turks and Moroccans, seldom practise these professions. They are to be found in production-related professions and in services.

The low position of employees from 'ethnic minority groups' is further illustrated by the data from the LTD survey of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (1988). Of all members of ethnic groups in that survey, 68 percent were working in jobs at the two lowest levels. The comparable figure for Dutch workers in positions at these levels was 26.4 percent (LTD survey, 1988: 6). The great majority work in (lower) technical and manual positions: 68.1 percent as compared to 40.5 percent for the Dutch workers.

Such general data can be further specified for each group, with the help of special surveys. Data relating to the position of workers from *Mediterranean* countries before 1978 are reviewed in the report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (Penninx, 1979). The general picture is that they were working in areas and in positions for which it was difficult to find Dutch workers. More than 85 percent of them were working as unskilled or semi-skilled workers. Working conditions were unattractive; wage-levels were relatively low. This general characteristic is confirmed by studies and surveys carried out later (see Shadid, 1979; Heijke, 1979 and 1986; Brassé *et al.*, 1983; Muus, 1984; Bouw and Nelissen, 1986; Einerhand and Oomen-van der Vegt, 1986 and the LTD-survey, 1988).

The position of employed *Surinamese* was surveyed in 1979 by Reubsæet *et al.* (1982). The industrial sector was host to both male and female; Surinamese

⁶ The LTD survey (1988: 8) found that 63 percent of the workers from 'ethnic minorities' had jobs in the industrial sector, compared to 31 percent of all workers in the survey.

Table 5.11. Estimates of employed foreign workers ^a in the Netherlands in March, 1983, 1985 and 1987 according to profession and selected (groups of) nationalities (in thousands)

Profession (category)	Year	Total	EC	Mediterranean countries		
				Total	Turkey	Morocco
0-1. Scientific, Specialists, Artists etc.	1983	23,1	16,6	2,6	0,7	0,7
	1985	25,3	17,9	3,6	1,1	1,0
	1987	32,3	21,5	3,3	2,0	0,4
2. Managerial and higher executive	1983	3,6	2,5	0,2	0,0	0,0
	1985	4,3	3,0	0,5	0,1	0,0
	1987	7,7	6,1	0,5	0,0	0,0
3. Administra- tive	1983	16,2	11,5	3,2	0,7	0,7
	1985	14,4	10,1	3,0	0,6	0,5
	1987	19,7	15,3	5,5	0,2	0,4
4. Commer- cial	1983	5,7	4,5	1,3	0,1	0,2
	1985	4,4	2,9	0,9	0,2	0,2
	1987	7,5	4,5	1,5	0,8	0,1
5. Service	1983	28,3	7,7	15,4	4,6	4,6
	1985	27,5	7,4	15,9	5,8	4,1
	1987	27,3	8,0	17,3	5,9	7,6
6. Agricul- tural, Fishing	1983	2,6	0,3	1,9	0,9	0,9
	1985	2,5	0,4	1,8	0,6	1,3
	1987	2,5	0,5	2,3	0,7	1,4
7-9. Production and related	1983	94,1	22,7	66,0	29,6	18,6
	1985	87,4	23,5	60,2	26,9	17,9
	1987	78,5	30,1	53,4	24,0	13,2
Total	1983	173,7	65,7	90,5	36,4	25,8
	1985	165,8	65,2	85,9	35,3	25,0
	1987	175,7	86,1	83,7	33,6	23,2

^a For definition see Table 5.9.

Source: CBS, Buitenlandse Werknemers in Nederland 1979-1987, Table 5.8.

women also found jobs in the administration and finance sector. The level of positions of employed Surinamese was much lower than the average Dutch worker: 20.1 percent were in unskilled work (compared to 5.8 percent of the total working force), 27.9 percent were skilled workers (compared to 23.9 percent for the total), 39.0 percent lower-level white collar workers (compared to 23.1 percent), 8.2 percent white collar on a middle level (compared to 20.7 percent) and 2.9 percent practised one of the higher professions (compared to 15.9 percent for the total Dutch labour force).

Research relating to the position of employed *Moluccans* was carried out by Veenman (1985). They find employment in the industrial sector (50 percent), particularly the older workers; young Moluccans more often have jobs in the service sector. The older workers have, correspondingly, a lower educational level than younger Moluccans. In Veenman's survey only 11 percent of the Moluccans held managerial positions in the lower and middle level of the hierarchy of the firm.

A study carried out by Brassé *et al.* (1986), relating to the position of ethnic groups in fourteen firms and organizations, is worth mentioning. The position of members of ethnic groups are systematically compared to Dutch workers in the same firms, and, predictably, the workers from Mediterranean countries held the lowest positions compared to both the Surinamese and Antilleans, and to the Dutch. This low status was hypothetically due to differences in age, sex, number of years in service, and level of education. To neutralize these variables, within each firm researchers located pairs of one Dutch and one ethnic or foreign worker with comparable qualities. Statistical analysis of these data confirmed that differences in the formal position between Dutch and the ethnic or foreign workers was indeed due to these factors, and especially to the level of education.

This points to the conclusion that, as long as aliens and ethnic workers have jobs, their formal position, measured according to the functional level and payment, is not worse than that of Dutch workers with the same qualifications. There is, however, a difference between their formal position and the realities of life on the work floor. Non-Dutch workers, particularly Turks and Moroccans, often complain that they have to do the dirtiest and dullest part of the work. Relations between Dutch and non-native workers are not always smooth, but on the other hand this study shows that high tensions between the two categories seldom occur. Communication is often difficult or lacking and this leads to irritation. These kinds of problems and complaints do not arise, or at least they occur to a lesser degree, among South European workers, Surinamese, and Antilleans. Furthermore, participation levels in works councils and associations of personnel differs: workers from Mediterranean countries are mainly passive, while Surinamese and Antilleans participate as actively as do the Dutch workers.

5.2.3. *Analysis of the labour-market situation of immigrants*

Research results given above show unequivocally that the position of immigrant groups in the Netherlands has become unfavourable, if not critical, in the course of the last fifteen years.

The first and most relevant factor is that access to the labour market has become extremely difficult: in mid-1987, unemployment among all major immigrant groups amounted to between 33 and 50 percent of the economically active population, a percentage more than three times that for the Dutch active population. The rise of the level of unemployment among immigrants started somewhat later than the first rise of Dutch unemployment⁷, namely in the mid-1970's, but from then on immigrant unemployment went up much faster, and did not stop when the unemployment rates of Dutch workers ceased rising, and began to fall from 1983 onwards.

The level and nature of the jobs held by employed immigrants of all groups is generally significantly lower than that of Dutch workers. As we have seen, Turks and Moroccans occupy the lowest levels. Although these two groups have found job opportunities in economic sectors outside those for which they were originally recruited, there are no indications that the level of the jobs they occupy has risen significantly. Some improvement is perceptible, when the position of young Turks and Moroccans is compared with that of their parents, who form the genuine first generation (the in-between generation: see Brassé and De Vries, 1986); compared to their Dutch contemporaries, however, these young immigrants lag far behind, even compared to those Dutch youngsters who have a similar level of education. Surinamese immigrants hold better positions than Turks and Moroccans: unskilled jobs are less common amongst them, and they more often find a place among the ranks of lower white collar employees. They do not, however, bear the comparison with the Dutch labour force in general. The same holds true, with slight variations, for the Moluccans. Only the employed Antillean immigrants have job levels resembling those of the Dutch employed labour force.

In general, therefore, the position of immigrants in the place of work is one of backwardness. This does not necessarily mean, however, that those immigrants who manage to secure a job are treated as inferior to the native Dutch. Research on this point, although still scarce, indicates that the low formal position of employed immigrants can in the main be attributed to the over-representation of features and characteristics which are appropriate to that position, like the level of education, age and years of work experience. In

⁷ Part of the explanation is that, at that time, part of the unemployment of (im)migrants was 'exported' by not extending the residence permits of unemployed aliens. This factor has become marginal in the course of time, since the great majority of aliens have permanent residence and work permits, and cannot be expelled in case of unemployment.

general, native Dutch workers matched on these characteristics hold the same formal positions and jobs.

The main conclusion from this material is that the deterioration of the position of immigrants has been found to reside mainly in the access to the labour market, rather than in mechanisms of unequal treatment of those employed. The need to take a closer look at the processes by means of which positions on the labour market are (or are not) acquired by or allocated to immigrants is therefore self-evident. How can the uneven development in the unemployment of immigrants and native Dutch be explained?

The rise and high level of unemployment of immigrants can partly be explained by their unfavourable starting-position on the labour market. The considerable reduction in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs in the secondary sector in general, and the fact that economic stagnation has struck particularly deep in those enterprises which formerly recruited migrant workers, has led to more redundancies and thus to higher unemployment among immigrants. But these factors cannot explain all the difference: if unskilled immigrant and Dutch workers are matched, a sizeable difference remains. A comparative analysis like this was carried out on the basis of the Labour Force Survey of 1983, and showed that the unemployment of unskilled Dutch workers amounted to 23 percent, as compared to 31,2 percent for their unskilled counterparts from Mediterranean countries⁸. There must be additional factors and mechanisms of allocation or acquisition at work.

The research literature indicates that very little explicit, negative allocation of position exists; in general, the law, formal regulations, and procedures do not exclude immigrants from the labour market or prohibit them from finding a job. There exist, however, some rather less direct mechanisms which put immigrants at a disadvantage when compared to Dutch candidates.

In the first place, the recruitment procedures practised in recent times offer immigrants fewer chances: informal recruitment through the existing organization and co-option of those already within it, internal recruitment and the increased use of employment agencies to hire temporary workers are examples of this (Gaspersz and Van Voorden, 1985; Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 1984; Becker and Kempen, 1982; Brassé *et al.*, 1983; Meloen and Hessels, 1985; Brassé *et al.*, 1986). Furthermore, there is in general a 'mismatch' between the recruitment channels of employers and the search strategies of immigrants, particularly of Turks and Moroccans (Hooghiemstra *et al.*, 1990).

⁸ See Einerhand and Oomen-van der Vegt in the SOPEMI-report Netherlands (Muus, 1986); a recent, more comprehensive analysis of this kind is done by Veenman (1990).

Secondly, immigrants often turn out to hold a disadvantageous position in selection procedures, such as interviews, culture-related tests, and the non-recognition of education and experience acquired abroad, etc. (Meloan and Hessels, 1985; Abell, 1985; Eppink and Zeef, 1984; Hooghiemstra *et al.*, 1990). The changes in the selection criteria during the last fifteen years are probably the most important explanation (Veenman, 1985; Brassé *et al.*, 1986). The criteria of educational level and technical skills have been raised, in a labour-market environment of too many applicants going after too few jobs. Technological developments and the constant modernization of production processes have given more weight to the criterion of "the ability of a candidate to learn new skills" (Heijke, 1986; Van Eekert, 1987). Significantly, social-normative criteria have gained weight, due to the wide choice available from numerous candidates: the precondition that the newcomer "should fit into the team", for example, has an adverse impact on the chances of immigrants, who are often seen as socially and culturally different, or whose command of the Dutch language is felt to be inadequate (Brassé *et al.*, 1986, 94; Becker and Kempen, 1982).

Finally, decisions regarding the employment of members of immigrant groups are influenced by the selectors' collective images relating to the productivity and output of various groups. Research has shown that on this point some quite negative collective images of immigrants have a wide currency. Notions relating to the costs of employment (if the employer foresees higher extra costs for immigrants) or to potential risks (when the employer perceives employment of native Dutch workers as less risky) also affect the chances of immigrants adversely (Abell *et al.*, 1985: 9 and 45; Meloan and Hessels, 1985: 9; Becker and Kempen, 1982; Veenman and Vijverberg, 1982: 126; Reubsæet and Kropman, 1985: 12 and 26; Bouw and Nelissen, 1986: 125, 135 and 138; Brassé *et al.*, 1986: 121 and 130; Choenni and Van der Zwan, 1987; Lagendijk, 1986; Oosterhuis *et al.*, 1986; Hooghiemstra *et al.*, 1990).

Research relating to large-scale redundancies indicates that in the procedures of selection of those to be laid off, generally the same criteria are applied as in the case of recruitment. The interests of immigrants are taken less into consideration than those of Dutch employees (Groenendijk *et al.*, 1984; for a recent analysis of redundancies in general see Verweij *et al.*, 1990).

Immigrants have no effective means available to counter these mechanisms of indirect negative position allocation. They do not have strong organizations to defend their interests collectively. On the individual level the education of many immigrants is still low, their command of the Dutch language imperfect and their work experience not always suited to Dutch conditions. Compared to fifteen years ago, however, their position on these points has definitely improved. But these gains are still outweighed by the much higher demands that employers make nowadays in the present labour-market conditions.

There are no serious indications that the high unemployment of immigrants is, even partly, due the specific attitudes or characteristics of the immigrants

themselves. The level of participation (or availability) in the labour market among immigrants is the same and for some groups even somewhat higher than for Dutch natives (Muus, 1984; Veenman, 1984; Reubsæet *et al.*, 1982; Brassé *et al.*, 1983; Reubsæet and Kropman, 1985; Bouw and Nelissen, 1986; Roelandt and Veenman, 1986; Ankersmit *et al.*, 1990). Their attitude towards work and their work ethics do not seem to differ essentially from those of Dutch workers in similar jobs.

Given the fact that the Dutch labour market is virtually closed to many immigrants, it is no wonder that in the period since 1975 the number of small entrepreneurs has risen significantly among immigrants. Much of the immigrant population has inherited from its socio-cultural background quite a few of the characteristics which are seen as essential for (small) entrepreneurship: a preference for independent work, a willingness to work long hours and to take risks, thrift, and making optimal use of the capital and labour of the (extended) family and other primary networks.

According to an inventory of ethnic enterprises registered with the Chambers of Commerce (on the basis of nationality and country of birth of the entrepreneurs) by Van Tillaart and Reubsæet (1988), about 10,000 entrepreneurs from ethnic minorities as defined in government policies were engaged in running some 7,973 firms in the Netherlands. At least 74 percent of these can be identified as small, independent entrepreneurs, strongly overrepresented in the catering sector. Many more are in retail and services. Favourite activities and fields are those for which no official permits are needed and where only modest capital investments have to be made and access is not monopolized: coffee and tea houses, shops, services, small clothing businesses, and the like. Within the ranks of the small entrepreneurs in the Netherlands, however, the immigrants again hold a low position. Entrepreneurs from countries north of the Mediterranean (Italians particularly) do relatively well, but Turks and Moroccans are much less successful. Many of them do not have an adequate background (having changed from being workers to small entrepreneurs), and the concentration in their sectors of activity is strong, making for keen competition and low incomes.

Various research projects have shown that mechanisms of negative position allocation also exist for small ethnic entrepreneurs. For many of them, laws and regulations limit their alternatives more than for native entrepreneurs, because they were originally made for the Dutch situation and Dutch entrepreneurs. Such regulations may even exclude (ethnic) newcomers, if a certain sector, like taxi-driving and market trading for example, is monopolized by established entrepreneurs by means of such regulations. Access to support facilities and financing can also be problematic for many immigrants.

5.3 | Immigrants and education

In studying the position of immigrants within the educational system, two basic facts should be kept in mind. The first is that, as a rule, in the first period after arrival, migration itself has a negative effect on the educational potential of the migrant, since language barriers, culture gaps and differences of school systems have to be bridged. In reading the following sections it should be borne in mind, therefore, that many of the immigrant pupils have not entered the Dutch educational system at the lowest grade at the age of 4 or 5 years, but at a later stage. This is particularly the case for Moroccan, Turkish, Surinamese and Antillean pupils. Comparisons of the educational results of such pupils with native Dutch are severely influenced by this fact. In many cases comparing the second generation (born in the immigration country) with those of native children would be more meaningful, but available data seldom allow such specific comparisons.

The second point is that education of children has two different aspects: the transfer of cognitive knowledge, and the transfer of culture. The transfer of culture is a matter of course for native pupils in the Dutch educational system, but not for immigrants from quite different cultural backgrounds.

5.3.1. *The level of education of adults*

Since the last population census of 1971 no regular statistics have been collected relating to the level of education of the total population, and special categories within it. Available data are, then, all from national surveys. The most recent figures are compiled in Table 5.12.

From that table it becomes clear that the educational level of adult immigrants is generally low. Moroccans and Turks have remained at the lowest levels; Italians, Spaniards, Yugoslavs, Greeks, and Portuguese have reached a somewhat higher level, as have the Moluccans and Surinamese, but they lag far behind the average level of the total Dutch population, which is met only by the Antilleans. It should be kept in mind that the level of education indicated is, for the majority of the adult immigrants, the level of education that they brought with them upon migration. The Moluccans are in fact the only group, in which many have acquired their education in the Netherlands. The nature of the data does not allow us to distinguish clear trends in the development of the level of education of adult immigrants.

Adult immigrants seem to participate quite extensively in various kinds of adult-education courses, or they do when they are permitted to register. The most frequented courses are on so-called 'basic education'. This consists of educational activities in which participants may acquire the knowledge and skills which will enable them to function in society: learning to read and write, Dutch language, basic arithmetic, basic social skills, orientation in certain professions, etc.

Table 5.12. Educational level^a of adult Surinamese, Antilleans, Turks, Moroccans, those from other Mediterranean countries, and Moluccans, compared to Dutch, in percentages

	Primary education or less	Secondary		Higher education	Unknown/ Not placeable	Student
		Lower and medium levels	Upper levels			
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Working population^b						
Moluccans 1983	32	53	13	2		
Dutch working population 1979	23	32	32	13		
LSO-data^c						
Surinamese 1985	38	35	19	8		
Antilleans 1985	23	32	31	13		
Dutch 1983	26	30	32	12		
AKT-data^d						
Turks 1985	65	12	4	1	6	11
Moroccans 1985	63	9	2	1	11	15
Other Mediter- raneans 1985	40	26	9	6	7	13
Total population						
Netherlands 1985	19	26	28	12	2	13

^a 1 = Primary education or less.

2 = Lower technical education and general secondary education of middle level (LBO and MAVO).

3 = Middle level of vocational education, general secondary education of higher level and preparatory scientific education (HAVO, VWO and MBO).

4 = Higher vocational and scientific education (HBO and university).

^b The Moluccan working population, based on a survey by Veenman carried out in 17 municipalities, compared with data from the Labour Force Survey 1979 for the total Dutch population, both pertaining to persons from 18-64 years of age (Veenman, 1984: 48).

^c Based on the general Quality of Life Survey 1983 and the QLS of Surinamese and Antilleans 1985, aged 18 years and older (Roelandt and Veenman, 1986: Table OW2).

^d Based on the Labour Force Survey, 1985, aged 15-64 (Ankersmit, Roelandt and Veenman, Table 5.1).

The number of immigrants in such courses is high: in 1987/88 more than 40 percent of the 65-70,000 students were immigrants, 58 percent of these being immigrant women. Many of the institutions which provide such courses have waiting lists, particularly for migrants who want to learn Dutch as a second language (Scientific Council, 1989: 167).

Participation of immigrants in higher forms of adult education, however, is much lower. Regular schools for adults seem to have few facilities offering immigrants specific pre-schooling to bridge the gap between their level of knowledge and command of the Dutch language, and the level needed to participate successfully in these regular school courses. The same holds true for special vocational training courses. Immigrants are under-represented among those who follow special professional reschooling programmes, on-the-job-training, and schooling within the factory. They do participate, however, in the special courses run by the Centres for Vocational Orientation and Practice, which were designed as a springboard for migrants to regular vocational training facilities.

5.3.2. Education of immigrant children

Participation in full-time education is compulsory in the Netherlands for all children up to the age of 16. Those aged 17 and 18 have to follow, at least part-time, some form of formal education.

It is generally assumed that all children below 12 years of age, both native and immigrant, do participate in the primary educational system comprising 8 grades. Above the age of 12, participation becomes less regular. Table 5.13 shows that Turkish and Moroccan children between 12 and 17, and particularly girls, have a lower participation rate than other groups. Participation among Surinamese youngsters in this age group is remarkably high, even higher than the average for Dutch. More detailed analysis of non-participation, dropping out, and non-attendance shows that these phenomena are high among those immigrant pupils who have entered Dutch schools at a later age, and have no real prospects of successfully finishing their education. In addition, cultural reasons seem to play a role for a minority of the Moroccan and Turkish girls. The position of those pupils who participate in the regular educational system can be measured by three main indicators: the pupils' results, the age/grade ratio, and the level and nature of the secondary education that they follow after primary school. Comparison of native Dutch pupils and immigrant children shows a more or less constant state of arrears. Turkish and Moroccan students underachieve according to all the indicators: their test results are lowest; at the end of primary school they are on average 1.5 years older than their classmates, and more than two thirds continue their education in the lowest ranks of vocational education (see also Tables 5.14 and 5.15). Antillean, Surinamese, Moluccan and South European students do not reach the average level on these indicators either, but they lag behind less. Arrears registered for these groups vary somewhat in the various research projects.

Table 5.13. Participation in education according to ethnic group, sex, age, and social background (percentages)

	12 - 14 years		15 - 17 years	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Turks	100	92	90	77
Moroccans	100	98	92	82
Surinamese	100	100	98	95
Native Dutch	100	100	92	91
Native Dutch from families with low levels of education	100	100	91	90

Source: Van Praag and Muus, 1987: 19; based on QLS Turks and Moroccans 1984, QLS Surinamese and Antilleans 1985, and General Facilities Survey among Dutch 1983.

If we compare average group achievements over a period of time, a modest improvement in the position of immigrant pupils is noticeable (Table 5.15). For example, in 1979 only 19.0 percent of all Moroccan and 27.6 percent of Turkish students continued their education in the secondary stage at levels higher than lower vocational schools; in 1985 these percentages had gone up to 31.1 and 39.3 percent. Nonetheless, these recent figures are far behind the Dutch average, which reached 78.5 percent in 1985.

Apart from such general comparisons, a few studies have tried to compare educational attainment in more sophisticated ways, for example by taking into account the duration of stay, and the point at which immigrant children have entered the Dutch educational system, matching social-economic background and family composition, and looking into the specific effects of high concentrations of immigrants in schools (Van Esch, 1983; De Jong and Batenburg, 1984; De Jong, 1987; Van Praag and Muus, 1987; Hooft, 1987 and 1989; Tesser en Mulder, 1990). Comparisons of matched groups of immigrant and native Dutch pupils show that the arrears, as measured above in general comparisons, can partly be explained by the characteristics listed above, and partly by factors linked to migration. The duration of stay, and thus implicitly the moment at which the educational system is entered, turns out to be the most

Table 5.14. Participation in education according to ethnic group, age, sex, and level of education ^a (percentages)

	Males			Females		
	Level			Level		
	I	II-1	II-2	I	II-1	II-2
12-14 years of age						
Turks	34	66	1	40	59	1
Moroccans	55	45	0	54	46	0
Surinamese	41	52	7 ^c	29	59	12 ^c
Native Dutch	20	80	0	12	87	1
Native Dutch from families with low levels of education ^b	21	78	0	13	86	1
15-17 years of age						
Turks	1	93	7	5	80	15
Moroccans	8	87	5	5	90	5
Surinamese	1	79	20	0	70	30
Native Dutch	2	63	35	1	53	47
Native Dutch from families with low levels of education ^b	3	70	26	1	60	38

- ^a Level I: Normal and special primary education;
 Level II, sub-level 1: Lower vocational education and general secondary education of middle level, first three grades of general secondary education of higher level and preparatory scientific education;
 Level II, sub-level 2: Middle level of vocational education, general secondary education of higher level and preparatory scientific education from grade 4 onwards.

^b The educational level of the head of household is primary school, or lower vocational education.

^c According to the authors of this table these figures could be misleading as a consequence of "mistakes in the original material" (Van Praag and Muus, 1987: 18).

Sources: Quality of Life Survey among Turks and Moroccans 1984, among Surinamese 1985, General Facilities Survey among the total population 1983. Taken from Van Praag and Muus, 1987: 19.

Table 5.15. Distribution of Turkish and Moroccan students in different forms of secondary education^a (percentages)

		LBO	AVO	MBO/HBO/WO
Turks	1979	72.4	25.5	2.1
	1982	69.6	26.9	4.0
	1985	60.7	31.7	7.6
Moroccans	1979	81.0	17.8	1.2
	1982	73.8	24.2	1.9
	1985	68.9	26.5	4.7
Netherlands: Total	1985	21.5	46.3	32.1

^a LBO: Lower technical education;
 AVO: General secondary education;
 MBO/HBO/WO: Middle level of vocational education,
 Higher vocational education and Scientific education.

Source: Calculations based on the yearly counts of pupils by the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

powerful explanatory factor: the longer the duration of stay and the earlier the moment of entry into the educational system, the smaller the educational arrears.

The socio-economic background of the immigrant groups studied here also explains part of the arrears in comparison with all Dutch pupils: as we have seen, most by far of the immigrant pupils come from a modest background, and their parents generally have a very low level of education. In some cases, particularly for Surinamese children, the composition of the family further explains their arrears: many pupils of Creole Surinamese origin live in female-centred families with only one parent.

Finally, a number of studies have revealed a correlation between the level of concentration of immigrant children in schools and their educational attainment. The material, however, is not very comprehensive or consistent.

Researchers agree only on the point that very high concentrations (more than 80 percent non-Dutch pupils) affect levels of attainment of all pupils negatively. The factors affecting the position of immigrant children as compared to Dutch ones can best be illustrated by two studies carried out by Hoolt (1987 and

1989). She was able to combine data from school registers, the population register and other sources, and thus create a dataset for all pupils in schools in Amsterdam. Apart from variables for identification of immigrant pupils this set contained data on:

- the moment of entrance into the Dutch school system, subdivided into 4 categories: a) born in the Netherlands; b) immigrants starting in the lowest grades of primary education; c) immigrants starting primary education in the Netherlands at an age younger than 9 years; d) immigrants starting education in the Netherlands at an age above 9 years.
- the composition of the family;
- the average socio-economic background of the neighbourhood (measured as the average level of education and profession of the fathers).

Comparisons of matched groups of native Dutch and immigrant pupils within this dataset pertaining to the situation in 1982 led her to the following conclusions:

- a. differences in age/grade ratios between native Dutch and immigrant pupils in both primary and secondary education do not exist for pupils born in the Netherlands; in general these differences increase for pupils who have entered Dutch education at a higher age/grade.
- b. the choice of nature and level of secondary education made by pupils from immigrant groups who are born in the Netherlands does not differ essentially from the choice made by the native Dutch. Dutch-born Chinese and South European pupils even continue their education in the secondary phase at a slightly higher level than native Dutch pupils. Dutch-born Moroccan and Turkish pupils make more or less the same choices as the Dutch, but the number of pupils from these groups born in the Netherlands is as yet too small to allow firm conclusions for these groups.
- c. if Surinamese and Dutch children are matched for the socio-economic level of their neighbourhood and for the composition of the family, their choice in the secondary phase of education is essentially the same.

A second analysis was carried out by Hooft (1989) on the basis of a comparable dataset of five years later, 1987, again for Amsterdam. A first conclusion based on that material is that the percentage of pupils born in the Netherlands, and the percentage which had started primary school at the lowest grade, increased significantly for all major immigrant groups, excepting the Antilleans. A second result is that the level of education of these immigrant children, again excepting the Antilleans, has increased. In general, arrears compared to Dutch pupils still existed, but they were smaller in 1987 than in 1982.

The material for 1987, however, does not entirely sustain the positive expectations created by the level of attainment in 1982 of pupils born in the

Netherlands. Matched groups of Dutch and immigrant pupils in the 1987 material showed that the immigrants' arrears had disappeared in the case of South Europeans, Surinamese girls and Antilleans, where they had started education at the lowest grade, but that Surinamese boys, and Turkish and Moroccan pupils who started early, still retain (reduced) arrears compared to the Dutch. It is hypothesized that this is due, for Turkish and Moroccans pupils, to arrears at the very beginning of their formal education, and for Surinamese boys to problems with teachers.

5.3.3. Analysis and interpretation of findings

The disadvantageous position of immigrants described above can to a certain extent be explained in terms of allocation and acquisition. A first conclusion is that no negative allocation in the form of exclusion exists; on the contrary, compulsory attendance at school up to the age of 16 also applies to and is observed by immigrants. Positive allocation exists, at least since 1980, in the form of an intensive policy aiming to overcome the educational arrears of immigrants and their children.

In 1980 the Ministry of Education and Science launched a plan for an educational policy for 'pupils from cultural minorities'. The two goals of this plan were equal educational opportunities and equivalence of cultures. The first goal was to be achieved by putting more emphasis on Dutch-language teaching and by intensifying the contacts between immigrant parents and the school. For providing this additional and special instruction in Dutch language, extra resources were given to schools, depending on the number of immigrant pupils, their duration of stay and their country of origin. It was especially assumed that pupils from non-Dutch-speaking backgrounds needed extra lessons in Dutch during the first two years of their stay.

The second goal, equivalence of culture, was to be achieved by two different provisions: Education in Mother-tongue and Culture (EMC), and Intercultural Education (IE). EMC-teaching was set up in the Netherlands in the early 1970s, but with a different motivation, namely as a policy measure to facilitate the eventual reintegration of pupils in the society of origin. It was provided by foreign teachers during a limited number of hours within regular Dutch schools, but was in fact quite separate from the normal curriculum. The motivation for providing EMC, however, changed radically in the new policies after 1980. In the 1980 policy plan the goals of mother-tongue teaching were reformulated in psychological terms (Eldering, 1989: 120): the aims were to foster the well-being and the ethnic awareness of the children, guard them against alienation from their parents and family, and strengthen their identity. It is also intended to contribute (indirectly) to a higher level of achievement, but whether it does is still a controversial issue in the field of education.

The idea behind Intercultural Education is quite different. It is intended to prepare children of both ethnic/cultural groups and the indigenous Dutch majority to live together harmoniously in a multicultural society such as the

Netherlands. It turned out to be difficult to translate this goal into concrete educational practice. Some teachers believe that IE should concentrate primarily on combatting prejudice and discrimination; in practice most IE activities involve only the folklore and history of the countries of origin.

Since 1985 all the special facilities for immigrant children have been brought together in a broader framework: that of educational priority policy. The basic assumption is that educational problems of lower class Dutch and immigrant pupils are to a high degree comparable, and can be dealt with within the same policy framework. Priority (i.e. additional funds) is given to schools and to geographical areas with a high percentage of lower class and immigrant children. Pupils are rated according to the educational level and economic position of their parents (lower class means a weighting of 1.25), family composition (divorced parents: 1.25), country of origin ('ethnic-minority children' count 1.9), and so on. Average Dutch children have a weighting of 1. This weighting determines the number and sort of staff and the funds allotted to a school. Schools with more lower class and particularly immigrant pupils thus get more funds than others. As yet, there is no systematic evaluation of this new policy available. It is clear, however, that in terms of financial input by the government, the program for the education of pupils from immigrant groups is considerable: it is by far the most costly part of the government's minorities budget.

At the level of the schools, a first element of possible position allocation is to be found in the 'choice' of schools. Within the Dutch system this choice of school has two aspects. The first has to do with the typically Dutch structure of the educational system with its 'public' (i.e. under municipal or state authority) and private schools (mostly denominational, including recently also a number of Islamic and Hindu schools, but also comprising schools practising special methods, like Freinet, Jena and Dalton). Public and private schools are entitled to maintenance from State funds, provided they comply with certain statutory conditions, and controls on the curriculum. Public schools are open to anybody, while access to private schools is up to the school boards.

In view of this particular school system, one would expect immigrant children from a non-Christian background to be concentrated in public or non-denominational private schools. This tendency is present, but is relatively weak (Table 5.16). In 1981, for example, 53.3 percent of all Turkish and 58.2 percent of all Moroccan pupils, mostly moslems, were in public schools. This unexpected distribution can be explained by the fact that, from the middle of the 1970s, many schools (and particularly denominational ones) experienced a decline in numbers of pupils as a consequence of the decrease in the fertility of the Dutch population in the sixties. Accepting immigrant pupils was, in these circumstances, a strategy for schools to survive or to keep enrolments stable. The second aspect of the 'choice' of school has become more important in recent times, it seems: the number of schools having a higher concentration of

Table 5.16. Percentage of foreign pupils in primary schools, according to denomination of schools, 1985/86

% foreign pupils	Public	Private			Total
		Protestant	Roman Catholic	Other private	
None	41.7	59.6	38.1	52.5	46.5
1-10%	37.5	32.8	47.1	39.2	39.1
11-20%	9.3	3.3	8.3	4.4	7.0
21-30%	4.0	1.9	3.0	2.1	3.0
31-40%	2.8	1.1	1.7	0.8	1.8
41-50%	1.8	0.5	0.9	-	1.0
51-60%	1.2	0.3	0.4	-	0.6
more than 60%	1.8	0.5	0.5	1.0	1.0
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics, Pupils statistics; taken from Ankersmit *et al.*, 1988: 113.

non-native pupils than would be expected on the basis of the composition of the neighbourhood of the school, has been growing during recent years, particularly in the big cities (see Table 5.17)⁹. It seems that more and more parents choose not to send their children to schools with a high concentration of immigrant children, because they think that the level of these schools is lower (De Wit, 1990). This phenomenon of 'white flight' is not entirely limited to native Dutch families; a small percentage of the parents in immigrant groups prefer also schools with few immigrant children. This selective mechanism can thus, at least to a certain extent, be viewed as a class phenomenon.

⁹ Figures in Table 5.17 refer only to pupils of non-Dutch nationality. Antillean and most Surinamese and Moluccan pupils are not included in this table. The figures are thus minimal data.

Table 5.17. *Percentage of foreign pupils in primary schools (as percentage of the total number of schools), 1985/86*

% foreign pupils	All schools	Amsterdam	Rotterdam	The Hague	Utrecht
None	46.6	22.4	14.8	10.7	11.0
1-10%	39.1	20.6	31.3	47.7	27.0
11-20%	7.0	16.8	14.7	16.8	17.0
21-30%	3.0	9.3	8.3	6.0	17.0
31-40%	1.8	8.4	6.9	7.4	11.0
41-50%	1.0	7.9	5.5	5.4	8.0
51-60%	0.6	7.5	3.2	2.0	2.0
More than 60%	0.9	7.1	15.3	4.0	7.0
Total (abs. = 100%)	8401	241	217	149	100

Source: Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics, Pupils statistics; taken from Scientific Council, 1989: 153.

Research until now has not been conclusive as to the effects of high concentrations. A straightforward correlation between concentration and lower performance of pupils does not seem to exist (see De Lange and Van Vegchel, 1986; Koot *et al.*, 1985; De Jong and Masson, 1980: 10 and 41; De Jong, 1987: 26; Van Esch, 1983: 19 and 39; Wijnstra, 1985; Everts *et al.*, 1986; Teunissen, 1988 and Tesser en Mulder, 1990), but it is clear that schools with concentrations above 80 percent and schools in which the concentration process proceeds very rapidly, have great difficulties in attaining average levels (in spite of the extra funds they may acquire). To this extent the concentration phenomenon can be viewed as negative position allocation, because it negatively affects the chances of immigrant pupils¹⁰.

¹⁰ This conclusion pertains the concentration in 'normal schools' which are the result of 'white flight'. It does not pertain to special schools like Hindu or Muslim schools of which some 13 have been established during the last years. In these cases the process by which concentration is reached is completely different (Teunissen, 1990).

Allocation factors within schools can be summarized as follows. The aims and practices of education and the approach used have not changed significantly as a consequence of the altered ethno-cultural composition of the schools. New initiatives like Education in Mother-tongue and Culture and Intercultural Education, have not really been integrated into the programme as a whole. With regard to inter-ethnic relations within primary schools, the general picture is that friction and prejudice do occur, but that within the school system as a whole the norm prevails that immigrant children should be regarded and treated on an equal footing by their schoolmates and by teachers. In general there is no strong group formation along ethnic lines, except for Turkish and Moroccan girls in the higher age groups (Koot *et al.*, 1985; Wijnstra, 1986; Arends *et al.*, 1986; Dors, 1987; Everts *et al.*, 1985).

Research results are contradictory as regards some aspects of position acquisition in the field of education. Some researchers argue that the attitude of the parents is passive, and encourages the evasion of compulsory school attendance, rather than compliance with it. Others, however, stress that parents do seek and have contact with teachers from their own ethnic group, with whom they can talk and feel more at home, and that the non-compliance with school attendance is a result of the fact that many migrant children have missed the link-up in Dutch schools and are therefore less motivated to participate in existing school curricula. Furthermore, they do not have real chances of attaining results (Everts *et al.*, 1985: 252 ff; Arends *et al.*, 1986: 69; Molony and Pechler, 1982: 23; De Jong and Masson, 1985; Risvanoglu *et al.*, 1986; Koot *et al.*, 1985: 85; De Jong, 1987: 205; Van Esch, 1983: 13-14; Vlug, 1985; Luykx and Uniken Venema, 1985).

5.4 | Housing

5.4.1. *Housing as an issue in government policy*

Housing is not only a scarce and expensive commodity, but is also a primary basic necessity. In a welfare state like the Netherlands this is more than reason enough for the government to intervene in the price formation and distribution of accommodation. Central or local government influence is present in all stages of the production process. Public authorities (state, province, municipality) are involved in determining where a house is to be built, its size, and whether it is to be sold or rented. In the latter case, the authorities, to a certain extent, can determine who will rent the accommodation and under what conditions the leasing will take place. If, for example, the house is rented accommodation for lower-income groups and let by a housing corporation, the rent is more or less laid down by the government. The rent is fixed at a level below the cost-price, and the government provides the difference by means of so-called bricks and mortar subsidies. Further, the government controls rent changes for virtually all rented accommodation by means of legislative regula-

tions (rents policy). The local authorities are involved in the distribution of housing, particularly in areas with a housing shortage, by means of reserving dwellings below a certain price for people from lower-income groups (municipal housing allocation). Finally, the government subsidizes those consumers who, despite all these measures, earn too little reasonably to afford the accommodation (individual rent subsidy).

It should be borne in mind that there are also owner-occupied properties. Currently, 43 percent of the Dutch housing stock is owner-occupied (the percentage is much lower among ethnic minorities). The price and distribution of owner-occupied dwellings is governed by different factors to those affecting rented accommodation. The free-market principle plays a more direct role, but prices are nevertheless partly dependent on subsidies, and particularly on government tax policy.

Government intervention in housing is not unique to the Netherlands, but is relatively highly developed there. For instance, subsidized public housing projects are of far greater significance than in other West European countries. A further characteristic of Dutch housing is the part played by housing corporations, which are non-profit organizations fulfilling a public role: it is generally not the public authorities themselves who commission the building and letting of the property, but in great part, the housing corporations. Their activities extend as far as the allocation of dwellings, which is important with regard to immigrant housing.

5.4.2. Minorities and their housing history

The housing history of immigrants is strongly intertwined with their migration history. Migration history differs widely among the various groups.

Foreign workers

In the sixties and seventies, large numbers foreign workers from the Mediterranean region arrived in the Netherlands via organized recruitment and spontaneous settlement. Initially these were mostly South Europeans, and later many more Turks and Moroccans. They were mainly young, married men who had left their families behind. Their sojourn was initially regarded as being of short duration. Special measures were not deemed necessary, and the responsibility for housing the newly recruited was assigned to the employers. In the second instance, the municipalities were responsible, but since it was a matter of housing single persons, the municipalities were not particularly active. The foreign workers found accommodation in communal barracks, rented rooms and boarding houses. In the private sector in particular, the housing was very poor, and during this period boarding houses were often in the public eye because of overcrowding, lack of facilities and fire risks (Penninx, 1979).

In 1968, three quarters of foreign workers were still living in boarding houses, rented rooms, or communal barracks (Van Praag, 1981).

In a subsequent phase of the migration process, family reunion began. The foreign workers made demands on the Dutch housing market but were not warmly received: on entering the housing market they had found difficulty in gaining access to the public sector (houses controlled by corporations and municipalities), municipalities and corporations were unresponsive, and there was a shortage of large, inexpensive dwellings (Prinssen, 1983). Most of the foreign workers rented poor-quality, private accommodation in which, at that time, the native population had little interest. Some decided, or were compelled, to purchase a dwelling, when rented accommodation appeared not to be available for a long period. They were often old, unattractive buildings in old urban districts.

In the late seventies, distribution regulations applying to family housing were disadvantageous to foreign workers, if not prohibitive. However, in the eighties most of the hindrances were taken away and equal access was granted, at least in a formal sense. Meanwhile family reunion has progressed considerably. Just a few years ago, 86 percent of Turkish married men had their families with them; among Moroccans the figure was 78 percent (CBS, 1987). Many family members who now come to the Netherlands are newly-married partners of Turks and Moroccans already living in the Netherlands.

Surinamese and Antilleans

Although Surinamese and Antilleans already had Dutch nationality and were more familiar with Dutch society than migrants from the Mediterranean countries, they too had difficulty in finding housing. This problem was enlarged by the concentration of the Surinamese migration in the years 1974/1975. The Surinamese and Antilleans, too, ended up largely in private rented accommodation in old urban districts, but in addition significant numbers found homes in various new housing estates built in the seventies, which had failed to attract the native population. One of those districts in particular, the Bijlmermeer in Amsterdam, received a considerable share of the flow. Many Surinamese and Antilleans sought accommodation with relatives already in the Netherlands. The Dutch government felt a greater responsibility toward the Surinamese immigrants who were, after all, Dutch by nationality. The magnitude of the immigration, and the tendency towards the big cities, was regarded as a problem by the state and the municipalities involved. So the reception of Surinamese and Antilleans was handed over to a special government bureau: the Central Bureau for the Execution of Settlement Policy (1974-1980). Among other things, this Bureau provided housing for those who wished to be eligible, and Surinamese and Antilleans already living in the big cities were able to make use of the Bureau's services. As a result, a certain measure of dispersal of migrants across the country came about, and some of the pressure was taken off the big cities (Reubsat and Kropman, 1982).

The method of reception was very similar to the model used earlier for immigrants from Indonesia. In order to obtain the housing vital to this policy the

government adopted the so-called 5 percent-priority regulation: 5 percent of all accommodation to be built in the public housing sector was earmarked for housing Surinamese and Antilleans. The 5 percent regulation was not applicable to the four big cities, where the concentration of Surinamese and Antillean migrants was to be reduced.

The Central Bureau for the Execution of the Settlement Policy was operative until 1980, by which time more than 5,000 Surinamese and Antillean families (this amounted to more than 10 percent of the families present in the period 1975-1980) were housed by the Bureau in more than 450 municipalities. The settlement and dispersal policy of the Central Bureau may be regarded as successful. Those who received housing through the intervention of the Bureau generally have good accommodation, and the housing market in the big cities has been somewhat relieved by this dispersal policy. A disadvantage of the policy, however, is that Surinamese migrants often arrived in small municipalities, which exposed them to a chance of isolation (Reubsaet and Kropman, 1982).

Moluccans

Housing has left its mark on the Moluccans' living conditions more than on those of any other immigrant group. When Indonesia gained independence in 1951, a number of ex-colonial soldiers from the Moluccans came to the Netherlands (13,000 people, family members included), and were housed by the government in some fifty barrack camps in rather isolated spots. It was the idea that they should remain there until they returned to their land of origin. This proved to be an illusion. Because the size of the group increased rapidly, new camps were built, and it was decided at the end of the fifties to create more permanent housing in the form of small, Moluccan residential districts, usually situated in the same regions as the barracks. Throughout the years, these districts became the usual Moluccan forms of settlement, and the barracks gradually disappeared. In addition, many Moluccans of later generations settled among the Dutch population.

The building of Moluccan residential districts was eventually brought to a halt, and since the eighties they have not been expanded. The responsibility for housing the Moluccans was assigned by the state to housing corporations and municipalities. Nowadays, Moluccans in need of housing have to rely on the general housing market, and can make use of ordinary facilities.

In the mid-eighties the number of Moluccans in the Netherlands had increased to about 40,000, of which an estimated two-thirds lived in Moluccan residential areas or smaller Moluccan clusters in the vicinity, the remainder being dispersed. There are reports of housing shortages among young people living with their families in certain Moluccan districts, unable to find their own accommodation in the same district (Tuyman-Kret, 1985).

Refugees and asylum seekers

Refugees and asylum seekers have always settled in the Netherlands. The term refugee applies to those whom the Dutch government has invited, and to those who have come to the Netherlands on their own initiative but who have subsequently been granted refugee status. Asylum seekers do not (yet) have the same residential status, but are awaiting a decision which often turns out to be negative (which does not necessarily mean that they actually leave the Netherlands).

In the eighties the number of asylum seekers in the Netherlands increased (see part I), and because of the rather sudden increase in the number of asylum seekers it was necessary to change the reception system. Since November 1987 the Regulation for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (in Dutch, ROA) has been in effect. On this basis, the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Culture is currently channelling the flow to more than 400 municipalities for temporary accommodation. Little is known about permanent housing.

5.4.3. Minorities and their housing situation

General characteristics of minorities

Ethnic groups do not only differ in their housing histories but also in their current social and cultural characteristics.

Some of these characteristics, such as household type and size, income level, and the size of the municipality which they inhabit, are particularly relevant in an assessment of the housing situation. At least part of the differences in housing situation between minorities and the native Dutch can be explained along these lines. The source of data in the following survey, unless otherwise stated, is the Housing Need Survey 1985/86.

The relatively small number of one-person households and couples without children among the minorities is striking; on the other hand, the percentage of families with children is high. Among Surinamese and Antilleans these families with children are, for a large part, one-parent families. The average household size among the Turks at 4.1, and Moroccans at 4.6, is very high for Dutch standards. This also applies to the Moluccans, whose average household size is estimated at 4.1 (Tuyman-Kret, 1985). Among the South Europeans the figure is 3.1, the Surinamese 2.9, and the Antilleans 2.6. These figures should be compared with the mean household size for the entire population of the Netherlands, which stands at 2.6.

In view of their household characteristics, the Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in particular require fairly large dwellings, a requirement that is often not met. The average ratio of persons to rooms (the number of residents divided by the number of rooms in a dwelling) is generally higher among the immigrants than among the total population of the Netherlands. At the beginning of 1986 the figure for the total population stood at 0.7. For Turks the figure was 1.2, for the Moroccans 1.4, for the Moluccans 1.0, for the South Europeans

and the Surinamese 0.9, and for the Antilleans 0.8. The dwellings of Turks and Moroccans tend to be especially overcrowded, if Dutch standards are applied. The immigrants are proportionately strongly concentrated in the four big cities, and under-represented in municipalities with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants (Table 5.18). In the last decade, this concentration has increased because immigrants have lagged behind in the suburbanization process. The concentration in the big cities negatively affects the housing quality.

The Moluccans, however, are under-represented in the large cities, but their housing situation is still unfavourable. The Moluccan residential districts were built hastily in the fifties and sixties to replace communal barracks, the dwellings generally contain no more than four rooms, and the quality leaves much to be desired. However, renovation has begun (Tuynman-Kret, 1985). In contrast to general opinion, the average income of immigrant households is not much lower than that of the total population. It even exceeds it among the South Europeans. These averages reflect, however, the fact that up to now few immigrants are pensioners. From the housing perspective, the fact that high incomes are uncommon among immigrants is also important, and for this reason alone, home ownership is rare.

The combination of large family households, settlement in the big cities, and only average incomes, renders the housing of certain minority groups problematic in advance. Large, inexpensive dwellings are scarce in these cities.

Table 5.18. Distribution of population by size of municipality 1986 (percentages)

	4 largest cities	other municipalities with > 100,000 pop.	municipalities < 100,000 pop.	Total
Turks	37	30	33	100
Moroccans	48	10	42	100
South Europeans	43	12	45	100
Surinamese	59	12	47	100
Antilleans	32	21	47	100
Total population	13	12	75	100

Source: CBS, Population Statistics and Housing Need Survey (1985/1986)

Quality of housing

Dwellings constitute a heterogeneous commodity. They differ according to style, lay-out, age, comfort, appearance and situation. All these aspects as a whole cannot be translated easily into a general indicator, such as practical value or living comfort, of which each inhabitant would have a certain measure at his disposal. Normally, the cost of a dwelling would act as a general indicator but, as already mentioned, the cost of housing is largely determined by subsidies and government measures. It is, therefore, difficult to achieve a comprehensive picture of tenants and home owners who are subjected to various methods of cost formation and who receive varying value for money.

Nevertheless, there is an encompassing measure of quality for housing. Since the end of the seventies, a housing evaluation system for the rents policy has been in use, which covers a wide range of aspects of the housing situation. On the basis of data from the Housing Need Survey (a large and recurring survey of which the latest available results at this moment date back to the end of 1985 and early 1986), it is possible to estimate that the average dwelling in the Netherlands scores 125 points. This observation functions as an anchor for an assessment of the housing quality of the various population groups. The number of points scored by a dwelling correlates strongly with the characteristics of the inhabitants. At the beginning of 1986 the average number of points scored was 99 among the lowest income groups, and 150 among the highest. Aside from this, the quality of housing is related to the size of the community, dwellings in large towns on the average being lower in quality.

All data in the following sections on quality, ownership and cost of housing are derived from the Housing Need Survey 1985/86, carried out by the CBS. More extensive reporting was done by Van Praag (1989), and the same subjects were treated by Roelandt and Veenman (1989), who based their work on another survey called the Social Position and Use of Facilities by Minorities (Dutch abbreviation SPVA).

First, a few words on the possession of a dwelling, as such: in the first phase after immigration, many immigrants had to make do without dwellings of their own. Workers from the Mediterranean countries were often housed in boarding houses or rented rooms, and many Surinamese and Antilleans lived with relatives. This situation belongs to the past: like the native Dutch, the immigrants with few exceptions live in their own dwellings. However, composite households are more common among the minority population than among the native Dutch. Young Turkish and Moroccan married couples often live with parents or parents-in-law, while Surinamese and Antilleans will often share accommodation with close or distant relatives.

Members of the minorities tend to live in single-family buildings less than the native Dutch, and more in flats, which is partly because they are concentrated in the large cities. If immigrants do live in single-family dwellings, then it is less often a corner house or detached house than in the case of the native Dutch.

The dwellings of the Mediterranean groups (Turks, Moroccans, and South Europeans) are, on average, older than those of the native Dutch. A considerable share, an estimated 40-45 percent, is pre-war, while the figure for the native Dutch is 29 percent. The dwellings of Surinamese and Antilleans are newer. These groups are relatively often to be found in housing built in the seventies and eighties.

When Turks and Moroccans live in older dwellings these are less often renovated or improved than those of the native Dutch; the Surinamese and Antilleans do not lag behind the native Dutch in this respect.

Although the households of immigrant groups are, on average, larger than those of the native Dutch, they have on average fewer rooms. On average, the dwellings of the native Dutch contain 4.1 rooms against 3.9 rooms in the case of the minorities (all groups together). Of the large households (6 or more persons), almost two-thirds of Turks and Moroccans live in a dwelling with four rooms or less. In large households among the rest of the population the share is no more than one quarter. The uneven character of the distribution is enhanced if the size of the dwelling is expressed in square meters of surface area, instead of numbers of rooms. Dwellings with a large living room are less common among minorities, particularly Turks and Moroccans, than among the native population.

Apart from shape, age and size in assessing the quality of a dwelling, the construction, living comfort and situation are important. All these aspects are included in the measure of quality outlined, according to which the average quality-score of dwellings in the Netherlands stood at 125. Table 5.19 compares the various population groups by the average number of points scored.

Table 5.19. Quality of dwellings by ownership (average scores)

	Tenants only	All occupants
Turks	90	89
Moroccans	85	86
South Europeans	86	96
Surinamese	99	100
Antilleans	111	112
Total population	106	125

Source: CBS, Housing Need Survey (1985/1986), data processed by SCP.

Because nearly all immigrants live in rented accommodation, the comparison was additionally made for tenants only. The quality of the dwelling is highest among the native population and lowest among Turks and Moroccans, with the other groups in between. It may be concluded that quality of owner-occupied dwellings is generally higher than the quality of rented ones, while in case of the minorities there is little difference in this respect. It was mentioned earlier that difference in housing quality is closely linked to factors such as income and size of municipality: the question is now to what extent the differences in housing quality between the various ethnic groups can be explained by these factors.

Through multivariate analysis it is possible to correct for these differences in income and municipality size. Quality scores are calculated for the minority population under the assumption that they would have the same distribution by income and municipality size as the native Dutch, and the influence of these factors in comparing the groups is therefore eliminated. The results are presented in Table 5.20.

The average quality-scores in the first column in Table 5.20 were the same as given in Table 5.19. Correction, however, results in smaller differences between the population groups. This means that at least part of the difference lies with the factors of income and municipality size. Yet clear differences still remain. The Mediterranean groups in particular are behind the native Dutch, and for various reasons.

Table 5.20. Dwellings by observed quality and expected quality after correction for differences among groups in income and size of municipality

	Observed	Expected
Turks	89	104
Moroccans	86	104
South Europeans	96	107
Surinamese	100	121
Antilleans	112	117
Total population	125	125

Source: CBS, Housing Need Survey (1985/1986), data processed by SCP.

The settlement history of these groups (see Section 5.4.5) caused them to lag behind immediately with little chance of catching up in the short term. Further, as will be shown, housing aspirations, particularly among Turks and Moroccans, seem to be lower. Finally, it should be remembered that discrimination on the part of landlords still occurs, and that dwellings of good quality might fall relatively often into the hands of the native Dutch.

Tenancy and housing costs

Few immigrants are owners of their housing nowadays. Numbers were higher in the recent past, when many Turkish and Moroccan families, out of preference or necessity, bought their houses (Table 5.21).

Unfortunately this was an expensive period and many of these buyers found themselves in financial difficulty due to rising interest rates, declining incomes (unemployment), and maintenance problems (Braamse, 1983). In various cities, in the framework of urban renewal or for other social reasons, these owners were released by the municipalities from their obligations and housed in rented accommodation.

The number of immigrants in housing let by private landlords is also declining. On the one hand, this is because these dwellings continue to be taken over by housing corporations and municipalities, and on the other hand, because less housing of this sort is being built. Finally, the distribution system is now more accessible for minority members. As a result of all these developments, immigrants now fall primarily into the public housing sector, and especially into accommodation let by the municipalities.

Table 5.21. Dwellings by ownership in 1986 (percentages)

	Owner occupied	Public housing sector	Let by local authorities	Private rented sector	Other or unknown	Total
Turks	15	49	22	12	2	100
Moroccans	5	54	25	12	3	100
South Europeans	25	41	17	13	5	100
Surinamese	14	59	11	13	4	100
Antilleans	16	59	6	17	1	100
Total population	43	33	7	14	3	100

Source: CBS, Housing Need Survey (1985/1986), data processed by SCP.

Turks and Moroccans tend to live in less expensive, Surinamese and Antilleans in more expensive dwellings than the native Dutch (in terms of gross rent received by the landlord). Many tenants, however, receive individual rent subsidy and pay a lower net rent. Calculated by net rents, at the beginning of 1986 the native Dutch had the highest living costs (an average of DF. 368,- per month) followed by Surinamese and Antilleans (DF. 347,-) then Turks and Moroccans (DF. 294,-).

In the entire population, at the beginning of 1986, people spent an average of 17 percent of their income on rent (net rent in relation to net household income). The percentage among Surinamese and Antilleans stood equally at 17, but among Turks and Moroccans the figure was no more than 13 percent. The incidence of rent subsidy among immigrants has increased sharply since 1982. The percentage of recipients as well as the average amount received increased more sharply among this group than among the total population. At the beginning of 1986 21 percent of all tenants received subsidy. Of the Turkish and Moroccan tenants, the percentage was also 21, of the Surinamese and Antillean tenants 43 percent. Whether or not tenants are eligible for subsidy depends on their income and gross rent.

Personal experience of the housing situation

It is often assumed that the various immigrant groups judge their housing situation in the Netherlands in their own culturally defined way. When comparing the various population groups (again the source is the Housing Need Survey 1985/86), differences in housing appreciation and expressed needs can indeed be observed. Immigrants, particularly Turks and Moroccans, are less satisfied with their dwellings than the native Dutch, and want to move house more often. The least satisfied are the Moroccans, while the most satisfied are the native Dutch and the Antilleans. Turks, South Europeans and the Surinamese are in between. Judgement of the local environment correlates closely with evaluation of the dwelling itself, and the desire to move house correlates with the level of satisfaction. While of the total population of the Netherlands 31 percent wanted to move within two years, the percentage among immigrants stood at around 50.

This does not mean that the differences between the groups are culturally determined: they can also relate to differences in actual living conditions. The immigrants, Turks and Moroccans in particular, live in worse conditions than the native Dutch and respond accordingly.

It is not easy to draw conclusions from mainly local and small-scale studies into the housing preferences of immigrants, but the general picture is one of people who assess their housing situation in roughly the same way as the native Dutch. Culturally determined desires, such as a dwelling with a particular lay-out, are hardly evident, and such preferences remain subordinate to the desire for a good quality dwelling with sufficient space at a moderate rent (Shadid and Kornalijnslijper, 1984). Neither is the often assumed preference for a neigh-

bourhood in which many fellow-members of the group reside universal. Generally, the quality of the dwelling prevails above the presence of compatriots (Van Praag, 1981: 102). If the satisfaction figures in Table 5.22 are corrected for differences in quality of the dwelling and for differences in ratio of persons to rooms, differences in satisfaction seem, for the most part, to disappear.

The fact that immigrants' response to their housing is similar to that of the native Dutch does not imply that, in the event of moving plans, they aspire to exactly the same type of dwellings. When there are more or less concrete moving plans, desires are modified by the situation a person is used to (his frame of reference) and by the actual possibilities on the housing market. It appears that Turks and Moroccans are the least ambitious.

They are less interested in single-family dwellings, newly-built dwellings and dwellings with large living rooms than the native Dutch. With regard to the desired number of rooms they are not behind the other groups, but taking into account the size of their households, their wishes are still modest. The rents they are prepared to pay correspond with the modest wishes and are much lower than among the native Dutch. Their interest in home ownership is virtually non-existent while the native Dutch are clearly more motivated. The aspirations of Surinamese and Antilleans are higher than those of Turks and Moroccans, but lower than the native Dutch. The Surinamese and Antilleans show a strong preference for newly built dwellings. This result probably reflects the fact that they already tend to inhabit newly built dwellings, and value the comfort.

Table 5.22. Satisfaction with housing (percentages and average scores)

	Very high (5 p.)	High (4 p.)	Moderate (3 p.)	Low (2 p.)	Very low (1 p.)	Total	Average score
Turks	2	10	52	24	12	100	2.6
Moroccans	2	10	42	31	15	100	2.5
South Europeans	5	13	49	19	14	100	2.8
Surinamese	4	11	48	26	11	100	2.7
Antilleans	10	15	52	18	6	100	3.1
Total population	14	27	47	10	3	100	3.4

Source: CBS, Housing Need Survey (1985/1986), data processed by SCP.

5.4.4. *Housing Policy*

General development of housing policy

In the policy with regard to minorities in the Netherlands a distinction is usually made between general policy (in principle for the total population) and specific minority policy. If this classification is applied to housing it becomes evident that there is virtually no minority policy. Minority groups are primarily dependent on general measures from which the whole population benefits. In the past the picture was different. At the time of the Moluccan settlement, the large-scale arrival of the Surinamese, and the recruitment of foreign workers from the Mediterranean countries, the newcomers were the subject of a specific housing policy, specific even to the individual groups.

At the end of the seventies the policy viewpoint changed in at least two respects. The sojourn of the immigrants, of whichever group, was no longer regarded as temporary. Further, the emphasis turned toward the similarities between the groups in their disadvantages when compared with the native Dutch. The minority status became the central characteristic of the groups, and the policy changed accordingly into a minorities policy. This new perspective was confirmed in the 1983 Memorandum on Minority Groups. The issue of housing was taken up in the sectors of society in which the disadvantaged position of the immigrants was apparent (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 1983).

On the basis of this concept, policymakers had, in principle, two options: a housing policy aimed specifically at the disadvantaged position of the minorities, or a general housing policy for the disadvantaged. In the domain of housing the general approach was opted for (Social and Cultural Planning Office 1987, Ch. 13). Consequently, the use of settlement facilities was limited to the then numerically insignificant groups of refugees and those seeking asylum. Further, minorities were subject to general regulations. In theory these were many, in practice mainly three: municipal housing allocation, the urban renewal policy and individual rent subsidy.

Rent subsidy

The use of individual rent subsidy has already been outlined. Turks and Moroccans appeared to benefit from the facilities in the same proportion as the native Dutch, whereas the Surinamese and Antilleans show a considerable over-representation in their take-up of rent subsidy. In order to arrive at a more accurate assessment, it would be necessary to consider statistics of rent-subsidy take-up in relation to the number of tenants *eligible* for it, rather than in relation to the total number of tenants. Such statistics do not exist.

Urban renewal

The urban renewal policy represents a host of legislative and subsidy measures laid down by central and local government. Immigrants are not a special subject of urban renewal policy but, nevertheless, are frequently confronted with it due to their over-representation in old urban districts. This does not imply that they all make use of urban renewal in the same way. Within the framework of urban renewal, the Surinamese and Antilleans tend to move towards newly-built housing in the same district (even more so than the native Dutch!), while the Turks and Moroccans show a preference for rehousing in improved old dwellings or in the still unimproved dwellings in nearby old districts. Consequently, the Surinamese and Antilleans are prepared to pay a relatively higher rent (CEBEON, 1988).

Municipal housing allocation

In many Dutch municipalities, according to legislation, dwellings below a certain rent or purchase price are classed by the Local Authorities of belonging to the distribution pool. Those taking up residence in such dwellings need a residence permit which is only issued to persons who meet certain requirements, and these municipalities often have a housing department which mediates between landlords and tenants. Those eligible, often after a long period of waiting, are offered a dwelling from the distribution pool. Housing corporations are important landlords; they generally control a considerable share of the distribution pool, and play a fairly large, sometimes dominant, part in housing allocation: the extent of their influence varies from one municipality to another.

Housing allocation takes place in a large part of the west of the country and in various large cities elsewhere. Due to their location and income, large numbers of immigrants qualify as candidates for distribution housing and as clients of the municipal housing department. In cities such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam, more than a quarter of registered applicants for housing are immigrants (Van Dantzig and Van Praag, 1989).

In the mid-seventies the position of immigrants in municipal housing allocation was a topic of discussion. In many municipalities foreigners appeared to be discriminated against, directly or indirectly, in the course of the allocation procedures. One of the requirements, for instance, which candidates for distribution housing had to meet was a minimum period of registration in the municipality. This put the immigrants at a disadvantage. Men who wanted their families to join them were often treated as if they intended starting a family and, consequently, as first-timers on the housing market. Housing corporations gave their members (virtually always native Dutch) priority. Certain urban districts were almost closed to immigrants.

Many municipalities have taken steps to combat these malpractices, and many direct and indirect forms of discrimination have disappeared. In view of the emphasis which had come to lie on a proportional benefit of facilities by

immigrants, the state urged the municipalities into reporting on the allocation policy. This took place by means of two circulars issued by the Ministry for Housing, Regional Development and the Environment (circulars MG 83-16 in 1983 and MG 88-33 in 1988).

As far as is known, housing allocation now takes place more justly. In a few large cities, the waiting period for immigrants was no longer than for native Dutch (Van Dantzig and Van Praag 1989). The problem, however, is that the allocation process is not very transparent. It is highly complex and differs from one municipality to another. This applies, for example, to the registration requirements for applicants and to the urgency point system. It applies also to the municipalities' control over the distribution pool, and to the extent to which the municipality is actively involved in mediation, or whether it restricts itself to subsequent sanctioning of spontaneous contracts between landlords and tenants. An accurate picture, therefore, of the results of housing allocation with regard to certain groups requires extensive research in a large number of municipalities, and even then it is not always easy to draw conclusions. An obstacle lies in the difficulty of comparing the different groups. Phenomena such as immigration and family reunion are, by definition, characteristic of immigrants and hardly occur among native Dutch; neither are there many Dutch households of six or more persons who want to rent an inexpensive dwelling, as is the case among Turks and Moroccans. Different groups have different demands. Despite the fact that some municipalities are carrying out the desired reports for the Ministry, the results in their present form do not allow conclusions regarding discrimination against particular groups (Prinssen and Kropman, 1986; Van Dantzig and Van Praag, 1989).

5.4.5. Concentration and segregation

The dispersal policy rather than the housing policy has been a real topic of discussion in the Netherlands. The settlement of the migrant groups discussed here, from the onset, went hand in hand with concentration in certain areas. There are a number of reasons for this: characteristics of the settlers, the types of housing available, current policy: these have already been discussed. The concentration of immigrants in certain parts of the country, in particular in certain districts of the towns, resulted early on in concern among the population and the authorities, who feared ghetto formation. Attempts to prevent ghetto formation date back to the early seventies.

Distribution within cities

The physical distribution of minorities on the national level has been dealt with elsewhere (see part I of this book and Table 5.1). Concentrations of minority members is most apparent within the cities: city districts where more than a third of the population is made up of minorities are no exception. In 1988, the four large cities together numbered 29 such districts. In six districts, the share is above half. These are almost without exception nineteenth- or early twentieth-

century working-class districts. Decay is characteristic of these areas, still untouched by urban renewal. In Amsterdam there are also a few new districts with such high percentages of immigrants. These include parts of the Bijlmermeer, where the Surinamese element is prominent.

The concentration of immigrants in these districts is partly due to their social characteristics. Their income and their concentration in the large cities determines to an extent their demand on the housing market. Their still relatively brief sojourn and, particularly among those from the Mediterranean countries, their poor command of the Dutch language and unfamiliarity with Dutch society, as well as their unwillingness to pay high rents, constitute further explanations. They are the same factors which explained the low housing quality. The concentration of immigrants is stronger, however, than can be explained solely by these characteristics. With regard to supply, factors are operative, or were operative, which also gave rise to concentration. It is a fact that the immigrants were also kept out of certain districts by landlords and municipal authorities, while other, less popular districts were open.

In such circumstances, ghetto formation (in the sense of districts where the vast majority of the population consists of minority people) is a strong possibility. If majority and minority live spatially separately, contact will be minimal. They each develop their own facilities, a fact that, in turn, promotes segregation. This would be particularly harmful to immigrants whose starting position is low. A continuous concentration within decayed districts could be an obstacle to sufficient participation in a wider society, and could perpetuate their disadvantaged position (Van Praag, 1981). This hypothesis is currently topical because there are numerous schools in concentration districts where more than three-quarters of the pupils are children of immigrants.

A problem resulting from increasing concentration or ghetto formation might also lie in the reaction of the original district population. When a district undergoes a total character-change within ten years or so, tensions between population groups make themselves felt and incidents along these lines occur. In order to prevent or combat these problems, various municipalities in the Netherlands have adopted the idea of dispersal. It was generally a question of adapting housing allocation in such a way that the growth of the immigrant population in concentration districts would be curbed, while at the same time entry into other districts would be promoted. The prime protagonist was the city of Rotterdam which, as early as 1972, wanted to link the allocation of housing to immigrants to the ethnic composition of the existing district. This decision was annulled by the state. Again in 1979 Rotterdam laid the foundation for a dispersal policy which was to result in a more proportional distribution of minority members over the districts. But again the plans were not executed: under pressure from welfare organisations and immigrant interest-groups the dispersal policy was shelved (Sloot, 1986).

So Rotterdam was undoubtedly the most prominent proponent of the dispersal concept, but certainly not the only one. A dispersal policy was carried out in

numerous large and medium-sized municipalities, more or less officially. Sometimes this was a pseudo-dispersal policy, which was aimed more at protecting certain districts from immigrant settlement than bringing about equal shares in each district. Allocating bodies sometimes maintained a dispersal policy at micro-level aimed at distributing immigrants in a certain way along streets and blocks (Valkonet-Freeman, 1977; Smit *et al.*, 1984; Musterd, 1985; Schoemaker, 1985).

It is possible that certain forms of dispersal policy are still in force. The details of housing allocation are largely unobservable to outsiders. The dispersal notion, however, is no longer fashionable. The main argument against it was its discriminatory character, and discrimination is indeed present in a policy which makes the entrance of minority people to a district dependent on the percentage of minority people already present.

The actual developments in the spatial dispersal policy of minorities in the Netherlands have not, so far, shown evidence of true ghetto formation. The districts with the highest concentrations are usually not those where the minority population shows the most rapid growth. In most cities, there is more often a spreading out of the concentrations across a larger part of the city, rather than an intensifying of the original concentrations. The minority population is reaching the newer districts, particularly those built in the fifties and early sixties. In cities other than in the west, this development has already taken root; in the large cities in the west the nucleus still lies in the pre-thirties districts.

The issue of concentration has been dealt with in general terms. The large differences in this respect between the various ethnic groups and municipalities have been left out, though these differences have been touched upon when housing quality and aspirations were dealt with. The Surinamese and Antilleans are ahead of the Turks and Moroccans. The spatial distribution of the Surinamese and Antilleans is accordingly favourable: they are situated in new districts to a far greater extent than the Turks and Moroccans, and their distribution across the town is more in line with that of the native Dutch. In addition, they participate more in suburbanization. The differences between the municipalities are also considerable. In Amsterdam, for example, the Turks and Moroccans are scattered far more widely across the city than in The Hague or Rotterdam. The smaller municipalities, too, differ considerably in this respect. The structure of the housing supply, as well as municipal policy, plays a role here.

6. THE ETHNO-CULTURAL POSITION OF IMMIGRANTS

6.1 | Introduction

The development of the ethno-cultural position of immigrant groups in the Netherlands during the last decades --i.e. the extent to which immigrant groups are regarded by the majority of society as primarily different groups, and the extent to which these groups define themselves primarily as such-- can in principle be reconstructed and analysed in the same way as the social position. The concepts of position acquisition and allocation and the levels of analysis institutions, organizations and individuals can also be applied here. This approach, however, is fairly new and cannot draw on a tradition of operationally defined studies, which makes it necessary to delineate the fields to be searched for research material on the development of the ethno-cultural position.

To delineate these fields, we have followed in the first place an inductive procedure: an inventory was made of themes in the research literature which have a more or less direct relationship to the concept of 'ethno-cultural position', or to important aspects of it. Secondly, we have followed a more deductive approach, and clustered these themes in terms of our heuristic model, resulting in eight main themes.

Four of these relate to the attitude of Dutch society, i.e. to the aspect of allocation of the ethno-cultural position: (1) politics and policies (particularly governmental policies), (2) political mobilization against minorities, (3) collective images and media relating to immigrants, and (4) the attitude of individual Dutchmen towards minorities. These four cover the three different levels of analysis.

Three of the topics relate primarily to the immigrants and to the acquisition aspect of the ethno-cultural position: (5) organizations of immigrants, (6) political mobilization and (7) the orientation of individual members of immigrant groups. The eighth topic, that of inter-ethnic relations in residential areas, combines both acquisition and allocation aspects. It is assumed that a

description of these eight themes taken together indicates the development of the ethno-cultural position of immigrant groups in the Netherlands.

6.2 | General governmental and institutional policies

6.2.1. *Policies before 1980*

As we have seen, Dutch politics and government have defined immigration in the post-war period in a very special way. The general opinion was that the Netherlands was not and should not be an immigration country, but in spite of such norms and intentions considerable immigration actually took place. Particularly in the 1970s, when considerable immigration from Surinam took place and the immigrant populations from Mediterranean countries grew quickly through family immigration, the "tension between norm and fact" (Entzinger, 1975: 327) increased. The way out of this conflict found by politics and policy lay in stressing the temporary nature of the migrants' stay, accentuating the desirability of return, and stimulating policies and opportunities of return-migration. The 'principle of rotation' for the 'guest-workers', and, somewhat later, premiums for those who would decide to return to their country of origin, were discussed in parliament but never introduced. As to the Surinamese immigration, the possibility of instituting a 'regulation of migration' between Surinam (an overseas part of the Dutch Kingdom until 1975) and the Netherlands was widely discussed, but in the end not accepted.

In these debates, not only were immigrants defined as different groups which did not belong (at least not permanently) in Dutch society, but policy measures for those who had already established themselves stressed the temporary character of their stay. The "fiction of temporary stay" (Entzinger, 1975) was deeply engrained in admission policies, in laws and regulations governing the legal position of immigrants, and in reception policies. The Mother-tongue and Culture programme for children from Mediterranean countries started in 1974, for example, explicitly aimed at facilitating the reintegration of these children in the society of origin after their supposed return. Reception facilities were meagre in general, had only short-term goals, and were specially organized for certain groups of immigrants, separate from the regular social services.

In conclusion, it can be said that the Netherlands was an "unwilling immigration country" (Entzinger, 1984: 67; Groenendijk, 1981; Van Amersfoort and Surie, 1987). The effect was that it was stressed time and again that the migrants had a special, temporary position in the Netherlands, and that their future would be somewhere else.

At the end of the 1970s the political discussion on immigrants changed. The hijackings and occupations by groups of young Moluccans in the mid-1970s had dramatic short-term consequences, but one positive consequence was that a new policy vision was developed: the fiction of temporality was declared outdated and the future of this group within Dutch society became a central topic in a

new policy document on Moluccans in 1978. The "Ethnic minorities" report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy of 1979 formed the impetus for politics to apply the same kind of reasoning for other immigrant groups. This led to the announcement of a new "overall ethnic minorities policy" in 1980, the Draft Minorities Bill in 1981, and the final Minorities Bill in 1983.

6.2.2. Policies after 1980

In this new minorities policy, certain immigrant groups were designated as target groups (see Chapter 4). Two main aims were formulated. On the one hand a tolerant, multi-cultural or multi-ethnic society should be created in which cultural and ethnic differences would be accepted and appreciated. On the other hand this policy aimed at solving the arrears of the immigrants' social position in Dutch society, and fighting discrimination (institutional or otherwise) which leads to unequal chances and sustains these arrears.

The first aim demands by its nature group-specific measures and so accentuates the special position of these groups. In contradistinction to the foregoing period, however, this was to be done from the perspective of the constitutional rights of these groups in, and as part of, Dutch society. Organizations of immigrants themselves would be given important tasks in "maintaining and developing their own culture and identity". As to the content of this maintenance and development, governmental agencies would not intervene, but would keep at a distance. The main task of these agencies and their policies would be to remove barriers, and fight intolerance in the society or in certain groups.

To realise the second aim it was stipulated that a consistent policy of fighting arrears and promoting equal opportunities was to be applied within the general policies applicable to the domains of the labour market, education and housing. Accessibility of facilities and institutions, non-discriminatory treatment, and equal opportunities are the key words. In governmental facilities and institutions, a new key word 'proportional representation or share' was introduced in the 1980s, as a yardstick of sound functioning in relation to immigrants.

Such policies, however, imply a certain measure of explicit identification of target groups and organizational structure and may thus accentuate their separate ethno-cultural position. This is particularly the case, since the organizations of certain groups, like the Moluccans, have argued that they should be given an important role in the implementation of such policies. They prefer a kind of collective emancipation in which a major part be played by their organizations in the distribution of important goods and services (jobs, housing and educational facilities) reserved for minority groups within the framework of the general minorities policies. The agreement between the Moluccan political organization *Badan Persatuan* and the Dutch government of

April 1986 manifests such ideas. In this agreement, certain quotas of jobs ¹, housing, and housing renovation were earmarked for the Moluccans in the Netherlands. Such measures, although they accentuate the special position of ethnic groups, should be evaluated in the light of the aims of these policies, which are to reduce arrears in the social position of immigrants, and can be characterized as positive position allocation.

The general aims of the new minorities policies were to be given a concrete form in a number of fields. The implementation of the aim of improving the social position of immigrants can be traced in the measures taken and facilities created in the fields of labour and income, education, and housing. The realization of the other general aim, of creating a tolerant, multi-ethnic society, can be identified in policy measures relating to the legal and political position of immigrants, and in matters relating to their religious, cultural and organizational freedom and acceptance. We shall now discuss the main lines of these policies.

Recent policies relating to the social position of immigrants

Looking back to *labour market policies* for immigrants it becomes clear that measures in this field have been rather one-sided during the 1980s. Although the Minorities Bill (1983: 51 ff) admits both that the position of immigrants within labour organizations is low and that unemployment among immigrants is disproportionately high, no real measures to redress this situation have been proposed. High unemployment is seen as an inevitable effect of the process of restructuring and modernization of the production sectors in which immigrants had previously found work. The measures and facilities proposed by the government were essentially oriented towards improving of skills of those offering their labour, and to the mediation structures. The demand side stayed completely out of the picture. Concrete measures in the Minorities Bill were:

1. improvement of the services of the Employment Exchanges for immigrants;
2. stimulating participation of immigrants in training and (re-)schooling programmes;
3. realising proportional participation of immigrants in job placement and employment programmes;
4. removing obstacles for small entrepreneurs among immigrants and providing information and services for them;
5. opening up employment opportunities for immigrants within governmental services by removing formal legal hindrances and by striving for a proportionate representation of minority groups among government employees.

¹ The implementation of the 1000-jobs-programme for Moluccans, however, has not been very successful, despite governmental commitment (Smeets, 1989).

Government action has not been effective, even in reaching these limited goals. Participation of immigrants in training and employment programmes and employment by government services has risen somewhat in the course of time, but in none of these areas was proportionate representation reached by the end of the 1980s. And worse still, even if these figures had been reached, it would not in any way have compensated for the disproportional rise of unemployment among immigrants during the last decade.

In the meantime, it was becoming clear from research results that the disproportionately high unemployment of immigrants (disproportionate also in relation to those Dutch with the same level of skills and education) had to be explained to a large extent by processes of recruitment and selection on the demand side of the labour market and by disproportionate redundancies among immigrants. In 1986, the Advisory Commission on Research on Minorities published a study on the experience with 'affirmative action' in the USA and 'positive action' in the UK, and proposed that such policies also be implemented in the Netherlands to give immigrants "a fair chance" (Bovenkerk, 1986).

The recommendations of the Advisory Commission, however, were not accepted. The SER (Advisory Council for Social and Economic Affairs, in which employers, trade unions and members appointed by the Crown are represented) published a report in 1987 on the position of immigrants in the labour market, at the request of the government, recommending a range of measures in the sphere of education and training, and voluntary joint action of trade unions and employers, but rejecting any kind of positive action with an obligatory character which might thus interfere with the autonomy of employers. The recent advice of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (1989) is roughly in line with this: it proposes an 'Employment Equity Act', borrowed from Canada, which would oblige employers to publish annual data on the ethnic composition of its employees, but does not provide any legal sanctions where this composition turns out to be disproportionate. Any sanctions are presumed to come from public action taken by ethnic organizations, and by public opinion.

One of the consequences of the advice of the Scientific Council and the discussions which followed it has been that employers' and labour unions have become more alert in this field, hoping to prevent further government restrictions. In November 1990 these two parties reached an agreement to combat the considerable unemployment among ethnic minorities. A common policy was formulated aiming to reduce the unemployment in these groups to proportions equal to those of the native working population within four to five years. To attain that goal some 60,000 immigrants should be offered employment, according to that agreement. The recently decentralized regional Employment Exchanges should play a major role in training these immigrants and finding them jobs. A few days after this agreement was published, the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment declared that an 'Employment Equity Act', as proposed by the Scientific Council, was no longer feasible any more.

In matters of *social security* for immigrants, things have developed quite differently. In legal terms, a generally equal position has developed for immigrants in this field. Nowadays the general social security provisions (old age pensions, benefits for widows and orphans, medical expenses, child allowances, and disability pensions) are in principle available for all residents of the Netherlands, regardless of nationality. In terms of the work-related social security provisions, too (covering sickpay, medical expenses, unemployment, and disability), foreigners with rights of residence have the same rights and duties as the native Dutch. Social Assistance is the safety net for those who fall outside the general and work-related provisions. In principle this Social Assistance is available only to Dutch people, but it can also be given to aliens. In practice it is usually given in general to foreigners legally residing in the Netherlands, who come from a country with which a social security agreement has been signed (including all EC countries and Turkey), and to foreign workers from 'recruitment countries'. Assistance may also be given to foreign legal residents from other countries.

There have been few exceptions to this general rule of equality in social security. One prominent exception, however, has been the repeated attempts of the government to lower the allowances paid for children who do not reside in the Netherlands, an austerity measure which would have hit Turkish and Moroccan parents in particular. The proposal was rejected, however, by Parliament.

A formally equal position does not necessarily mean that the actual treatment is as equal and fair. Some research projects have shown that immigrants may be confronted with particular problems due to their specific situation, their cultural traits or the attitude of those who have to apply the laws and regulations (Minderhoud and Den Ouden, 1985; Minderhoud and Radema, 1987). *Educational policies* for immigrants were discussed extensively in paragraph 5.4.2. Developments in this field differ from labour market policies. Government intervention and policies have been much more substantial in education. To illustrate this in terms of financial efforts, of the 733 million guilders spent on for minorities policies in 1990, no less than 397 million were earmarked for educational facilities, most of it to be spent within the general framework of the educational priority policy. We have seen that, notwithstanding these efforts, the arrears of immigrants and their children are still considerable.

With regard to *housing*, two different policy lines have existed in the course of time. Firstly, in the case of certain groups of immigrants a part of the welfare housing sector has been reserved and allocated to them. This kind of explicit positive allocation was practised for the Moluccans in the 1960s, when new residential areas were built for them, including churches and community buildings, to replace the camps. Between 1975 and 1980 a similar reservation was made for part of the newly arrived Surinamese and Antillean immigrant population still living in temporary lodgings: 5 percent of the newly built

subsidized housing² was allocated to these immigrants. However, this policy also aimed at the deconcentration of immigrants, so these houses were generally offered outside the western conurbation and outside the big cities. In the 1980s this same process of reservation was applied for invited and recognized refugees. Workers from the Mediterranean countries and their families never had the opportunity to benefit from these regulations. For this category a limited amount of accommodation for single persons was built in the 1970s. The second policy line, developed from the beginning of the 1980s, was to open up the market for rented family houses for immigrants on the same basis as for native Dutch candidates. Regulations for application, urgency rules and distribution have been made 'neutral' for immigrants and discriminatory rules have been outlawed. As we have seen, these policies have been most successful in that part of the market owned by municipalities and housing corporations, but even in this field arrears persist.

Recent policies relating to the ethno-cultural position of immigrants

The legal position

One may speak of *explicit* negative position-allocation by government if immigrants and ethnic groups are designated in law and official regulations as separate, lower-classified groups. Negative allocation of this kind can be found for example in ethnically and racially stratified and segregated societies, such as South Africa. In general such negative allocation has not taken place in post-war Dutch society³. This would be in contradiction of the democratic foundations of Dutch society and of the ideology of equality and equal opportunities for all in welfare states.

Indirect negative allocation of the ethno-cultural position, however, does exist. Here we mean that in certain laws and regulations criteria for differential treatment are used, which frequently coincide with membership of a separate ethno-cultural group: nationality, religion, culture, language or mother tongue. Nationality or citizenship is the most important of these criteria. Being a citizen of another country formally excludes the foreigner from the national community, and in common language and thought this often carries the connotation of 'not belonging here'.

² This regulation was originally for government officials and railway personnel. It was applied for the first time for immigrants in the 1950s, to house the 'repatriates' from Indonesia.

³ One could argue that negative allocation existed to a certain extent for 'persons of Chinese origin', and even to a certain extent for the Tamils; if we look at the instructions given by the Ministries in relation to the application of laws and regulations relating to these two groups (Groenendijk, 1987: 85 ff).

Being a 'foreigner' is relevant for indirect allocation in two respects. The first is that nationality has an ambiguous meaning in policies relating to foreign immigrants. On the one hand policies are strict and restrictive concerning the *admission* of foreigners who have yet to arrive, or who have done so illegally. On the other hand, minorities policies try to protect the position of legally settled foreigners and to promote their emancipation in Dutch society. Although these two aspects can be distinguished analytically, the distinction is seldom made in daily life. Native Dutch, who often cannot distinguish clearly between legal and illegal, foreigner and native Dutch, may well also apply the severe distinctions made in admission policies for those who are legally resident (Groenendijk, 1981: 541).

The second aspect of nationality pertains to the *juridical position* of legally resident foreigners. In this respect a consistent policy on rights of residence and equality has been pursued since the beginning of the 1980s. Those who entered the country legally may acquire a permanent residence permit after 5 years of continuous stay in the Netherlands. Those who have come as family members of legal immigrants may acquire a permanent settlement permit after one year. Revocation or withdrawal of a permanent permit and subsequent deportation is only possible in very exceptional circumstances, like long-term prison sentences. Long-term unemployment and dependency on social security benefits are insufficient grounds for revocation. Of the first generation Turkish and Moroccan immigrants about 85 percent have permanent residence permits. Most family members who have joined them enjoy the same residence rights.

The other aspect of policy pertains to the equal treatment of legal immigrants and the native Dutch. For this purpose an inventory was drawn up of articles and clauses in Dutch law and regulations in which discrimination on the grounds of nationality, religion, culture or language occurred (Beune and Hessels, 1983). Subsequently many of these have been revised, and in this respect the new minorities policies have been successful (Groenendijk, 1987a: 7). Nevertheless there are regular calls for a 'Law concerning the Equal Treatment of Immigrants' (Groenendijk, 1987a; Scientific Council, 1989), stipulating that the juridical position of foreigners of five years legal residence in the Netherlands is the same as that of Dutch citizens. This proposal, however, has not been adopted.

Another route to improving the legal position of foreigners (and particularly their children) was a change in the law on Dutch citizenship and procedures of *naturalization*. On January 1st 1985 a new law was introduced. The most significant changes were a) that not only the children of a Dutch male citizen, but also the children of a Dutch woman will be Dutch citizens by birth, b) that both male and female non-Dutch spouses of a Dutch national have special rights to apply for Dutch citizenship, and c) that children of the third generation (born to parents who themselves were born in the Netherlands) will automatically be Dutch citizens.

Furthermore the possibility was created of acquiring Dutch citizenship by option, in cases where a foreigner was born in the Netherlands, has reached majority age (18 years), and has lived in the Netherlands continuously. Such aliens have to apply for a 'certificate of Dutch citizenship' before the age of 25. A temporary provision further stipulated that non-Dutch children of Dutch women born before January 1, 1985 could obtain Dutch nationality, if they were under 21 years of age on that date. This provision expired on January 1, 1988. Another important procedural change was that naturalization became a matter of Crown discretion rather than law.

These changes have led to a temporary steep rise of naturalizations. In 1985, a total of 34,630 persons acquired Dutch citizenship, taking advantage of the new law, as against 13,180 in the year before.

Non-discrimination in laws and formal regulations is important: not only do they have material consequences, but also a symbolic and sociological function. Groenendijk (1987a: 3) formulated this function of the new minorities policies as follows: "The acceptance and implementation of that policy was and is a clear signal for decision makers within and outside governmental agencies that immigrants may claim as residents and fellow citizens the same rights and treatment. Discrimination of immigrants is in most cases not the consequence of explicit discrimination in laws and regulations. Most discrimination takes place (consciously or unconsciously) in the implementation of neutral laws, laws that make no distinction according to nationality, language or culture".

If this is true, the attitude and behaviour of those who are in charge of making those laws and who carry them out also is important. Discriminatory or dubious formulations and attitudes may have the function of legitimizing discriminatory tendencies in society at large. In this respect Dutch politicians and authorities have in general a good reputation in comparison to some other West European countries. Immigrants and ethnic groups have never been major controversial topics in elections, except in the programmes of the small anti-immigration parties of the NVU, CP and CD (see Section 6.3).

The acceptance of immigrants in political circles has also been formalized in the fact that foreigners with more than 3 years' legal residence in the Netherlands gained *voting rights* in municipal elections in 1986. Prior to 1986, foreign residents were able to participate in elections for neighbourhood councils, which had recently been introduced in big cities like Amsterdam and Rotterdam (see Section 6.7).

Another important element of the new minorities policies was the *fight against discrimination*. Apart from the changes outlined above in laws and regulations, several courses of action were taken to meet this end. First of all a number of changes in the law were introduced to anchor the non-discrimination principle in Dutch law and to enable more effective prosecution of discriminating persons and organizations. In Article 1 of the Constitution a new non-discrimination article was introduced, forbidding such things as discrimination according to

race or religion⁴. Some articles in the Penal Code have been adapted to facilitate the prosecution of discriminatory practices. Furthermore, in recent years some provisions in the Civil Code have proven of use in fighting discriminatory practices.

Secondly, apart from changes in laws and jurisprudence, it was deemed necessary to make the legal procedures for complaints easier. Police and prosecutors were given instructions to deal effectively with cases of discrimination, and the government subsidized a private-sector National Bureau for Combatting Racism. This bureau works together with local anti-racist registration and service groups.

A third avenue of advance is that of fighting prejudice by providing information, running training courses for central and local government employees at all levels, subsidizing private initiatives in this field, and introducing Intercultural Education facilities in schools.

These measures can not, of course, prevent every incident, or even certain forms of institutional discrimination, but it may be said that they have contributed to a situation where equality and non-discrimination are strongly anchored as norms in public life in the Netherlands.

Culture, religion, language and ethnic organizations

In the Minorities Bill (1983: 107 ff) a multi-cultural and pluralistic society is envisaged, in which immigrants have the same rights and opportunities to practise and develop their own cultural and religious identity as other groups in Dutch society. Immigrants should be given room to develop their identity, and Dutch society and its authorities should be open to these developments and should adapt to the circumstances of a multi-cultural society.

As for the *right* to preserve and practise their culture, religion and language, and the right to organize as a group, immigrants have not been confronted with too many problems. The religiously 'pillarized' and compartmentalized Dutch society has long recognized these fundamental rights, and provided the immigrants' cultural or religious norms, values and practices were not incompatible with the "fundamental norms of our pluriform society" (Minorities Bill, 1983: 107 ff), few problems arise. The existing facilities are available for the newcomers on the same conditions as for settled Dutch religious, cultural or language groups.

As for the *opportunities*, however, policy makers were realistic enough to see that these newcomers would not be able to make use of these rights on an equal footing, because of their small numbers, their low social position, low level of education and their weak degree of organization. These circumstances made necessary special provisions in a number of areas:

⁴ The Netherlands had previously signed a number of international treaties incorporating this same principle.

- a. Strengthening of immigrant or ethnic organizations. Since the government welcomed the activities of organizations which develop cultural identity and promote contact between immigrants and the majority, these activities could be subsidized. Activities at the local level received highest priority, subsidized by the Ministry of Welfare, Public Health and Culture through the municipal authorities. These subventions would also indirectly enhance the organization of immigrants, and at the national level a limited number of umbrella organizations for immigrants also received support.
- b. Stimulating participation of immigrant organizations in the formulation of policy. The Ministry of Welfare, Public Health and Culture promoted participation at the local level by stipulating that local welfare plans for immigrants should be drawn up by municipalities in consultation with the immigrants' representatives. At the national level a National Consultative Council (Landelijk Overleg en Adviesorgaan) was established, with sub-councils for each of the different immigrant groups. This national council meets with the Co-ordinating Minister for Minorities Policies twice a year, and must be consulted about any major policy decision taken by Dutch government.
- c. Facilitating immigrants' religious activities. Because one of the major obstacles for religions like the Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism is that few if any facilities like houses of prayer are available, partial subventions were made available for groups of immigrants who wanted to buy or build such facilities. These subventions, however, have been cut back recently.
- d. Adaptation of laws and regulations to facilitate particular religious practices. A number of measures have been taken in this field. Regulations have been made and facilities created to allow for ritual slaughtering according to Islamic rites. Ritual burials according to Hindu and Islamic rites have been legalized. The public call to prayer of the Imam is accepted on the same basis as the bells of the Christian churches. Clerics will be appointed in the near future for counselling in prisons and in the army.; teachers are being appointed to give religious instruction in state schools. Prisoners and soldiers have a right to observe their religious rules.
- e. Facilitating broadcasting for and by immigrants. In this field several developments have taken place. First, the number of programmes specially made for immigrants and broadcast by the National Broadcasting Foundation (NOS) has been increased; a large part of this extra time is devoted to special educational programmes for immigrants. Secondly, a number of experiments of local broadcasting by and for immigrants have been established, for the most part in the cities. These experiments, subsidized by the Ministry of Welfare, are supposed to continue on a permanent basis, subsidized by the municipalities. Thirdly, an Islamic Broadcasting Foundation has been established according to the provisions of Dutch law, and started its programmes on one of the three national channels a few years ago.

- f. Stimulating performing arts of immigrants. Non-professional expression is subsidized as part of the welfare programmes of municipalities. For professional artists in the immigrants groups, special funds were temporarily made available to stimulate the expressive arts; these budgets have recently been cut back. In the long run, regular facilities in this field should be available for immigrants on the same footing as for Dutch artists.
- g. Continuing facilities for teaching immigrants languages. As was made clear in Section 5.2, Education in Mother-tongue and Culture has become a regular facility, incorporated into the law on primary education. If sufficient pupils register, these lessons may be given for 5 hours a week, half within regular school time, half outside (Driessen *et al.*, 1988).
- h. Starting Inter-cultural Education. This kind of education should be provided (in theory) in all primary schools to prepare children both from ethnic or cultural groups and from the indigenous Dutch majority to live harmoniously in a multi-cultural society. In practice, however, there are many difficulties in the practice of this kind of education (Fase and Van den Berg, 1985).

Social services for immigrants

In the Netherlands two phenomena dominate the way in which social services are organized. The first is the religious pillarization or compartmentalization of Dutch society, and consequently of social service provision. This means that in every city or town social service institutions run for the major religious groups are in place: one for Protestants, one for Catholics, one for 'humanists', one for Jews, and so forth. The second characteristic is that all these institutions have been set up and are managed by private agents, who have joined forces in a foundation or association. These foundations and associations are paid by national, provincial and/or local authorities to perform certain tasks, such as offering professional social-work services, and in this context the resulting network of institutions is often highly complex.

The situation in the 1950s and early 1960s was as follows. The Moluccans were placed --temporarily-- in camps, and fully cared for by a special division of the central government (CAZ). The Moluccans developed strong political and religious organizations within the camps, and later in the new residential areas, but policy implementation, including social services, was done by the CAZ. In the case of the temporary 'guest workers', the first initiatives were private efforts, usually in the form of Catholic community work, or conducted by company representatives. In 1964, the Ministry of Welfare began to subsidize these organizations, which took the form of foundations. The ministry itself did nothing to set up administrative bodies for the purpose of implementing social services, but relied completely on private initiatives. The subsidization of the social service activities of these foundations increased from 40 percent in 1964 to 100 percent in 1975. Later, when non-Catholic, mainly Muslim migrant workers also started to come to the Netherlands, these 'Foundations for Assis-

tance to Foreign workers' lost their initial Catholic image: they became group-specific, working only for migrant workers. Migrants' organizations were virtually non-existent at that time and, in so far as they existed, were ignored in the network of social service institutions.

The first group-specific 'Foundations for the Welfare of Surinamese and Antillean immigrants' were founded somewhat later. The procedures of establishment and subsidization were the same. The difference was that many of the initiators and the staff were themselves of Surinamese and Antillean origin.

In the second half of the 1960s the philosophy of community development became popular in the Netherlands: the general idea was that all those living within a certain territory should form a community, and that everybody should be stimulated to participate actively in the development of that community. This concept became the reference for a large part of the welfare policy at that time. The existing group-specific foundations were brought under the direction of a Community Development Division of the Ministry of Welfare. Policies became less passive and a number of activities were subsidized: informing and educating immigrants about Dutch society, informing the Dutch population about the backgrounds of the immigrants, co-operating with groups of immigrants in the promotion of activities on their behalf, and managing meeting centres for immigrants. The essence of this work, therefore, was to influence group relations in a positive direction. The implementation of this policy, however, was problematic. The boundaries between Community Development and social work and cultural work were unclear. A situation developed in which the group-specific foundations for immigrants took on all kinds of problems, and did social and cultural work as well as community development. In fact the greater part of their work for immigrants from the Mediterranean countries and for the Surinamese consisted of helping them individually not only with material problems, but also with personal social services.

For the Moluccans the situation was different, since there were no historically evolved foundations by the end of the 1960s. When the nationally controlled social-service provision by the CAZ was abolished in 1970, fifty-two new foundations for the welfare of Moluccans were established and subsidized, one in nearly every Moluccan residential area. These foundations differ from those for foreign workers and Surinamese immigrants in that they do not engage in social work activities, but concentrate almost entirely on cultural work and, to a lesser extent, community development tasks.

The introduction of the new minorities policies since 1980, as described earlier, had important consequences. The new definition of the situation (i.e. that the majority of the immigrants had come to stay) and of the goals of government policy (i.e. that the formation of a new underclass of immigrants in society should be prevented) has led to two major discussions and developments in the welfare sector. The first one involves the part played by the immigrants themselves and their organizations in the formation and implementation of policies.

The second is the renewed discussion of the division of tasks between group-specific foundations for immigrants and the public social-service institutions. The issue of participation in the formation and implementation of policy has been taken seriously, as we have seen: comprehensive advisory procedures, a national advisory body with eight subcommittees, participation of foreigners in municipal elections, and consultative procedures and structures for immigrants with regard to local welfare policies. Immigrant or ethnic organizations should be stimulated, in the vision of the new policy, to act as a 'link' between Dutch society and its institutions on the one hand, and members of the immigrant communities on the other. They can be subsidized by municipal authorities and, in principle, a number of the tasks which formerly were the prerogative of the foundations can now be carried out by local immigrant organizations. This new situation is closely connected to the second important development: the redistribution of tasks to be carried out by the various organizations and institutions. The debate on the reshuffling of responsibilities has two dimensions: the first is on the decentralization of the largest part of the welfare programs; whereas formerly funds were given by the Ministry of Welfare directly to institutions, in the new situation (since 1985) it is the municipal authorities who receive funds to organize welfare programmes. Secondly, the debate on the division of responsibilities among the different institutions at the local level was revived, and a new division established. New policies required that all public service institutions in the Netherlands should be accessible to immigrants, and should acquire special expert knowledge to help them; the old group-specific foundations were cut down, were to give up their former social work and cultural activities, and concentrate on servicing both public service institutions and organizations of immigrants; and finally, immigrant organizations should be eligible for subsidization in order to implement tasks in the field of welfare, for example cultural activities. In fact, the old group-specific foundations (which gradually became staffed with more and more people from the groups themselves) have been restyled and given limited, mostly secondary tasks, while the primary functions have to be fulfilled by existing public institutions.

6.3 | Political mobilization against immigrants

As we have already observed, Dutch politics and politicians of most parties have never made immigrants a major issue in the negative sense. Small right-wing parties, however, have tried time and again to do so. How did this political mobilization against immigrants develop, and what has been the significance for the ethno-cultural position of immigrants?

In the 1960s anti-immigrant sentiments were used and exploited to a certain extent by the Farmers Party, although they played no major role in the ideology of that party. It was in particular the Netherlands People's Union (NVU) in the

early 1970s which made anti-immigrant propaganda a major issue of its political programme (Van Donselaar and Van Praag, 1983). This party participated in municipal elections, particularly in the big cities, and was able to gain a seat in some municipal councils, thanks to the system of proportional representation without thresholds for small parties.

In 1980, a new anti-immigrant party was established, an off-shoot of the NVU, called the Centrum Party (CP). In the 1970s and early 1980s the total number of votes for such parties seemed to increase gradually. In municipal elections in March 1982 the anti-immigrant electorate had grown to about 2.5 percent of all votes in the cities of Rotterdam and The Hague. Two months later, in May 1982, the CP was able to gain 0.8 percent of all votes in the Netherlands at the national elections for Parliament, sufficient to secure one of the 150 seats in the Second Chamber of Parliament. In the four big cities this party gained 2.9 percent of all votes in this election.

The election of a CP representative in Parliament in 1982 led to a vehement public discussion among politicians and the public, and also to a clear and firm stand by all the established political parties against the CP and its anti-immigrant views and propaganda. Opinion polls nevertheless indicated that the potential number of voters (compared to the 1982 elections) was still mounting. An extraordinary municipal election in Almere in September 1983 (where the CP got 9 percent of all votes) and elections for neighbourhood councils in Rotterdam in 1984 supported that indication. New initiatives were taken by politicians, and by individuals and action groups, to counteract the growing anti-immigrant mobilization.

A schism in the CP --the Centrum Democrats broke away from the CP-- was probably the most important reason for its lack of success in the national election for Parliament in 1986. The seat lost by the CP in 1986 was regained, however, by the CD in the elections of September 1989. The 'racist electorate' in 1989 was back to its 1982 level, at some 1 percent of all votes. In the municipal elections of 1990, anti-immigrant parties had council members elected in some ten large cities in the Netherlands.

The political ideology of the NVU, CP and CD, as it transpires from their programmes and pamphlets, combines sometimes veiled xenophobia and racism with emotional pleas for a revival of Dutch nationalism ("the Netherlands for the Dutch"), and the protection of Dutch culture, national character and territory. Recurrent elements in speech and programme are the contrasts of 'we' and 'they', 'our own' and 'foreign', citizens versus aliens, and the insistence that immigrants do not belong here and should return to their own country.

Researchers have tried to identify the people who vote for these parties (Bovenkerk *et al.*, 1978 and 1982; Van Donselaar and Van Praag, 1983). It is generally agreed that the voters are predominantly found in the big cities of the western conurbation in the Netherlands. Within these cities, districts combining a low socio-economic status with a high percentage of immigrants generally yield a relative larger portion of the 'racist electorate'. But it also seems that

the speed of growth of the immigrant population may contribute: this would explain why some districts which still have a low percentage of immigrants show a high number of NVU, CP or CD voters.

Researchers are divided on the question of why people vote for these parties (Van Donselaar and Van Praag, 1983). Some argue that xenophobia and racism are the dominant characteristic of 'single issue' parties, and their supporters are assumed to know it. Therefore they speak of 'the racist electorate', and predict that, if such parties are able to mobilize anti-immigrant sentiments, their constituency may grow further. Others, however, define a diffuse protest against the established political parties as the main characteristic of the success of such parties. This may lead to success in the short term, but neither the electorate nor the parties themselves are stable enough to guarantee success in the long run. Although it is too early to make a final judgement, developments up to 1990 seem to favour the latter analysis.

One may question the significance, so far, of the anti-immigrant parties in Dutch politics and society. A first possible significance, often mentioned in the international literature, is that such parties permit important shifts within the whole political structure: new extreme stands relating in this case to immigrants, so runs the argument, make somewhat less extreme viewpoints more acceptable. In this way the activities of the National Front in the U.K. may have assisted a move of the conservatives to the right, and to a more severe anti-immigrant position. Larger established parties may turn to more anti-immigrant attitudes and programmes to retain support, or to attract potential voters from extreme parties, as happened in France as a consequence of the success of Le Pen. This kind of effect, however, is not yet visible in the Netherlands, as has been shown for example by an analysis of party manifestos in 1986 (Huitzing, 1986).

A second possible significance is also taken from the international literature: the rise and growth of such parties often goes hand in hand with increasing physical violence against immigrants. This seems to be confirmed for the Netherlands in the second half of the 1970s, when an increasing number of violent incidents were reported in which NVU supporters were involved. However, the CP and the CD, the largest anti-immigrant parties in the 1980s, do not fit this pattern: they dissociate themselves explicitly from acts of violence against immigrants, and try their best to gain respectability within the political scene. It seems that the political mobilization against immigrants staged by these parties has amounted to exactly the opposite of what they wanted. Admittedly they have been successful in bringing topics like immigration, minorities and the multi-cultural society (as opposed to the 'truly Dutch society') to the top of the political agenda and into public discussion. But that has led predominantly to quite a widespread consensus among the established political parties against the racist language and programmes of these parties. It is not unlikely that the policy of fighting discrimination has received quite a stimulus from the existence of these parties. Forces have been mobilized against them in many

ways: anti-racist and anti-fascist committees, working groups in schools and churches, information campaigns, and similar organizations have been set up.

6.4 | Mass media and collective images of immigrants

It is generally supposed that in a situation where the majority of the Dutch people have little or no daily contact with immigrants, collective images and judgments relating to these groups are formed largely through the mass media. Mass media may thus contribute to positive or negative allocation of the ethno-cultural position of immigrants. Dutch research on this point is limited to content analysis of daily newspapers, with emphasis on the news and on crime reporting. A general conclusion that can be drawn from Dutch research projects is that explicitly negative or racist reporting is exceptional in Dutch newspapers. Nevertheless, news reports on immigrants are very selective and reflect a distorted picture of their place in society: problems of or in relation to immigrants are prominent in newspapers, and problems with negative connotations like criminality and public disorders are particularly highlighted. A number of content analyses over the period from 1963 to 1978 suggest that the picture of immigrants as reflected in the mirror of the daily press, became more negative in the first phase up to 1972 (i.e. more frequent connections of immigrants with crime and the police). This negative tendency seemed to halt after 1972, but a considerable distortion remained (Bovenkerk and Bovenkerk-Teerink, 1972 and Bovenkerk, 1978).

6.5 | Attitudes of individual Dutch people

Opinion polls have been held regularly among Dutch people, trying to measure their 'opinion' about or 'attitude' towards immigrants, their 'prejudice' or their 'inclination to discriminate' against immigrants. The standard procedure is that a number of questions are put to a representative sample of individuals. Answers are taken directly as a yardstick of discriminatory attitudes or in somewhat more sophisticated polls, various answers are related to each other and then taken jointly as an indicator. Researchers disagree on what such polls are supposed to mean. As instruments to measure 'attitudes' they are in most cases too weak. Furthermore, if an attitude is indicated, it is still very difficult to prove that the attitude has a direct relation to prejudice, discrimination or discriminatory behaviour. As a result, polls can be best taken simply and only as an "indicator of the extent to which individual Dutchmen express a negative opinion about immigrants in a more or less neutral context (the test situation)" (Elich and Maso, 1984: 33 ff), or as a "measure of the opinion climate" (Van Praag, 1983: 77).

This opinion climate was still relatively favourable at the end of the 1960s according to Bovenkerk and Bovenkerk-Teerink (1972), and Bagley (1973). Bovenkerk (1972: 8) states: "Our own (Dutch) group is described more favourably than foreign groups. Our attitude towards foreign groups is one of condescending friendliness. We assign few unfavourable characteristics to other races (..). Our opinions about those who have long hair and about Turks, however, are rather negative." Bagley (1973: 188-207) also found in his 1968 comparative research that the Dutch were "less racist" than the British.

Polls held during the 1970s indicate a development towards a harsher climate and a greater social distance from foreigners, and this seems to be independently confirmed by a number of polls. A turning point was reached somewhere around 1982 (Brants and Castenmiller, 1984): scores on the social distance scale and on questions measuring the 'inclination to discriminate' stabilized or even became somewhat more positive.

Comparability of such opinion polls, however, is very difficult, if not questionable. There are two clusters of questions which were included in the same phrasing in various polls. These are brought together in Table 6.1. This table confirms that a turn of the tide took place in the public opinion climate around 1982. Negative scores on the social distance scale do not increase further; on the contrary, a slight tendency towards positive scores is discernible.

It remains uncertain how this turn should be interpreted and exactly what it means. This uncertainty is related to the fact that it is unclear what these polls measure. It may well be the case, as is suggested by Van Praag (1983: 74), that in the course of time different phenomena are measured. In the 1960s, he states, when the number of immigrants was still small, social distance questions may have measured mainly "a piece of ideology". In the course of the 1970s and 1980s they may reflect much more direct experience and polarized opinions, especially in neighbourhoods with high concentrations of immigrants. Others, like Brants and Castenmiller (1984) suggest that the rise of anti-immigrant parties has led to a greater consciousness on this point.

6.6 | Immigrant organizations

Empirical research and inventories (Werkgroep Ad Hoc, 1983; De Graaf, 1983 and 1985; De Graaf *et al.*, 1988; Buiks *et al.*, 1985; SGB0, 1982) have shown that among the Turks and Moroccans religious organizations have become the most numerous and important since the early 1980s.

They have the largest number of members and supporters, some measure of stability and continuity, and some financial strength. In general they have a traditional leadership. The frame of reference of these organizations is predominantly the country of origin, and particularly the religious tradition and practice of that country. These local religious organizations and their leaders are not oriented towards Dutch society, and they are badly equipped for participation in that society. Their primary aim is to recreate a familiar world within the immigration country. These organizations function as a place of shelter in

Table 6.1. *Tolerance and acceptance of ethnic minorities, 1966-1989, in percentages*

	1966	1975	1979	1981	1983	1985	1987	1989
Acceptance of people of another race as close neighbours								
- no objection at all	86	60	49	46	48	53	52	55
- it depends	2	12	25	27	26	25	21	24
- perceived as less pleasant	2	25	23	25	23	20	26	19
- opposed to it	1	3	2	2	3	2	2	2
Opinion relating to the presence of children of guest workers and Surinamese in their own children's class at school								
- no objection at all				74	76	75	78	73
- it depends				15	13	15	14	17
- perceived as less pleasant				10	10	9	7	9
- opposed to it				1	1	1	1	1
Acceptance of guest workers and Surinamese as colleagues at work								
- no objection at all				74	77	80	84	81
- it depends				16	13	13	10	12
- perceived as less pleasant				10	9	6	5	7
- opposed to it				1	1	1	1	0

Source: God in Nederland, 1966; Culturele veranderingen in Nederland 1975, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989. From: Sociaal en Cultureel rapport 1988 en 1990, SCP, Rijswijk 1988 and 1990: 381 and 342.

an unknown society which is perceived sometimes even as immoral and hostile. It is interesting, however, that some of the national umbrella organizations of these local associations, like the Turkish Federation of Muslim Organizations, have taken on the function of forming a bridge to Dutch society and the Dutch authorities. To some extent they have adapted their leadership and public presentation to that task. Furthermore initiatives have been taken recently by muslim organizations to discuss the 'integration of muslims and muslim organizations' in Dutch society, and the tasks of muslim organizations in this field. In 1988, for example, an umbrella of local organizations was established in Rotterdam under the name SPIOR, which functions as an intermediary between the muslim community and local authorities in Rotterdam. In January 1991 a first national conference was organized by the ISBI (Islamic Foundation for the Promotion of Integration) on integration opportunities for muslims in the Netherlands.

Socio-cultural and sports associations come in second in the case of Turks and Moroccans, but they form the largest category of local organizations for most of the other immigrant groups. They operate on a local basis and have limited goals: offering a meeting place, sporting events, celebrations, and cultural and educational activities. In principle they work exclusively for their own group, and gear their activities to the needs of that group. Their form of organization is loose, small-scale and dependent on the input of a few volunteers. Their leaders are essentially organizers, not traditional authorities. Although few empirical data are available for other immigrant groups, it may be assumed that their socio-cultural organizations do not differ in essence.

The political organizations of Turks and Moroccans are relatively small in number and have limited membership. Their left-wing organizations clearly reflect political patterns and relations in the country of origin, but they also direct a substantial part of their energy and ideology to the position of their group in the Netherlands. They often co-operate and have contacts with Dutch people and political parties. Right-wing immigrant political organizations tend to have other preoccupations. Their frame of reference is nationalistic and strongly oriented towards their country of origin. Their form of organization is often unclear, and in some cases their activities are subversive.

The political organizations of Surinamese and Antillean immigrants are also few in number, and relatively even more fluid and unstable. Those of the Italians and Spaniards, however, have a more steady tradition: they often are branches of labour-union organizations in the country of origin. The Moluccans in the Netherlands have the longest tradition of relatively strong and influential political organizations, striving for the rehabilitation of Moluccan soldiers of the colonial army of the Dutch Indies and for an independent Moluccan Republic. In the case of the Moluccans, the political and (mainly Protestant) religious organizations are strongly interwoven. During the last decade these traditional organizations have shifted their activities to a significant extent towards the position of Moluccans in Dutch society, as is shown by the agreement in 1986

between the largest political organization, the *Badan Persatuan*, and the Dutch government (Bartels, 1989).

Finally there is the category called by De Graaf (1985) "other interest-organizations". This relates mainly to organizations for consultation on and participation in the formulation of policies. Most of these organizations have come into existence in response to the invitations of local and central government, or as a reaction to certain policies. Their frame of reference is by definition the situation of immigrants in the Netherlands. In most cases these organizations are small, have a small and fluid or even non-existent rank and file, and show low continuity. Their leaders are not from the traditional authority circles, but from the younger, better-educated generation of immigrants.

From this brief sketch of immigrant organizations it becomes clear that there exists a tension between the orientation of most organizations and the facilities they offer on the one hand, and the expectations of government as laid down in policy documents on the other. Most of these organizations aim to re-create the world the migrants have left, and offer their members opportunities to feel secure in their own environment, while the authorities stress that the organizations should function as a bridge between the individual migrant and the new society, and that they should defend group interests and stimulate participation in Dutch society. De Graaf (1985) stresses that there are elements of a contradiction in such high expectations. If organizations are strongly oriented towards the position of their members in Dutch society more than the rank and file desires, this will lead inevitably to a loss of strength in the organizations. If they focus on the direct needs of the rank and file, they are often unable to fulfil the expectations of policy makers. This dilemma pertains particularly to the organizations of first-generation Turks and Moroccans.

Surinamese, Antillean, Moluccan, and some of the second-generation Turkish and Moroccan organizations are in general better equipped (educationally), and are more oriented towards Dutch society, although in a special way. These organizations often become a means and symbol in the search for ethnic identification within Dutch society. They may play a major role in defining the position of second generation immigrants as a group with its own identity, and consequently become an instrument for defending the material and non-material interests of members of that group. A tension between internal needs and external expectation may also exist in these cases: the high and selective expectations of policy makers are often perceived as meddling or as "interference in their search for their own identity", and seen as an obstacle rather than a help towards stronger organization in the group. Such organizations do not differ from policy makers in their opinion about the objective of organization, i.e. emancipation, but they have different opinions as to the strategy that should be followed. These organizations advocate in general a collective form of emancipation in which they should have an important function as defenders of group interests and as social and cultural workers. Such work, in their view, should preferably be done by people of their own group and the government should

subsidize those activities. These claims, however, are not in line with the policy trends as sketched earlier (see Section 6.2.2).

6.7 | Political mobilization of immigrants

The participation of foreigners in municipal elections (since 1986) and elections for neighbourhood councils "has not been the consequence of social action by the electorate as was the case when workers and women gained voting rights. As yet there exist insufficient powerful organizations of immigrants to organize such action". This quotation of Groenendijk (1986: 18) sketches in a nutshell the background against which the political mobilisation of immigrants should be regarded. Dutch politics and government have offered unsolicited these opportunities for participation.

Nevertheless the consequences may be of importance. Two questions deserve our attention: a) do immigrants present themselves as a separate or special group in politics, and b) what influence does their opportunity to participate have on the established political structure in the Netherlands?

Rotterdam has offered opportunities for foreigners to participate in elections for neighbourhood councils since 1980, and Amsterdam has done so since 1981. The results in this first phase were not encouraging (Rath, 1981 and 1987). In Rotterdam only 11 percent of the Turks and Moroccans voted as against 38 percent of the total population. The political style of the Turkish and Moroccan candidates in these elections were described as that of 'political entrepreneurs': sometimes new ethnic parties were formed, and sometimes immigrant candidates presented themselves within established parties as ethnic candidates mobilizing their own ethnic constituency. The Mediterranean political culture, with its elements of patronage, was translated into the Dutch context in the form of personalism, which is why Rath speaks of Turkish and Moroccan islands in Dutch political waters.

It was clear from these experiences that the knowledge held by foreign immigrants of the Dutch political system was limited, but Bovenkerk's (1982) research also made it clear that Dutch political parties had made little of the existence of an ethnic electorate. He had followed the Moluccan, Surinamese and Antillean candidates in the municipal elections of 1982, and analysed the ethnic vote of these immigrant populations (whose members hold predominantly Dutch citizenship). The number of ethnic candidates in 1982 turned out to be low, 37 in total, while 900 would be expected on a proportional basis. Half of these candidates had established their own ethnic parties, while half of them were on the lists of established parties. Five Surinamese, one Antillean and one Moluccan were chosen as members of municipal councils, all of whom were on the lists of established parties. Special ethnic parties apparently had no appeal for ethnic voters. Participation of ethnic voters was lower than average,

but it was higher in municipalities with ethnic candidates. Here too, personalism and ethnic loyalty played a role.

In the period after 1982 the ethnic electorate has become more acquainted with the Dutch political system, helped by a nation-wide campaign before the municipal elections in 1986. Although it is too soon to draw definitive conclusions, some trends are discernible (Buijs and Rath, 1986; Pennings, 1987; Rath, 1990).

The first is that the number of ethnic candidates elected as members of municipal councils increased modestly until 1986, and then stabilized: 5 Surinamese and one Moluccan in 1982 (foreigners had no voting rights then); 53 municipal council members in 1986, of which 18 Surinamese, 15 Turks, 4 Moroccans and 2 Moluccans; and in the 1990 elections about 50 council members from immigrant groups were elected. For participation in national elections for Parliament, Dutch citizenship is still required. In 1986, the first member of Moluccan descent was elected to Parliament on the Labour Party ticket. A second candidate of Greek origin was elected for the same party in 1989. Furthermore, a member of Turkish Islamic origin was elected recently to the Board of the Christian Democratic Party.

Secondly, it is clear that the participation of ethnic voters in the municipal elections of 1986 was relatively successful. On average 50 percent of the immigrants voted, somewhat lower than the national average. Participation in the 1990 municipal elections seems to have been lower, at least in Rotterdam (Rath, 1990). Among the various immigrant groups, Turks have the highest score on participation, resembling the native Dutch.

Thirdly, although special new ethnic parties crop up regularly before elections, they seldom manage to attract sufficient votes to gain a seat. The great majority of ethnic candidates elected are on the lists of established parties, particularly the Labour Party. This does not mean that ethnic voters do not have special voting patterns. They do, but it seems that the combination of a personal campaign by ethnic candidates with the political line of an established party is the most successful.

To return to the original questions: do immigrants present themselves as a separate group in Dutch politics? The answer is both affirmative and negative. On the one hand special ethnic parties are few in number and they are not successful. On the other hand ethnic candidates on the lists of established parties are capable of stimulating political participation and mobilizing ethnic votes. Political parties in municipalities with a large number of immigrants have learned this lesson, and have taken ethnic candidates onto their lists. Where these two interests coincide, it seems to stimulate both the political mobilization of immigrants and their integration in the established Dutch political system. At the same time, however, researchers remark that political parties act with great caution in this area fearing possible 'backlash-effects' in their general constituency.

In answer to the second question: the significance of the political mobilization of immigrants lies not in the figures: even if immigrants were represented proportionally in municipal councils and parliament, they would not have more than 5 percent of the seats. The significance is much more symbolic: political parties have started to ask the question of how to present themselves to new voters; they have recognised these voters to some extent as a political factor. And this recognition probably also influences society at large.

6.8 | Attitudes and orientations of individual immigrants

The orientations of individual immigrants and their frame of reference is of great importance. They determine to a great extent the way these immigrants perceive the new society and their own position in it. If for example immigrants see their sojourn in the Netherlands as temporary, and plan their future in their country of origin after return, this will have consequences for the way they perceive their present position in Dutch society, their willingness to adapt, the choices they make for their children in the educational system, and so on. Those who see their future in their country of origin will act differently from those who intend to stay permanently in the new society.

As far as the immigrants from Mediterranean countries are concerned their attitudes and intention to return have been analysed by Muus *et al.* (1984: 145 ff). From that analysis it becomes clear that research on this topic is full of pitfalls. Direct questions are problematic. Answers strongly depend on how questions are phrased, on the moment they are asked, and by whom. It also becomes clear that there is no direct correlation between intention to return and actual return. Intention to return is still high, but actual return has decreased since the mid-1970s to a very low level, particularly for Turks and Moroccans (Penninx, 1984a). So attitudes and intentions have a very low predictive value for actual migration behaviour.

The available material leaves no room for doubting the intentions of most of the first generation workers from *Mediterranean* countries. The original intention of most of them has been to work abroad temporarily to ameliorate or strengthen their position in their country of origin. It is very much the question, however, whether they will be able to realise their aims. Regular postponement of return and extension of the sojourn in the new society often leads to unplanned consequences: the migrant adapts himself to the new society and develops new ambitions. Contracting a mixed marriage, or bringing the family over from the country of origin, turns out to have a catalytic function. This does not directly bring about a change in intention, but makes actual return in the long run improbable or impossible (Van den Berg-Eldering, 1978). Although the percentage of immigrants stating that they intend to stay permanently in the Netherlands has grown gradually, the great majority of first generation immigrants want to keep all the options open as far as possible; their

attitude towards Dutch society and their orientation is therefore essentially ambivalent.

The different forms of this ambivalence were shown by a study of Risvanoglu-Bilgin *et al.* (1986) of 100 randomly chosen Turkish households in two towns in the Netherlands. They concluded that these households combined quite a high participation in the labour market and in the educational system with "a cultural orientation which is to a great extent determined by ideas about religion and return, and has Turkish society as the most important frame of reference" (1986: 217). The primary social contact of members of these households takes place predominantly within the nationality group, including those who have been in the Netherlands for some time. On the other hand it is shown that the households surveyed differ individually "like the fingers on a hand": there are traditional households in which religion plays a central role, and where a strict style of upbringing is practised, and there are modern households in which religion is less important, the style of upbringing is more democratic, and the traditional division of roles between the sexes is changing. In between these extremes several variants exist.

Among the *Surinamese immigrants* too a great discrepancy between the intention to return as measured in surveys, and actual return as shown by migration statistics, was visible in the 1970s and early 1980s. Bovenkerk and Verschoor (1984) speak of an 'ideology of return' among these immigrants, which had a sociological function: firstly, through this ideology they express the feeling of a common destiny, and their involvement with events in Surinam. It is one of the few ideas which unites Surinamese of different classes and ethnic groups, and functions as an important element in the formation of a common Surinamese-Dutch identity. Secondly, it makes it easier for the group as a whole, and for individuals, to accept the disappointments inherent to the migration process. But the other side of the coin is that it makes the need to strive for a better position in the new society less urgent. Bovenkerk and Verschoor show that the 'ideology of return' weakened in the period 1974-1982 and that the attention to their position in Dutch society increased. This tendency was probably reinforced by the political developments in Surinam after the military coup in 1982. In a representative survey in 1985 (CBS, 1986: 38 ff), only 13 percent expected 'certainly to return', 42 percent expected to stay in the Netherlands, and 45 percent did not know yet.

These studies mainly relate to the first generation of immigrants. What are the attitudes and orientations of the 'in-between generation' and the genuine second generation? Research material on this point is scarce and difficult to compare. Nevertheless some tendencies can be noted.

In the sphere of leisure and freely chosen social contacts, Turkish and Moroccan youngsters seem to orient themselves strongly towards their own ethnic group. Brassé (1985) found, for example, that about 75 percent of Turkish and Moroccan youngsters between 15 and 29 years of age had contacts predominantly within their own group; 20 percent had mixed contacts, and 5 percent

associated only with the Dutch. Surinamese youngsters have more contacts with Dutch counterparts (Van Niekerk *et al.*, 1987: 28); Campbell *et al.* (1986: 171/2) drew the following conclusions based on a survey: "the orientation towards Surinam (country of origin and country of future) is not very strong. There is, however, an orientation towards the Surinamese community in the Netherlands. (...) Contacts with Dutch counterparts are reasonably good, and this contributes to the fact that Surinamese youngsters participate frequently in activities run by Dutch organizations. (...) As far as leisure activities are concerned it has become clear that there is a need for specific socio-cultural activities attuned to the Surinamese background of these youngsters."

Van Niekerk *et al.* (1987: 28) posit that the age of young immigrants at the moment of arrival is the most important determining factor: the younger the arrival age, the more they associate with Dutch youngsters. But age, combined with the phase of the life cycle (unmarried/married) and social situation (jobless/employed) is also important in another way: "School is a relatively favourable environment in which to strike up contacts with youngsters of the same age group. The transition from school to work often leads to a decrease of relations with the Dutch. This is even stronger in the case of a transition from being in work to unemployment. Furthermore, youngsters experience discrimination more often at work than in school, which may lead to a stronger orientation towards the own group." (Van Niekerk *et al.*, 1987: 194).

In the case of Turkish and Moroccan youngsters, gender plays an important differentiating role. De Vries (1987) has shown that young Turkish females are strongly oriented towards Turkish norms and values and the Turkish community. Differences in orientation within the surveyed female group according to duration of stay seem less pronounced than those among Turkish male youngsters.

These data may give the impression that the orientation of immigrant youngsters does not differ very much from that of their parents. A closer comparison, however, makes the differences clearly visible. The most important difference is that for adult immigrants of the first generation, the orientation towards the country of origin, its culture and the immigrant community is a matter of course. For younger immigrants this is much less self-evident: to a varying extent, depending on the intensity of their participation in Dutch education, they have had intensive contacts with Dutchmen and have come to know their orientations, norms and values. These youngsters generally try to develop their own life-styles and orientations, borrowing elements from various reference groups and cultures.

Sansone and Heukels (1986: 60-61) illustrate this process and its different results by comparing young Surinamese adults in Amsterdam with the teenage generation. The teenager "resembles in orientation and expectations much more closely the white counterpart of the same age group in Amsterdam. This does not mean that teenagers perceive themselves to be less of a minority group than their older brothers do, but they derive their ethnic identity from a broader

scale of sources (..). They use their ethnicity to develop what I call 'youth life-styles' (rasta, disco, electric boogie) not only as a form of resistance, but also as an instrument to play their own role in the cultural life of the city." They differ significantly "from the majority of their older brothers (..), who see themselves in a 'unfamiliar' society which they do not really know. Many of them live in relative poverty, or have avoided such circumstances by illegal activities. They are strongly attached and loyal to their own ethnic community, and have emotional bonds with their country of birth: Surinam. The younger ones experience their ethnicity as a choice (..); the older ones see it as an objective datum."

The intensity of youngsters' separate ethnic orientation and its importance may thus vary widely. Some groups develop styles of life or survival techniques that have far-reaching consequences for the youngsters concerned. This is the case for example with the Surinamese and Moroccan marginal groups studied by Buiks and De Rooi (1982), Werdmölder (1986), and Sansone (1990), and for the orthodox Turkish youngsters surveyed by Vermeulen (1984: 131-167). Most of the youngsters, however, seem to develop life-styles and orientations that relate to the spheres of leisure and recreation. In this field a multitude of rather fluid life-styles is visible, the elements of which are taken from a broad range of sources: country of origin, culture of parents, youth cultures and general Dutch orientations. All these styles have in common that they take local Dutch society as a frame of reference; that can be done by taking over certain elements of that society, but at the same time by opposing parts of it.

6.9 | Inter-ethnic relations in residential areas

In the 1970s the Dutch press often focused on growing intolerance and worsening relations between the native Dutch and immigrants, particularly in residential areas where concentrations of immigrants had developed rapidly. The 'riots' in the Afrikaanderwijk in Rotterdam in 1972 and in Schiedam in 1976 made a deep impression and have stimulated considerable debate. Tensions between different ethnic groups, and certainly collective violent action against newcomers, were new phenomena in the Netherlands. They were compared with race riots in the U.K. and the U.S.A., and the press (and some of the academics) speculated about a future of "long, hot summers" in the old parts of the big cities in the Netherlands. Since 1976, however, no such collective actions have been reported.

How have inter-ethnic relations developed in residential areas? Are we to distinguish different phases in these relations, and did they develop positively or negatively? A number of studies have been done in various cities; their conclusions do not converge at all points, and often they stress quite different aspects. A quick survey of these studies will illustrate this.

Abraham-Van der Mark (1984) surveyed native Dutch residents of an old district of Amsterdam in the early 1980s to find out how they perceived the settlement of immigrants there. In the eyes of most native residents the neighbourhood had been invaded by immigrants, which had led to a deterioration and 'stigmatization' of the neighbourhood. Municipal authorities and particularly the housing distribution service are regarded as the main culprits in this process. Inter-ethnic problems were formulated predominantly in terms of cultural differences. The reactions of the native Dutch residents were two-fold. Some of them tried to create social distance between native residents and newcomers by stressing cultural differences and presenting their own culture as better. As a consequence they avoided contact, but might also claim special rights for native residents on the labour and housing markets, and try to exclude immigrants from such rights. Others reacted differently, and tried to make the newcomers adapt themselves to the specific neighbourhood culture.

Bovenkerk *et al.* (1985) have tried to reconstruct the settlement of immigrants in two old districts in Utrecht. In these districts too, immigrants have become the symbol of the decline of the neighbourhood, and the municipal authorities are seen as the main culprits. This development, however, is quite recent, according to these researchers: during the 1970s, when the newcomers arrived, there was apparently a considerable readiness to help, and tolerance seems to have prevailed. Those who arrived at that time were predominantly males, living in lodging houses, with an open mind towards the native residents. The often protective help of the native residents aimed at the adaptation of the newcomers to the neighbourhood, which meant adaptation to a typical working men's culture, with its highly valued norms of neatness, decency and conformism. Because of the massive family reunification in the second half of the 1970s, however, the situation changed drastically. The males now had their own homes, and they started to build up their own world: mosques, tea houses, shops, associations. From about 1980 onwards, the newcomers tended to retreat within their own groups, leaving those who had helped them rather disillusioned. An attitude of resignation prevailed: there are numerous, small, daily conflicts as a consequence of the different life-styles of the various groups, but violent conflicts and public aggression are rare. Nor is there any systematic form of mobilization against immigrants.

Another survey was done by Verkoren-Hemelaar and Kaufman (1983) in one of those same districts in Utrecht. This study confirms most of the elements of the Bovenkerk study, but the authors question the strong re-orientation among immigrants which took place according to Bovenkerk around 1980. Relying on interviews with immigrants, they found little evidence for that change in attitude. Immigrants, in general, have a positive attitude towards Dutch people and Dutch society. They conclude that "the absence of unfriendly treatment and discriminatory action on the part of the Dutch leads to a positive vision among foreigners" (1983: 109-111).

Gorgels (in Vermeulen, 1985) describes a quite different history of inter-ethnic relations in a district in Haarlem, but with the same results. The arrival of Turks in that neighbourhood met with resistance, and a period of tensions and conflicts followed (1978-1980). The negative attitude of the native residents --to which the local press contributed significantly-- reinforced the group cohesion and group consciousness of the Turkish immigrants. After these turbulent years the number of new arrivals decreased. Relations have stabilized: both sides have retreated within their own group.

The most interesting study of the development of inter-ethnic relations was done by De Jong (1989) in an old district of Rotterdam. His study covers a period of 15 years (1970-1985), and examines these relations at the individual, the organizational and the institutional level in the neighbourhood. He studies ethnic tolerance defined as "behaviour towards people of different ethnic origin in one's own experiential sphere (residential situations, the workplace, and other every-day situations), in which ethnic origin as such is not regarded as a reason to withhold rights, positions and opportunities" (1989: 258). Ethnic tolerance is the outcome of group processes. The definition of situations, and the setting of norms as they develop in interaction between groups, is a determining factor for ethnic tolerance. Starting from these assumptions, he describes the development of ethnic tolerance in an old Rotterdam district in which redevelopment was planned, but resisted by the residents and their action group.

In the period 1970-1973, when the first single, male, foreign workers arrived and lived in lodging houses, ethnic intolerance was predominant. The action group in the neighbourhood defined the situation and its own action clearly against the newcomers: "every dwelling where an immigrant intended to move in was taken over by Dutch squatters for Dutch families, and the campaign (originally against local authorities) came to be directed against immigrants as such." Implicitly, the action group took the side of those in the area who objected to immigrants per se, thereby reinforcing the idea among the indigenous population that it was impossible to live with other ethnic groups, a view which was expressed graphically as well as in words.

In the period 1973-1976 there was intolerance too, but perspectives had changed: the local authorities had decided not to tear down and redevelop the area, but to renovate it. In this phase, however, these plans existed only on paper. In the meantime numerous Dutch families left the neighbourhood while Turkish, Moroccan, and Surinamese families started to move in. The action group no longer resisted the newcomers, but concentrated on the new plans, in which, however, the area's Dutch residents were taken as the reference group. Their interests, rights and opportunities were to be defended; immigrants would be tolerated as long as there was some room left over.

In the period 1976-1980 a certain amount of housing was renovated and built, and it had to be distributed. Many Dutch residents saw the immigrants as rivals. Two factors, however, led to a different definition of this competition. Firstly, the renovation was based on a decentralized policy, which meant that mandated

officials and residents had to take group decisions as to the rules for the distribution of the renovated houses. The second was that it was only possible to build new houses if old ones were demolished first, since there were no vacant sites in the area. This led to an area plan, under which small housing-construction projects were to be carried out one after another. There was thus only a short time-lag between rehousing and the move into a new dwelling. Consequently, on technical grounds, the leaders of the action group redefined the situation as one of mutual dependence rather than competition. To be able to replace all the old houses without delay, it would be necessary for everyone to co-operate — both the indigenous and the immigrant populations. As a result, the "objective housing-allocation rules" were adopted in 1979 after a year of debate. This turned out to be a necessary condition for the development of ethnic tolerance in later years.

In the period 1980-1985 ethnic tolerance developed. The action group contributed further to this by drawing the attention of various groups to common interests in the neighbourhood, such as action against heroine users and dealers. Another important factor was that the ethnic groups gradually developed organizations, which took part in neighbourhood action on an equal footing. The action group also attuned its organization more to the immigrants and their organizations. The norm of reciprocal tolerance was widely expressed at public events, but also by action against anti-immigrant political parties such as the Centrum Party.

As a final remark it should be noted that in nearly all these studies it is mainly the Turkish and Moroccan groups which are regarded as problematic by the native Dutch. Immigrants from Southern Europe are perceived as 'adapted'. Neither are Surinamese immigrants often seen as a separate problematic group.

7. THE POSITION OF IMMIGRANTS: CONCLUSIONS

7.1 | General conclusions

7.1.1. Summary and conclusions relating to the social position of immigrants

We have taken developments in the fields of labour, income and social security, of education, and of housing as the main indicators of the development of the social position of immigrants. The analysis in Chapter 5 has shown that developments in these three fields have been quite different.

As far as labour and income is concerned, it was shown unequivocally that the position of immigrant groups in the Netherlands has become unfavourable, if not critical, in the course of the last 15 years. The first and most relevant factor is that access to the labour market has become extremely difficult: mid-1987 unemployment among all major immigrant groups amounted to between 33 and 50 percent of the economically active population, a percentage three times that of the Dutch active population. The duration of the unemployment of immigrants is also significantly longer than for the Dutch unemployed. The rise of unemployment among immigrants after 1975 was much faster than for the Dutch, and did not stop when unemployment rates of Dutch workers fell somewhat from 1983 onwards. The unemployment position of young immigrants is no better than that of their parents.

The educational level of adult immigrants is generally low. The position of pupils in the regular educational system is also low, measured by pupils' results and the level and nature of the secondary education followed after primary school. Improvements for immigrant children as a whole are visible, but they are modest. A great part of these arrears are related to migration itself. Pupils who come to the Netherlands above a certain age have great difficulties in attaining a good level of education. Comparison of native Dutch students and immigrant children born in the Netherlands or following Dutch education from an early age, show that for some groups the arrears disappear, and for others diminish substantially.

The position of immigrants in the housing sector has improved during the last decade (except for the Moluccans), although on average it is still lower than that of the native Dutch. Access to the market of rented family houses, particularly those owned by municipalities and housing corporations, has become easier. Turks and Moroccans have relatively the greatest arrears. The position of young immigrants in this field does not --yet-- differ essentially from that of the elder generation.

Negative developments in the field of labour should be regarded as the main determinant of the social position of immigrants. Not only do they have a negative influence on opportunities for social mobility, but they also determine income and housing to a great extent, and indirectly the chances of immigrant children in the educational system.

For the largest immigrant groups, the Surinamese, the Turks, and the Moroccans, the first generation still dominates this general picture. A second generation of adults in the strict sense is virtually non-existent. The empirical evidence on the 'in-between generation' is limited. For the Turks and Moroccans the position of this 'in-between generation' of young immigrants resembles their parents' situation more closely than that of their Dutch age-counterparts. The position of young Surinamese immigrants seems in general less problematic than that of young Turks and Moroccans. The genuine second and third generation Moluccans have a higher educational level than their parents, but arrears in comparison with their Dutch counterparts have remained, and their position on the labour market is extremely weak. Research material on this group, however, is limited and selective, since in most cases it only concerns inhabitants living in municipalities with Moluccan residential areas.

To what extent can these developments be attributed to negative or positive *position allocation*? Research literature indicates that very little explicit negative allocation of position exists; in general, laws, formal regulations and procedures do not exclude immigrants from the labour market, education or housing. Positive allocation exists, particularly since 1980, in the form of a special minorities policy and its facilities, through which resources are earmarked for immigrants in the distribution of scarce commodities. This is especially the case in the fields of education, housing and welfare. This minorities policy also tries to combat mechanisms of negative allocation.

Negative position-allocation takes place mainly indirectly, and can be traced at the level of organizations and individuals. The bulk of the negative developments that have taken place can be explained by general developments, on the labour market for example, which have had specially negative consequences for immigrants. There are widespread indications, however, that many individuals and organizations systematically treat immigrants differently and unfavourably. This is not necessarily done on purpose: it may be the unconscious consequence of established procedures, of culture-bound or ethnocentric judgements, of negative collective images of immigrants as productive workers or

colleagues, of weighing up costs and risks, etc. Particularly in the labour market, the procedures of recruitment and selection used by employers have many such elements leading to fewer job opportunities for immigrants. The extent of public regulation and control seems to be very relevant to the question of whether negative allocation takes place or not. In sectors without public regulation and control, negative position-allocation is strongest. This can be shown particularly in the labour market and in the housing sector. In the private sector of the labour market immigrants clearly have fewer chances. In the publicly and politically controlled part of the labour market the government has set goals to make the composition of its employees reflect the ethnic composition of the total population (although such measures have not yet proven very successful). On the housing market the chances of immigrants finding rented accommodation are lowest in the privately owned sector. The housing owned by municipalities and distributed under public and political control is most accessible. The semi-public housing corporations are somewhere in between. Furthermore, it has become clear that the interests of immigrants are better protected in municipalities which implement a full public control of the distribution of social housing than in those which leave distribution to the forces of the free market.

The Dutch educational system is, in principle, completely financed and controlled by the government. One element of negative position-allocation in this field is the existence and growth of schools with disproportionately high numbers of immigrant children. Very high concentrations may lead to fewer chances for immigrant children of attaining an educational level according to their potential. Turning to *position acquisition* of immigrants in the fields of labour, housing, and education, we have to conclude that no important ethnically based organizations have been established to defend the interests of immigrants as a group. There are no employer or labour unions for immigrants, nor any special housing corporations for these groups. Only in the field of education have some organizations emerged particularly to protect and stimulate the transfer of cultural elements in education: Education in Mother-tongue and Culture, religious instruction, islamic schools, etc. The general picture, however, is one of individual immigrants using the facilities and means which are available to everybody. In general, the protection of the special interests of immigrants in these fields has taken place through consultative bodies (mainly promoted by the government), and by means of professional welfare workers (also subsidized by the government).

There are no indications that the special position of immigrants on the labour market is to be explained by the fact that individual immigrants systematically display less effort to find jobs, or are less productive, or that they have fundamentally different wishes and preferences to those of native Dutch workers with the same qualifications.

The same holds true for the housing market, although it should be recognised that Turks and Moroccans in general prefer to spend less on housing than their

native Dutch counterparts of the same income class. Some Moluccans, moreover, express a strong preference for housing in or nearby one of the Moluccan residential areas.

Differences between immigrants and native Dutch are most clearly visible in the field of education. These differences do not relate to wishes and preferences regarding the final level of education of their children, except for a minority of the Moroccans and Turks as far as the girls are concerned. Their specific wishes concern education as transfer of culture, particularly their own: Education in Mother-tongue and Culture is regarded by a majority of the Turkish, Moroccan and Moluccan parents as very important. Surinamese and Antilleans (for which no such education is available) focus much more on topics like intercultural and anti-racist education.

Finally it has become clear that the meaning and impact of processes of position allocation and acquisition have changed greatly during the last 15 years. In the field of labour these changes have had severe consequences. Fundamental changes in supply and demand on the labour market since 1975 have greatly increased the importance of position allocation and decreased the significance of acquisition. Greater competition has led to keener selection by employers. The quality of the labour offered by immigrants is not less than before. Admittedly, on the individual level the education of many immigrants is still low, their command of the Dutch language imperfect, and their work experience not always suited to Dutch conditions. Compared to 15 years ago, however, their position on these points has definitely improved. But these gains do not measure up to the much higher demands made by employers nowadays in present labour-market conditions. There are no serious indications that the high unemployment of immigrants is, even partly, due the specific attitudes of the immigrants themselves. The level of participation and availability in the labour market among immigrants is the same and for some groups even somewhat higher than for Dutch natives. Their attitude towards work and their work ethics do not seem to differ from those of Dutch workers in similar jobs. Many immigrants have sought refuge in small-scale entrepreneurship as an alternative in order to earn an income, but here too opportunities are limited and the financial and educational capacity of most immigrants is insufficient.

In the field of housing, however, the importance of negative position-allocation has decreased during the last decade. Changes in the rules of access and distribution have opened the council or public housing system to immigrants on a formally equal footing. The relative amelioration of previous housing shortages has offered immigrants the opportunity to move into this market. Admittedly, they are offered predominantly lower-quality houses at the bottom of the market, unless part of the newly built council houses are reserved for immigrants, as was the case for the Surinamese and Antilleans between 1975 and 1980, and nowadays for invited refugees. Some of the immigrants who started at the bottom of the market in council housing have moved up in the meantime to newer and better-quality houses.

7.1.2. Summary and conclusions relating to the ethno-cultural position of immigrants

In order to describe the development of the ethno-cultural position of immigrant groups in the Netherlands --i.e. the extent to which a group is regarded by the majority of society as primarily a different group, or the extent to which a group defines itself primarily as such-- we have examined eight topics as indicators.

Research results relating to these eight topics indicate that in the 1970s a number of unfavourable developments took place which accentuated the different ethno-cultural position of immigrants. First of all, on the institutional level government policies continuously stressed the temporary nature of the residence of immigrants, thereby setting them apart from other residents within the Dutch territory and giving them a lower legal and social status. Furthermore, a mobilization of anti-immigrant sentiments took place, particularly in the form of political parties which tried to establish an anti-immigrant climate and promoted racist activities and policies. In this same period negative image formation with regard to immigrant and ethnic groups was registered in the mass media in the Netherlands. Fourthly, the attitude of the Dutch people, as measured in opinion polls, became more reserved, and the number of respondents showing negative attitudes increased. Tensions in inter-ethnic relations were found in quite a few of the residential districts of the big cities. In a few cases violent confrontations between gangs of native Dutch and ethnic groups took place on a collective basis, such as in Rotterdam in 1973 and in Schiedam in 1976.

As a general rule the new immigrants themselves kept a low profile in the 1970s. Admittedly, most of the recent immigrants regarded themselves primarily as members of a separate group and they tried hard to rebuild within the immigrant community the familiar world they had left. They established their own organizations, public meeting-places, religious facilities, and the like. But these activities cannot be regarded as stressing their own separate ethnic or cultural position. These phenomena are inherent in the migration process. Dutch society is not the particular frame of reference of these activities, as is shown by the fact that migrants in all other Northwest European countries did the same.

The events relating to the Moluccan group have been the sole exception to the idea of immigrants keeping a low profile. Groups of young Moluccans have identified themselves clearly, in the most extreme form in violent activities like the hijacking of trains in the mid-1970s. The people concerned were not recent immigrants, but second-generation Moluccans whose acts should be regarded as a marking of their position in Dutch society, and in particular as acts of protest against the Dutch government. The short-term effects of these actions were clearly negative, but in the long run they seem to have had considerable (if unintended) positive effects: on the part of Dutch society they have certainly contributed to the redefinition of policies towards the Moluccans in particular, and towards immigrants in general; within the Moluccan group itself it has triggered a re-evaluation of political ideals and the position of Moluccans in

the Netherlands. Since 1977 there has been "a strong resurgence of Moluccan identity, including a re-evaluation and re-interpretation of traditional values and customs", and at the same time "a greater willingness to accept permanent residence in the Netherlands with the result of a better adaptation to life in Dutch society" (Bartels, 1986: 38).

These negative developments of the 1970s have been halted or reversed in the 1980s. The general minorities policy of the government since 1980 provides the most obvious example of this change: the immigrant groups which form the target groups of the government's 'minorities policies' are held to be permanent residents in the Netherlands with equal rights, and a series of measures have been taken and facilities created to improve their low social status and to reinforce the multi-cultural and multi-ethnic character of Dutch society. This change in the official definition of the problem has probably also influenced public attitudes and mobilized forces in favour of immigrants and ethnic groups. In the 1980s considerable counter-forces developed, which have withstood anti-immigrant political actions and discrimination in general. The attitude of the public, again measured in opinion polls, has become somewhat milder, showing for example less social distance from immigrants, and more respect for equal rights than before. In the mixed residential areas in the major cities collective confrontations have not occurred in the 1980s. Native residents and newcomers seem to have grown more familiar with each other, and in general a peaceful co-existence, each keeping within its own group, has been the result.

Turning to the acquisition of the ethno-cultural position, it should be stressed that most immigrant groups have arrived only recently in the Netherlands, so that an adult second generation hardly exists. Consequently, most groups still have a strong orientation towards their own community and country of origin. Their first priority is to rebuild their immigrant communities, with their own social infrastructure and institutions. In the case of the first generation of Turks and Moroccans their Islamic religion appears to be the main factor in mobilizing and organizing these communities. Official policies have tried to foster a stronger orientation towards and participation in Dutch society by creating facilities for immigrant groups to participate in the making of 'minorities policies': representative boards of ethnic groups which advise the government on policy matters, and government-subsidized institutions which highlight and defend the interests of these groups. Opening up the opportunities for foreigners to participate in local elections is another example of such effort. In only a few cases have immigrants tried to present themselves in separate ethnic political parties, and when they did, they gained little support. As a general rule they have manifested themselves as pressure groups within the existing political parties in Dutch society.

To the extent that research results relating to second-generation immigrants are available, it has become clear that, far more than their parents, they take Dutch society (or parts of it, such as the youth culture) as their frame of reference. In stressing their own cultural or ethnic identity within Dutch society they often

use selected symbols and elements from the country or culture of their parents to mark the boundaries. This group formation on the basis of cultural and ethnic symbols is usually mixed with cultural elements of Dutch society. This process of mixing and fusing leads to a great diversity of groups in these second and later generations, and these manifestations of cultural and ethnic diversity are present mainly in the areas of religion, leisure and recreation. This is also the case with the second and third generations of Moluccans after the hijackings of the mid-1970s. Alongside this phenomenon of ethnic group formation there also exist groups of young immigrants --mainly members of an 'in-between generation'-- which develop 'alternative life-styles'. In most cases, however, such life-styles are more satisfactorily explained by regarding them as general life-styles of youngsters holding marginal positions in society.

7.2 | Minority-group formation or emancipation?

In Chapter 4 a group was defined as a minority group, if a) its social position is homogeneously low; b) its ethno-cultural position is perceived as markedly different; c) its numerical position prohibits the exertion of power and influence; and d) these three conditions continue to exist over generations. What can be said about minority-group formation in the light of the evidence given in the preceding descriptive chapters?

As far as the first criterion is concerned, it has become clear that the evolution of the immigrants' social position has been, and still is, alarming. Admittedly the position in the housing and education sector has improved, but considerable arrears remain. But by far the most important development has been on the labour market: an ever-expanding part of the economically active immigrant population (up to half of it) cannot gain access to the labour market, a clear manifestation of negative position allocation, albeit for the most part indirect. Unemployment among minorities will certainly increase further, unless redistribution measures are taken. The climate for preferential treatment of ethnic groups, however, is not yet ripe in the Netherlands, except in the case of governmental services, and in certain municipalities where such schemes have recently been initiated.

Looking at the second criterion, a more or less unexpected result of the analysis was that the development of the ethno-cultural position turned out to have been negative in the 1970s, but took a more positive turn during the 1980s. Admittedly, the relations between the various groups are vulnerable: many unexpected factors and developments may have an influence on these relations, and they may change very quickly. But still the curious fact remains that, precisely in a period of economic stagnation and worsening labour-market conditions, the ethno-cultural position of immigrant groups has stabilized or even improved. If we take the first two criteria together we have to conclude that, to the extent that minority-group formation takes place, developments in the social position

and on the labour market in particular function as the prime motor of that formation.

Turning to the third criterion, that of the group's size, immigrant groups in the Netherlands are relatively small. The largest, the Surinamese, forms 1.4 percent of the total population of the Netherlands, and all the target groups of the minorities policy together amount to some 5 percent. Although these groups have gained the opportunity of political participation, at least at the local level, this does not mean that they can exert direct and effective political influence, even in situations where considerable local concentrations of immigrants exist. Finally, the fourth criterion, concerned with the duration of the other criteria, reminds us to be cautious in drawing general conclusions. Most members of the immigrant groups dealt with here are first-generation immigrants. The children of immigrants born in the Netherlands are still small in number, and systematic data about their position are not yet available. Moluccans, however, measure up best to this fourth criterion.

We have stated repeatedly that the developments outlined above were not always and in all respects the same for the various immigrant groups. If we reformulate the central question in terms of groups, which groups can be said to be in a minority position in the strict sense of our definition? Of all immigrants, the *Moluccans* most closely approached the minority situation in the mid-1970s. All four criteria were, to some extent, applicable to the majority of that group. Developments, however, have taken a positive turn for this group, at least with regard to the evolution of the ethno-cultural position. Furthermore, in the recent agreement between the central government and the Moluccan organizations, concrete plans were agreed upon to improve the social position of the Moluccans by reserving jobs and developing plans for the renewal of the Moluccan housing estates.

The social position of the *Turks and Moroccans* shows the greatest arrears of all immigrant groups. Their ethno-cultural position, however, is still predominantly determined by the first generation. The very lack of further generations means that we can hardly speak of these groups as minorities in the strict sense. Looking to the future, however, there are several reasons to fear that a minority situation may develop. There are substantial forces in Dutch society which stress the separate position of this group, accentuating their different culture and religion. Combined with their homogeneously low social position, and taking into account that Turks and Moroccans form the largest groups amongst the immigrants, this forms a solid basis for that development.

Although *Italians, Spaniards, Greeks*, and other South Europeans have come to the Netherlands for the same reasons as Turks and Moroccans, their position now is quite different. The social position of the former groups has improved considerably during the last two decades. These groups having arrived earlier, their chances have been better, and furthermore, the group of permanent immigrants resulting from the migration flows of two decades is much smaller and much more selective. Ethno-culturally they are not regarded as a separate group

and, apart from in the expressive and cultural sphere, they do not manifest themselves as a separate group. For these South Europeans no real danger of minority-group formation exists.

The *Surinamese immigrants* form a very heterogeneous category. Their social position is not homogeneously low, although on average there are clearly arrears compared to the Dutch population. In particular, their labour market position is critical. Ethnically they again form a heterogeneous category, divided along ethnic, religious and linguistic lines. This heterogeneity, however, is not always recognizable in the image that Dutch have of this group, which is at least partially biased and stereotyped. Although it is not likely that this group as a whole will develop towards a minority situation, there is a real danger that part of it will.

The *Antillean migrants*, finally, are the latest newcomers to the Netherlands. Their arrears are smaller than that of any group mentioned. Furthermore, there are no signs of a development towards a markedly separate ethno-cultural position.

PART III

THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON THE NETHERLANDS

8. CONCLUSIONS

8.1 | The impact of immigration

In the course of the last three decades, immigration into the Netherlands has almost invariably exceeded emigration. This fact in itself has had a certain impact. The population has grown faster than it otherwise would have done. As will be shown in the next section, the additional population growth resulting from a net immigration surplus must not be exaggerated. Nonetheless, in a situation where natural increase is on the decline, and in which immigration figures are rising, immigration has, at the very least, become more important as a component of population projections. In many areas of life, it has been necessary to adapt to immigration in general, and to the continuously increasing ethnic minority population. Annual housing construction plans have had to take account of the migration surplus, and education has had to adapt to the presence of considerable numbers of children with language problems. The impact has not been evenly spread: in certain parts of the country, especially in the large cities of the west, and in other industrial towns, the sheer weight of numbers has been disproportionately heavy. The concentration of ethnic minorities in the four largest cities exceeds the national figures by three or four times.

As a result of immigration the number of foreigners has steadily risen: from 1.1 percent of the total population in 1947 to 4.3 percent in 1990. The figure for ethnic minority members in the total population now stands at an estimated 800,000 or 5.4 percent of the total population. These figures are of great significance: it is now officially acknowledged that the Netherlands has become a multi-ethnic or a multicultural society, a national minorities policy has come into existence, and the position of ethnic minorities in society has become a permanent issue in politics and in public debate.

Immigration and its corollary, ethnic minorities, have had consequences in a number of different areas. The following discussion will deal in turn with the demographic, the economic, the cultural and the political arenas.

8.2 | The demographic impact

Currently there are an estimated 2.2 million people living in the Netherlands of foreign origin in either the present or previous generation. That amounts to one in every seven residents; 52 percent of these are themselves immigrants. The post-war migration history of the Netherlands has been integrally related to Dutch colonial history, to the demand for labour, and increasingly to the effects of political instabilities in other countries and to global economic inequality. As a result of this, in spite of a continuous policy of restricted immigration based on the generally held view that the Netherlands is overpopulated, immigration has in fact exceeded emigration for the past three decades, with the sole exception of the year 1967.

Only during the post-war reconstruction period did emigration exceed immigration, as the feeling of overcrowding, the continuously difficult economic situation, and the desire to shake off the memory of the dark years of the German occupation caused close to half a million Dutch citizens to choose to start a new life in the Americas (especially the United States and Canada), Australia, New Zealand, or South Africa. They were assisted in this by an active emigration policy on the part of the Dutch government. On the other hand, in the same period about 300,000 people, mainly of Dutch-Indonesian descent, were 'repatriated' from the Netherlands East Indies or Indonesia, leaving only a small negative migration balance.

In the Indonesian case, the option to move to the Netherlands was restricted to specific groups of the population. In Surinam, however, at the time of independence in 1975, the total population, then estimated at about 420,000 (United Nations estimate) had Dutch citizenship and therefore had free access to the Netherlands. In the years 1974-1980, 108,000 persons born in Surinam moved to the Netherlands. The political and economic situation in Surinam has meant that there has been little return migration (18,000 in the same period). The growing demand for labour from the mid-1950s onwards could not be satisfied by the resident population in the Netherlands --despite a high fertility level-- and so began almost two decades of Mediterranean labour recruitment. By the end of the recruitment period (marked by the 1973 oil crisis), the number of workers from Mediterranean countries living in the Netherlands had increased to 139,000 (Penninx, 1979: 95).

Expanding economies in Southern Europe ensured relatively high rates of return migration among the Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese, and Yugoslavs. But Turkish and Moroccan workers were confronted with limited options for return, and instead they preferred family reunion in the Netherlands, and as a result the two decades of the 1970s and 1980s were characterized by family-related immigration. This follow-up migration reached a level far higher than the original immigration of workers, due partly to prevailing large families. Family immigration was further enhanced by the fact that many Turkish and Moroccan men were already married before they came to work in the Netherlands, and

those who were not did not in any significant numbers marry Dutch women (contrary to the immigrant workers from Southern Europe, especially the Italians). The 1980s also saw the beginning of a third phase in the process of migration from the Mediterranean regions, following the earlier phases of labour migration and family reunion, and that was the immigration of marriage partners for the children of the original labour migrants. This third phase has been especially prominent among the Turks and Moroccans, for like their parents, this generation of youngsters who have grown up in the Netherlands have taken only limited advantage of the opportunity to marry other residents of the Netherlands — even those belonging to the same ethnic group.

The reception of refugees has long been a part of Dutch migration history. In the post-war period it originally concerned displaced persons, followed in the 1950s and 1960s by people fleeing from Communist Eastern Europe, and in the 1970s by refugees from South America. During the past decade, citizens from developing countries in Asia and Africa have started to arrive in increasing numbers; in addition, more people from Eastern Europe have been applying for asylum since the political changes there in the late 1980s. As a result, the annual number of requests for asylum has increased from about 1,000 in 1980 to 5,000 in the mid-1980s, and then to over 20,000 in the early 1990s. As the number of requests has increased, the acceptance rate has declined as people have been refused asylum on the grounds that they are considered to be 'economic' refugees rather than refugees in the terms of the Geneva Convention, according to which refugees are only those persons who have been persecuted on the basis of race, creed, or political conviction.

Apart from these developments, migration from the member states of the European Community has been relatively stable, and can be divided into two categories. On the one hand, there is economic migration which, in contrast to most of the other migration streams referred to, tends to be of a temporary nature, for instance, concerning professionals and their families on company contracts of three or four years; the other main strand of EC migration is marriage migration, usually consisting of foreign women following their Dutch husbands.

Demographic developments after migration have brought about an increase which is most notable in the population of Turkish and Moroccan origin. This is due in particular to relatively high fertility levels, in combination with the fact that a large proportion of these groups consists of men and women in the procreative age ranges. Fertility levels among both Turks and Moroccans show signs of rapid decline, influenced by developments in the countries of origin as well as by the changes in opportunities due to migration. Both groups (especially the Turks) show remarkably little inclination for naturalization or marriage with members of other ethnic groups. Part of the explanation for this phenomenon of ethnic group cohesion —at least in the demographic sense— is probably attributable to the recent nature of the migration, as well as to such

factors as cultural and especially religious distance from the native population, low socio-economic status, insecurity or uncertainty about the permanency of residence in the Netherlands, feelings of national pride, or in some cases the attitude of authorities in the countries of origin about changes of citizenship. Currently, marriage with a partner from the country of origin keeps immigration levels fairly high. Given that there is little return migration except at retirement age, positive net migration is still the main cause of the rapid growth of the Turkish and Moroccan groups.

The development of the population from the other recruitment countries has been quite different. A higher rate of return migration and more frequent marriage with Dutch partners have combined to lower follow-up migration consisting of family reunion and marriage migration for the benefit of the children. Low fertility levels have contributed further to suppressing the growth of these population groups to levels far below those of the Turkish and Moroccan groups. The growth of the population from the EC member states (of which four are former recruitment countries) tends to be very stable. Return migration is high, and duration of residence is relatively short, except for those who have migrated for the purpose of marriage or who have married a Dutch partner after immigration. In the latter group naturalization is frequent, and children of mixed marriages receive Dutch citizenship. Fertility levels are low, as they are among the native population, and since there is a significant proportion of elderly people in the EC group (especially among those from Northern EC countries), natural increase is small. Part of the EC population is of Chinese origin — British citizens born in Hong Kong; in addition, there are ethnic Chinese from the People's Republic, as well as from Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Surinam. Because of these diverse origins, it is difficult to estimate the demographic size and development of the Chinese population. One main characteristic is the very high naturalization rate, Dutch citizenship often obtained soon after the minimum waiting period of five years' residence has passed. Fertility levels are probably low, and they are possibly the most geographically dispersed ethnic group in the Netherlands.

In terms of numbers, the population of Dutch-Indonesian descent and the population of Surinamese origin are considerably larger, but their post-migration demographic history is quite different from that of the Turks and Moroccans. The large majority of Surinamese share with the Turks and Moroccans a recent migration history, but their ex-colonial ties with Dutch society have eased integration to a certain extent — not least because of their knowledge of the Dutch language. Furthermore, legal regulations have made it easier for Surinamese to acquire Dutch citizenship than for non-colonial migrants, and in fact all but a few percent of the population of Surinamese origin are Dutch citizens. More than among the Turkish and Moroccan groups, those born in the Netherlands are children of 'mixed' marriages (or so it would appear from the data on the parents' country of birth). The fertility of the Surinamese population is only slightly higher than that of the native population. In the 1980s, natural

increase and net migration have contributed about equally to the currently moderate growth of this group. The demographic structure of the Antilleans is different from that of the Surinamese, mainly due to the fact that there has been no massive immigration. Many of the Antilleans are temporary residents who have come to study in the Netherlands; therefore, return migration is fairly high. Fertility levels are as low as for the native population. Low natural increase and low net migration would lead us to expect only moderate growth in this population group in the near future.

Within the time-frame of this book, the group with the longest migration history, those of Dutch-Indonesian descent, is also the largest group of foreign origin in the Netherlands. All but a few percent have Dutch citizenship; the second generation has overtaken the first one in size; and three out of every four persons belonging to this second generation have only one parent who was born in the Netherlands East Indies or Indonesia, which is one --albeit oblique-- indicator of group integration. Though no data are available, it seems reasonable to assume that fertility levels are not different to any significant extent from those of the rest of the population. Included in these data on country of birth is the group of Moluccans, who have experienced a rather different evolution of their relationships with Dutch society. Initially high fertility seems to have decreased rapidly to Dutch levels; and mixed marriage has probably been much more infrequent than among other immigrants from the Netherlands East Indies, due to a different attitude towards the duration of residence and to Dutch society, and more generally to a strong group cohesion enhanced by government policy aimed at the preservation of Moluccan cultural identity, and by the policy of separate housing.

Refugees from Eastern Europe, Portugal, and Latin America, who entered the Netherlands from the 1950s to the 1970s, have frequently become naturalized or have returned when political developments have made it possible. More recent refugees, such as the Vietnamese, have also frequently opted for Dutch citizenship. The recent steep increase in the number of those seeking asylum may have all sorts of consequences. If a substantial number receives residence permits, or if there are regularizations of groups of illegal aliens (many of whom may have previously sought asylum), fresh immigration can be expected to follow in the form of family reunion and --depending on the degree of demographic integration-- marriage migration.

The experiences of immigration and subsequent population development summarized so far have led not only to a significant increase in the population of foreign descent, but also to a fundamental change in the composition of that population. The emphasis is no longer so much on migrants of European origin, with cultural and religious heritages relatively close to that of the native Dutch, or on those from the Netherlands East Indies, with its generally close ties to and orientation towards Dutch society; rather we are now principally concerned with migrants from countries both geographically and culturally more distant.

This shift has coincided with a deteriorating economic situation, while in addition the composition of the migration stream --in terms of occupational structure and educational level-- shows an increasing mismatch with the demands of the labour market. Current immigration policy, which --apart from EC migration-- is almost entirely restricted to admissions for humanitarian reasons, leaves little scope for adjusting immigration to the current and expected future demands of the labour market.

The impact of international migration on the size of the population of the Netherlands during the past three decades has been relatively small. Instead of 14.7 million inhabitants on January 1, 1988, the country would have had 600,000 (or four percent) fewer inhabitants had there been no immigration or emigration. As far as the future is concerned, according to current projections, it is expected that immigration will continue to exceed emigration by about 25,000 each year. If this expectation is realised, it would lead to a delay in the decline of the population — which is expected to inevitably occur as a consequence of sustained below-replacement fertility.

Though net immigration is unlikely to prevent an eventual population decline, the impact of migration on the future size of the population may be significant. For example, in the period from 1988 to 2050, the difference between the two hypothetical populations with and without international migration would be substantial: by the middle of the next century the population would be just 12.5 million in the absence of migration; but if annual net immigration over the period were about 28,000, the population would reach 14.7 million by 2050, which is about equal to the size of the population in 1990.

However, the effect of immigration on the age structure of the population tends to be rather limited. In the absence of migration, the percentage of people aged 65 years or over would increase from 12.5 in 1988 to 23.5 percent in 2050; but also with net immigration in the order of 28,000 per year this percentage would still reach 21.5. Continuous immigration at levels significantly higher than experienced in the Netherlands in the past would be required to achieve any substantial effect on the age structure of the population.

8.3 | The economic impact

The economic impact of immigration is mainly based on two factors: the characteristics of the labour market in the receiving country, and the qualifications of the immigrants. Both can change over time. The arrival of 'repatriates' from Indonesia (1948-62) took place in a period when economic reconstruction was in full swing, during which there was a shortage of labour. These immigrants had, furthermore, a relatively high level of education and a strong orientation towards Dutch society. Their economic integration was no less than spectacular. It was regarded as complete by the end of the sixties.

Neither did the early refugee movements of Hungarians (1956) and Czechs (1968), relatively small groups with high qualifications, bring about serious problems with regard to their economic integration.

Events took a less fortunate course for immigrant groups that followed in later years. Initially the arrival of migrant workers from Mediterranean countries did not give rise to economic problems. On the contrary, this migration to the Netherlands was a result of explicit economic demand. The coal mines in the southern part of the country had started to recruit foreign workers as early as the 1950s. Later, during the sixties and early seventies, the reconstruction of Dutch industry enjoyed considerable success, and a shortage of unskilled and semi-skilled labour emerged. 'Guest workers' from the Mediterranean countries were recruited to fill the vacancies in the lowest segments of the labour market. There has been a discussion among economists as to the economic merits of this solution. Some argue that the employment of foreign labour had an adverse effect on the economy, since the availability of cheap labour delayed the modernization of industry. Others lay stress on short term advantages: employment of migrant workers kept invested capital productive with an eventual positive influence on the national product per capita. It is beyond doubt that, around the time of recruitment, the foreign migrant workers, who usually lived in the Netherlands as bachelors, contributed significantly to economic production. Both arguments can be found in a report that the Central Planning Office published in 1972 (Centraal Planbureau, 1972). Even at that stage it was calculated that the economic advantage to be gained from foreign migrant workers was conditional on the absence of their families. Family reunion, which at that time was just beginning, would render the presence of migrant workers unprofitable. After the first oil crisis of 1973, the economic picture started to change. Dutch industry was gradually restructured: industrial sectors not able to compete internationally were abandoned, others were modernized. These changes led to a drastic reduction in the demand for unskilled and semi-skilled labour. Unemployment, particularly of unskilled workers, increased. Migrant workers, being relatively new on the labour market and working in the most vulnerable sectors, were the first to be fired, and with their low qualifications they had more problems than the native Dutch in finding new jobs. In a labour market characterized by an excess of supply over demand, foreign descent in itself began to have adverse effects on the migrants' chances.

Another change was the advent of family reunion. From the mid-seventies onwards, migrant workers arranged for their families to join them in the Netherlands. A more lenient policy relating to family reunion and the removal of practical obstacles in the sphere of housing led to a substantial influx of the family members of Turks and Moroccans in particular. Since quite a few of the wives and older children presented themselves on the labour market, competition for jobs increased. Many of the newcomers joined the ranks of the unem-

ployed. Unemployed foreigners with the right to reside in the Netherlands are entitled to the same social security benefits as the native Dutch. Thus the cost-benefit analysis that could be applied to the presence of migrant workers changed for the worse, especially in the case of Turks and Moroccans. The low and only slowly rising level of education among Turks and Moroccans, together with the ever-increasing qualifications required by employers, make for a gloomy picture. A substantial effort in the sphere of education will be needed before a more complete absorption of Turks and Moroccans can be achieved.

Whereas the immigration of migrant workers from the Mediterranean area was initiated by the Dutch government, the immigration of other groups was spontaneous from the start. Migrants from the Dutch colonies in the West Indies i.e. from Surinam (Dutch Guyana) and the Dutch Antilles, already held Dutch citizenship and were free to settle in the Netherlands. In the mid-seventies the movement was accelerated by the decolonization process in Surinam. The Surinamese and Antilleans who came to the Netherlands found the same situation already described for the Turkish and Moroccan families. Though their educational qualification level was not homogeneously low as in the case of the Turks and Moroccans, their position on the Dutch labour market was nevertheless difficult. A large proportion of the West Indians have become dependent on social security for their income. The same applies to immigrants who are now arriving and requesting asylum, mainly from developing countries, and who are given access to the Netherlands on humanitarian grounds. In fact those seeking asylum are not actually permitted to enter the labour market until they have been granted a more definite residence status.

These changes in the Dutch labour market alone do not in themselves explain why so many ethnic minority members are presently unemployed. The nature of migration itself has undergone a change. The immigrants showed an increasing reluctance to return to their far from prosperous home countries, even when their position on the Dutch labour market deteriorated. The initial revolving system by which new shifts of immigrants continuously took the place of those returning gave way to an immigration of settlers, who acquired stronger residence titles as the duration of their stay increased. As their families joined them, and a second generation came into being (partly through family reunion, partly through newly born children), they began to take roots. These developments took place against the background of a new minorities policy aimed at a maximum inclusion of ethnic minorities in Dutch society, with access to all its facilities.

Public discussion changed accordingly. In the sixties and early seventies cost-benefit analyses relating to the immigration of 'guest workers' were repeatedly carried out (Centraal Planbureau, 1972; Lucassen *et al.*, 1973). Over the last ten years, however, the social consequences of immigration have dominated

the discussion. One of the basic issues is whether a permanent ethnic underclass of poorly qualified, mostly unemployed immigrants is emerging, and if so, how such a development can be reversed. There is a widespread agreement that the position of immigrants on the labour market is precarious, and that a major effort is required to combat unemployment and bring about *de facto* equality in all sections of society. There is no consensus, however, as to the strategy and the means. The Advisory Council on Research relating to Minorities (1986) pleaded for binding forms of positive action to be initiated by the national government. Employers would have had to raise the proportion of ethnic employees by a selective recruitment and appointment policy. The Scientific Council for Government Policy (1989) preferred to stimulate rather than force employers to take on minority members, by proposing an Employment Equity Act. Under this Act there is no obligation for employers to take minority members into their service; it merely compels them to report periodically on the number of ethnic minority members they employ. Recently (November 1990) employers and labour unions have concluded an agreement on additional efforts to be made for the employment of 60,000 members of ethnic minorities in the coming four or five years. This agreement led the central government to denounce any form of positive action policy in the private sector. However, the programme to increase the share of ethnic minority members employed by the civil service is to be continued. Although the initial objective, set at a minority percentage of three by 1990, was not achieved, the new target has recently been set at a level of five percent, to be reached by 1995.

In recent years the renewed discussion on illegal immigrants has shown the ambivalence in Dutch society about the economic impact of immigration. On the one hand politicians and authorities have argued for a strict policy to combat illegal residence, illegal work, and the use of social security and other facilities by illegal immigrants. On the other hand it is known that certain sectors of the economy, such as seasonal work in the bulb fields and other kinds of horticulture, the clothing industry, and certain forms of piecework done at home, are largely dependent on illegal workers, because this kind of work is unattractive to others. Official attempts to prevent such illegal work by pressing charges against the employers are half-hearted to say the least. It is estimated that some 30,000 illegal residents are living in the Netherlands at the moment. Whatever the reliability of the estimate, it is clear that the phenomenon will persist, and possibly increase in significance.

In conclusion it can be said that the present economic impact of immigration, especially where it concerns ethnic minorities, is generally estimated to be negative. The Dutch labour market has not been able to absorb the ethnic labour potential. The recent report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (1989) insists that a policy must be developed to assure more positive effects in the long run. The government is advised to invest in compulsory

education and training for the unemployed. More important still, newcomers to the Netherlands should on arrival be given a course on the Dutch language and on Dutch society. Their progress into the Dutch social system, and into the labour market in particular, should be closely monitored. Critics are not very optimistic about the outcome of this programme, while at the same time many are unhappy with the amount of coercion implied by the proposed measures.

8.4 | The cultural impact

Even before the era of post-war immigration, Dutch society was by no means homogeneous. Dutch history over the last four centuries shows massive immigration movements of many different sorts (Lucassen and Penninx, 1985), and these movements have undoubtedly left their mark. Apart from ethnic variety there are of course the usual class and regional divisions, and a rather unusual form of religious diversity. Among the sources of cultural variety religion has been a dominant influence. In the course of the last century a variety of plural structure developed in which different religious 'pillars' found their place (Lijphart, 1968), by which is meant that Catholics and Protestants created their own organizations in all domains of public life. Non-religious segments of society, such as the liberals and socialists, were obliged to organize themselves in more or less the same way. The members of the pillars were controlled by their own elites; society was ruled by an amalgam of these elites, necessarily so because none of the pillars could claim a majority in Dutch society. Laws and regulations were developed by which state funds and facilities were distributed between the different pillars; state policy was implemented by pillarized organizations. The system applied to education, health, housing, welfare, broadcasting, voluntary associations and even to the economic domain, where both workers and employers were largely organized along denominational lines.

This pillarized society was still fully operational in the fifties and early sixties. Since that time the situation has changed dramatically. On the ideological level the system started to crumble because of the declining power of faith. Religious doctrines, however adaptable to more worldly needs, lost their appeal. Probably half of the Dutch no longer identify themselves with any religion at all; many of those who still define themselves as Catholics or Protestants are not prepared to accept the restrictions which used to go together with membership of a denomination in the previously pillarized society. They prefer to be free in their voting behaviour, in their choice of organizations, and in the way they relate to other people. In short, society became secularized. On the political level the merging in 1977 of several Protestant and Catholic parties into the Christian Democratic Party (CDA) can be considered a landmark in the decline of pillarization.

However, on the institutional level secularization remained incomplete. In some domains, especially education, pillarized organizations still are a dominant feature of Dutch society. They have been able to survive because their power is incorporated in legislation and resulting financial arrangements. Though widely considered as a relic from times past, they enjoy sufficient political backing and popular support to maintain themselves. In the mass-media a pillarized structure still exists because it is officially upheld, although another more commercial principle of organization is cutting through the old system. In areas like housing, health, and social services, pillarization is only nominally present. In so far as facilities are provided by pillarized organizations, they tend to serve all clients regardless of creed or membership. This was also the period in which the welfare state took shape. The social security systems which is the core of the present welfare state, implied from the beginning a relationship between state and individual not mediated by private organizations, pillarized or otherwise. The growth of the welfare state made it possible for the individual to assume a more personal lifestyle, and thereby helped in precipitating the downfall of pillarization.

The appearance of Islam almost took the Dutch by surprise. At the height of secularization the country was suddenly confronted with communities in which religion is still very much alive, and is moreover an obvious basis for social organization. Muslims, mainly from Turkey, Morocco and Surinam, represent at present about three percent of the total population, but probably form six percent of the religious population of the Netherlands (if subjective identification is taken as a criterion). Though only loosely organized and internally divided by ethnic, political and doctrinal boundaries, Islam has become a cultural factor in Dutch society.

Muslim communities are creating their own institutions: mosques, coffee houses, restaurants, shops, slaughterhouses, and travel agencies. Of late, exclusively Islamic primary schools are being founded. These amenities have added to the colour of old urban areas but they have also given rise to complaints and animosity on the part of the local Dutch population, and there is also a certain tension at the national level. Opinions held by many Muslims, particularly on the position of women and on the role of religion in public life, run counter to the feelings of most of the native Dutch, and sometimes collide with official norms and legal rules. Conflicts arise for instance over insufficient school attendance by some Turkish and Moroccan girls. Muslims in their turn complain that they are hampered in the performance of religious duties by the fact that Dutch society is still essentially a Christian society, tuned to the rhythm of Christian holidays and Christian religious habits, insensitive to Muslim needs. There is at present for instance no government subsidy for the foundation or the running of mosques: the official separation of Church and State which prevails in the Netherlands prohibits such financial support. On an

incidental basis ways are often found at the local level to subsidize religious and cultural life in Muslim communities, and at national level legal obstacles to different burial and slaughtering practices have been removed.

Tensions have also arisen over symbolic issues like the wearing of headscarves by girls in school and the Salman Rushdie affair. The Gulf War provided new opportunities for the expression of identifications and for the manifestation of popular sentiment. Until now the voices of moderation and restraint have prevailed, both on the side of Muslim spokesmen and from the native Dutch religious and other organizations. The government has been careful to maintain close contact with the representatives of the Muslim communities and to safeguard Dutch inter-ethnic harmony against intrusions from the outside world. This dialogue between government and Dutch Islam is in itself reminiscent of the previously prevalent pillarization, and so is the occasional foundation of exclusively Islamic primary schools. While mosques belong, at least in the eyes of the Dutch, to the private sphere where the citizen is at liberty to follow his own habits (as long as he does not disturb others), education is a more public matter. Within the framework of Dutch society there is no legal objection to denominational schools; on the contrary, the educational system is itself an inducement to the foundation of such schools. Denominational schools still form the majority in the Netherlands. Nonetheless, there is uneasiness about the growth of a separate Muslim branch of education. This uneasiness cannot be reduced to thoughtless ethnocentrism. The fact must be taken into account that Christian education is only nominally religious and that Christian schools differ very little from their non-religious counterparts. Muslim education, on the other hand, is often seen as insular and giving rise to segregation.

On the whole the arrival of traditional Turkish and Moroccan culture has met with some ambivalence on the part of the Dutch population. On the one hand respect for other people's convictions, embedded in the pillar system, is still part of the Dutch heritage. It is also a firmly established principle in minorities policy. On the other hand, in so far as these convictions run counter to widely shared western values, and in so far as they tend towards a new structural cleavage in Dutch society, there is less appreciation.

The cultural impact of immigration is not restricted to the appearance of Islam on the Dutch scene. Several ethnic groups contribute to the present rather fragmented cultural panorama. Many immigrants originate from non-Islamic countries. A large minority of the Surinamese, for instance, belong to the Hindu faith (estimated number at present 70,000), and to a certain extent they have also created their own facilities. Consequently the cultural variety resulting from immigration can certainly not be reduced to diversity of a religious nature, and several cultural characteristics of immigrants, even if they come from Islamic countries, have only a loose connection with creed in the strict sense. Nevertheless the role of Islam has been highlighted because it is the only major

cultural power capable of mobilizing considerable numbers of people. Certainly among the Turks and the Moroccans the most important organizations are religious ones.

It should further be kept in mind that the picture outlined here is a simplification yet in another respect. The presence of Muslim communities in the Netherlands is still a fairly recent one, and the experience so far is mainly with the first generation of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants. These groups consist on the whole of traditional people, characterized by clearly observable, objective cultural traits. Traditionalism fades in the next generation. Through participation in Dutch education, Dutch is substituted for the original language, and views on religion, the family, and the role of women are apt to change. This does not mean that western standards are comprehensively adopted. Elements are borrowed from both cultures. Adaptation to Dutch norms and values is only partial: peer groups tend to be restricted mainly to members of the same ethnic group, and the idea of intermarriage is generally rejected. Intra-ethnic loyalties are fed by negative experiences in encounters with the host society.

Surinamese and Antilleans are ethnically and socially heterogeneous, and this is especially so for the Surinamese. From a cultural point of view the Christian Creoles differ widely from the numerically equally strong Hindustanis, of whom about 80 percent are adherents of the Hindu faith, the remainder being Muslim. Hindustani culture is in some respects reminiscent of Turkish or Moroccan culture, but on the whole the Surinamese and the Antilleans are culturally closer to the Dutch, even in the first generation of settlers. Both have a common history of Dutch colonization, their knowledge of Dutch language and society is more developed, and their general orientation is less particularistic. Naturally they too have added to a greater cultural variety in the form of shops, trades, restaurants, and such like, and they play a prominent role in certain trends of mass culture in music and dance.

So far cultural variety has been treated in an objective sense. In Chapter 6 we argued that the ethno-cultural position of a group is also dependent on subjective processes of self-definition by members of the group concerned, and on attributions made by members of the majority population. The feeling of belonging to a group does not always at any given moment presuppose the presence of important cultural characteristics distinguishing a group from the rest of society. Generations growing up in the country in which their parents settled as immigrants may gradually lose such distinguishing characteristics, but nevertheless through common experience retain some form of ethnicity. Quite often such ethnic groups, based primarily on feelings of solidarity, will develop their own cultural symbols, for which they may selectively draw on the culture of their parents, but also on any other cultural reservoir available, especially in a modern society open to world-wide mass communication. Thus culture need

not always precede group formation; the reverse may also occur. Rejection experienced by children of migrants in the host society may function as a fertile soil for such a process of ethnicity formation.

In the objective sense we can maintain that present Dutch society is to a certain degree multi-cultural, but we expect that in the future clearly delimited cultural enclaves, as now formed by certain immigrant groups, will probably re-appear as much more diffuse categories after new generations have emerged. As acculturation proceeds, ethnicity formation will probably create new cultural identities, although it is not clear to what extent and to what depth this process will occur.

For the time being Dutch policy is certainly not aimed at alienating minorities from their original cultures. The teaching of the language and culture of several of the countries of origin has been added to the curricula of Dutch primary schools, and it is paid for by the government. The existence of different cultures in Dutch society, and the basic equality of all these cultures, are officially acknowledged by the introduction of so-called 'intercultural education' programs in schools. Ethnic cohesion is also promoted by the ethnic broadcasting channels which are used for the provision of cultural facilities to immigrants. Incidentally these facilities do not have to be wrested by the ethnic minorities from reluctant Dutch authorities. In the Netherlands there is a sincere belief that the preservation of minority cultures is valuable, both in itself, and in that it serves the eventual emancipation of ethnic minorities in Dutch society. The idea of a multicultural society is firmly established in Dutch policy rhetoric. The term is not only used as reflecting an existing reality, but also as an objective of policy.

8.5 | The political impact

Political consequences of immigration can be observed at various levels. To begin with, immigrants participate actively in Dutch political life. In addition a passive role is played by minorities in that their presence in increasing numbers functions as an issue in Dutch politics. Finally a role is reserved for minority groups in the execution of specific minorities policy.

As a consequence of the new minorities policy in the early eighties, with its strong emphasis on social equality, the extension of political rights to aliens was felt to be necessary. Foreigners with the right of residence, after having spent a required period in the Netherlands, were given active and passive voting rights in elections for the urban district councils into which the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam are subdivided. This happened in the early eighties. In 1986, they were for the first time allowed to participate in elections for the municipal councils. A further extension of voting rights, to the provincial and

national level, was considered, but a majority supporting the idea could not be found in Parliament.

Having been granted voting rights for local councils, the foreigners among the minorities, like Turks and Moroccans, could establish their own political parties. Several ethnic parties consequently took part in local elections. So far, none of them has succeeded in selecting members to any council, but this does not mean that the immigrant electorate did not exercise any influence at all. Established political parties tried in varying degrees to win the new immigrant votes, by running special campaigns among immigrants, and by enlisting 'ethnic candidates' to attract the new voters. The relative success of the Labour Party in the first elections of 1986 inspired other parties to enlist 'ethnic' candidates as well. The direct effects of these efforts have been modest: in the 1990 elections some 50 ethnic council members (out of a total of slightly more than 11,000) were elected. The participation of ethnic voters was lower than average. Nevertheless, one may assume that ethnic issues have received more attention in the programmes and campaigns of political parties than otherwise would have been the case. The existence of ethnic voters and the incorporation of ethnic delegates into established political parties has probably broadened the basis for integration.

The new minorities policy also provided for active participation by minority groups in government policy regarding the ethnic minorities themselves. A National Advisory Board with representatives of all target groups of the minorities policy was installed. Plans and proposed policy measures must be submitted to this Board for advice. Although the Board has only advisory powers and no right of veto, it may be assumed that its mere existence will affect the course of events, as the policy makers anticipate its reactions.

As we saw in Chapter 6, the presence of immigrants has evoked quite another effect: the political mobilization of xenophobia by a number of small political parties, who have made this their main political topic. These parties try to gain political weight by exploiting feelings of fear and unease among the native population. Their efforts have so far met with only limited success. In some cases, mainly in the larger cities, they have managed to elect delegates to local councils. In Parliament they hold one out of the 150 seats. It is sometimes assumed that their real influence is hidden in the fact that established parties incorporate xenophobic elements in their own programmes in order to steal a march on the anti-immigrant parties, but this phenomenon does not seem to occur in the Netherlands. On the contrary, the modest success of these parties has given rise to the emergence of a common front of all the other parties against anti-immigrant parties, and to an even more articulate anti-racist stand.

The present attitude of the government and of most politicians towards immigration is restrictive, as it has been since the early seventies. The admission

of foreigners on humanitarian grounds is not really the subject of dispute, but the principle involved is subject to changing interpretations. The rules applying to foreigners who seek admittance under the principle of family reunion are quite clear. Compared to other countries, the Netherlands applies a rather lenient policy in this respect, though minor restrictions have been practised for some time in the past, in particular where secondary family reunion was concerned. However, the sudden increases in the number of those seeking asylum, which occur from time to time, cause concern and promptly lead to restrictive measures in policy implementation. The numbers have grown significantly during the last few years, and measures have been taken to discourage further applications. The disappearance of the wall in Berlin and the political developments in Eastern Europe have done little in the way of reassuring the politicians. Further pressure on the Dutch borders is anticipated.

At this moment one is going through the process of completing the Single Market of the European Community. Speculation as to the consequences of the abolition of the frontiers within the Common Market is still active. It is feared that the situation could lead to an uncontrolled influx of illegal immigrants, and this is one of the reasons that five West European member states have concluded what has come to be known as the Schengen agreement. The eventual result of all factors at work is uncertain, but at least this much is clear, simply on the basis of past experience: the Netherlands will remain an immigration country for quite some time to come.

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APPENDIX 1:

DATA SOURCES

Both in a sociological as well as in a statistical sense, categorizing is often ambiguous: standard categories as 'EC', 'European', 'labour-recruitment', 'refugee', '(ex-)colonial', 'Chinese', minority, etc., are often not clearly defined and overlap to a considerable extent even when one is just aiming for global descriptions. For statistical purposes, criteria that are in use internationally --either separate or in different combinations-- for the identification of 'immigrant groups and their descendants' are nationality/citizenship, country of birth, country of birth of parents, duration of residence, type of residence permit, language, race/ethnicity, religion, cultural background, name, etc. (ACOM, 1980; Schoorl, 1982). In the Netherlands, mostly 'objective', administrative criteria such as nationality or country of birth have been used to identify groups for research and policy purposes; nationality is the criterion most often available in data sources in the Netherlands, followed at a distance by country of birth. The latter criterion implies that the 'second generation', i.e., those born in the Netherlands from parents who were born abroad, cannot be identified. This could be considered a disadvantage as long as such groups occupy marginal and disadvantaged positions in society. Furthermore, neither criterion serves well to identify heterogeneous groups such as, for example, refugees and Chinese.

Criteria related to ethnic identity or ethnic group, religious affiliation are generally disapproved, both for technical and for ethical reasons (ACOM, 1980). Recently, however, due to the fact that the current administrative criteria are increasingly insufficient to identify ethnic groups that are considered policy relevant, the option to register ethnic identity has been forwarded by the Scientific Council for Government Policy in the latest report about minority policy (1989), though this report is vague about the practical implementation of such a registration (ACOM, 1989).

In the Netherlands, demographic and socio-economic data on immigrants and their descendants come from the following main sources:

1. the municipal population registers and the local and national statistics based on them;
2. other registration systems;
3. national population censuses, which have been held every ten years until 1971;
4. national surveys among the general population;
5. special surveys among immigrant or minority populations.

A detailed description of the system of municipal population registration is given by Van den Brekel (1977) and by Verhoef and Van de Kaa (1987). The system serves primarily administrative purposes for local and national government but it is used also as a basis for the preparation of statistics. The system was introduced in 1850 and includes all persons residing in the Netherlands, with the exception of those who intend to stay for a period shorter than 30 days (Dutch citizens) or 180 days (foreign citizens) respectively; diplomatic personnel and members of foreign armed forces stationed in the Netherlands as well as their families are also exempt from registration. A person, irrespective of nationality, remains in the register if (s)he leaves the country for a period of 360 days or less. Equally, Dutch citizens abroad who are in diplomatic service and national armed forces stationed abroad as well as their families are not removed from the registers.

At birth or at first immigration a personal card is made out for each person which follows him/her as a paper shadow until death or permanent emigration. Residents are required to report any changes (births, deaths, changes of address, marriages, divorces) and these are periodically reported by the municipalities to the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (NCBS). Only immigrants who intend to stay for a period of at least 30 days (nationals) or 180 days (foreigners) are processed in the immigration statistics; while people leaving the country are only statistically processed as emigrants when they intend to stay away for a period of 360 days or more. Emigration suffers from some underreporting, but eventually (after a time lag of probably at most a few years) departures turn up in the 'administrative corrections'¹. Furthermore, a current study by the Department of Justice indicates that some internal migrants are incorrectly registered as immigrants.

Another source of inaccuracy is in the underreporting of marriages by foreigners residing in the Netherlands if these marriages are concluded abroad or at consular offices.

Nationality, country of birth and parents' country of birth are registered; but while at the local level demographic data are --at least in theory-- available by

¹ This underreporting of departure is most serious among the fluent group of asylum seekers.

all three criteria², at the national level such data were until very recently only collected by nationality. Per January 1, 1990 a register count has been held in which also data by country of birth and country of birth of parents have been collected.

There are numerous partial registers in which information about immigrants or minorities is collected. A number of these, with special attention to demographic information, has been inventorized recently by Van der Erf *et al.* (1990). Examples of such systems are the regional registration systems of those looking for work; registration of the Municipal Welfare Bureaus; registrations of asylum seekers and refugees; registration of work permits, etc. If such registration systems cover both native and immigrant groups, nationality or country of birth are the prevalent criteria.

The last census in the Netherlands has been held in 1971 and, though census-taking has since only been 'postponed', the likelihood of a census being held in the foreseeable future is nil, due to opposition of the population to answer the census questions.

So, together with the population register data, demographic as well as socio-economic information about the population of the Netherlands comes from sample surveys. Inventories of such surveys are available in several publications (Schoorl, 1982; Van Praag, 1984; Penninx, 1988; Ankersmit *et al.*, 1987- ; Van der Erf *et al.*, 1990). There are several large national surveys, including the Labour Force Survey, which is held every two years until 1987 and the Continuous Labour Force Survey which replaces the biannual one; the Housing Need Survey (every four years); the Fertility Survey (every two years). The samples of the first two survey are large enough to include a sufficient number of foreigners or immigrants and questions are included on nationality and/or country of birth. The sample of the Fertility Survey is too small for reliable information on minority populations. Furthermore, these surveys suffer from the fact that usually no special efforts are being made to question foreigners (interviews in the Dutch language only, etc.) with the result of serious under-response³.

In addition to the large national surveys among the total population, there have been several surveys among selected minority populations: a survey among the Surinamese dating from 1978; 'Quality of Life' surveys (NCBS) among the

² However, there are more than 700 municipalities and not all of them have computerized registers.

³ However, in some recent surveys efforts have been made to improve the response rate among those who do not speak Dutch.

Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans (1984) and a comparable survey 'Social Position and Use of Public Services' among the same groups (1988); a smaller scale fertility survey among Turkish and Moroccan women (1984); as well as a number of other small-scale surveys which in addition to socio-economic information include some demographic data. Their advantage is that special attention has been paid to approach and to interviewing in the mother tongue of the respondents; disadvantages lay in the relatively small sample sizes and/or in the fact that the results are often not directly comparable to the total population of the Netherlands (see e.g. Penninx, 1988; Van Praag and Schoorl, 1989).

APPENDIX 2:

LIST OF TERMS

(International) migrants

A group of persons moving from one country to another during a specific period.

Immigrants, emigrants

A group of persons moving into, respectively out of a country during a specific period.

Re-emigration

Emigration of former immigrants, irrespective of the country of destination.

Return migration

Emigration of former immigrants to their country of origin.

(Im)migrant population

The population of persons born abroad who are residing in the country concerned at a specific date (irrespective of their nationality).

First generation

Persons born abroad; the immigrant population.

Second generation

Persons born in the country concerned, from parents who were born abroad.

First and second generation

Persons born abroad and their children.

Immigrants and their descendants

Persons born abroad and their children.

Population of foreign origin/descent

Persons born abroad and their children.

Foreign population

The population of persons who have a foreign nationality and who are residing in the country concerned at a specific date (irrespective of their country of birth).

Foreign nationals/citizens, foreigners/aliens

See 'foreign population'.

Ethnic minorities (policy definition)

Workers from Mediterranean countries and their families, Surinamese, Antilleans, Moluccans, refugees, gypsies, and caravan dwellers.

Ethnic minorities (strict sociological definition)

Groups of non-Dutch ethnic origin whose social position is consistently low, whose ethno-cultural position is markedly different from that of the dominant Dutch ethnic group, whose numerical position prohibits the exertion of power and influence, and for which these conditions continue to exist over generation (see paragraph 4.3.2).

Ethnic groups

Groups distinguished by their different ethnic origins. The majority population may also be considered as an ethnic group according to this definition.

Native population

Persons born in the country, or: those whose families have been residing in the country for 'several' generations. In the latter sense, the non-native population would include the group of 'immigrants and their (immediate) descendants'.

Refugees

Persons who have received the official status of refugee according to the Geneva Convention.

Asylum seekers

Persons who have applied for asylum but have not (yet) received the official status of refugee.

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1. *Population and family in the Low Countries I* (1976). 179 pp.
2. R.L. Cliquet and R. Schoenmaeckers (1976), *From incidental to planned parenthood. Results of the second national fertility survey in Belgium*. 145 pp.
3. R. Chester (1977), *Divorce in Europe*. 316 pp.
4. M. Leroy (1978), *Population and world politics*. 144 pp.
5. G. Santow (1978), *A simulation approach to the study of human fertility*. 215 pp.
6. *Population and family in the Low Countries II* (1978). 153 pp.
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8. G. Dooghe and J. Helander (1979), *Family life in old age*. 203 pp.
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23. E. van Imhoff and N.W. Keilman (1991), *Lipro 2.0: an application of a dynamic demographic projection model to household structure in the Netherlands*. Amsterdam/Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger, 245 pp. (including diskette).
24. N.W. Keilman and H. Crujisen (1992), *Population forecasts in industrialized countries*. Amsterdam/Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger, 364 pp.
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27. N. van Nimwegen, J.C. Chesnais and P.A. Dykstra (1993), *Coping with sustained low fertility in France and the Netherlands*. Amsterdam/Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger, 321 pp.
28. R. Penninx, J. Schoorl and C. van Praag (1993), *The impact of international migration on receiving countries: the case of the Netherlands*. Amsterdam/Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger, 251 pp.

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This book has been prepared within the framework of a series of national monographs on the impact of international migration on receiving countries, initiated by the Committee for International Cooperation in National Research in Demography (CICRED) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). It combines analyses of both the demographic and the socio-economic, cultural, and political impacts of migration on Dutch society. In part I, the growth of the population of foreign descent and the changes in its demographic composition are described, as well as trends in and backgrounds of international migration, fertility, mortality, nuptiality, and naturalization. Part II focuses on ethnic minorities. The development of the social position of ethnic minorities is depicted, using an analytical model that includes as main indicators labour, income, social security, education, and housing. Furthermore, centred around the notion of 'ethno-cultural' position, questions such as how these immigrant groups are seen and defined by the receiving society, how they define their own position in that society, and how relations between these groups and the receiving society have developed, are discussed. The main conclusions are summarized in Part III, and a cautious attempt is made to forecast future developments and their consequences.

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