Back to home pageRepublic of China (Taipei) ACADEMIA ECONOMIC PAPERS MARCH 1992 - VOLUME 20, NUMBER 1 93.15.01 - Chinese - Ts'ui-jung LIU and Shi- yung LIU, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei (Taiwan) Water Supply and Water Drainage: A Study on the History of Environment in Taiwan (p. 459-504) This paper attempts to investigate the problems of water supply and drainage in settlements in Taiwan from the perspective of environmental history. It tries to trace first the conditions of water supply and drainage prior to the 20th century and then, focuses on the development of these two public utility enterprises and their effects. The first modern water supply system was established in 1896; the rate of population served was 15% in 1940 and 84% in 1990. With regard to drainage, after the Restoration (1945), the system was one of the public works in the city planning areas. Due to the fact that the expenditure allotted was relatively small, the constructions often lagged behind the plan and the rate of population served was far below that of the advanced countries. As both the water supply and water drainage systems have been closely related to water pollution issues arising in recent years, this paper suggests that adjustments in institutional and managerial arrangements should be thought over carefully in order to utilize the limited resources and available capital more rationally and efficiently. (TAIWAN, WATER, ENVIRONMENT) SEPTEMBER 1992 - VOLUME 20, NUMBER 2 93.15.02 - Chinese - Huoying WU, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei (Taiwan) Job Separations and the Shared Investment of Specific Human Capital (p. 743-756) A life-cycle labour turnover behaviour is formalized by a multi- period model. In particular, a three-period model is taken as an example to illustrate the relationship between job separations and the shared investment of specific human capital. This paper shows that a firm is less likely to lay off a worker who possesses more specific human capital which has accumulated through seniority. As the worker's firm-specific human capital declines due to depreciation, however, the firm is more likely to lay him/her off later, even though the worker's seniority is greater than that of other workers. The layoff probability profile over the life cycle first declines with seniority then rises again after the firm- specific human capital depreciates. The results of this paper also suggest that the profile of the probability of a quit is very similar to the profile of the probability of a layoff. It also declines early in the worker's life and rises later. The reasons are similar. When the worker's firm-specific human capital starts to accumulate, he/she is less likely to consider quitting. However, after the worker's specific human capital stock reaches its maximum, he/she is more likely to quit. Finally, the author examines the probability of recalling a laid-off worker and the probability of the worker accepting the recall offer. (TAIWAN, LABOUR FORCE, EMPLOYMENT POLICY) MARCH 1993 - VOLUME 21, NUMBER 1 93.15.03 - Chinese - Deng-Shing HUANG, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei (Taiwan) On the Optimal Subsidy of National Health Insurance (p. 63-85) In general, expenditure on national health insurance is shared by employers, employees and the government. A substantial number of studies concerning the share of employers and employees has been published. However, studies on government subsidies are relatively few and the author attempts to fill this gap. Using national income data from the Taiwan area in 1988, the author calculates the Gini coefficient and Atkinson index under different ratios of government subsidies. Without considering the moral hazard, the opportunity cost of government expenditure and assuming zero price elasticity of labour supply, we find: (i) zero or full subsidies are not optimal; (ii) the government share is about 83% with respect to a minimum Gini coefficient; (iii) the optimal share lies between 62% and 31%, if the aim is to minimize the Atkinson index with ð between 1 and 3. It should be noted that assumptions in this paper would theoretically raise the optimal ratio of the government share. Thus, the ratio found in this paper can only be treated as an upper bound in practice. (TAIWAN, INSURANCE, HEALTH)
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